Episoder
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âSOCRATES: Now, Nicias, could you explain it to us again from the beginning? You know we started our discussion by considering bravery as a part of goodness?
NICIAS: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: So you did agree with our answer that itâs a part, and hence that there are other parts, which are known collectively as goodness, didnât you?
NICIAS: Yes, of course.
SOCRATES: Now, you mean the same by these parts as I do, donât you? For me, besides bravery, the list includes self-control, fairness and other similar qualities. Isnât it the same for you?
NICIAS: Certainly. âŠ
SOCRATES: [But] bravery canât only be knowledge of what is fearful and what is encouraging, because like other kinds of knowledge it understands not only the future stages of good and evil, but also the present and the past.
NICIAS: Apparently so.
SOCRATES: So the answer you gave us, Nicias, covers only about a third part of bravery, whereas we asked what bravery is as a whole. And so now, it seems, on your own admission, bravery is knowledge not only of what is fearful and what is encouraging, but according to the way you describe it now, of pretty well the whole subject of good and evil, regardless of time. Does that reflect your change of mind, or would you put it differently, Nicias?
NICIAS: No, Thatâs how it seems to me, Socrates. âŠ
SOCRATES: So, What youâre now describing, Nicias, wonât be a part of goodness, but goodness in its entirety.
NICIAS: So it seems.
SOCRATES: But we did say that bravery is only one of the parts of goodness.
NICIAS: Yes, we did.
SOCRATES: But what youâre now describing appears not to be so.
NICIAS: No, it seems not.
SOCRATES: So weâve not discovered what bravery is, Nicias.
NICIAS: No, apparently not.â
(Laches, 198a-199e)
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âAny means by which it is possible to procure freedom from fearing other people is a natural good.
Some people have desired to gain reputation and to be well regarded, thinking in this way to gain protection from others. If the lives of such people are secure, they have acquired a natural blessing; but if they are not, they do not possess what they originally reached for by natural instinct.
No pleasure is bad in itself. But the things that make for pleasure in certain cases entail disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.â
(Leading Doctrines, 6, 7, and 8)
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Mangler du episoder?
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âThe opinion of Socrates respecting this matter is clearly stated in the book which treats of his death, of which we have already said so much; for when he had discussed the immortality of the soul, and when the time of his dying was approaching rapidly, being asked by Crito how he would be buried, âI have taken a great deal of pains,â said he, âmy friends, to no purpose, for I have not convinced our Crito that I shall fly from hence, and leave no part of me behind. Notwithstanding, Crito, if you can overtake me, wheresoever you get hold of me, bury me as you please: but believe me, none of you will be able to catch me when I have flown away from hence.â
That was excellently said, inasmuch as he allows his friend to do as he pleased, and yet shows his indifference about anything of this kind.
Diogenes was rougher, though of the same opinion; but in his character of a Cynic he expressed himself in a somewhat harsher manner; he ordered himself to be thrown anywhere without being buried. And when his friends replied, âWhat! to the birds and beasts?â âBy no means,â said he; âplace my staff near me, that I may drive them away.â âHow can you do that,â they answer, âfor you will not perceive them?â âHow am I then injured by being torn by those animals, if I have no sensation?â âŠ
With regard to the body, it is clear that, whether the soul live or die, it has no sensation.â
(Tusculan Disputations, I.43)
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SOCRATES: Now, Nicias, tell me â or rather, tell us, since Laches and I are sharing the discussion between us â your argument is that bravery is knowledge of what is fearful and what is encouraging, isnât it?
NICIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And this isnât something everyone is aware of ⊠unless they supplement their own knowledge with this particular kind. Isnât that what you said?
NICIAS: Yes, it was.
SOCRATES: So, itâs actually not something any pig would know, as the saying goes, and a pig couldnât be brave.
NICIAS: No, I think not. âŠ
SOCRATES: I think that if one puts forward this theory, one is forced to deny that any animal whatsoever is brave. âŠ
NICIAS: âBraveâ is not a word I use to describe animals, or anything else thatâs not afraid of danger because of its own lack of understanding; I prefer âfearlessâ and âfoolish.â Or do you suppose I call every little child brave because it doesnât understand, and so is not afraid of anything? No, I think to be unafraid and to be brave are two quite different things. Bravery and foresight are, in my opinion, things a very small number of people possess; whereas being reckless, daring, fearless and blind to consequences is the norm for the vast majority of men, women, children and animals. So you see, what you and most people call brave, I call reckless: brave actions are those coupled with wisdom, as I said.
(Laches, 196d-197e)
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âAway, then, with those follies, such as that it is miserable to die before our time. What time do you mean? That of nature? But she has only lent you life, as she might lend you money, without fixing any certain time for its repayment. Have you any grounds of complaint, then, that she recalls it at her pleasure? For you received it on these terms. âŠ
Because there is nothing beyond old age, we call that long: all these things are said to be long or short, according to the proportion of time they were given us for.
Aristotle said there is a kind of insect near the river Hypanis, which runs from a certain part of Europe into the Pontus, whose life consists but of one day; those that die at the eighth hour die in full age; those who die when the sun sets are very old, especially when the days are at the longest.
Compare our longest life with eternity, and we shall be found almost as short-lived as those little animals.â
(Tusculan Disputations, I.39)
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âThose fortunes that turn out in the contrary way restrict and even ruin oneâs blessedness, for they both inflict pains and impede many activities.
Nevertheless, even in the midst of these, nobility shines through, whenever someone bears up calmly under many great misfortunes, not because of any insensitivity to pain but because he is wellborn and great souled. âŠ
For we suppose that someone who is truly good and sensible bears up under all fortunes in a becoming way and always does what is noblest given the circumstances, just as a good general makes use, with the greatest military skill, of the army he has. âŠ
And if this is so, the happy person would never become wretched. ⊠He would not be unstable and subject to reversals either, for he will not be easily moved from happiness, and then not by any random misfortunes but only by great and numerous ones.â
(Nicomachean Ethics, I.10)
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âIt is to be expected, then, that we do not say that either a cow or a horse or any other animal is at all happy, for none of them are able to share in such an activity.
It is because of this too that a child is not happy either: he is not yet apt to do such things, on account of his age. âŠ
As we said, both complete virtue and a complete life are required: many reversals and all manner of fortune arise in the course of life, and it is possible for someone who is particularly thriving to encounter great disasters in old age, just as the myth is told about Priam in the Trojan tales.
Nobody deems happy someone who deals with fortunes of that sort and comes to a wretched end.â
(Nicomachean Ethics, I.9)
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âThe good Epicurean believes that certain events occur deterministically, that others are chance events, and that still others are in our own hands.
He sees also that necessity cannot be held morally responsible and that chance is an unpredictable thing, but that what is in our own hands, since it has no master, is naturally associated with blameworthiness and the opposite.
Actually it would be better to subscribe to the popular mythology than to become a slave by accepting the determinism of the natural philosophers, because popular religion underwrites the hope of supplicating the gods by offerings, but determinism contains an element of necessity, which is inexorable.â
(Letter to Menoeceus, II)
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â[Socrates] First of all, then, letâs try to say what bravery is, Laches; and after that weâll investigate any ways of adding it to young men, in so far as it may be possible to do so by means of various activities and disciplines. So, as I say, try to put into words what bravery is.
[Laches] My word, Socrates, thatâs not difficult! If a man is prepared to stand in the ranks, face up to the enemy and not run away, you can be sure that heâs brave. âŠ
[Socrates] But what about another man, a man who still fights the enemy, but runs away and doesnât make a stand?
[Laches] How do you mean, âruns awayâ?
[Socrates] Well, I suppose just like the Scythians are said to fight every bit as much in retreat as in pursuit. âŠ
[Laches] Your point about the Scythians applies to cavalry â thatâs the way cavalry go into action, but infantry operate as I described.
[Socrates] With the possible exception, Laches, of the Spartan infantry. At the battle of Plataea, so the story goes, the Spartans came up against the troops with wicker shields, but werenât willing to stand and fight, and fell back. The Persians broke ranks in pursuit; but then the Spartans wheeled round fighting like cavalry and so won that part of the battle.
[Laches] Thatâs true.
[Socrates] Well, this is what I meant just now when I said it was my fault you didnât give a proper answer, because I didnât phrase the question properly; you see, I wanted to find out not just what it is to be brave as an infantryman, but also as a cavalryman, and as any kind of member of the forces; and not just what it is to be brave during a war, but to be brave in the face of danger at sea; and I wanted to find out what it is to be brave in the face of an illness, in the face of poverty, and in public life; and whatâs more not just what it is to be brave in resisting pain or fear, but also in putting up stern opposition to temptation and indulgence â because Iâm assuming, Laches, that there are people who are brave in all these situations.
[Laches] Very much so, Socrates.
[Socrates] ⊠So try again, and tell me with respect to bravery first of all what the constant factor in all these situations is â or do you still not understand what I mean?â
(Laches, 190d-191d)
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âHappiness manifestly requires external goods in addition, just as we said. For it is impossible or not easy for someone without equipment to do what is noble: many things are done through instruments, as it wereâthrough friends, wealth, and political power.
Those who are bereft of some of these (for example, good birth, good children, or beauty) disfigure their blessedness, for a person who is altogether ugly in appearance, or of poor birth, or solitary and childless cannot really be characterized as happy; and he is perhaps still less happy, if he should have altogether bad children or friends or, though he did have good ones, they are dead.
Just as we said, then, happiness seems to require some such external prosperity in addition.â
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1.8)
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âLACHES: I take courage to be a certain endurance present in oneâs character, if I have to mention the element essentially present in all cases.
SOCRATES: Now, this is how it appears to me: by no means every kind of endurance, I think, can appear to you to be bravery. So endurance accompanied by wisdom would be both fine and good, wouldnât it?
LACHES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But what of it when accompanied by foolishness? Surely itâs quite the opposite, damaging and detrimental?
LACHES: Yes.
SOCRATES: So, according to your account, wise endurance will be bravery.
LACHES: So it seems.
SOCRATES: Letâs see now: wise, but wise in what respect? Perhaps in every respect, great or small? Suppose, for instance, someone showed endurance in spending his money wisely, because he realized that if he spent it, heâd make a profit: would you call him brave?
LACHES: Good heavens, I certainly wouldnât!
SOCRATES: Well then, suppose during a war a man showed endurance by being prepared to fight: he has calculated his chances wisely and realized that others will support him, and that heâll be fighting an enemy outnumbered and outclassed by his own side, and that he has the stronger position â now, which would you say is the braver, the man showing endurance with the benefit of this kind of wisdom and these resources, or a man from the opposing camp willing to show endurance in standing against him?
LACHES: Iâd say the man in the opposing camp, Socrates.
SOCRATES: But surely his endurance is more foolish than that of the other?
LACHES: Yes, youâre right.
SOCRATES: Now, weâve previously shown that without knowledge endurance and daring are disgraceful and damaging, havenât we?
LACHES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But now weâre claiming, on the contrary, that this disgraceful thing, endurance without knowledge, is bravery.
LACHES: Apparently so.
SOCRATES: Then do you think weâve given a good account?
LACHES: Good heavens, Socrates, I certainly donât. Iâm not prepared to give up too soon, Socrates. Iâm really annoyed because I canât find the words to say what Iâm thinking â Iâm sure I can see what Bravery is, but somehow or other she has escaped me for the moment, so I canât find the words to catch her and actually say what she is!
SOCRATES: Then do you mind if we invite Nicias here to join the hunt? He may be more resourceful than we are.
LACHES: Of course I donât mind.
SOCRATES: Come on then, Nicias, your friends are floundering in a sea of words! Weâve got ourselves hopelessly confused, so youâd better give us some help, if thereâs anything you can do. The hopelessness of our predicament is obvious; but if you tell us what you think bravery is, youâll get us out of this hopeless state, and youâll also confirm your own thoughts by putting them into words.â
(Laches, 192c-194c)
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âWhen I say that pleasure is the goal of living I do not mean the pleasures of libertines or the pleasures inherent in positive enjoyment, as is supposed by certain persons who are ignorant of our doctrine or who are not in agreement with it or who interpret it perversely.
I mean, on the contrary, the pleasure that consists in freedom from bodily pain and mental agitation. The pleasant life is not the product of one drinking party after another or of sexual intercourse with women and boys or of the seafood and other delicacies afforded by a luxurious table.
On the contrary, it is the result of sober thinking â namely, investigation of the reasons for every act of choice and aversion and elimination of those false ideas about the gods and death which are the chief source of mental disturbances.â
(Letter to Menoeceus, II)
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âBut should we grant them even this, that people are by death deprived of good things; would it follow that the dead are therefore in need of the good things of life, and are miserable on that account? âŠ
Can those who do not exist be in need of anything? To be in need of has a melancholy sound, because it in effect amounts to this â they had, but they have not; they regret, they look back upon, they want.
Such are, I suppose, the distresses of one who is in need of. Are they deprived of eyes? to be blind is misery. Are they destitute of children? not to have them is misery.
These considerations apply to the living, but the dead are neither in need of the blessings of life, nor of life itself. But when I am speaking of the dead, I am speaking of those who have no existence. âŠ
âTo want,â then, is an expression which you cannot apply to the dead. âŠ
When such an expression is used respecting the dead, it is absolutely unintelligible. For to want implies to be sensible; but the dead are insensible: therefore, the dead can be in no want.â
(Tusculan Disputations, I.36)
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âHelvidius Priscus saw this, too, and acted on the insight.
When Vespasian told him not to attend a meeting of the Senate, he replied, âYou have the power to disqualify me as a senator, but as long as I am one, Iâm obliged to attend meetings.â
âAll right, then, attend the meeting,â says Vespasian, âbut donât say anything.â âDonât ask me for my opinion and Iâll keep quiet.â
âBut Iâm bound to ask you.â âAnd Iâm bound to say what seems right.â
âBut if you speak, Iâll have you killed.â âDid I ever tell you that I was immortal? You do your job and Iâll do mine. Yours is to put me to death and mine to die fearlessly. Yours is to send me into exile and mine to leave without grieving.ââ
(Discourses, 1.2.19)
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âThe case of our friend Pompey was something better: once, when he had been very ill at Naples, the Neapolitans, on his recovery, put crowns on their heads, as did those of Puteoli; the people flocked from the country to congratulate himâit is a Grecian custom, and a foolish one; still, it is a sign of good fortune.
But the question is, had he died, would he have been taken from good, or from evil?
Certainly from evil. He would not have been engaged in a war with his father-in-law; he would not have taken up arms before he was prepared; he would not have left his own house, nor fled from Italy; he would not, after the loss of his army, have fallen unarmed into the hands of slaves, and been put to death by them; his children would not have been destroyed; nor would his whole fortune have come into the possession of the conquerors.
Did not he, then, who, if he had died at that time, would have died in all his glory, owe all the great and terrible misfortunes into which he subsequently fell to the prolongation of his life?â
(Tusculan Disputations, 1.35)
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âLysimachus and Melesias have invited us to discuss their sons, because theyâre anxious for the boysâ characters to develop in the best way possible. So, what we must do, if we claim we can, is to point out to them teachers who are known firstly to have been upstanding men in their own right and to have cared for many young menâs characters, and secondly to have taught us also. âŠ
Iâll be the first to explain my position, then, Lysimachus and Melesias, and I may say Iâve not had any instruction on the subject, although itâs true that it has been a passionate interest of mine ever since I was a boy. But Iâve never been able to pay fees to the sophists â the only ones who professed to be able to make a good and honest man of me â and I canât discover the art for myself even now. âŠ
I have in consequence a request to make of you in return, Lysimachus. âŠ
I urge you not to let Laches or Nicias slip away, but to ask them some questions. Say to them, âSocrates says he doesnât understand this subject in the slightest and isnât competent to decide which of you is right: he hasnât been taught, or discovered for himself, anything about that kind of thing at all. And now you, Laches and Nicias, are each to tell us if youâve met anyone who was highly skilled in bringing up the young, and whether you learnt what you know from someone else or discovered it for yourselves. If you learnt it, could you tell us who taught each of you, and who is in the same profession?â
(Laches, 186a-186e)
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â[Lysimachus] âI am asking you, Socrates, because it seems as if our council needs someone to act as umpire.â
[Socrates] âWhat, Lysimachus? Do you intend to follow whatever course the majority of us recommends?â
[Lysimachus] âYes, what alternative is there, Socrates?â
[Socrates] âImagine there was some discussion about the kind of athletic training your son should practice: would you be influenced by the majority of us, or by the man who happened to have trained and exercised under a good coach. ⊠I think that if a decision is to be made properly, then it must be made on the basis of knowledge and not numbers.â
âSo, what we should do now, first of all, is consider whether we have among us an expert in the subject weâre discussing or not. If we have, we should take his advice and ignore other people; and if we havenât, we should look for somebody else.ââ
(Laches, 184c-185a)
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âThere are many who labor on the other side of the question, and condemn souls to death, as if they were criminals capitally convicted; nor have they any other reason to allege why the immortality of the soul appears to them to be incredible, except that they are not able to conceive what sort of thing the soul can be when disentangled from the body; just as if they could really form a correct idea as to what sort of thing it is, even when it is in the body; what its form, and size, and abode are; so that were they able to have a full view of all that is now hidden from them in a living body, they have no idea whether the soul would be discernible by them, or whether it is of so fine a texture that it would escape their sight.
Let those consider this, who say that they are unable to form any idea of the soul without the body, and then they will see whether they can form any adequate idea of what it is when it is in the body. For my own part, when I reflect on the nature of the soul, it appears to me a far more perplexing and obscure question to determine what is its character while it is in the bodyâa place which, as it were, does not belong to itâthan to imagine what it is when it leaves it, and has arrived at the free aether, which is, if I may so say, its proper, its own habitation.â
(Tusculan Disputations, I.22)
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âSaying that âhappiness is bestâ is something manifestly agreed on, whereas what it is still needs to be said more distinctly. Now, perhaps this would come to pass if the work of the human being should be grasped. âŠ
So whatever, then, would this work be? For living appears to be something common even to plants, but what is peculiar [to human beings] is being sought. One must set aside, then, the life characterized by nutrition as well as growth.
A certain life characterized by sense perception would be next, but it too appears to be common to a horse and cow and in fact to every animal. So there remains a certain active life of that which possesses reason. âŠ
We assert that the work of a given person is the same in kind as that of a serious person, just as it would be in the case of a cithara player. ⊠For it belongs to a cithara player to play the cithara, but to a serious one to do so well. âŠ
If we posit the work of a human being as a certain life, and this is an activity of soul and actions accompanied by reason, the work of a serious man is to do these things well and nobly. âŠ
But, in addition, in a complete life. For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day. And in this way, one day or a short time does not make someone blessed and happy either.â
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1.7)
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âWhich is preferable, death or life? Life, of course. Pain or pleasure? Pleasure, of course.
âBut if I refuse to take part in the Emperorâs show, Iâll lose my head.â âGo ahead, then. Take part. But I wonât.â
âWhy me and not you?â âBecause youâre thinking of yourself as just one thread in the toga.â âMeaning what?â
âYouâre bound to care about how to be similar to other people, just as a thread too wants to be no different from all the other threads. But Iâd like to be purple, the little bit of brightness that makes all the rest seem fair and lovely. So why are you telling me to conform to the majority? How, in that case, would I be purple?ââ
(Discourses, I.2.15-18)
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