Episodes
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Last week saw a flurry of technopolitical developments as the US and India announced a slew of technology and defense deals. In case you missed it, we had a special post dissecting the preliminary details of India’s accession to the Artemis Accords. Check it out here! Also tune in to this podcast episode of All Things Policy, where Pranay Kotasthane, Aditya Ramanathan, Bharath Reddy, and Saurabh Todi from the High-Tech Geopolitics team discuss the announcements in the India-US joint statement in the field of Semiconductors, Advanced Telecommunications, and Space.
Matsyanyaaya 1: Concerns Surrounding TikTok and the Future of ‘Project Texas’
— Anushka Saxena
On June 16, the CEO of the controversial Chinese media platform TikTok, Shou Zi Chew, sent a letter to US Congress Senators Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), responding to their questions about the company surrounding the storage of data of American users on the platform. In his testimony to a House Committee of the US Congress, Shou had previously stated that "American data has always been stored in Virginia and Singapore." But now, a Forbes investigation from late May has revealed that this may not entirely be true. This investigation prompted said Senators to seek answers from TikTok, and Shou's letter has confirmed said suspicions.
What did Forbes' investigation say?
On May 30, Forbes published a report arguing that "over the past several years, thousands of TikTok creators and businesses around the world have given the company sensitive financial information—including their social security numbers and tax IDs—so that they can be paid by the platform. But unbeknownst to many of them, TikTok has stored that personal financial information on servers in China that are accessible by employees there, Forbes has learned."
Further, their report argued: "TikTok uses various internal tools and databases from its Beijing-based parent ByteDance to manage payments to creators who earn money through the app, including many of its biggest stars in the United States and Europe. The same tools are used to pay outside vendors and small businesses working with TikTok. But a trove of records obtained by Forbes from multiple sources across different parts of the company reveals that highly sensitive financial and personal information about those prized users and third parties has been stored in China. The discovery also raises questions about whether employees who are not authorized to access that data have been able to. It draws on internal communications, audio recordings, videos, screenshots, documents marked "Privileged and Confidential," and several people familiar with the matter."
…And what has Shou said in his letter to Blackburn and Blumenthal?
The point of the letter is to confirm that over the past year, TikTok has collaborated closely with Oracle to implement various measures to enhance the protection of the application, systems, and the security of data belonging to its users in the United States.
They also announced that in January 2023, they had achieved a significant milestone in this endeavour – the default storage location for US user data has been changed. All US user traffic is currently being directed to Oracle Cloud Infrastructure. While TikTok's data centres in the US and Singapore are still utilized for backup purposes, the company's ongoing efforts involve removing US users' private data from our data centres. Their objective is to fully transition to Oracle cloud servers in the United States, for which, as of March 2023, they have also started deleting previously stored data from foreign servers.
But the controversy has arisen from the second main iteration of the letter, which reads: "TikTok has been clear that there are certain, limited exceptions to the definition of protected data. These exceptions are in place to help ensure interoperability of TikTok as a global platform and were determined as part of TikTok's extensive, multi-year negotiations with CFIUS that have occurred under two Administrations. Exceptions include categories such as public data, business metrics, interoperability data, and certain creator data, if a creator voluntarily signs up for a commercial program to be supported by TikTok in reaching new audiences and monetizing content. As part of Project Texas, we are also designing a trusted path to enable TikTok to respond to global government and litigation demands for documents relating to users."
This confirms that if a content creator based out of the US has subscribed to paid content promotion programmes on the platform for the sake of 'interoperability', their data has been redirected to servers abroad… including those in China.
The senators have responded in an obviously indignant manner, stating: "We are extremely concerned that TikTok is storing Americans' personal, private data within the reach of the Chinese government. TikTok executives appear to have repeatedly and intentionally misled Congress when answering how the company secures and protects the data of Americans. TikTok's response makes it crystal clear that Americans' data is still exposed to Beijing's draconian and pervasive spying regimes – despite the claims of TikTok's misleading public relations campaign."
What is Project Texas?
'Project Texas' is Shou Zi Chew's answer to the US Congress's security concerns. Through the Project, TikTok in the US would maintain local data servers disallowing any flow of information of American users outside the country, and Oracle will reportedly own these servers. Moreover, as part of the Project, TikTok might also reveal its algorithm to the US agencies for greater transparency.
At this point, the countries of the 'Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance', namely the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK, as well as the European Parliament, have already collectively banned TikTok from being installed in government-issued/ federal service devices, to prevent sensitive official data from reaching the hands of China, or any externally based TikTok server that the US may have no jurisdiction over.
Moreover, a Bill by US Senator McCaul on 'Deterring America's Technological Adversaries' Act (DATA Act) is already tabled for discussion in Congress since February this year, and it identifies TikTok and its parent company 'ByteDance' major security threats to American users' privacy. With the developments in the debate on TikTok and data governance likely to continue, the latest controversy surrounding the letter may well be the death knell that pushes the US to adopt broader legislation regulating civilian uses of the app.
Cyberpolitik Explainer : The Soviet Semiconductor Failure
— Revati Gandekar
Semiconductors are critical for technological sectors that produce electronic components such as transistors, diodes, integrated circuits, and microprocessors. These components are essential for computers, telecommunications, consumer electronics, military, and aerospace. The semiconductor industry played a pivotal role in shaping the technological landscape of the 20th century. While the United States and other Western countries experienced significant growth and innovation in this field, the Soviet Union also made notable advancements in the semiconductor industry. This aims to analyze the rise and fall of the semiconductor industry in the USSR, exploring what contributed to its initial success, the subsequent challenges, and ultimately the industry's failure.
In the late 1950s, the USSR recognized the potential of semiconductor technology and sought to develop its industry. They established research institutes, such as the Moscow Institute of Electronic Technology and the Lebedev Physical Institute, which focused on semiconductor research and development. Additionally, collaborations with Eastern Bloc countries, such as East Germany, helped accelerate the industry's growth.
Unlike the market-driven approach of the West industries, the USSR's semiconductor sector was primarily state-driven. The Soviet government heavily invested in research and development, providing massive funding and resources to semiconductor projects. This support allowed Soviet scientists and engineers to progress significantly in the field, albeit often in a more secretive and controlled environment.
The Soviet semiconductor industry achieved several notable milestones during its heyday. In the early 1960s, Soviet scientists developed the first silicon planar transistor, a breakthrough that revolutionized transistor manufacturing worldwide. The USSR also made significant progress in integrated circuit technology, contributing to advancements in military electronics, space exploration, and industrial automation.
While the USSR achieved remarkable progress in the semiconductor industry, it faced numerous challenges and limitations that eventually hindered its growth. One significant factor was the lack of open collaboration and information exchange with Western countries. The USSR's isolationist policies limited access to global semiconductor developments, impeding the industry's ability to keep pace with international advancements. This stifled innovation, as government committees with little technical expertise decided on resource allocation, technology adoption, and production targets. The lack of market-oriented incentives hindered the industry's ability to respond to changing market dynamics and meet international standards.
One of the main challenges that the Soviet Union faced in developing its semiconductor industry was the initial ideological opposition to cybernetics, which was seen as a bourgeois pseudoscience that threatened the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This attitude changed in the late 1950s and early 1960s when Nikita Khrushchev adopted a policy that encouraged computer production and scientific research. The Soviet Union realized the strategic implications of semiconductors and set up new facilities to manufacture them in cities like Leningrad and Riga. In 1958, the Soviet government set up a whole new city, Zelenograd, a technical-type Special Economic Zone, just for semiconductor manufacturing.
The Soviet Union's centralized planning and bureaucratic system also posed challenges for the semiconductor industry. This top-down approach led to inefficiencies. As a result, in 1973-74, USSR produced only basic types of semiconductors (transistors and diodes), and the production was close to only 2% of the US output.
However, the Soviet semiconductor industry soon encountered another problem: technological lag behind the West. Moreover, the Soviet Union could not keep up with the rapid innovation and miniaturization of Western semiconductors, especially after the invention of the integrated circuit in 1959. It also suffered from a shortage of skilled personnel, quality control, and market incentives. To overcome these difficulties, it resorted to copying Western designs and importing Western machinery and components. For example, the KR580VM80A was a clone of the Intel 8080 CPU, and Soviet scientists also replicated the Texas Instruments SN-51, as these processors were able to execute several thousand instructions per second. The USSR also tried to obtain specialized production equipment and complete production processes from the Free World, sometimes indirectly from the US. However, this increased dependence on foreign sources violated international trade regulations and prevented original innovation.
The country faced a scarcity of raw materials, inadequate infrastructure, and a lack of market-oriented incentives. Additionally, this contributed to poor quality control and an inability to compete with Western semiconductor manufacturers.
The global interests of major semiconductor-producing countries, particularly the United States and its allies, also influenced the USSR's failure in the industry. The Cold War rivalry intensified the competition between the Soviet Union and the West. The US and its allies pursued technological advancements in semiconductors to gain a competitive edge in various industries, including telecommunications, computers, and consumer electronics.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the semiconductor industry in the USSR experienced a rapid decline. It marked the end of its semiconductor industry as a coherent entity. Most of the Soviet computer manufacturers ceased operations or switched to other products. A few companies that survived into the 1990s used foreign components and have yet to achieve significant production volumes. The economic turmoil, political instability, and transition to a market-based economy further eroded the industry. The dismantling of the planned economy also led to a brain drain, as skilled professionals looked for opportunities in the private sector or emigrated to other countries.
The Soviet Union had some achievements in this field, such as creating the first electronic computer in continental Europe (MESM) and developing some local semiconductor facilities. However, it faced many challenges, including ideological opposition, technological lag, foreign dependence, and internal disorganization. The dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in the fragmentation and decline of its semiconductor industry.
In conclusion, complete government intervention in the semiconductor industry in USSR had adverse effects on isolating innovation and lagging behind foreign rivals. The government controlled and centralized the semiconductor industry but failed to foster innovation and competitiveness. The government intervention isolated it as it lagged behind the US and its allies in terms of technology, production, and market share. While the USSR made significant strides in semiconductor research and development, the industry's ultimate decline can be attributed to factors such as limited international collaboration, centralized planning, economic challenges, and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. Despite its eventual demise, the legacy of the Soviet semiconductor industry serves as a reminder of the importance of collaboration, innovation, and market-oriented policies.
Matsyanyaaya 2: The Fission Factor in India-US Ties
— Saurabh Todi
Last month Science and Technology Minister Jitendra Singh revealed that Indian scientists are working on developing small modular reactors, or SMRs, one of the most promising emerging technologies in nuclear power. The interest in new technology and India's ambitious plan to build 10 new reactors in a decade is evidence of an enduring commitment to nuclear energy. Recently, the India-US Joint Statement following PM Modi's State Visit also affirmed nuclear energy as a necessary resource to meet our nations' climate, energy transition, and energy security needs. Both leaders also noted the ongoing discussion on developing next-generation small modular reactor technologies in a collaborative mode for the domestic market as well as for export.
The nuclear industry is undergoing a renaissance. Over 50 nuclear reactors are under construction globally today. Even countries like South Korea and Japan, which were planning to phase out nuclear power, have reconsidered or scaled back their decisions. The European Union's inclusion of nuclear power as a sustainable investment has further enhanced its appeal. Technological advancements led by start-ups and established companies have further improved the long-term outlook for nuclear power. Innovations such as SMRs, pebble-bed reactors, and molten-salt reactors aim to enhance the safety, flexibility in size, and economic viability of nuclear plants. China also recently issued an operational permit for its first experimental thorium-based reactor.
This sector is ripe for further and intensified cooperation between India-US and other close partners such as Japan and Australia.
Matsyanyaaya 3: High-Tech Takes Centre-Stage
— Pranay Kotasthane
I don’t think any serious policy analyst—even five years ago—would have anticipated that the press briefing of an Indian PM’s Official State Visit to the US would headline concrete actions on high-tech areas such as semiconductors, critical minerals, telecommunications, Space, Quantum Computing, and Artificial Intelligence.
Nevertheless, here we are. Technology is now the centrepiece of the India-US partnership. This technology framework includes strategic technologies, such as jet engine manufacturing in India and space, and also commercial technologies, such as telecommunications, optical fibres, and semiconductors.
How Does it Matter?
Technology occupying the pole position in India-US relations is a big change in the foreign policy outlooks on technology partnerships. Here’s why.
Phase 1.0
After its independence, India interacted with many countries in the West to access advanced industrial technologies. The US specifically assisted India’s nuclear and space programmes, helped develop IIT Kanpur, and contributed to the Green Revolution.
Phase 2.0
But technology became a sore point as the Cold War picked up pace. India faced stringent denial of technology from international regimes in the nuclear and space sectors. The denial of Indian membership into multilateral export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) cast a long shadow on India’s foreign policy outlook. The US came to be seen as a technology denier. India’s default stance over the next five decades was to protect its turf in global technological fora while simultaneously developing and shielding domestic capabilities.
This is why the civil nuclear deal in 2005 was such a big deal. It helped India and the US move on from a low-level equilibrium. However, technology still remained a marginal area of cooperation at a time when terrorism and American support for Pakistan gated progress in other sectors.
Phase 3.0
The Modi-Biden Summit is a firm indication that India’s foreign policy outlook on technology has changed. Contributing factors are a growing domestic technological base; an increased presence of Indian talent in the global technology ecosystem; emergent geopolitical realities concerning China; and the rising contribution of crosscutting technologies in national power.
The Indian foreign policy establishment now has a far more positive view of technology and the opportunities it offers for collaboration and competition, apart from contestation. India also realises that technology is now a global enterprise where autarchy is not an option. The contemporary concern is to manage interdependence and make technological supply chains trusted, transparent and resilient. More recently, India’s advances in large-scale digital public infrastructure—payments, identity and data-sharing—give it the confidence to use technology to deepen diplomatic ties.
As for the US, technology has become a primary driver for addressing the China challenge. Nuclear weapons make large-scale conventional conflict unlikely. Similarly, China’s disproportionate role in material supply chains makes any large-scale economic decoupling costly. Consequently, contestation has been in the high-technology domain.
Apart from the denial of technology to China, it has also meant that the US has changed the foreign policy use of technology towards its partners. Cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS arrangement showed that the US was now willing to share sensitive technologies with partners to counter China. Back then, in the context of India’s dependence on Russia for defence systems, I wrote:
It is thus in the West’s interest to apply this new technology alliance mindset to India. As more options become available, India will find it easier to reduce its dependence on Russia.
It seems this has come true to an extent. The US has been more forthcoming in sharing technology than opening its markets. The FTA with India remains a non-starter, but technology collaboration has grown rapidly.
What does it Imply?
High-tech cooperation is also not as high-stakes as the more contentious areas like trade and the South China Sea. The India-US relationship is so far behind the production possibility frontier on technology, trade and defence that there are enough low-hanging fruits to pick. And that’s exactly what we are seeing now.
In edition #165, I proposed a tri-axis framework to look at the India-US relationship: state-to-state relations, state-to-people relations, and people-to-people relations. There has never been a problem on the people-to-people axis. As the State Visit shows, state-to-state relations have also turned a corner. However, it is the state-to-people axis that is the problematic axis. Many Indians still seem to harbour a deep frustration with the American State. On the other hand, many Americans also have doubts about India as a partner of strategic importance.
Only the two administrations could do something to break this ceiling. By delivering on the asymmetric promises under the technology and defence agreements, the state-to-people axis will finally move on from recollections of the technology denial regime. The announcements are just the beginning; a lot depends on the execution from both sides in these areas.
Note: this piece was earlier published on Anticipating the Unintended #216. Check it out here!
Our Reading Menu
[Explainer] The problem with India’s new guidelines on genetically modified insects, by Dr. Shambhavi Naik.
[Op-ed] India mustn’t miss this chance to supercharge its electronic goods industry, by Anupam Manur and Pranay Kotasthane.
[Op-ed] Our PLI schemes are in need of a coherent trade policy, by Satya S. Sahu.
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com -
Matsyanyaaya: Insights from recent OEWG discussions on Information and Communications Technologies
— Anushka Saxena
The militarisation of cyberspace is a reality. And to enable states to discuss and adopt common rules for global governance of cyberspace, on 31 December 2020, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 75/240 establishing an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on the security of and in the use of Information and Communications Technologies. The mandate for the Group extends from 2021 to 2025.
The Group recently concluded its informal, inter-sessional meetings on 26 May, and deliberations put forth by various states give us some insights into the kind of talking points we could look out for during the fifth Substantive Session of the Group, scheduled for July 2023.
To summarise, various stakeholders, ranging from governments and representatives of UN bodies to scholars from think tanks and technology corporations, submitted ideas about what the 2023 Annual Progress Report (APR) should entail. All of their ideas either build on or expand what has already been discussed in the previous substantive and informal sessions in 2023 or the 2022 APR. Some interesting ideas are as follows:
* Iran submitted a Working Paper on establishing a provisional directory of 'Points of Contact' (PoCs) on ICT and cybersecurity.
● The first proposal to develop such a global directory was tabled in the UN Governmental Group of Experts Reports of 2013 (A/68/98). Now, every GGE and OEWG discussion notes progress on the directory.
● The aim of this directory shall be for states to appoint field experts in technical or diplomatic positions (or both), which would be a part of a global PoC network debating everything from responsible state behaviour in cyberspace and the applicability of international law to defining threats to ICT.
● As we know, the current Indian government has quite a knack for portals, and to formalise the creation of a PoCs global directory, India, too, has proposed the creation of a Global Cyber Security Cooperation Portal. The proposal, submitted by India's Permanent Representative in New York in July 2022, states that such a Portal shall be voluntarily updated by states and maintained by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs.
* The UNOCT/UNCCT and the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate presented proposals for 'capacity building'. The proposal by the former was basically about glorifying the successes of its Global CounterTerrorism Programme on Cybersecurity and New Technologies. But the latter proposal, presented by the UNCTED, emphatically highlights the challenge of malicious online activity by rogue non-state actors and how existing counter-terrorism infrastructure can be leveraged to deal with it.
● The important recommendation is to develop comprehensive training programmes for law enforcement personnel and criminal justice practitioners working with digital evidence. The mention of the latter may be an important signal of more private sector participation in navigating the legalities of what constitutes 'terrorism' in cyberspace.
* Submissions from the private sector mainly highlighted which governmental proposals are the most crucial for focus on in the next substantive session and how they can be expanded or narrowed down:
● Stimson Center's submission iterated that the two major emerging technologies states should agree on are common threats to ICT Security are ransomware and Artificial Intelligence.
● It should be noted that both El Salvador and Czechia had made statements during the last substantive session in March on the need for developing standards on 'responsible state behaviour' in new and emerging tech like AI and Quantum. But these efforts would be futile until states can first agree on what harmful use of AI/ Quantum is, given the dual nature of such technologies, and then move on to standard-setting.
● DCX Technologies presented anecdotes on how to avert a ransomware attack and engage with the attacker. Two suggestions stand out from their four-page intervention – one, that knowledge of critical infrastructure is essential to know how to protect it (such as by using enterprise security tools to detect malicious behaviour), and second, that any response to a large-scale ransomware attack such as the one DCX faced in 2020 requires a transparent, multi-stakeholder mitigation model.
If adopted and developed, these ideas could provide meaningful direction for the next set of discussions at the OEWG-ICT. However, if we look at some of the concerns governments presented during the fourth substantive session of the Group earlier in March, we can safely conclude that some of these ideas are a massive jump ahead of the tide. For example, India's primary concern during the session was as fundamental as something can be – for states to converge on their definitions and interpretations of international law! Similarly, Kenya's proposal entailed that states at least converge on how to define 'common threats in the cyberspace'.
This is, however, not to say that there exist no agreements whatsoever – states at the OEWG have now come to agree that the UN Charter is readily applicable to cybersecurity (especially provisions under Articles 2(1), 2(4), and 33). In doing so, they have cemented the idea that existing global governance institutions like the International Court of Justice can be utilised even to resolve cyber-incident disputes peacefully. This has not stopped countries like Russia and Syria from proposing a new legally-binding mechanism to govern state behaviour in ICT, citing the inability of existing mechanisms to do so.
Overall, some convergence exists on building capacity, creating a global knowledge base involving both state and non-state actors, and creating a due diligence mechanism for states to respond to malicious activities originating from their territory. The next Substantive Session would be vital to understand how states respond to these ideas and whether they can agree to resolve some of the fundamental challenges facing the OEWG's ambitious goals.
Cyberpolitik : A “broadly” unclear Light-Touch Regulation for India’s Online Gaming Industry.
— Satya Sahu
Online gaming is one of the fastest-growing segments of India’s digital economy, with millions of users playing various games on platforms ranging from smartphones, consoles and PCs. India’s gaming population is pegged to reach 700 million by 2025, with a significant portion of players spending real money on games. (current conversion rate is about 24% or 120 million players. It is a good bet that this trend will comfortably allow the Indian online gaming industry's ambitions of growing to USD 8.6 billion by 2027.
However, online gaming also comes with challenges and risks, because it can serve as a pathway to gambling using real money, addiction, an easy target for cybercrime, and exposure to illegal illicit content.
So of course, the Ministry of Electronics and IT (MeitY) notified amendments to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, related to online gaming in early April 2023. The amendments aim to enforce greater due diligence by online gaming intermediaries, such as platforms, websites, and apps that offer online games, and to protect users from illegal betting and wagering online. The amendments also envisage the creation of self-regulatory bodies (SROs) that will register and certify permissible online games and resolve complaints through a grievance redressal mechanism.
In most regards, the amendments have garnered applause from the gaming industry for being an unusual example of a light-touch regulation and promoting the idea of a trustworthy self-regulating market. It is a rare example of an enabling legislation meant to promote regulatory certainty without much in the way of prescriptive mandates. But with the lack of prescription, also comes uncertainty, particularly in the matter of definitions involved in deciding what constitutes "online gaming", "betting”, or "gambling. While jurisprudence across the country is settled on the distinction being whether the game in question has an element of skill or an element of chance (with the latter legally prohibited), the Rules do not provide any assistance in making that distinction clear.
There is also a significant issue about the implementation of these regulations due to the fact that gambling is a state list subject under the Indian constitution; however, the discussion on federalism in this context is beyond the scope of this post.
This post’s focus, however, is the definition of “user harm” in the context of online gaming. As per the explanation to Rule 3(1)(b)(ii), “user harm” and “harm” mean any effect which is detrimental to a user or child, as the case may be.
Even at a cursory glance, this definition is unusually broad and vague, leaving much room for interpretation and discretion by the government and the SROs. For instance, would considerations of obscenity, defamation, hate speech, discrimination, harassment, cyberbullying, cyberstalking, phishing, hacking, identity theft, addiction, or compulsive behaviour etc be relevant while defining “harm” in the context of online gaming?
How will these terms be defined and measured? Who decides whether an online game is likely to incite any of these harms? What are the criteria and standards for such decisions? How will the users be informed and educated about these harms and their consequences?
Moreover, a definition of user harm that does not take into account the diversity and complexity of online gaming genres, formats, modes, and audiences would be woefully limited. Online gaming is not a monolithic phenomenon, but a rapidly evolving one, with different types of games catering to different players.
In games, the depiction of drug use, violence, and sexually explicit content is handled by certification and age-rating systems like ESRB and PEGI in the US and the UK respectively, with generally consistent decision-making. In the case of India, the Rules mention the objective of tackling content-related concerns in terms of depiction of violent or inappropriate content. However, Rules 4A(8) and 4C have imposed an obligation on the SRO to ensure that the verification process to determine a game’s permissibility be based on a self-devised framework which assesses whether an online game contains adequate safeguards against user harm. The only considerations to be used while formulating said framework, are “self harm and psychological harm”, which do not do much to circumscribe our definitional woes.
The idea of the SROs to also act as a classification and age-rating body is a possible step in the right direction assuming that multiple SROs will not create conflicting frameworks for verification. While India’s approach may end up as a beefed-up version of the US and the UK (with legal liabilities on the online gaming intermediaries, and direct oversight of the Union Government etc.) , the case of Australia’s National Classification Code should serve as a warning of the kind of distortions that can be created in a regulatory regime when overbroad concepts are used to define what constitutes “harm” to the player. Australia’s Office of Film and Literature Classification, bound by their legislative regime, can reject certification for a game if its depiction of sex and drug use is potentially portrayed “positively”. Because age-ratings and classifications directly impact the commercial success of games (as well as movies, which is usually used as a counterpoint against controversial classification systems which do not keep up with the changing nature of multimedia consumption), the Indian gaming market can potentially find themselves reworking key aspects of their games just to be able to get them onto the market. It is a costly endeavour to say the least.
As all these teething questions abound, one only hopes that a consistent framework is proposed to guide interpretations regarding the ambit of "user harm" before dispute redressal and adjudication processes inevitably commence in the future.
Antariksh Matters : China’s in a Hurry to Get to the Moon
— Aditya Ramanathan
China has announced an official deadline of 2030 for landing humans on the lunar surface. On Monday, Lin Xiqiang, the deputy head of the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA) said the mission to put humans on the Moon was underway and would include a programme of research during short visits.
Lin’s announcement confirms a public comment in April by Wu Weiren, a scientist with China’s lunar exploration programme, who said putting humans on the Moon by 2030 was “not a problem”.
China has been steadily developing its crewed lunar programme. In 2022, it unveiled a model of a 90-metre-long moon rocket scheduled to undergo a flight test in 2027. Earlier in 2019, a promotional video showed off what appeared to be a crewed vehicle for deep space travel being developed by the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST).
China’s ongoing pursuit of sustained human presence in low Earth orbit will contribute to its ability to send people to the Moon. Lin’s official confirmation came at a press conference in which he also presented the new three-person crew for the Tiangong space station, which will launch into orbit this week, replacing three others who have been inhabiting the space station for six months. The experience with Tiangong will especially come in handy if China manages to proceed to the next stage of its lunar project: setting up a permanent base on the Moon.
Lunar Living
In 2021, China and Russia entered into an agreement to establish a permanent presence on the Moon. Eventually dubbed International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), the project was meant to be a direct counterpart to the United States’ Artemis programme, which, as of this writing, still intends to return humans to the Moon by 2025 and eventually set up a permanent presence on the lunar surface and in orbit.
In April, Wu publicly discussed a multi-stage plan for the ILRS up to 2050. This would include uncrewed missions and the setting up of a “basic version” that will be followed by a “full version” put together by 2040. Other stages include setting up a nuclear power source and research infrastructure. As with Artemis, China plans to support all this by putting a large constellation of satellites into lunar orbit for position navigation and timing (PNT), relay communications to the dark side of the Moon, and remote sensing.
Earthly Constraints
ILRS may have begun as a Russia-China collaboration, but since the outbreak of the war with Ukraine, Russia has been conspicuous by its absence from recent Chinese statements. Instead, China has focused on its own plans and has sought other foreign partners for its upcoming Chang’e uncrewed missions to the Moon.
China’s lunar ambitions are also evidently fuelled by its rivalry with the United States. However, China does not have the option of blending competition with a bit of cooperation. In 2011, the US introduced the so-called ‘Wolf Amendment’, which effectively bans US government funding to be used in cooperation with any Chinese entity without clearance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). While this is not technically an outright ban on space collaboration with China, its effect is much the same.
Indeed, it seems clear that NASA is determined to keep away from China. NASA’s administrator Bill Nelson has made alarmist remarks about China appropriating lunar territory, presumably to bolster support for the Artemis programme. However, if China and the US are engaged in a space race to the Moon, it is a relatively muted affair at the moment. Top politicians have not expended political capital on the issue, and space agencies have not seen an explosion in their budgets. The lunar ambitions of great powers will continue to be subject to Earthly constraints like economic downturns, wars, stubborn technological challenges, and myriad other pressing issues.
Our Reading Menu
[Podcast] - A Day in the Life of a Cop, a new limited series on 'policing' on All Things Policy, by Shrikrishna Upadhyay and Javeed Ahmed.
[Op-ed] Rs 2,000 Note Withdrawal: No demonetisation redux but RBI could have done it better, by Anupam Manur.
[Report] Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelly M. Sayler.
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com -
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Biopolitik: The Power of Four: Biomanufacturing and the Quad
— Saurabh Todi
A biological revolution is underway in global manufacturing. Products produced from genetic engineering and biomanufacturing techniques are replacing many chemical, industrial and farm-based products. According to a 2020 McKinsey report, the substitution of chemical products with biological alternatives through modern biotechnology has the potential to produce up to 60 per cent of the physical inputs required by the global economy. Similar modern biotechnology efforts are underway for milk, meat, pharmaceuticals, oils and numerous other industries. Individually, these industries are worth many billions or trillions of dollars. Combined, they make biotechnology one of the most economically lucrative emerging technologies.
However, beyond the obvious economic value, there is significant strategic and social value in modern biotechnologies. The products produced by modern biotechnology are or will be essential for producing food, energy, and health management. Those that control the IP and supply chains will potentially control key determinants of society’s technological progress. There are also numerous potential military applications for biotechnology that range from food security to new, lightweight polymers to understanding the potential of highly effective biological weapons (which are banned under international law).
Given the immense economic and strategic importance of these technologies, it is vital that countries do not place themselves in a vulnerable position. The Quad has sought to address this potential vulnerability by establishing a Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group that will monitor trends in critical and emerging technologies, such as synthetic biology, genome sequencing, and biomanufacturing, and also identify opportunities for cooperation within Quad.
China plans to establish its dominance in biomanufacturing as well. In a Chinese government document on building the bioeconomy, a central theme was biomanufacturing at scale, including plastics, oils and agri-food technology. The ASPI critical technology tracker shows that academics in China publish more of the top 10% of most-cited academic papers for biomanufacturing than in any other country. Given China’s track record in establishing a lead in several emerging technologies, There’s good reason to believe China will build its biomanufacturing base faster than its competitors.
To capitalise on the economic potential of the biomanufacturing industry and address potential supply chain vulnerabilities, we recommended that Quad countries establish a biomanufacturing hub in India. The proposed Quad-led hub would invest in three main areas: strengthening physical infrastructure, bolstering workforce capabilities, and identifying opportunities for collaboration.
Researchers at the Takshashila Institution, Saurabh Todi and Shambhavi Naik, along with researchers at Australian National University, Dirk van der Kley and Daniel Pavlich, have explored this idea in detail in a recently published as a Discussion Document. The recommendation was published as op-eds in publications like ASPI Strategist.
Matsyanyaaya: Preparing for the quantum leap
— Rijesh Panicker
The National Mission for Quantum Technologies and Applications (NM-QTA) seeks to strengthen India’s research and development ecosystem in various quantum technologies like quantum communications, quantum computing, quantum sensing and quantum materials. It will also look to build 50-100 qubit quantum computers within the next 5-8 years.
With an outlay of ₹6,000 crores over the next eight years, NM-QTA represents a significant step forward from the Quantum Enabled Science and Technology (QueST) research program, funded by the Department of Science and Technology (DST) for ₹80 crore.
India has also sought international collaboration in this area. Among these is a partnership between the National Science Foundation in the US and Indian science agencies as part of the US-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) in several areas, including quantum technologies, an Indo-US quantum coordination mechanism to facilitate research and collaboration, and an agreement with Finland, which includes setting up virtual quantum centres at three institutes in collaboration with Finnish academia.
Three key factors explain this acceleration in investment in quantum technologies.
First, quantum technologies are disruptive in their positive and negative impact. Quantum computers use quantum bits (qubits) to perform calculations based on quantum mechanical principles, allowing them to solve certain problems exponentially faster than traditional computers, which use classical bits (0 or 1) for computation. This is because qubits can exist in multiple states simultaneously (both 0 and 1), enabling quantum computers to perform many calculations at once, whereas classical bits can only exist in one state at a time. In areas such as material sciences and chemistry, quantum computers could prove groundbreaking, helping develop new and innovative molecules and materials at a rate faster than ever. Similarly, quantum secure communications significantly improve our cyber security and threat-detection capabilities.
Conversely, quantum computers above a certain size (measured in qubits) can easily break the encryption algorithms that secure most of our data today. Any actor – either state or non-state – that captures financial, military and infrastructure-related data critical to our national interest only needs to hold onto it until quantum computers are of a certain capability to be able to decrypt the data. This leaves us vulnerable to the inevitable progress in quantum computing.
The second factor is the global geopolitical environment. China and the US are battling for strategic advantage, especially in emerging technologies. Countries will protect their core technology, push for their standards and maintain close control over their allied supply chains. In quantum, for example, China has chosen to push its path forward. Similarly, India should not simply depend on its allies. In the 1990s, Russia was not allowed to fully transfer cryogenic engine technology to the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) due to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) that existed. Ultimately, ISRO developed its own indigenous cryogenic engine in 2014. We must avoid something similar happening to us in the quantum space.
We can see this playing out in the area of quantum communications, where countries like China, Japan, and South Korea have demonstrated their own quantum secure communication networks. The standards for quantum communications are still being developed, and whoever influences these standards gains an advantage.
In the quantum computing space, there are multiple methods to build a quantum computing core, each with its strengths and weaknesses. No one technology has a clear path to a viable, large-scale quantum computer. The winner of this race will undoubtedly have a long-term advantage over its competitors.
A third reason to consider is our relative weakness in high-tech research and development (R&D). India has spent about 0.7% of its GDP on R&D annually over the last decade. In particular, the government accounts for over 55% of all R&D investments in India. In contrast, China spends about 2.1% and the US 3% of GDP on research, both with high levels of private sector participation. Compare the nearly $1.2 billion investment in quantum computing just in 2022 by the private sector in the US with the National Quantum Mission (NM-QTA) $730 million budget over the next eight years.
A recent study by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) comparing quantum investments across countries shows India lagging the US and China, both in terms of trained manpower and in terms of research conducted (as measured by highly cited papers; probably a biased metric for quality of research, but a metric nonetheless).
We must choose where to be “Atmanirbhar” and where we want to depend on others. India must decide where to wait and watch and where to go now. In some areas, like quantum communications, we have already decided to go, which is the right move.
As a matter of good strategy, India must identify those parts of the quantum technology space where we need to maintain technological independence and diversity. A considered allocation of resources to build infrastructure, fund and encourage research, train manpower, and participate in and influence global standards is a great path forward.
Antariksh Matters: China’s secretive space plane
— Aditya Ramanathan
China’s enigmatic space plane landed horizontally on Earth on May 8 after 276 days in orbit, according to the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC).
The uncrewed reusable vehicle was launched in August 2022 on a Long March 2F rocket. This was the second such mission involving a reusable vehicle. In September 2020, a reusable craft was put into orbit for just two days, during which time it deployed two small objects into orbit.
The recently concluded mission also involved putting a payload into orbit. On October 31, 2022, about three months after its launch, the craft deployed an object that may have been a small companion satellite meant to monitor the craft. Chinese crewed craft have released similar monitoring satellites in the past.
The space situational awareness company Leolabs tracked the Chinese craft and has concluded that it docked with an ‘Object J’ (most likely the same monitoring satellite) two or three times. Leolabs also concluded that the space plane had an independent capacity to manoeuvre and propel itself while in orbit.
Everyone Likes Spaceplanes
States have been experimenting with space planes for decades. The erstwhile US Space Shuttle was the most prominent example of a reusable crewed vehicle that was launched vertically and landed horizontally.
However, most ongoing space plane programmes are uncrewed, and some have explicit military roles. For instance, Boeing is developing the uncrewed X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (OTV), which is operated by the US Space Force. The X-37B is already considerably ahead of China’s space plane programme, having completed six missions, the last of which was in orbit for 908 days. Like China’s space planes, the X-37B is capable of placing objects in orbit, such as the experimental FalconSAT-8 for the US Air Force.
Other countries have been looking to develop space planes of their own. India took a modest first step in this direction in April when it dropped a prototype 6.5 metre-long uncrewed space plane called the Reusable Launch Vehicle from a helicopter and landed it.
Private companies are also attempting to develop space planes of their own. The most prominent examples include Sierra Space’s Dream Chaser, which could include both crewed and uncrewed variants, as well as the Dawn Aerospace’s Mk-II Aurora. While these projects are still in their early stages, there could be strong commercial incentives for investing in them.
What Are They Good For?
The most obvious reason to invest in space planes is to reduce the cost of access to space: the dream of reusable craft being able to insert payloads into orbit quickly and cheaply is an old one. This is the stated reason for India’s own RLV and the driving force for space plane development by private companies.
The direct military utility of space planes is unclear at this stage. The US X-37B is operated by the Space Delta 9 unit of the Space Force, which is, among other things, responsible for ‘orbital warfare’. It is possible that future space planes could deploy a range of small payloads that can conduct space situational awareness (SSA) missions, carry out rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), or possibly use directed energy to dazzle or blind other orbital craft. However, the most likely military utility for space planes today is their ability to act as test beds to other technologies, such as autonomous manoeuvring in space and hypersonic capabilities. For now, at least, space planes are not harbingers of a new era of space warfare.
Our Reading Menu
[Report] China-Russia Space Cooperation: The Strategic, Military, Diplomatic, and Economic Implications of a Growing Relationship.
[Op-ed] Globalising India's DPI for a Common Digital Future by Bharath Reddy and Saurabh Todi.
[Blog] This time, it feels different by Kailash Nadh.
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com -
Cyberpolitik: AI and Crime Prevention: Is it a force multiplier?
— Satya Sahu
Crime prevention is based on the idea that crime can be reduced or eliminated by modifying the factors that influence its occurrence or consequences. We can classify “prevention” into three main types: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary prevention addresses the root causes of crime or deters potential offenders before they commit a crime. Secondary prevention aims to intervene with at-risk groups or individuals to prevent them from becoming involved in crime. Finally, tertiary prevention efforts seek to rehabilitate or punish offenders to prevent them from reoffending. (This, however, is beyond the scope of today’s discussion.)
Flipping the coin, we notice that policing is based on the idea that law enforcement and public order can be maintained by enforcing the law and responding to crimes or incidents. Policing also lends itself to being classified into two main types: reactive and proactive. Reactive policing responds to reported crimes or incidents after they occur. Proactive policing anticipates or prevents crimes or incidents before they occur. On the face of it, AI can help us prevent and fight crime by enhancing both types of crime prevention and policing.
AI can digest and analyse petabytes of data from disparate sources, such as social media, CCTV footage, sensors used in our Smart Cities™, and boring old digitised government records, to identify patterns, trends, and anomalies that can indicate potential criminal activity. For example, the police in Vancouver use predictive models to identify areas where robberies are expected to occur and then post officers to deter potential thieves or other criminals. Similarly, the police in Los Angeles use a system called PredPol that generates maps of hotspots where crimes are likely to happen based on past data. These systems can help the police allocate their resources more efficiently and effectively and reduce crime rates and response times.
When it comes to collecting and processing evidence, such as fingerprints, DNA, facial recognition, voice recognition, and digital forensics etc., we can look at the UK Home Office’s VALCRI, which uses AI to analyse large volumes of data from different sources, such as crime reports, witness statements, CCTV footage, and social media posts, to generate hypotheses and leads for investigators. For example, the police in India used ML-backed facial recognition technology to reunite thousands of missing children with their families. Moreover, AI can help the police in presenting evidence and arguments in court, such as using natural language processing to generate concise summaries or transcripts of testimonies or documents.
It could augment efforts to monitor and evaluate police performance and conduct, such as using dashcams, bodycams, or drones to record their interactions with the public and/or suspects. For example, the police in New Orleans developed a program called EPIC that uses AI to analyse video footage from bodycams to identify instances of misconduct or excessive force by officers. It can also help the police in engaging with the public and building trust and confidence, such as using chatbots or social media platforms to communicate with citizens and provide critical information services, hopefully unlike the chatbot from my bank’s beleaguered website.
However, all this has enormous implications for the jurisprudential underpinnings of crime prevention and policing. One such significance arises when AI itself can change the nature and scope of crime and criminality. AI can enable new forms of crime that exploit its capabilities and vulnerabilities, such as cyberattacks, biometric spoofing, deepfakes, autonomous weapons, or social engineering. Unlike their current-crime counterparts, leveraging AI allows these future crimes to be more sophisticated, scalable and anonymous than conventional ones. Therefore, the legal and ethical frameworks that govern our efforts to control such crimes must, therefore, must evolve to address these new crimes. It is a foregone conclusion that without involving AI at the forefront of these efforts, it will be impossible to counter AI-enabled crimes themselves. Hence the concomitant need to update the legal and ethical norms guiding society’s conceptions of policing and crime prevention.
Yet another implication is that AI also transforms the roles and responsibilities of police officers and other actors involved in crime prevention or response. As the examples show, AI can augment or automate some of the tasks that police officers perform, such as data collection, analysis, or evidence processing. AI can also assist or replace some of the decisions that police officers make, such as risk assessment, resource allocation, or intervention selection. To ensure that the concerns of effectiveness and responsibility surrounding Mx. Robo-Cop are adequately balanced, clear and consistent standards and regulations for police and state actors must be established side-by-side with the development and deployment of such systems.
This is not to say that we need to disavow the use of AI in the field of policing and crime prevention. The potential and limitations of AI and the skills and knowledge to use it effectively and responsibly make it so versatile and terrifying. However, it is still a tool to be wielded by the legitimate wielder of the state’s punitive power: the police.
The use of AI in identifying young people who are vulnerable to gang exploitation or violence and mounting efforts to prevent them from becoming involved in crime is already a burning question in the UK. This recognises that leveraging AI to provide better targeted and tailored state support and services to at-risk groups or individuals, is valuable. On the face of it, any enhancements to their state’s performance, efficiency, and accountability in this regard will be applauded. But given what we know about the pitfalls surrounding AI, the opposite also holds: violating the privacy, dignity, or rights of individuals or communities will reduce the trust and legitimacy that is essential for state actors and the police to be able to police under the social contract.
Referring back to my previous post here, we know that AI can create or exacerbate the digital divide or systemic social inequalities among different groups or individuals. The conversation about the use of AI in a field where the slightest deviation from the limited scope of policing is undesirable must discuss the processes involved as well as the outcomes exacted upon the population being policed. This indicates the need to ensure that AI is used in a way that respects and protects the interests and values of individuals or communities. AI is a powerful tool that can help us understand the causes of, prevent, and reduce crime. Still, it is not a substitute for human judgment or responsibility. It is not merely a technology but also a socio-cultural phenomenon to be embraced with a healthy mixture of curiosity and caution.
(I use the term ‘AI’ to include machine learning, Neural Language Processing, etc., here for brevity.)
Matsyanyaaya: Why a local Indian rickshaw app should worry Big Tech
— Shailesh Chitnis
Digital platforms, such as Google and Facebook for advertising and Amazon for e-commerce, derive their power by bringing sellers and buyers together in one place. Over time, "network effects" ensure that these platforms achieve monopoly power in the market. Regulators have tried different methods to limit the reach of these platforms. The European Union prefers a rule-based approach to reining in these companies, while the United States M+A policy is focused on preventing market concentration.
Neither has worked particularly well.
Namma Yatri, a small ride-hailing app in Bangalore, may point in another direction. Since its launch last November, the app lists almost a third of the city's 150,000-odd rickshaw drivers on its network and routes 40% of all rickshaw rides. It is now a viable competitor to Ola and Uber, the dominant apps.
Namma Yatri is unique in that it is entirely funded and run by the community. The app is based on the open-source platform Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC), which is a non-profit supported by the Indian government. A private company, Juspay Technologies create the app, and there is no commission fee.
ONDC's concept is to create a common platform where buyers and sellers can easily transact. This is essentially a technological solution that deconstructs a marketplace (see figure below). By abstracting the platform from supply and demand, ONDC seeks to remove some of the barriers of large digital platforms.
ONDC’s approach is not unique. Last week, Bluesky, a new social media platform backed by Twitter’s founder Jack Dorsey, started inviting users to its Twitter-like platform. What makes it different is that the social network is built on a decentralized system. This would allow, in theory, users from multiple social networks, each with its own systems of curation and moderation to interact.
A technology-driven solution that unbundles a marketplace into different pieces may spur more competition. And given India’s success with pushing large-scale digital infrastructure projects, entrenched platforms should pay attention.
Though it’s early days for these platforms, there are a few questions, particularly around their business model.
- Can a community-supported model work for India when our open-source culture isn’t that well-developed?
- If private companies are developing and maintaining applications on the platform, what are the monetization models?
But perhaps, the most important question is about government intervention. With ONDC, if the government actively participates in defining the protocol and in advocating its use, does that influence innovation and natural market evolution?
Antariksh Matters: Challenges for the Indian private space sector
— Pranav R Satyanath
The approval of the new space policy by the Union Cabinet ushers in a new era for the space sector in India. The long-awaited reform, reflected in an 11-page document, details the activities that the commercial space sector can undertake and delineates the roles of three key government agencies: Indian National Space Promotion & Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), and the Department of Space (DoS). We have covered the merits and shortcomings of the policy in a Takshashila blog.
The enthusiasm for the growth of the private space sector is indeed merited, as private entities were largely denied these opportunities in the past. However, there also exists a host of challenges that the Indian private space sector will face in the future. Some of these challenges are rooted in the historical evolution of the space sector in India, while others are created by the structure of market competition in the space sector. To understand the challenges, we must first briefly analyse how the private space sector has evolved to its present state in India.
Evolution of India’s private space sector
Private sector participation in India’s space sector has historically been sparse. This was because space activities were the state’s monopoly for several decades, and ISRO had achieved several feats, such as developing indigenous launch vehicles with limited resources. Indeed, since space was a high-risk and relatively low-reward sector, private entities stayed away from undertaking entire space projects and instead played the role of contractors and subcontractors for manufacturing satellite and launch vehicle components.
Given ISRO’s monopoly over space activities, a regulatory mechanism to oversee national space activities was seen as unnecessary, even after commercial space activities became a viable undertaking for the private sector. ISRO became the de-facto regulator for the private sector as it was the only route through which the private sector could participate in space activities. The absence of a set regulatory framework, therefore, disincentivised major private sector participation.
This affected the evolution of the private sector in three ways. First, due to the large capital required to establish manufacturing facilities for the space sector, the task of taking the role of suppliers fell on the traditional heavy industries who had large resources at their disposal. Second, since the industries largely followed ISRO’s guidelines on design and manufacturing, they had very little incentives to innovate on their own. Finally, an ancillary support industry or the space sector did not flourish as ISRO imported or manufactured key components in-horse. Put together, these factors would go on to place several structural constraints on India’s private space sector.
The challenges for India’s private space sector
With clarity on the regulatory framework, the private space sector is free to pursue activities in both the Upstream sector (which includes satellite manufacturing and launch services) and the Downstream sector (Ground Segment and satellite services). However, the industry must overcome several hurdles before achieving a high degree of competitiveness. This essay focuses on two challenges that are discussed less frequently.
Support from the government
The miniaturisation of satellites has given rise to a new market for satellite service providers, which has, in turn, spurred the demand for launch vehicles. Despite the boom in demand, the private space sector continues to rely on significant government funding to stay in business. For the NewSpace industry, support from the government comes in the form of purchasing services or directly funding the research and development of new technologies.
Consider the example of the launch industry in the United States. Traditionally the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) purchased services from the established space and missile industry through a cost-plus arrangement. The rise of the private space launch market introduced a new fixed-cost model, where NASA and USAF paid for launches on a need basis. Furthermore, NASA has taken significant steps to involve the private industry in human spaceflight, as the national space agency has shaped itself to undertake high-risk exploration missions. The military sector has also taken major steps to integrate the private industry into the procurement ecosystem, making the government a major source of funding for the private space sector.
Such a model of government funding does not exist in India. According to the new space policy, NewSpace India Limited (NSIL), an entity under the DoS, will take responsibility for operating launch vehicles developed by ISRO. Further, ISRO has also stated that it will develop a new reusable launch vehicle to replace the PSLV. There is no indication that either the DOS or the armed forces will fund private launch providers for launch services or develop new launchers.
Due to the long absence of a commercial space policy, India’s private space industry is in its nascent stages. As the industry matures, it will face stiff competition from well-established international players. In this regard, the Union government must be cognizant of the fact that international competitors have some level of backing from foreign governments, which skews their advantage in the international market.
Access to key technologies
The second major challenge to Indian companies arises from the lack of a robust supply ecosystem in India. As mentioned earlier, the evolution of India’s space sector led to a condition where a supporting industry for the space sector had limited incentives to flourish into its full potential. Decades later, a new generation of space entrepreneurs began to rely on foreign suppliers for key components and technologies as they could not find equivalent suppliers domestically. The lack of a domestic space ecosystem has led several space entrepreneurs to shift their establishments to foreign countries, where access to technology, talent and support systems was easier.
Indeed, the NewSpace ecosystem will eventually gain competence as the domestic industry begins to mature and the demand for domestically-manufactured sensors, optics, testing equipment and software increases. During the transition period, however, space startups will continue to rely on foreign suppliers. The process of procuring foreign components is often a roadblock due to the export control regime on dual-use technologies.
Charging forward
While the new policy achieves high marks in several key areas, the transformation of India’s space sector is far from complete. To achieve the vision of augmenting India’s capabilities through the commercial space sector, India needs a National Space Strategy which charts a clear path forward for both civilian and military activities. Such a strategy must lay down the objectives for India’s space programme and seamlessly incorporate the interests of the commercial space sector into the national strategy.
Our Reading Menu
[Book] Traffic: Genius, Rivalry, and Delusion in the Billion-Dollar Race to Go Viral by Ben Smith
[Report] Mapping Biosafety Level-3 Laboratories by Publications by Caroline Schuerger, Sara Abdulla and Anna Puglisi
[Op-ed] CPC’s tryst with private regulatory interventionism by Anushka Saxena
[Podcast] Indian Space Policy - 2023 with Aditya Ramanathan and Narayan Prasad
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com -
Cyberpolitik: The Gell-mann “AI”mnesiac Effect
— Satya Sahu
Here are two screenshots of a hastily written prompt to which ChatGPT dutifully responded almost immediately.
As I read the responses to my prompts, I was painfully aware of the fact that the second passage could very plausibly be attached alongside a doctored image of a scientist holding up a processor die and forwarded countless times on Whatsapp by thousands of my fellow citizens, all overjoyed at the prospect of India finally having become a semiconductor nation. These persuasively written passages contain no usual hallmarks of a shoddy copypasta-like questionable grammar and syntactical errors. The issue evident to anybody familiar with the global semiconductor value chain is that unless the reader of these passages also knows that efforts to produce an indigenous x86 processor are non-existent, they would not be able to discern the falsehood.
While AI can generate realistic and useful content for entertainment, education, research, and communication, it can also produce and disseminate misinformation, propaganda, and fake news. Misinformation is false or inaccurate information that is deliberately or unintentionally spread to influence people’s beliefs, attitudes, or behaviours. Misinformation can have serious negative impacts on individuals and society, such as eroding trust, polarizing opinions, undermining democracy, and endangering public health and safety.
One of the challenges of combating misinformation is that people are often vulnerable to cognitive biases that impair their ability to evaluate the credibility and accuracy of information. One such bias is the Gell-Mann Amnesia effect, coined by Michael Crichton and named after the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Murray Gell-Mann. The Gell-Mann Amnesia effect describes the phenomenon of an expert believing news articles on topics outside of their field of expertise even after acknowledging that articles written in the same publication that are within the expert’s field of expertise are error-ridden and full of misunderstanding. For example, a physicist may read an article on physics in a newspaper and find it full of errors and misconceptions but then turn the page and read an article on politics or economics and accept it as factual and reliable.
The Gell-Mann Amnesia effect illustrates how people tend to forget or ignore their prior knowledge and experience when they encounter new information that is presented by a seemingly authoritative source. This effect can be exploited by AI-generated misinformation, which can mimic the style and tone of reputable media outlets and create convincing content that appeals to people’s emotions, biases, and expectations. AI-generated misinformation can also leverage social media platforms and networks to amplify its reach and influence by exploiting algorithms that favour sensationalism, novelty, and popularity over quality, accuracy, and relevance.
Another challenge in combating misinformation is that large language models (LLMs), the main technology behind AI-generated content, are biased and incomplete. LLMs are trained on massive amounts of text data collected from the internet, which reflect the biases and gaps present in society and culture. LLMs learn to reproduce and amplify these biases and gaps in their outputs, which can lead to harmful and misleading content. One type of bias that LLMs can perpetuate is second-order bias, which is the bias that arises from the way data is organized, categorized, and represented. Second-order bias can affect how LLMs understand and generate information, such as classifying entities, assigning attributes, inferring relationships, and constructing narratives. These can also affect how LLMs interact with users, such as how they respond to queries, provide feedback, and adapt to preferences.
Second-order bias can make misinformation more problematic at scale because it can affect not only the content but also the context and purpose of information. For example, it can influence how LLMs frame and filter information to suit different audiences and agendas, as well as manipulate and persuade users to accept or reject information based on their emotions, biases, and expectations. It can also influence how LLMs conceal or reveal their sources and intentions to users.
All of this is to say that the effort associated with generating false WhatsApp forwards like the example above (but far less benign!) for hundreds of thousands of people at a time is now rendered minuscule. Obviously, the public needs to develop critical thinking and media literacy skills to discern truth from falsehoods on a rapid-fire basis, but the consensus amongst researchers is that there is no silver bullet to this problem.
One can only hope that the human cost of developing AI-fuelled output that is difficult to distinguish from human creative output makes us pause and take stock of the situation. It may, however, be too late.
Matsyanyaaya: Cooperating to Communicate
— Bharath Reddy
The telecommunications network of a country qualifies as critical infrastructure. With the increasing adoption of 5G and the Internet of Things (IoT), almost everything we do will rely on this infrastructure. The recently signed India and US initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) recognises next-generation telecommunications as one of the collaboration domains.
Within this domain, iCET identifies the following two areas for collaboration:
* “Launching a public-private dialogue on telecommunications and regulations.”
* “Advancing cooperation on research and development in 5G and 6G, facilitating deployment and adoption of Open RAN in India, and fostering global economies of scale within the sector.”
These welcome developments aim to address shared challenges for both India and US.
The telecom equipment industry has high entry barriers and is dominated by a handful of vendors. The top four vendors - Ericsson, Nokia, Huawei and ZTE - share around 85% of the Radio Access Network (RAN) market share. Sanctions and bans imposed against Huawei and ZTE further limit vendor choice. The lack of competition in the market could lead to a decline in innovation, an increase in prices and the risk of disrupted supply chains.
Several applications necessary for our daily life, such as communications, autonomous vehicles, and smart cities, require a secure and reliable telecommunication infrastructure. The choice of vendors is critical. It’s no wonder many states have implemented sanctions against Huawei, recognising it as a potential threat to national security. The telecommunications giant has close ties to the Chinese state. Given the geopolitical climate, relying on an adversary to maintain and upgradation of critical infrastructure is not an option.
The companies with the largest RAN market share are full-stack vendors that offer tightly integrated solutions. Open RAN promises to reduce entry barriers by disaggregating the RAN ecosystem. This allows smaller vendors to enter the market by building interoperable and modular components. However, this comes with the risk of complexities in system integration. The responsibility of a reliable and secure system will shift from a single vendor to system integrators and regulators. Given this market dynamic, system integrators and regulators need to develop the skills and capacity to integrate and validate the robustness of such systems.
Chinese companies dominate in 5G/6G standard development organisations such as the 3GPP. The disaggregation caused by adopting Open RAN should enable more innovation and broader participation in standards development. Open RAN adoption is progressing slowly, but it can play a more significant role in 6G. Cooperation between India and US in research and development in 5G, 6G and Open RAN will stand both countries in good stead. It will help build resilient supply chains and technical competence in these critical technologies.
Antariksh Matters: A vehicle worth reusing
— Pranav R Satyanath
On April 2nd, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) conducted an autonomous landing test of the Reusable Launch Vehicle — a spacecraft that looks a lot like an uncrewed spaceplane. The test was indeed unique as the RLV was carried to an altitude of 4.5 km by a helicopter, after which the RLV made an autonomous landing using on-board computers and navigation receivers.
The existence of the vehicle is no secret. The RLV Test Demonstrator has been in development since 2012. In 2016, ISRO mounted the test vehicle on a sounding rocket and carried out the first hypersonic flight experiment. Since then, the RLV has undergone several experiments to test the flight and landing characteristics of the vehicle. Since the vehicle’s inception, ISRO has envisioned the RLV to be a test bed for a launch vehicle that could become fully operational by 2030. Of course, the RLV is more akin to the space shuttle than the reusable rockets used by SpaceX or Blue Origin. The space shuttle, for its part, was far more expensive than what the National Aeronautics and Space Administration first calculated.
So the question remains: will the RLV suffer the same fate? The answer? No. This is because the ISRO’s space plane design is likely to be far smaller and more nimble than the Space Shuttle (the latter was designed to carry both heavy cargo and astronauts). Concepts for space planes have existed since the 1960s, most prominent of which was the Boeing X-20 Dyna-SOAR, which never made it past early testing. The RLV could follow the X-20 style lineage, which inspired space planes like the European Space Agency’s HERMES spacecraft and the DreamChaser mini space shuttle by the private company, Sierra Space. India’s space shuttle, therefore, could eventually develop into a spacecraft that will be mounted on top of the LVM-III rocket and carry astronauts into space.
Those who watch space activities closely will also recognise that the RLV looks rather similar to the Boeing X-37B spaceplane, whose purpose of exitance seems to be shrouded in secrecy. Indeed, as I have written in a previous edition of Technopolitik, the X-37B is far less sinister than it appears. While the spacecraft is used for military purposes, its capabilities are limited to reconnaissance and small satellite deployment.
It would not come as a surprise if the RLV is repurposed for military utility. After all, ISRO’s tweets mention that the test was developed along wide the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Indian Air Force. Having a spaceplane similar to the X-37B will give India’s military space operators the ability to perform rendezvous and proximity operations, including the capability to deploy micro satellite for inspections.
Our Reading Menu
[Book] Algorithmic Modernity: Mechanizing Thought and Action, 1500-2000, edited by Morgan G. Ames and Massimo Mazzotti.
[Article] Engines of power: Electricity, AI, and general-purpose, military transformations by Jeffrey Ding and Allan Dafoe.
[Op-ed] The TikTok Debate Should Start With Reciprocity; Everything Else Is Secondary by David Moschella.
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com -
A new discussion document authored by Shailesh Chitnis provides a pragmatic assessment of India’s capabilities in Artificial Intelligence (AI) today. It proposes one bold idea which, if properly executed, has the potential to catapult the country into a dominant position in the AI race. But why another document about AI strategy for India? The expert from the document is provided below.
Most reports on AI in India follow a predictable pattern. First, they fuss over the potential of AI to alter every aspect of society and the economy. Next, they present eye-watering numbers on the impact of AI on India’s economy. Finally, there’s a mild caution against missing out on this once-in-a-generation boom.
Left unsaid are the steps needed to get there. This is not such a report. It assumes that the reader is astute enough to know the transformational nature of AI. The reader also agrees that over time, this general-purpose technology will permeate every aspect of our lives. The extent of change depends on how successful we are in adopting this technology. But no one, this report hopes, needs to be convinced of the potential pay-off with AI. Instead, this short paper is focused on that space between strategy and outcome, namely execution. It deliberately takes a near-term – three to five years – view in its analysis, since the intent is to spur action.
The problem: Staying behind in the AI race
India is languishing at the bottom of the artificial intelligence (AI) leaderboard when compared with its G20 peers. Other than exporting our best brains, our contributions have been tiny. Even as the gap between the United States and China on one side, and everyone else on the other widens, India's policymakers, researchers, and business leaders have shown little urgency.
The first AI strategy document by the government was released in 2018, a year or so after China had released its detailed, target-linked AI plan. Five years later, India is still in the strategy and consultation phase, while China has left us behind.
We need to shift gears. Our research surveyed the state of AI in India and evaluated various policy options. While there are many recommendations that can be made, we prefer those that are immediate and agile.
Our big idea: BharatAI
AI is mainstream. And, as the preceding sections have demonstrated, India needs to catch up. Fast. Industry leaders can wait for guidance from the government on a roadmap, with defined milestones, ample funds, and coordinated action among industry, the public sector, and academia. But India is not China. Disruptive change will come from the private sector. One approach is to launch a privately funded research lab that works on foundational models for AI. We call this lab BharatAI.
This company, BharatAI, has the potential to become the hub of India's AI innovation ecosystem. Our initial estimate calls is for an investment of roughly $250 million over five years. But an unproven company that requires over $250 mn over five years with no defined product or revenue won’t be flush with investor cash. The mismatch between high upfront costs and a long horizon to recoup the investments, requires patient capital. Hence we propose a pooled investment approach. Similar to a venture capital (VC) fund, BharatAI’s investors will resemble limited partners (LPs) that park their money into this venture for a defined period, say 10 years. In return, they buy equity into the firm but are not involved in the company’s management.
Investors into this company can be of three types.
a. Strategic investment from India's large technology services companies
b. Venture capital funds
c. Private endowments
The company will also have two other backers who will be critical for its success: a platform partner and the government.
The company itself would focus on foundational AI problems with broad applicability. BharatAI should not attempt to develop end-to-end applications. It should instead provide tools through application programming interfaces (APIs) and open-source or licence its models.
A single company, however, can not alter India’s AI trajectory. But it can make a sizeable dent in our efforts to overcome our handicaps.
BharatAI can serve as a talent magnet for high-quality, high-demand engineers. A research lab that is closely tied to industry will also promote a culture of privately-led innovation. Finally, the Indian government is keen on expanding India stack – a set of open APIs and public digital goods – globally. Having an AI layer in the stack that offers countries an alternative to Big Tech capture will be a big benefit.
The full document can be found here: https://takshashila.org.in/research/rebooting-ai-india
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Cyberpolitik: A Recurring Payments Nightmare
— Bharath Reddy
Have you tried to make a recurring card payment to a foreign merchant only to find that your card gets declined? This is not an issue with the card being maxed out; most international payments using Indian credit or debit cards don’t work because merchants find it too cumbersome to comply with India-specific regulations.
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) mandated that from October 1st, 2021, for every recurring transaction below ₹5,000, banks must send a notification at least 24 hours before the renewal date. For amounts over ₹5,000, banks require a one-time password to authorise every transaction. The transaction mandate continues to be a recurring nightmare a year and a half since its introduction. While all recurring transactions faced severe disruptions initially, banks resolved the teething issues, and domestic payments worked after a few months. However, international payments continue to face issues. Publishing an impact assessment study and holding stakeholder consultations could have helped anticipate some problems beforehand. But since these mandates have already been implemented, some exemptions must be made so international payments can be functional again.
Exiting from subscriptions is often deliberately complicated, and people often remain subscribed to services they don’t use. Free trial periods sometimes turn into indefinite subscriptions when users forget to cancel. RBI’s mandate aimed to help customers keep track of their subscriptions and exit unwanted ones. However, implementing these requirements requires coordination across the value chain of consumers, banks, mandate processing platforms, payment aggregators, and merchants. This coordination has not been seamless, and the fallout has caused much pain to businesses and consumers.
The most significant impact has been on businesses whose subscription revenue dried up. Despite the adequate notice given by the RBI, companies, both big and small, had little recourse. The list included OTT platforms, news organisations, non-profits, cloud service providers, and many others. The most significant impact has been on small bootstrapped businesses, which depend on revenue from subscriptions for their day-to-day operations. An additional burden for small subscription-based businesses is the effort that now goes towards manually processing the payments for what was once an automated process.
The mandate also creates hurdles for Indians who subscribe to global content and services. Most international merchants do not comply with RBI’s regulations. In response to queries about declined payments from Indian subscribers, The New York Times has recommended using a valid US credit card for payments! International merchants with a significant Indian customer base might now start supporting UPI. Some might have a mobile app through which one can subscribe, but that would attract a 30% markup due to the commissions charged by Apple or Google. However, for most others, customers have no option. Such hurdles in transacting with global merchants limit customer choice and hinder the ease of doing business. During the transition period, individuals and organisations had to deal with the overhead of manually paying for subscriptions. To date, this continues to be a burden for international subscriptions or for transactions above the threshold for which a one-time password is required for each renewal. The threshold, however, has subsequently been revised to ₹15,000, which has eased some of the burdens.
Before the mandate, there were problems with opting out of subscriptions in some situations, but it worked for most people. The impact of the mandates is unknown, but it has imposed concentrated costs on many businesses and consumers. Holding open consultations and inviting stakeholder comments can help anticipate most of these consequences. Publishing an impact assessment report also helps to build a consensus on the scope of the problem, the costs and benefits involved, and evaluate the impact of the policy.
Since this involves multiple stakeholders across the value chain, coordination has been a challenge. Lower-cost interventions, such as requiring banks to provide consumers with the ability to view and manage their subscriptions, might have also addressed the issue without as many disruptions. However, it’s worth considering whether this is the RBI’s responsibility. As Andy Mukherjee says, “lopsided buyer-seller relationships are a consumer protection problem. The job of a central bank is to provide a well-oiled payment system while safeguarding the integrity of the financial network from money launderers, terrorists, scammers, and hackers. Its targets should not include Netflix Inc. or the New York Times”.
It is unlikely that international merchants without a significantly large Indian customer base will take on the burden of complying with the mandates. It can get quite complex to comply with different regulatory requirements across geographies for the same payment service. Standards that have evolved might not be the most foolproof solution, but they are based on a consensus and ensure seamless interoperability. Given that these mandates have already been implemented across the country, RBI must create an exemption to ensure that international transactions can continue.
Biopolitik: Growing US-China Competition in Biotechnology
— Saurabh Todi
During his remarks at the Special Competitive Studies Project Global Emerging Technologies Summit in February 2021, US NSA Jake Sullivan expressed concern about the potential risks associated with biotechnology. He stated that while biotechnology holds great promise for advancing science and medicine, it also enables the possibility of accidental or intentional misuse. Sullivan further emphasised the need for the responsible and ethical development of biotechnology, including robust regulatory frameworks and international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of dangerous biotechnology. He also called for increased investment in research and development to ensure that the US remained at the forefront of biotechnology innovation.
These remarks indicated the seriousness with which the United States wants to maintain its biotechnology dominance vis-à-vis China. The US President, in September 2021, issued an Executive Order on Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation. The order aims to promote innovation and growth in the biotechnology and biomanufacturing industries. It established a national strategy for biotechnology research and development and initiatives to increase access to funding and support for small and disadvantaged businesses in the field. The order also aims to strengthen the biomanufacturing supply chain and promote collaboration between industry, government, and academic institutions to advance research and development in biotechnology. In September 2022, The United States government announced $2 billion in new investments and resources to advance its National Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Initiative. The investment includes $1.5 billion in funding for research and development, including establishing seven new biomanufacturing institutes across the US. The remaining $500 million will be used to create public-private partnerships to help support the development of new biotechnology products and solutions.
More recently, The US Department of Commerce added several units of Chinese genomics company BGI to its trade blacklist, citing concerns about their alleged ties to the Chinese military and its role in human rights abuses. The move follows earlier restrictions on BGI due to concerns about potential national security risks. The US government has expressed concerns about the Chinese government’s ability to access sensitive personal data collected by companies like BGI, as well as the potential for these companies to use their technologies for military or strategic purposes. The trade blacklist restricts US companies and organisations from exporting certain technologies to the listed companies without a licence from the US government.
These steps seem to align with this report in the New York Times, which indicated last year that the Biden administration is mulling further export controls that would clamp down on China’s ability to access cutting-edge technologies. Just as US-China competition in semiconductors got accelerated due to sanctions imposed by the US, there is a possibility that similar export-control restrictions could be imposed on high-tech biotechnology. The new biotech competition is something to keep an eye on.
Antariksh Matters: Setting your watch to Moon Time
— Aditya Ramanathan
Over the last couple of weeks, even casual followers of outer space news likely came across stories about scientists calling for a standard time for the Moon.
Comments from Pietro Giordano, an engineer at the European Space Agency, prompted the most recent spurt of stories. However, discussions began in earnest at least a year ago. More importantly, the need to agree upon a time-keeping standard is implicit in the ambitious plans that states and private enterprises have outlined for the Moon.
GPS for the Moon
The most ambitious plans for lunar exploration come from the United States, led by its Artemis Program, which looks to create a sustained human presence on the Moon and use it as a springboard for the exploration of Mars. We’ve discussed Artemis and the governance problems it creates in previous editions of this newsletter. What is clear, however, is that Artemis, as well as other more modest programmes outlined by the Europeans, Japan, China, and Russia, would benefit from a reliable lunar navigation, timing and communications infrastructure. In theory, at least, such a system would greatly increase our ability to dispatch crewed and uncrewed missions to the far side of the Moon and the lunar South Pole. It would also be crucial to the planned Lunar Gateway, a US-led project to establish a space station orbiting the Moon. Another project that would need lunar satellite-based support is the European Large Logistics Lander, which is meant to provide uncrewed logistics support to Artemis missions.
The American space agency, NASA, is already pursuing what it calls the Lunar Communications Relay and Navigation Systems or LCRNS. As the name suggests, LCRNS is an effort to put a smaller version of the Earth-bound GPS and communications satellites into lunar orbit. The ESA has a similar project of its own, dubbed Moonlight. Together they form what’s called LunaNet, which, according to NASA, is meant to offer a “set of standards that can enable an open, evolving, cooperative lunar communications and navigation architecture”.
Who Sets the Clocks?
Earth-bound Global Navigation Satellite Systems such as GPS, the European Galileo, China’s BeiDou, and India’s NavIC use onboard atomic clocks and radio signals to determine positions. While accurate timing is an inherent function of any such orbital navigation system, what’s undecided is how to set a time standard for the Moon.
The obvious option is to link lunar time to Earth time. The International Space Station uses Universal Coordinated Time or UTC, essentially the same as Greenwich Mean Time or GMT and is maintained by the Bureau International de Poids et Mesures in Paris, with the help of an array of atomic clocks. The challenge with linking Moon time with Earth time is the effects of gravity. Because the Moon has only 16.6% of Earth’s gravity, it gains about 56 microseconds per Earth day. While such time discrepancies mean little in our daily lives, they can create complications for susceptible systems like satellite navigation.
Ultimately, the business of keeping time on the Moon is both technical and political. Giordano’s call to create a time-keeping standard is evidence that there’s real value to the complexities and drudgery of multilateral lunar governance that draws in all major players, including China, Russia, and India. The US-led Artemis Program and Artemis Accords are no substitutes for formal laws, agreements, and treaties.
Our Reading Menu
[Book] Great Power Politics in the Fourth Industrial Revolution by Glenn Diesen
[Article] Defining the scope of AI regulations by Jonas Schuett
[Discussion Document] Strengthening research, promoting innovation through richer collaboration by Shambhavi Naik
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Matsyanyaaya: Why Apple's teething troubles in India matter
— Shailesh Chitnis
Last year, between April and December, Apple exported more than $2.5bn worth of iPhones from India. Shipments during those eight months were nearly double the previous fiscal year’s (April 2021 - March 2022) total. For India’s “Make in India” ambitions, those numbers are promising.
They are also tiny. According to Bloomberg Intelligence, in 2021, India produced 3 million iPhones. China produced 230 million units during the same period. The sizable difference between the two countries should give decoupling champions some pause.
(Source: Financial Times)
India, or any other country, cannot hope to dislodge the Chinese manufacturing Goliath anytime soon. Apple has a long history in China, going back to 2007. Unwinding its dependence will take time.
The product is also highly complex to assemble. Indian contractors are learning this the hard way. Last month, the Financial Times reported that only half of all components produced at a Tata casing factory passed quality checks. The 50% yield compares poorly with Apple’s goal of zero defects.
Some of these teething troubles are to be expected. Private players such as Tata and Foxconn, Apple’s assembly partner, have strong incentives to fix the problems. But it highlights the difficulty of building a complex manufacturing base in India.
Building an iPhone requires an entire supply chain dedicated to moving components from one contractor to another quickly. In China, private contractors and the local government worked together to win Apple orders at all costs. India must show the same agility between the private and public sectors.
Apple had redesigned the iPhone’s screen at the last minute, forcing an assembly line overhaul. New screens began arriving at the plant near midnight. A foreman immediately roused 8,000 workers inside the company’s dormitories, according to the executive. Each employee was given a biscuit and a cup of tea, guided to a workstation, and within half an hour started a 12-hour shift fitting glass screens into beveled frames. Within 96 hours, the plant was producing over 10,000 iPhones a day.
From: Duhigg, (Charles & Bradsher, Keith) “How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work”. The New York Times. 21 Jan 2012Investing in skilled labour is another imperative. During Apple’s early years in China, the company sent its product designers and engineers to the manufacturing units, sometimes for months at a time. It invested in building custom machinery for some of those contractors. Apple’s level of involvement with China had a transformative effect on the country’s manufacturing and technical capabilities. It spawned an entire network of companies that serviced Apple and its suppliers.
The Indian government wants Apple to make a quarter of all its phones here by 2025. Getting there will require business and public services to scale up in ways they haven’t before.
Apple’s investment in India is critical for both the company and the central government. The company has signalled its intention to wean off its China dependency by publicly embracing alternatives. For India, this is a test of its commitment to move “up the stack” in manufacturing. Failure here will have far-reaching consequences that go beyond a single device manufacturer.
Antariksh Matters: What’s the matter with commercial space stations?
— Pranav R Satyanath
Last week, the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) released two new documents which outline expectations for new commercial space stations. The documents outline NASA’s operational and technical expectations from the new commercial space stations and add a new layer of nuance to NASA’s plan for transitioning from operating on the International Space Station (ISS) and conducting all Low Earth Orbit (LEO) operations on commercial space stations.
The ISS is the largest human-built structure in the Earth’s orbit. It is also a really old structure, with the first module of the ISS being launched in 1998. The ISS is also a testament to international cooperation in space, as it brought together Canada, Europe, Japan, Russia and the United States to collaborate on a massive space project. The ISS has stood strong despite all the difficulties thrown at it — from geopolitical tensions to space debris. But it needs a replacement, perhaps before the end of this decade.
To Bolding Go Commercial
The retirement of the ISS was initially slated for 2024, but the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to extend its life through 2030. To replace the ISS, however, NASA has taken a bold route and decided to place all its bets on commercial entities. Although the US made Artemis its primary space policy goal, it still maintains an interest in LEO. Under the Commercial LEO Development (CLD) programme, NASA aims to commercialise LEO activities by opening the ISS for commercial activities and transitioning to research commercially-owned space stations by 2030.
Funding for new commercial space stations began in 2021 under the new CLD programme. NASA has funded three commercial entities to develop a private space station:
• Blue Origin (with Sierra Space) for the Orbital Reef space station: $130 million.
• Nanoracks (with Voyager Space Lockheed Martin) for the Starlab space station: $160 million.
• Northrop Grumman for a free-flyer space station: $125.6 million.
Further, NASA has also contracted Axiom Space for $140 million to develop and build a commercial module for the ISS over seven years.
These new commercial stations will be far smaller than the ISS. They will, perhaps, also cater to customers beyond national space agencies and cater to space tourists and high-paying nations that do not have their own astronaut programmes.
Getting Commercial Space Stations Going
So what are the challenges of getting commercial space stations up into space? First, it’s the funding. When the ISS first came into being, it had already cost a billion dollars in the 1980s to complete initial designs. Even today, the ISS consumes about a $ 3.1 billion dollars each year for operations and maintenance. Commercial space stations, meanwhile, will have to operate in a substantially together financial situation. A 2021 report by NASA’s Inspector General warned that the CLD programme vastly underestimates the costs of developing commercial space stations and that NASA has set itself the ambitious goal of transitioning to private space stations by 2028.
Second, if NASA goes through with the CLD programme without international partners, it risks losing the long-standing international collaboration that it has built with the Canadian Space Agency, and European Space Agency and has held since the 1970s. In February 2022, for example, the head of ESA’s Washington office, Sylvie Espinasse, said that the idea of purchasing commercial services from American companies in the future would not be an entirely acceptable option for European partners.
Finally, commercial space stations may not meet all of NASA’s space research requirements. The newly released documents, for example, highlight that the agency wants to conduct anywhere between 130-250 experiments each year. It also estimates to transfer of about 5000 km of cargo to commercial stations each year. Of course, NASA will likely be given priority on board the new space stations when they enter service. However, the agency might not have the same level of control or flexibility when operating in a station built by companies that also want to profit from activities such as tourism.
The commercial space station programme we know today may turn out very differently five years later. After all, commercial space is new territory for everyone, including NASA.
Cyberpolitik: First steps to better regulate military AI
— Atharwa Sarnobat
Artificial Intelligence, or AI, in recent days, has seen a resurgence of interest mainly due to the popularity of natural language AIs such as ChatGPT, which has captivated our imaginations with responses that simulate human conversations somewhat realistically. Similarly, governments around the world concerned with the use of AI in warfare convened for REAIM or the Summit on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain conference held at The Hague in the Netherlands. The joint conference was organised by the Netherlands and Korean governments and focused on the impact and regulation of AI in warfare.
The conference was out together with three specific aspects in mind:
* Countries wanted to understand how AI played a role in warfare.
* Countries wanted to get a clear picture of AI’s current and potential future impact in warfare.
* Participants of the conference wanted to gain clarity on what the current legislative situation looked like and how that could be remedied by recommending newer legislation that could properly govern AI in warfare.
The conference highlighted a few ideas and brought them to the forefront of the discourse around AI in warfare, such as the fact that autonomous weapons systems were great from a tactical perspective since they put fewer humans in the line of fire and they could potentially even take the jobs of peacekeepers in the future. It was also understood that while much of the world did not want “killer robots” on the battlefield, a complete ban could not be achieved since the genie could not be put back in the bottle, and these weapons systems were here to stay.
The conference also recognised that the public discourse over the regulation of AI in warfare was severely lagging and that had to be remedied if effective laws governing its use were to be drafted and enacted by governments. It also noted that AI in warfare was a technological domain where nations were engaged in a technological arms race to maintain or achieve their superiority in the global context. A few areas of concern were identified regarding the regulation of AI in warfare. One central area of concern highlighted was the postulation that using AI in warfare would lower the threshold for using force in a conflict or armed engagement. Another was the idea that humans would be required to monitor AI weapons systems such as loitering munitions since these systems had not reached a stage where they could make those decisions by themselves.
Some participants recommended potential solutions, which proposed minimum acceptable levels for human control. The conference also recognised that old treaties on warfare needed to be updated to regulate military AI. Nations must also eliminate a high threshold approach to regulating military AI since these systems have broad use cases. Therefore, counties made the case that context-specific regulation was the only way forward.
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Antariksh Matters #1: Can India and the US Head into Space Together?
— Aditya Ramanathan
India and the United States have taken a modest leap towards greater cooperation in space.
Last week, the two countries’ national security advisers, Ajit Doval and Jake Sullivan, kicked off the first meeting of the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology or iCET. First set up in 2022, the focus of iCET was to enhance technological cooperation in defence as well as other sectors. A fact sheet released after the meeting outlined new avenues of India-US cooperation in defence technology, semiconductor supply chains, 5G, and space.
We’ll be providing our take on some aspects of the iCET soon, but in this Technopolitik entry, I’ll focus on the bits about space.
Three steps outlined in the factsheet stand out. One, the two sides have agreed to train an Indian at the NASA Johnson Space Center, the main facility for training American astronauts. Two, both countries have also agreed to figure out how Indian companies can participate in NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) programme. Three, the factsheet outlines initiatives to increase commercial space cooperation and interaction between academics and experts.
Let’s start with human spaceflight. On India’s Independence Day in 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that the Indians would be launched into space on an indigenous mission in 2022 named Gaganyaan. That ambitious plan fell behind schedule, largely thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic. At present, the first Indians are not scheduled to go into orbit only in the last quarter of 2024. Two uncrewed launches will precede the mission to send Indians into orbit to test various parameters of the human-rated spacecraft..
Starting in 2020, four Indian Air Force (IAF) officers also began training at Russia’s Yuri Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Centre for the Gaganyaan mission. While their training was spectacularly ill-timed - starting right at the onset of the pandemic - they nevertheless completed the course in a year. However, with Russia’s space programme financially constrained and heavily sanctioned because of the country’s ongoing war with Ukraine, India is clearly looking to diversify. While the agreement to train Indian spacefarers in the United States may have come too late to speed up the schedule for the first Gaganyaan launch, it is an important step in India’s hunt for a reliable partner to train its ‘vyomanauts’ as ISRO has called them.
India and the US have also inched closer towards cooperating on lunar exploration. The fact sheet commits ISRO and NASA to bring together Indian private sector space companies and American companies involved in the CLPS programme. CLPS is part of America’s expansive plans to return to the Moon sustainably. While NASA is to focus on some of the big-ticket projects like sending humans to the lunar surface, CLPS allows private companies to take scientific payloads from NASA and others to the Moon on uncrewed spacecraft. NASA’s goal is to act as a primary customer for these private missions until they become commercially viable and self-sustaining.
By engaging India with CLPS, the US appears to have two goals. One is to find Indian customers for the American CLPS companies. The other is to involve India in the US-led multinational effort to return to the Moon. Much of this comes under the rubric of what the US calls the Artemis programme. Countries that want to join the Artemis programme are required to sign the Artemis Accords, a series of ten principles governing lunar activity. While most of these principles are innocuous aspects of existing international law, a few, like those that allow the use of lunar resources and call for ‘deconfliction,’ raise concerns about the creation of de facto private real estate or even de facto sovereign territory on the Moon.
By last count, 23 states including the US were part of the Artemis Accords. India has not signed up, evidently because it is concerned that the accords create a parallel legal framework that is designed to primarily serve US interests and impinge on India’s own lunar ambitions.
If Indian companies decide to become customers or even partners in the CLPS, it will be interesting to see if they are implicitly or even explicitly expected to agree to some of the Artemis principles.
The third important aspect of space cooperation outlined in the factsheet is a handful of steps to encourage greater commercial space cooperation and interaction between experts on both sides. India’s Department of Space and the US’ Department of Commerce are to lead a new initiative under the existing Civil Space Joint Working Group or CSJWG to “foster U.S.-India commercial space engagement and enable growth and partnerships between U.S. and Indian commercial space sectors.” While such initiatives may seem minor, they can help pave the way for Indian and American space companies to forge productive partnerships in a heavily regulated sector.
Finally, the fact sheet also announces steps to make “talent exchanges” easier and increase interaction between ISRO and NASA personnel. While these initiatives don’t address some of the gripes Indian private space companies have with visa rules, they are obviously intended to build trust between the two countries’ national space agencies, which have long looked at each other warily.
Biopolitik: The Promise of Gene Drive
— Saurabh Todi
Gene drives are genetic elements of an organism that are transmitted to progeny at higher than mendelian frequencies (>50%). Gene editing techniques such as CRISPR–Cas9 have made gene drives extremely efficient in laboratory settings and have shown the potential to reduce the prevalence of vector-borne diseases, crop pests, and non-native invasive species. Research in gene drives, especially on mosquitoes, is being carried out by scientists at the University of California, San Diego, Texas A&M University, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, among others. However, concerns have been raised regarding the potential unintended consequences, especially in terms of the ecological impact of gene-drive systems.
Reducing the incidence of vector-borne diseases has become a technology demonstrator for gene drive technology. Mosquitoes engineered with gene drive systems can pass specific genes to the next generation at higher than Mendelian inheritance rates (>50%). This ensures that the target gene spreads through the wild-type mosquito population, despite some associated fitness costs. Gene-drive mosquito techniques work in two major ways: They reduce the population of mosquitos (population suppression); or modify (population replacement) a given vector population.
Population suppression involves the release of modified male mosquitoes to suppress vector populations to a level which makes it difficult to sustain malaria transmission. Population suppression strategies are based on the inactivation, or knock-out, of genes which aim to reduce fertility or production of female progeny or are biased towards higher production of male progeny (which do not bite). In a small study, gene drive mosquitoes wiped out captive populations of mosquitoes in just eight to twelve generations. In contrast, the population replacement method aims to reduce the ability of a mosquito to transmit the malaria pathogen. Population replacement strategies are based on the inactivation of genes that enable mosquitoes to be effective vectors. For example, many potential effector genes have been identified to impair the development of Plasmodium parasites (that cause malaria) by Anopheles mosquitoes (the vector).
The use of either population replacement or population suppression would depend on their relative strengths and challenges in the given situation. For example, population replacement can provide a level of environmental safety because it would not result in the elimination of an ecological niche that an opportunistic invasive species could occupy. However, it is a risky approach because the genetic modification will remain in the environment forever, increasing the likelihood of unintended consequences. To address these concerns, scientists are working on ways to reduce the risk of the unintentional spread of a gene drive mosquito and to ensure researchers hold much more control over their safe manipulation. Scientists at the University of California, San Diego, may have found a way to reduce this risk. They have created a flexible genetic "hacking" system for converting split gene drives (sDGs) into full gene drives (fGDs) while reducing the risk of using the latter.
Although gene drive technology to eliminate vector-borne diseases such as Malaria hasn't been commercialised yet, it holds promise to reduce the scourge of this disease, which causes upwards of 600,000 deaths annually, predominantly in Africa.
Antariksh Matters #2: Reducing Space Threats, Round 3
— Pranav R Satyanath
In the previous edition of Technopolitiik, we covered the recommendations from our discussion document for our OEWG. On a positive note, that version of the document was published as a working paper for the OEWG. But not all was positive in the third round, as we shall see.
Disagreements among states must not shock us. It is exactly what was expected of the group. It seems, however, that the OEWG is widening the divide between some member-states rather than bridging them. More prevailingly, the third meeting of the OEWG also revealed that states do not agree on the working procedures of the group, something that could eventually threaten to derail the entire OEWG process. I identified two issues that could cause deadlocks in the final round of the OEWG, which will be held in August this year.
1. Consensus about consensus: The first major issue that occupied the minds of the member-states was regarding the procedure of the OEWG. The issue of consensus arose when Russia and China protested the participation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) during the formal session of the OEWG. They argued that since members disagree on the status of NGOs, no consensus can be reached; therefore, agreeing on the participation of NGOs is invalid. The Chair, on his part, ruled the participation of NGOs in the formal sessions as valid since no consensus could be reached.
Russia, China and other states interpreted the Chair’s move as divergence from the OEWG’s mandate and, therefore, an abuse of the Chair’s power. Russia protected the participation of NGOs into the second day, arguing that the lack of consensus about consensus threatens the future of OEWG, including the adoption of a final outcome paper.
2. International Humanitarian Law: The status of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) was already a contested issue in the opening meeting of the OEWG. The contest over the status of IHL grew all the more intense in the third round. China, for its part, argued that invoking IHL would mean accepting outer space as a domain of armed conflict since IHL deals with customary laws of armed conflict. Therefore, applying IHL would mean that states automatically classify outer space as a domain for warfighting. Russia echoed these sentiments while also arguing that Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) already enables the partial demilitarisation of space. Accepting the applicability of IHL in space, in Russia’s logic, would overturn the principles of the OST.
Of course, the issue of the need for pure legally-binding instruments and the status of non-legally-binding measures persist between states. These matters might sound mundane to many, including veterans of the space sector. However, it is important to note that with no common principles for governing space, we may end up in a situation where no advancements are made to govern the use of dual-use technologies or the deployment of space-based conventional armaments.
Resolving the debates about the founding principles of outer space security, safety, and sustainability is essential to achieve stable, universally-applicable treaties.
Our Reading Menu
[Twitter Thread] Why does chatGPT make up fake academic papers? by David Smerdon
[Report] Controlling the innovation chain: China’s strategy to become a science & technology superpower
[Paper] Digital Power China
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com -
Matsinaya: Backdoors to state control
— Shailesh Chitnis
The Chinese government has signalled a shift in how it plans to control big tech. This month, news reports emerged that state-owned enterprises are set to take a 1% stake in two of its most prominent tech companies, Alibaba and Tencent.
Euphemistically dubbed "golden shares," this small stake grants special privileges and gives the government an outsized role in how these companies are run. Typically, these shares come with a board seat and the right to review or veto any content decisions. The stake in Alibaba was acquired by an investment fund set up by the Cyberspace Administration of China, the country's central internet regulator and censor.
So far, the arrangement seems to target companies with a significant user base for online content. Alibaba owns social media entities, including Youku, the Chinese version of YouTube, and the web browser UCWeb. Tencent operates Tencent Video, a popular Chinese streaming service. In April 2021, the government paid around 2M Rmb (~$290K) for a percent share in ByteDance Technology, the parent of TikTok.
Golden shares, known in China as "Special management shares" have been around since 2015 as a mechanism to control online content platforms. But over the past three years, the government has preferred more direct intervention to curtail what it perceives as an overreach by some of its largest companies. In October 2020, Alibaba controlled Ant Financial's IPO listing, which valued the company at a staggering $313 billion, which was pulled at the last minute. In July 2021, the ride-hailing app company Didi was banned from accepting new users over data privacy concerns. In the same month, China's edtech sector was crushed overnight when the government announced rules preventing these companies from making profits, raising capital, or going public.
With the Chinese economy faltering and Xi Jinping's coronation completed, Beijing appears to be taking a subtler path to control its biggest technology companies. Business leaders may see this as a preferable approach to more aggressive and, at times, unpredictable regulation. Having a government representative on the board will reduce the companies' independence. But there is less scope for sudden rule changes since the insider would be privy to all content moderation decisions. However, shareholders of these companies, in particular overseas investors, won't be too happy with this arrangement. They will have less visibility and control over how the business operates.
These concerns are now playing out publicly in how TikTok is trying to operate in the US. This month, the company shared details of a proposal that would spin off the US arm into a separate entity owned by ByteDance but entirely operated by US government-approved employees. It has also offered to allow Oracle and other third-party monitors to review its video recommendation algorithm. In the absence of a deal, the company is worried that it will be forced to sell its US operations or leave the market.
ByteDance's travails highlight how difficult it will be for Chinese-owned companies to straddle both the US and Chinese markets.
Antariksh Matters: Opening the doors for redressing orbital dangers
— Pranav R Satyanath
Over the past several issues of Techopolitik, we have covered several issues surrounding the weaponisation of space and the threats faced by satellites. One topic of particular interest has been the discussions and deliberations within the Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats (OEWG).
We began covering the OEWG back in May 2022, when the group held its first meeting in Geneva. The second meeting of the OEWG was help in September. And in 2023, we approach the third meeting of the OEWG.
Much of the deliberations of the OEWG have been covered in a discussion document released in July 2022. During the deliberations, however, it became evident that India did little to be vocal about its own preferences for space risk reduction. After months of lamenting India’s lack of proactiveness, we at the Takshashila Institution have put down our set of recommended approaches for India to pursue at the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations. The new discussion document titled, “Redressing Orbital Dangers: Approaches to Advance India’s Interests in Outer Space,” also provides an analysis of the US-led moratorium destructive DA-ASAT testing and India’s position on space risk reduction. Here’s an executive summary:
In December 2022, the United Nations overwhelmingly adopted a resolution that called for states to commit not to carry out destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests. The proposed destructive DA-ASAT missile test moratorium does not restrict the research, development and deployment of counterspace capabilities. India, however, abstained from voting on the resolution and indicated its preference for legally-binding instruments. Moreover, India has yet to put forward its proposals for members of international fora to pursue. This document recommends four approaches which India can pursue to secure its interests. These recommendations are:
* Pursue legally-binding instruments which ban the destructive testing of anti-satellite capabilities in outer space.
* Advocate for mutual proximity notifications wherein states notify one another during close approaches or when one satellite operator notices unusual satellite behaviour by another operator.
* Promote sharing space situational awareness data to increase the knowledge of the space environment and build transparency and confidence between states.
* Advance existing norms, rules and responsible behaviours in outer space by adopting and strengthening non-legally-binding measures.
No single recommended approach can redress all the threats in space. India must therefore advocate for multiple approaches in tandem to achieve peace and prosperity in outer space.
Cyberpolitik: Closing all backdoors through open-source
— Bharath Reddy
Open-source software (OSS) can help India achieve techno-strategic autonomy, economic growth, technology leadership, and skill development. As India takes on the G20 presidency, it needs to champion the adoption of OSS and create a sustainable ecosystem around it. A pledge by G20 countries to follow an OSS-first procurement policy that opts for proprietary closed-source solutions only when OSS options are unavailable can go a long way in creating an affordable and accessible common digital future.
The rise of platforms and cloud-based services is a significant cause for concern in the information age. Big tech companies wield enormous power as gatekeepers of platforms. Network effects and vertically integrated services make it increasingly difficult for users to opt-out. User data often ends up being locked in silos. The need to have ownership and sovereignty over one’s data is increasingly being recognised as an essential consideration in determining our choice of software.
France and Germany have recognised the perils of having government communication on siloed big tech platforms such as Slack, Teams, WhatsApp or Telegram. They have taken the lead in moving government communication to a decentralised platform based on the Matrix open standard. France and Germany also have, to different extents, banned Microsoft’s Office 365 and Google Workspace, citing concerns around compliance with GDPR and data sovereignty.
These moves recognise that we live in an environment of increasing geopolitical risks. OSS offers a path to techno-strategic autonomy and data sovereignty. It provides unfettered access to secure, reliable and transparent technologies and ensures that data ownership stays with the users.
The ominous term surveillance capitalism accurately describes the practice followed by tech companies to exploit users' personal data for advertising-driven profit. Surveillance capitalism thrives on the power of platforms. Tech companies have convinced users to trade our privacy for convenience to such an extent that they can predict our behaviour and influence it. We need software and algorithms that are transparent and inspire trust. If we indeed want to mitigate surveillance, open-source is the way to go.
Building software using OSS components is now the de-facto model. Reusable modular OSS components can reduce costs and speed up the development process. A recent study shows that almost 97% of commercial software contains open-source code. This increased reliance on OSS puts additional strain on the communities of developers who maintain the code. Maintenance of OSS, including feature updates, bug fixes, and security updates, is a significant strain on the developers maintaining this code. Given that OSS forms the backbone of most software, a sustainable ecosystem with a contribution culture is essential.
Governments are some of the biggest purchasers of software and IT services. The union government already has a soft preference for OSS in software procurement. Current IT procurement policies, such as the e-Governance Policy Initiatives under Digital India of 2015, state that the government shall endeavour to adopt OSS in e-governance systems and that OSS should be mandatorily considered as one of the options. A stronger preference for OSS in government purchases can go a long way in creating a sustainable open-source ecosystem. IT procurement policies of the union and state governments should mandate that all software purchased through tax-payer funding be open-source. Proprietary and closed technologies should be considered only where adequate OSS technologies are not an option.
"Public Money? Public Code!" can be the guiding principle for government software purchases. In practice, this will lead to tax-payer-funded software having the freedom for everyone to use, modify, study, change and redistribute. The trickle-down effects will benefit society as a whole.
OSS is an integral part of our common digital future, and promoting it will lead to economic growth and skill development. It will promote open standards and interoperability. It will also lead to skill development, job creation and entrepreneurship. All of these benefits are aligned with the objectives of the G20 in promoting an affordable and accessible common digital future. Investing in OSS will also help countries of the global south access state-of-the-art technologies.
Adopting an OSS-first procurement policy by the G20 countries can create strong incentives for a vibrant open-source ecosystem. India must lead the way by adopting such a policy and champion other countries to pledge to do the same. In addition, G20 countries should also create a common fund which shall be used to fund critical OSS projects. The multiplier effects for the economy will far exceed the costs incurred towards maintaining these projects.
Our Reading Menu
[Blog] TikTok is a New Type of Superweapon by Gurwinder.
[Article] Trust but verify: Satellite reconnaissance, secrecy and arms control during the Cold War by Aaron Bateman.
[Report] Software Power: The Economic and Geopolitical Implications of Open Source Software by Alice Pannier
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com -
A happy new year to all our readers! To kickstart this year’s edition of Technopolitik, we have assembled a list of predictions for 2023 across tech sectors, ranging from online regulation, biotech and outer space. Maybe we can take stock of these predictions and see how much of it we got wrong (or right) at the end of this year!
Beginning from this edition, we also introduce a new section to our newsletter called Biopolitik, while will cover all the fascinating tidbits about the biotechnology industry and its intersection with policy and politics.
Be sure to check out our Reading Menu. This edition lists some of the best books that the authors have read from last year. With that, we wish you a great year ahead!
Cyberpolitik #1: Regulatory tech battles in India
— Shailesh Chitnis
Big tech is vulnerable. For the first time in big-tech history, technology platforms are confronting slowing growth and bottom-line pressures. Aggressive expansion during the pandemic years has given way to cost-cutting during a cooling economy.
Amazon recently announced plans to cut 18,000 workers, mostly in the retail, recruiting and devices businesses. Meta, the parent of Facebook and Instagram, has cut more than 11,000 workers, or about 13% of its staff. It's a similar story across other platforms — Salesforce, Snap, Twitter — no one seems immune.
Against this backdrop, regulators are getting more active in reigning in what they see as an overreach by these platforms. In the past, Indian regulators had given technology platforms a free hand. But increasingly, the Indian government has signalled its intention to shape the country's technology landscape.
In a series of rulings in October, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) fined Google almost Rs. 2,300 crores for abusing dominance with its Android operating system and the Play Store. The government is also getting into specifics of technology implementation with new rules around standardising chargers (USB-C) and upholding consumers' right-to-repair for devices.
In 2023, expect more activity. The gatekeeping role of Apple and Google, which they exercise through their app stores, will be challenged. But since commissions from these stores are a significant revenue source for both these companies, any moves to change this structure will be a long legal battle. With the government's active role in market design, expect more public battles between incumbent tech and the government. Adding to the tech vs regulators battle, India will also be gearing up for general elections in 2024. As the elections draw closer, we can expect the conversations and controversies on the role of social media platforms in disseminating information to be pitched even further.
Indeed, 2022 was a busy year for technology policy-making with the semiconductor manufacturing policy and a revised draft of the much-awaited digital data protection bill. But this year, the government has promised to introduce a complete overhaul of the IT Act, which governs much of the digital ecosystem. The IT Act was passed in 2000 and needs to be set up for all the complexity of the internet today - from intermediaries and platforms to AI and data privacy. We also expect the bill's first draft to cover a wide range of online platforms, including social media sites, e-commerce entities and ad-tech platforms.
This act can have far-reaching consequences for businesses and civil society since all problems are now technology problems in some form.
Biopolitik: Pandemics and regulatory politics
— Saurabh Todi
The World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2023 is expected to accelerate negotiations on a draft international pandemic treaty governing prevention, preparedness, and response to future pandemics. The World Health Assembly (WHA) in December 2021 launched the process of negotiating a historical global accord. It established an International Negotiating Body (INB) to formulate a 'WHO convention, agreement or another international instrument' to aid a united global response to any infectious disease crises in the future.
Countries felt the need for a new treaty due to various challenges made conspicuous by the experience of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. These include equitable distribution of vaccines and health services among and within countries, knowledge and data sharing, and strengthening countries' capabilities to respond to health emergencies. Although there has been a broad consensus on the ways of working and broad policies that will guide this process, there are also significant disagreements between member states.
A central sticking point is the legal nature of this treaty. While the majority of the WHO member states favour a legally-binding instrument, there are differences in how to approach this issue. For example, the WHA has agreed to adopt the global instrument under Article 19 of the WHO constitution, which enables the assembly to draw up binding agreements on a wide range of issues under its mandate. But some countries want the treaty to fall under Article 21, which limits the number of topics that can have binding agreements. Furthermore, some prefer "non-legally binding recommendations" in the draft.
In December 2022, at the third meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB), a Conceptual Zero Draft (CZD) of the instrument was released, which has been developed by the Bureau of the INB following widespread consultation. During the meeting, the task fell on INB to develop a "zero draft" in order to start negotiations at the fourth INB meeting scheduled for February 2023. The WHO has committed itself to a timeline where INB will deliver a progress report to the 76th World Health Assembly in 2023 and; submit an outcome document for consideration by the 77th World Health Assembly in 2024.
Interestingly, India has maintained a studied silence over its position on this proposed treaty. As an advocate of the interests of the global south, it must ensure the security of the interests of the developing countries during these negotiations. Given the difference of opinion among countries on these issues, it would be interesting to see how the global community reaches a consensus on this crucial initiative.
Antariksh Matters: A Space Policy at Last?
— Aditya Ramanathan
Against my better judgement, I am going to make predictions that may be largely wrong. First, the easy part: sometime in 2023, the Indian government will release a Space Policy. While the release of this policy has been long-promised, it is more likely than not to be finally made public this year.
Now, the more difficult part: predicting some of the broad contours of the policy. I’ll start with some brief background. In 2017, the government released a draft Space Activities Bill for comments. The bill was an important step in laying down a legal framework under which space companies can operate. However, the feedback wasn’t good. The bill had vague definitions and granted excessive discretionary authority to government officials. As an example of vagueness, the bill only covered Indians or private entities registered in India, leaving foreign collaborators in a regulatory dead zone.
Similarly, it defined ‘space activity’ so broadly that even a start-up doing preliminary research and development might find itself coping with a barrage of licensing requirements. The draft bill also offers little clarity on liability. India is a signatory to the 1972 Liability Convention, which makes states liable for damage caused by space activities. The bill simply states that the government will decide the amount of money for which a private entity is liable - the sort of provision that is virtually guaranteed to scare off investors.
A lot has changed since 2017. The government has pledged to revise the 2017 draft bill based on comments received. It has also created the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe) to act as a nodal agency for private space companies. The next steps are to release a Space Policy followed by the heavily modified Space Activities Bill. So here are my three predictions for the Space Policy:
One, the policy will be genuinely oriented towards encouraging private sector space activity and will identify it as a key priority for India. There’s enough evidence that the government takes this seriously. The private space economy is (rightly or wrongly) seen as an important component of the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” vision of a self-reliant India. The space economy is also seen as a key catalyst for high-technology industries. The Indian Prime Minister’s push for the creation of the industry body Indian Space Association (ISpA) is indication enough that this support extends to the apex of the political leadership.
Two, despite this commitment to private industry, the verbiage of the space policy will still place the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) at the centre of India’s space aspirations. Indeed, it is quite likely that the policy will consider the primary role of India’s private sector to be a supporting ecosystem for ISRO rather than a dynamic entity in its own right. This is a somewhat shakier prediction to make, and it is, more than anything else, a hunch based on statements made by ISRO officials and an awareness of the influence ISRO and the Department of Space wield.
Three, the policy will likely offer a potential solution to the issue of liability. I suspect the proposal it will come up with is the creation of a space liability fund that can act as a sort of insurance pool. Typically, such funds will be built by space companies pledging a portion of their profits, but the details would probably only become clear in the Space Activities Bill.
So that’s my largely optimistic prediction for 2023. Whatever the actual outcomes, we’ll dissect them in detail for you in this newsletter.
Cyberpolitik #2: In Service of the Digital Public Infrastructure
— Bharath Reddy
As we enter 2023, we will see increased deployment of different facets of digital public infrastructure (DPI). As we have seen with UPI, this can lead to financial inclusion and empowerment of citizens, but it comes at the cost of centralising platforms in the hands of the government.
Different facets of DPI, such as the Account Aggregator framework, Open Credit Enablement Network, UHI for health, and enhancements to Aadhaar and Digilocker, are expected to be deployed and adopted widely. These improvements will likely lead to the seamless delivery of services and unlock easy access to citizens' data across different silos.
In addition to this, as Rahul Matthan writes, DPI will also serve as a techno-legal framework for data governance. Across the world, governing how data is collected and used has proved to be a challenge. Regulations have yet to be successful. Companies have been able to circumvent the law, and the capacity required for enforcement is also relatively high. Moreover, since DPI can be encoded into the public infrastructure, they might offer a better solution for compliance. Requests for data, consent and provision of minimal purpose-specific data can be built into the infrastructure, making compliance easier to enforce.
However, these advantages come at the cost of concentrating power over the platforms in the hands of the state. The state has access to large amounts of citizens' personal data and is responsible for safeguarding it. It also has regulatory control and gatekeeping privileges for these critical platforms.
Concerns over regulatory access are critical given that we expect the Digital Personal Data Protection Bill (DPDPB) and Telecom Bill to be tabled in Parliament this year. The broad exemptions granted to government entities and the lack of independence of the proposed Data Protection Board in the draft DPDPB, 2022, are a cause for concern. The draft Telecom Bill 2022 has expansive definitions and allows for greater state surveillance.
Since both bills have received comments already, we can expect them to be passed this year. The checks and balances they will enforce will play a crucial role.
Our Reading Menu
[Book] Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology by Chris Miller.
[Book] 10% Human: How Your Body’s Microbes Hold the Key to Health and Happiness by Allana Collen.
[Book] Human-Build World: How to Think about Technology and Culture by Thomas P. Hughes.
[Book] The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the Digital Economy by Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz.
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com -
Matsyanyaaya #1: Opening up to open-tech
— Bharath Reddy
"Open Tech" refers to transparent, inclusive technology and embodies the freedom to use, study, modify and redistribute to the maximum extent possible. The definitions of open-source software, open standards, and open-source hardware are well understood. "Open Tech" is an umbrella term that includes all of these technology areas.
The usual arguments promoting open source technologies highlight reducing costs, avoiding vendor and technology lock-in, and the ability to customise. But, given the current geopolitical climate, access to state-of-the-art technology cannot be taken for granted. Supply chain resilience and tech sanctions are a cause for serious concern.
The acquisition of advanced technologies is not an end in itself, but a means to bring peace and prosperity to all Indian citizens. Unhindered access to state-of-the-art technology and foundational knowledge is, therefore, in India's national interest. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar echoed this sentiment when he said India "cannot be agnostic about technology" as there is "a strong political connotation in-built into technology".
Open tech can help India achieve techno-strategic autonomy, economic growth, technology leadership, and skill development. The "openness" also helps foster trust, broaden access to technology and further democratic values.
Open tech, by its nature, is both non-rival (its use by someone does not diminish the utility to others) and non-excludable (its access cannot be denied to anyone). In economic terms, this qualifies it as a public good. As we see with other public goods, such as clean air or street lights, the incentives are weak for markets or individuals to tend to the maintenance and upkeep of public goods. This is visible in one of the main problems facing open-source software today.
A recent study shows that almost 97% of all commercial software uses open-source code. A large number of open-source projects are maintained by individuals or small communities of developers without adequate funding. This growing reliance on open-source software increases the burden on maintainers of this code to keep the software secure, bug-free and up-to-date.
Other areas, such as the open-source hardware, are in a nascent stage, and India could gain a valuable head-start given a favourable policy environment. This is especially important given the silicon geopolitics playing out between the US and China.
Open standards have a range of benefits, such as removing entry barriers, promoting interoperability, and lowering costs. The government needs to encourage the promotion of open standards and also represent India-specific requirements at various international Standard Development Organisations.
The existing policy landscape includes a preference for open-source software in procurement and a policy on standards for e-governance at the Union and State governments. However, given the growing importance of open tech, a comprehensive open tech strategy is indispensable.
This short essay is a preview of an upcoming Takshashila Report on an open tech strategy for India.
Apply here: https://bit.ly/pgp-jan23-nl
Antariksh Matters: Buying space power?
— Pranav R Satyanath
Earlier this week, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) launched its first rover, Rashid, towards the Moon’s surface. The rover was carried on a Falcon-9 rocket along with a miniature rover from the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). But there’s a catch. The UAE did not build the Rashid rover, but it was built under contract by a Japanese private space venture called ispace. When we think of space-faring nations of the world, the UAE does not immediately strike a chord.
However, the desert country has big space ambitions for the next decade. It has signed the US-led Artemis Accords. It has also signed an agreement with China to collaborate on future Moon missions. This is a surprising move since China has opposed the Artemis Accords and challenged its legality in the broader context of international space law. The country also boasts a full-fledged Mars programme. In March 2021, UAE became the first Arab country to place a probe in Mars orbit as part of the Emirates Mars Mission. The probe, named Hope or Al Amal in Arabic, was built by the Mohammed Bin Rashid Space Centre in collaboration with the University of Colorado, Boulder. Furthermore, the UAE also boasts an astronaut programme in partnership with NASA’s Johnson Space Center.
But UAE is not the only Arab country to veer into the lucrative and prestigious space sector. Saudi Arabia plans to invest $2.1 billion into its space programme as part of its larger Vision 2030 mission. The country set up the Saudi Space Commission in 2018 and placed the SGS-1, a communications satellite built by Lockheed Martin, in February 2019. Earlier this year, the Saudi Space Commission and Axiom Space, a US-based private space company, also signed a deal to send the Kingdom’s astronauts into space.
Petro-states by the likes of UAE and Saudi Arabia are the newest entries into the small and often restrictive space club. Their rise is only possible due to the large-scale commercialisation of space activities. Using their large reserves of income, petro-states can buy commercial services with relative ease and break into the space club rather than spend years building a domestic space industry from scratch.
This phenomenon raises the question: what makes a country a space power? More often than not, those counties can launch rockets (or missiles), and perhaps, the ones that can build satellites are deemed as space powers. For much of the Cold War, orbital rocketry (and missile technology) captured the imagination of a space-faring nation, one that could build bigger and more powerful rockets to send payloads to the Moon and beyond. Although some of these rockets and satellites were built by private entities, their operations, for the most part, were controlled by national space agencies.
Of course, not all space powers are born equal. Space powers can be ranked based on the range of activities they carry out across their civilian and military space programmes. The United States and Russia by far carry out the most space activities, with China slowly playing catch-up. France, India and Japan could fall in the category of middle space powers due to similarities in their space capabilities.
Countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE and Turkey could be categorised under an entirely new category of space powers. Their power is drawn from their ability to redirect financial resources to attract commercial collaborators. As I point out in my discussion document on the future of India’s space station programme, commercial collaboration is a new mechanism through which countries with limited capabilities can partner with private entities to augment their overall capabilities without the need for large-scale investment.
As more private entities enter the space sector, we will likely witness more commercial collaborations in the future. Thus, making space easily accessible to many more countries.
Matsyanyaaya #2: Vibing with nuclear fusion
— Saurabh Todi
The Financial Times reported that the scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in California had achieved a net energy gain in a nuclear fusion reaction for the first time, which promises to become a cheap and carbon-neutral source of energy. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is expected to officially announce the breakthrough on Tuesday. This significant feat was achieved by LLNL’s National Ignition Facility (NIF), which is the size of three football fields. According to the website of NIF,
“NIF is the world’s most precise and reproducible laser system. It precisely guides, amplifies, reflects, and focuses 192 powerful laser beams into a target about the size of a pencil eraser in a few billionths of a second, delivering more than 2 million joules of ultraviolet energy and 500 trillion watts of peak power, [generating] temperatures in the target of more than 180 million degrees Fahrenheit and pressures of more than 100 billion Earth atmospheres. Those extreme conditions cause hydrogen atoms in the target to fuse and release energy in a controlled thermonuclear reaction.”
Although an extraordinary milestone, the commercialisation of nuclear fusion technology will face several resources and technological constraints that are worth considering, a popular YouTube channel Real Engineering, explained these constraints in their latest video:
* Current fusion reactors combine two isotopes of Hydrogen: Deuterium (2H) and Tritium (3H), to produce Helium (4He). Although the supply of Deuterium (also called heavy water) is abundant as it is found in seawater, Tritium is a relatively rare isotope sourced primarily from nuclear reactor moderator pools where heavy water gets radiated to produce Tritium. This is a major constraint as the current supply of Tritium would significantly outstrip the demand from commercial fusion reactors, with the limited scope of increasing production.
* Lithium can be used as an alternative source of Tritium as it undergoes fission to produce Tritium and Helium. However, this process requires materials made of Beryllium which is a rare and extremely expensive element. There are also safety concerns due to the presence of trace amounts of Uranium in this material.
The video explains these and a few other challenges that the commercialisation of nuclear fusion would face. The path from technological breakthrough to commercialisation is a tough one, but the video ends on a hopeful note. This piece by Charles Seife in The Atlantic is also cautiously optimistic about the breakthrough while detailing the history of NIF and its several fusion experiments.
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com -
Antariksh Matters: Shattering Space Record Myths
— Pranav R Satyanath
Earlier this week, a record was broken in the shadowy world of military space tech. At least, that’s what some of the headlines make you believe. The secretive X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (OTV) uncrewed spaceplane, operated by the US Space Force, landed at the NASA Kennedy Space Center on November 12th after spending 908 days in orbit. It broke the previous orbital record (780 days) by a large margin. The spaceplane, which is built by Boeing, has been in operation since 2010. Its mission and purpose are largely unknown, building some sort of a myth around this mini-Space Shuttle-looking vehicle.
Let’s take a step back. From all the open-source images available, we know that the X-37B has a single liquid-fuelled engine built by Aerojet and powered by storable propellants. This means it can stay in orbit by increasing its altitude. So, one can say that spaceplanes are not very different from regular satellites, which operate for years and decades in orbit. Now compare those years and decades to 908 days. Not much, right? Well, yes. So long as the spaceplane can maintain orbital speed, it can stay in orbit as long as its operators wish.
Although we don’t know much about the X-37B’s true purpose, we know some meta details that give clues as to what the purpose might be. The programme that gave birth to the X-37B isn’t a secret. Back in the early 1990s, people in the US government got pretty worried about the costs of operating the Space Shuttle. It was reusable for sure, but it was a slow and painstaking process to get the vehicle back to space. So, the US Congress told NASA to go and look at other alternatives. The result was the Access to Space study, which outlined faster, better, cheaper and smaller alternatives to the Suttle. After pondering their heads over what to test, NASA began to fund a handful of companies to research and develop reusable spaceplanes, including Single-Stage To Orbit (SSTO) tech, which is considered the pinnacle of rocketry.
Chief among these experimental spaceplanes included Lockheed Martin’s X-33 and Orbital Science’s X-34 reusable launch vehicles, along with Boeing’s X-37 experimental space manoeuvring vehicle. By 1999, NASA saw the funds dry up and no progress to show. The US Air Force (USAF) was ready to take up the X-34 and the X-37 programmes. The X-34 programme got cancelled, and the X-37 was transferred to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Two years later, the X-37B was in the hands of the USAF.
From what we know, we can draw out two hypotheses:
* The X-37B is a highly manoeuvrable vehicle used to inspect suspicious activities and objects in space.
* The X-37B is a test vehicle for the US Space Force (and Air Force) which allows them to test hypersonic re-entry, autonomous capabilities and perhaps, deployment of small payloads.
A part of the second hypothesis is already confirmed. Astronomer and space watcher Jonathan McDowell reported that the X-37B launched a subsatellite named the FalconSAT-t8, an experimental payload developed by the Air Force Academy. The second hypothesis is less likely to be true, as small satellites can perform a far better (and less suspicious) job of inspecting suspicious activities and objects.
Like the US, the Chinese also have a handful of spaceplane projects. It will not be surprising that these vehicles will have both civilian and military uses. India is also testing a version of its spaceplane called the Reusable Launch Vehicle-Technology Demonstrator (RLV-TD).
Spaceplanes are interesting. But we must not get carried away by spooky headlines.
Comments on the Draft Telecommunications Bill, 2022
— Satya Sahu and Gayathri Poti
The draft Telecommunications Bill, 2022 will do more to prohibit Digital India's growth story rather than facilitate it. We outline some of its most glaring issues:
Definitional Over-breadth, Legislative Conflict and Procedural Lacunae
* Explanatory Note to the Bill in para.51 reassures that provisions concerning internet shutdowns recognize citizens' rights; there is no enumeration of this safeguard in the concerned clause nor mechanisms for judicial oversight or review panels to record the legality of suspension orders à la the Telecom Suspension Rules, 2017.
* The Union Government recently withdrew the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2021. In the absence of a data protection regime and an independent Data Protection Authority vested with powers to implement safeguards on the access and use of personal data by public authorities in line with the principles laid out in Puttaswamy and Shreya Singhal. , Clause 24(2)(b) contributes to the increasingly fragmented data protection framework in India, alongside the IT Act, 2000, SEBI Data Sharing Policy, 2019, Payments and Settlements Act, 2008 etc. Regulatory uncertainty and compliance costs within this framework become increasingly difficult due to the wide gamut of entities subject to the definition of "Telecommunication services" under Clause 2(2). The increased cost of compliance with implementing KYC norms and mandatory licensing regimes will result in extremely high barriers to entry for players in the OTT market. It will ensure that only market players with significant resources to meet these obligations can afford to remain in it, amplifying concerns about stifled innovation and competition in this oligopolistic sector.
* Subjecting OTT platforms to DoT jurisdiction creates regulatory overlap with MeitY's powers, creating potentially conflicting laws, duplication of efforts by regulators and market players alike, ownership of implementation measures, and increasing costs of conducting business.
* OTT platforms like real-time messaging services deploy E2E encryption. Currently, access to encrypted communication is governed by the 2021 Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code released by MeitY. Under this, significant social media intermediaries are only expected to enable the identification of the first originator of the information. The rules deliberately refrain from mandating access to the contents of the communication (especially since the 2015 draft rules that insisted on making available the plaintext of communications was met with heavy criticism), but Clause 24 empowers the Government to gain access to the contents of the communication as well. This conflicts with the 2021 Code and further aggravates the issue of regulatory overlap. The provision implicitly requires OTT platforms to create encryption backdoors and inevitably undermines Constitutional protection for free speech afforded by encryption.
* The territorial applicability of the provisions of the Bill has not been described unlike in the Telegraph Act, 1885, and the IT Act, 2000, which circumscribe their application in terms of geography and cyber attribution. The telecom and OTT sectors depend on cross-border interconnectivity and rely on internationally administered infrastructure like satellites, marine fibre-optic cable networks, etc. It is necessary to foresee and describe the territorial limits of domestic law to avoid international conflict of laws to maintain market confidence and decrease legal costs and instances of interruption in critical services.
* Clause 46 (k) of the Bill dilutes TRAI's standing to requisition information from the Government and provide recommendations before awarding licenses. Deleting the non-obstante clause and provisos to S.11 (1) of the TRAI Act eliminates TRAI's role in ensuring a level playing field for TSPs and fair and non-discriminatory treatment by the Government. Vesting TRAI with the power to investigate predatory pricing exacerbates existing overlap between the mandates of TRAI and CCI, increasing possibility of regulatory arbitrage.
* Clause 24(1) vests the Central Government with the power to take temporary possession of telecommunication services, networks, and infrastructure, in the occurrence of any public emergency or in the interest of public safety. Clause 24(4) makes the exercise of this power concomitant with the duration of a public emergency or occasion. The Bill, however, does not provide any procedure for Government action nor define the terms' public safety' and 'public emergency', undermining the temporary nature of this power, inviting constitutional scrutiny and low investor confidence.
Insufficient Justifications for Overarching Policy
* OTT platforms should be permitted to continue operating under the existing framework without any regulatory intervention until the ITU and similar foreign jurisdictions conclusively determine the regulation of such platforms. TRAI's 2020 recommendations propose no deviation from this approach, especially since there has been limited global progress concerning OTT regulation.
* Compliance with KYC norms is mandated for the issuance of SIM Cards and broadband connections; extending this requirement for accessing OTT communication services is unwarranted. The rigours associated with KYC rules are reserved for tightly regulated sectors like banking, where identity verification systems combat the incidence of high-risk pernicious activities. Mandating adherence to the KYC process for creating an account on an IM/e-mail/video telephony platform is not only disproportionate but is likely to dissuade users from accessing critical services. In particular, KYC formalities will deter consumers from testing newer platforms which could result in market stagnation.
* Clause 32 envisages framing regulatory sandboxes to enable innovation and technological development in the sector. However, it allows access to regulatory sandboxes only as part of the terms and conditions under its new licensing regime defeating the intent of a regulatory sandbox. Providing access to this environment only upon the award of a license raises the costs of introducing new technology in a fixed-capital-intensive sector like telecom and entrenches the market power of already dominant entities who can bear this cost. The extent and nature of the usage of new technology cannot always be preempted in the terms of a license at the time of licensing. This creates the future burden of bearing opportunity costs of not being able to leverage its own technology in new ways on the licensee, leading to avoidable legal costs and ad hoc renegotiation.
The authors are students of Takshashila’s GCPP (Technology & Policy) Programme.
Matsyanyaaya: Splinternet Conviction?
— Bharath Reddy
We often hear predictions about a splinter-net or a bifurcated Internet. What does this mean? And what are the incentives at play other than the obvious state control and censorship?
To get an idea of how the Internet could split and what it means, a good example would be Runet - the Russian national segment of the Internet. Russian interventions to create an independent national Internet range from state censorship to mandating ISPs to use national Domain Name System (DNS) servers (where website names are translated to addresses).
There are also forces from outside Russia incentivising the split as well. During the initial phase of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, there were appeals by Ukraine to remove Russian domains from DNS servers which would cut them off from the rest of the Internet. This request was rejected as it could destroy trust in a global internet if the DNS does not remain neutral. However, requests by Ukraine to certificate authorities that issue SSL and TLS certificates for websites have been more successful, creating barriers in the process. Lastly, the hardware sanctions and market exits following the conflict could potentially lead to a split in internet standards.
As you might know, the Internet is based on communication protocols which enable different devices to speak a common language and communicate with each other. Broadly, these protocols can be classified under - content, logic and infrastructure layers. While censorship at the content layer is quite common, a fork in the lower logic and infrastructure layers could have serious ramifications.
Network effects, protocol politics and geopolitics, come together here. The largest networks have incentives to refuse to be interoperable with competitors. In the current nature of the Internet, the US and its allies wield power to cut off competitors from critical chokepoints. This power has been exercised to an extent during the recent sanctions against China and Russia.
The threat of such actions creates incentives for bifurcated supply chains and in this world of bifurcated supply chains there would be takers for China’s vision of national internet sovereignty. In such a scenario, future network protocols such as New IP being developed by Huawei could become more widespread. The intelligence built into the protocols at the logic and infrastructure layers could enable more surveillance and control by the ISPs and the State.
The concerns around the splitting of the Internet is thus a complex interplay between technology, geopolitics, and the relation between the State and the individual.
The report titled “One, Two, or Two Hundred Internets” by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich is an exciting read that covers this subject in detail. As the author hopes, it helps enable informed discussion and decision-making on splitting the Internet.
Our Reading Menu
[Opinion] Road Ahead for UPI: Free Public Infrastructure or Yet Another Payment Mechanism? by Rohan Pai and Mihir Mahajan.
[Chapter] Gene Editing and the Need to Reevaluate Bioweapons by Shambhavi Naik.
[Book] Cellular: An Economic and Business History of the International Mobile-Phone Industry by Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz and Martin Campbell-Kelly.
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com -
Antariksh Matters: Tying commercial and military ends
— Pranav R Satyanath
Eight months after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it is an established fact that commercial entities in space provide a vital service for enhancing military capabilities. The Ukrainian military purchased hundreds of images from companies like Maxar and Planet to monitor Russian formations. More famously, internet services provided by SpaceX’s Starlink constellations proved vital for soldiers on the battlefield. Other companies, like HawkEye 360, offer services that warn the Ukrainian military of potential GPS interference.
My colleague Aditya Ramanathan and I have extensively covered the issues of using commercial satellites for military purposes. After all, we covered Starlink and Russian attacks in the previous edition. The problem of commercial-military satellite entanglement, however, is indispensable. On Thursday (October 27), Russian officials warned that Western commercial satellites could be legally targeted if the United States and its allies continue their involvement in the war in Ukraine.
As mentioned in previous Technopolitik editions, Professor Davi Koplow has made a robust case for legally targeting space assets. He argues that any space asset that assists a country’s military operations could be legally targeted under the Law of Armed Conflict. Others have highlighted the importance of proportionality of attack under International Humanitarian Law and the need to take into consideration the possibility of indirect harm towards civilians during armed conflict.
The issue that I raise here is more novel. I ponder the connection between the US-Russia bilateral noninterference agreement with National Technical Means (intelligence-gathering assets, including spy satellites) and the Law of Armed Conflict. Let’s begin with National Technical Means (NTM)). During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union wished to limit the number of nuclear weapons deployed on either side. While both countries were willing to agree on some limits (starting with the 1972 Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty under SALT I), neither side showed interest in on-site inspections for verification (this changed much later). Hence, the two sides agreed to verify the treaty using “national technical means of verification”. NTMs not only include satellites but also consist of ground-based radars and telemetry gathering devices. The definition of NTMs is ambiguous on purpose, as they help countries maintain technical secrecy while acknowledging spying tools as legitimate tools of verification.
Early arms control agreements between the US and the Soviet Union also led to the first steps towards space arms control. Article XII (2) of the ABM treaty stated the following:
“Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.”
Noninterference was codified in the bilateral agreement, which continues to be a norm in the US-Russia New START agreement.
During the Cold War, commercial entities did exist to provide satellite imagery. Even when they did, governments did not use commercial images to verify arms control agreements. Things are, however, a little different today. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which launches and operates US spy satellites, began purchasing images from commercial vendors, signing billions of dollars in contracts. The end-use of these images is unknown. Since one can not conclusively determine whether commercial images are being used for arms control verification, commercial satellites can be considered to be part of NTMs.
So, if companies like Maxar and Planet, which sell images to the NRO, also sell images to the Ukrainian armed forces, does the rule of noninterference apply, or does the Law of Armed Conflict take precedence? The answer, unfortunately, is that we do not know. The phenomenon of commercial-military entanglement is still unfolding. But pondering these questions is essential to keep outer space safe and secure.
Matsyanyaaya #1: What did CCI just do?
— Bharath Reddy
Over the past few weeks, the Competition Commission of India imposed penalties of ₹1,337 crores and ₹936 crores in two antitrust cases against Google.
The first was related to Google abusing its market dominance in the mobile operating system and Android app store markets to gain a significant advantage over competitors in other markets. The CCI observed that Google entered into multiple agreements with OEMs that govern their rights and obligations. One such agreement assures that Google's apps, such as search, Chrome and YouTube, come pre-installed on Android devices without an option for users to uninstall them. Other agreements ensure exclusivity of its search services and even prohibit OEMs from offering devices with alternative versions of Android (forks of the open-source code), which are not approved by Google. Access to Google’s Play Store, which is essential to a smartphone, was conditional on complying with these agreements.
The second was related to Google’s Play Store policies requiring developers to mandatorily and exclusively use Google Play’s Billing System for app payments and in-app purchases. This increases costs for users due to the hefty service fees - Apple and Google take a 15 to 30 per cent cut from app developers and also stifles choice and innovation in the payments ecosystem.
These verdicts come close on the heels of Google’s failed attempt to overturn the €4.34 billion antitrust fine handed down by the European Union four years ago. The fines are a little more than rounding errors for a corporation that reported revenue of $69 billion last quarter, but the increasing antitrust cases globally might force them to reconsider their policies.
There are some ostensibly valid reasons for the restrictions imposed in the agreements with OEMs. Having multiple forks of the Android operating system could lead to fragmentation, which could delay security and feature updates. Having a single app store with a gatekeeper could keep unreliable and malicious apps out. OEMs could bundle adware and malware into essential apps such as browsers. While there is a lot of attention and scrutiny about the privacy and anticompetitive practices of big tech companies, there exists a long tail of mid and small-size tech companies which have little to no oversight. Centralisation and control help avoid these risks; however, it hands over control of the entire ecosystem to Google.
Google can leverage the network effects of the Android operating system to gain an unsurpassable advantage in other markets. This is achieved not only through the prominent placement of its apps on Android phones but also through the vast amounts of data about user preferences and behaviour which can be used to improve their offerings. Such self-preferencing and vertical integration are detrimental to competition and limit choice to the end user.
A lot of the issues discussed above are also present in Apple’s iOS and other platforms as well. Big tech companies such as Google, Apple, Meta, Microsoft and Amazon wield enormous power as gatekeepers of their platforms. The EU’s Digital Markets Act which comes into force in May next year, is expected to bring about reforms which will impose obligations on gatekeepers to ensure a level playing field.
Third-party app stores might become a reality ending Apple and Google’s monopoly in app stores, which is also one of the demands made by the CCI. There might be some trade-offs in user freedom and security when this becomes a reality. It is also quite likely that app stores will compete to find a way to balance both of these while also avoiding the exorbitant service fees currently being charged to app developers.
Matsyanyaaya #2: The CCI verdict: All bark and no bite?
— Shailesh Chitnis
It was a busy October for the Competition Commission of India (CCI), India’s antitrust regulator. In a one-two punch against Google, the CCI first fined it $161.9 million for forcing device makers to pre-install Google’s suite of apps and penalising alternate versions of Android, its “open source” operating system. Next, the CCI hit Google with a $113 million penalty for preventing app developers from using third-party payment apps.
The same week, it fined MakeMyTrip, India’s largest travel portal and OYO, a hotel aggregator, a combined $47 million for restricting market access to OYO’s competitors on MakeMyTrip’s platform. Taking all factors together, the decision represents a clear message that the CCI is looking at digital markets and platforms a lot more closely.
But do these actions have wider implications? A hot-take is to compare the penalties to the revenues of the companies and predict that it would hardly have an impact. Most companies appeal the rulings in court, and in the years that it takes for the cases to be resolved, the fines are whittled down. The CCI has also been notoriously ineffective when it comes to collections. Data shows that from 2011-2018, the CCI imposed a cumulative penalty of more than $1.3B but recovered less than 1%.
But that misses the point. The CCI rulings are important because they signal that the regulator is taking a measured approach to competition in the digital ecosystem. Until this point, India had been fair “hands off” with its approach to digital platforms. Part of the reason may have been the size of online markets when compared with offline markets. But the nature of digital markets, especially the network effects, which create outsized winners, makes an intervention in this domain timely.
Second, the CCI also recognizes the limits of its power. In the absence of supporting legislation and the fast-changing nature of this industry, the agency is nudging participants towards corrective action rather than enforcement. Even as Google will likely challenge these rulings in court, it has paused the requirement for developers to use Google Play’s billing system. Treebo and FabHotels, Oyo’s competitors, are back on MakeMyTrip. Market correction, not enforcement.
Finally, the cohort of Google, Meta and others have been used to dealing with regulators around the world. India would be no different. But, for probably the first time in their existence, big tech is vulnerable. The continued slowdown in the ad-tech supported business, coupled with fears of a recession, has created uncertainty over their growth.
Against this backdrop, the CCI’s actions couldn't have come at a worse time.
Our Reading Menu
[Opinion] The US and China are battling for semiconductor supremacy by Pranay Kotasthane and Abhiram Manchi.
[Article] Paradoxes of Intermediation in Aadhaar: Human Making of a Digital Infrastructure by Bidisha Chaudhuri.
[Book] From Mainframes to Smartphones: A History of the International Computer Industry by Martin Campbell-Kelly and Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz.
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com -
Antariksh Matters: Starlink & the Dismal Attractions of Space Warfare
— Aditya Ramanathan
The contributors to this newsletter are not an unduly pessimistic lot. They nevertheless retained little doubt that geopolitical adversaries would seek to contest each others’ ability to use space-based assets. What was harder to predict was that we would see its first instances as early as 2022. It was also harder to imagine that some of these dangers would draw public attention because of a sordid spat over money.
Over the last few weeks, Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX, which runs the Starlink constellation, has been engaged in a public argument with diplomats, reporters, and assorted opinion-makers. He’s been pilloried both for his unsolicited comments on the Russia-Ukraine war, and over reports that his company sought compensation from the US government for providing the Ukrainians with Starlink services.
Starlink’s satellite Internet services have proved crucial to Ukrainian military operations against Russia. But the story of how it became crucial to the war effort is an unusual one that involves many of the preoccupations of this newsletter: social media, private space companies, cyber attacks, remotely piloted platforms, and space warfare.
Musk began despatching Starlink systems to the war zone following a tweet from a Ukrainian politician. Starlink systems directly enabled lethal strikes on Russian forces, many of which involved the use of drones. With no formal agreement in place for the use of Starlink in combat, Musk’s company apparently sought substantial US Department of Defense financial support, with some accusing him of price gouging. Through all this, Russian forces attempted to disrupt Starlink services through electronic warfare. It is this last phenomenon that the remainder of this Technopolitik entry will focus on.
Space Warfare is Difficult
The Russians were always keenly aware of the value of satellite communications. According to US officials, they mounted a successful cyber attack on the operations of Viasat at the outset of the war. The attack targeted Ukrainian military communications and disrupted Internet services for many civilians. It also had collateral effects beyond Ukraine’s borders, most notably, disrupting the functioning of 5,800 wind turbines in Germany (see the entry from my colleague Pranav for more on this).
Once the Ukrainians began making extensive use of Sarlink services, the Russians reportedly mounted an electronic warfare (EW) attack that SpaceX quickly repelled. Musk acknowledged this on Twitter by saying SpaceX had temporarily “reprioritized to cyber defense & overcoming signal jamming”
The exact nature of these Russian attacks are not clear. Musk’s own tweets only add to the confusion. Were they simply electronic jamming attacks? Or did they include a cyber component? It is also unclear if Russia has limited itself to electronic jamming near the Earth’s surface or if it also attempted to jam the satellites themselves. After all, Russia has a mobile ground-based platform called the Tirada-2 for precisely this purpose. What is significant is that despite reports of outages, Starlink is not known to have suffered a setback similar to that of Viasat.
Russia’s Dilemmas and Incentive to Use Space for Military Purposes
For Russia, Starlink is a problem from hell. Legally, Starlink is probably fair game for Russian forces, since the satellite constellation is providing direct combat support to the Ukrainian military. However, the fact that it is owned by a third-party, and the fact that the third party happens to be American effectively limit Russian options.
Also limiting Russia’s options are the sheer number of Starlink satellites. There are more than 3,000 of these tiny satellites presently in orbit. About 400 provide service to Ukrainian forces. While Russian direct-ascent antisatellite (DA-ASAT) missile would short work of a single Starlink satellite in low earth orbit (LEO), Moscow would run out of missiles if it tried to attack the whole constellation and would likely make no serious dent on Starlink operations.
In the years to come, SpaceX plans to have up to 42,000 Starlink satellites in orbit. Even if it achieves only a quarter of this number, SpaceX would have dramatically increased the number of satellites in LEO. With rivals such as OneWeb also developing their own LEO constellations, the orbits are not only likely to get crowded but also become valuable real estate for strategic purposes, providing a sanctuary for military support systems.
Indeed, if space were to remain a sanctuary, as some hope it does, it would only further incentivise states to use space for military purposes. This, in turn, is likely to increase competitive pressures back on Earth to find novel ways of contesting an adversary’s use of space. Starlink has given us an unexpected glimpse of the dilemmas that lie ahead.
Matsyanyaaya: What’s Technological Sovereignty Anyway?
— Pranay Kotasthane
In recent years, technological or digital sovereignty has been all the rage. Not only is it a term meant for government strategy documents, but an empirical reality and public policy, as witnessed most recently in the US export controls on China’s semiconductor industry.
And yet, we know little about what the term means. Poor-quality arguments mistake autarky for technological sovereignty or, worse, as a mission that should be achieved by a particular date rather than as a continuing process.
And how do you even square technological self-sufficiency with the reality that the technology ecosystem is a multinational effort and not merely about creating national champions, as in the past? As I wrote in the third edition of this newsletter:
There are significant problems with the goal of high-tech self-sufficiency and the instrument of industrial subsidies, both. That's because high-tech industries today rely on extensive cross-border movements of intermediate products, talent, and intellectual property. As R&D costs required to produce technological improvements have risen across sectors, erstwhile 'national' industries have been transformed into global supply chains. Instead of national champions making complete products independently, companies only specialise in specific parts of global supply chains.
And so, while searching for a better definition of technological sovereignty, I landed on a crisp CESifo paper titled Technological Sovereignty as Ability, Not Autarky by Christoph March and Ina Schieferdecker.
This paper uses our understanding of what it means to be politically and economically sovereign, to construct a definition of technological sovereignty. Their framework assessing the impact of General Purpose Technologies on political, economic, and individual sovereignty, is a foundational contribution.
Then, they go on to define technological sovereignty as follows:
In a narrow sense, technological sovereignty is the ability to make self-determined decisions about the development and use of technologies and technology-based innovations, especially regarding their properties (e.g. energy consumption, data usage, security, or safety) and their terms of use (e.g. restriction to certain domains, or transparency). In a broader sense, a polity is technologically sovereign, if it possesses the technological abilities necessary to maintain political and economic sovereignty.
Describing technological sovereignty as an ability opens a new window for understanding the concept. This approach places innovation policy, technology transfer, and education at the front and centre.
Crucially, this definition recognises the global superstructure of innovation and distances itself from self-sufficiency:
The ability to understand, advance, or produce new technologies must not be confused with the attempt to actually do so in all key enabling technologies and/or components. Instead, we understand it as a widening of choice opportunities, and as a prerequisite for international trade “on eye level”. Moreover, we see capacities to innovate as a key to achieving technological sovereignty.
In another section, the authors go one step further and identify the interdependence between international trade and technological sovereignty. While the simplistic arguments position these two concepts as opposites, the authors argue that the two reinforce each other.
I encourage readers to read the entire paper. Papers such as these are critical for building the epistemological foundations of technology geopolitics.
Cyberpolitik: Browser Wars, again?
— Bharath Reddy
Firefox maker Mozilla’s recent report highlights how manufacturers of operating systems use market power and choice architecture to favour affiliated browsers leading to outcomes which are not in the best interest of users.
Mozilla’s research finds that “software can be designed to influence or even manipulate consumer outcomes. And operating systems are designed to maximise usage of their affiliated browsers.” Of the 4.2 billion mobile internet subscribers globally, roughly 72% run on Android and 27% run on iOS. The browser usage on these devices shows a strong preference for the default browser, with 65% of users on Chrome and 24% on Safari.
Having a competitive playing field for browsers is in the best interest of users. The competition fosters innovation leading to better quality, security and privacy for users. When Internet Explorer was the dominant browser after crushing Netscape, innovation had taken a backseat with no significant upgrades for five years. Firefox entered the scene with better speed, security and new features such as tabbed browsing. This created more competition in the browser market with more frequent updates.
Browser engines are another major area of concern. Currently, only Apple, Google and Mozilla develop and maintain browser engines. Since Apple’s Webkit engine is limited to apple devices, it leaves only Google’s Blink engine and Mozilla’s Gecko engine as the only cross-platform options. Having such a critical access point for the web in the hands of a single company not only leads to a lack of innovation but could be a major privacy and security risk for users.
The current situation has come about largely due to operating systems providers using elaborate choice architecture to encourage desired outcomes. The choice of architecture includes:
- having pre-installed browsers bundled with the OS
- prohibiting or overriding changing to the defaults
- using dark patterns to nudge users against changing the defaults.
Other measures include having contracts that mandate OEMs to have only affiliated browsers pre-installed on the devices. App store restrictions, such as Apple’s current ban on alternative browser engines, also play a big role. Similarly, features such as in-app browsing are only possible on Android using the Blink engine.
As we move towards wider adoption of smart devices, virtual reality, and autonomous vehicles, browsers might be tightly bundled with all of these applications. Mozilla’s report highlights how competition in the browser market is necessary to advance innovation, performance, speed, privacy and security and calls upon regulators, policymakers, and lawmakers to create a new era.
Our Reading Menu
[Podcast] Escalation in the US-China Tech War by Pranay Kotasthane and Pranav Satyanath.
[Book] Great Power Politics in the Fourth Industrial Revolution: The Geoeconomics of Technological Sovereignty by Glenn Diesen.
[Report] The War in Ukraine from a Space Cybersecurity Perspective
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com -
Antariksh Matters #1: Small Launchers and Small Windows of Opportunity
— Pranav R Satyanath
The small satellite launch vehicle market has a new player - Firefly Aerospace. The US-based private company on Saturday (October 1st 2022) conducted the first successful launch of its rocket Firefly Alpha. The company attempted a launch in September 2021, which failed to get to orbit. Today, Firefly is one of only four private NewSpace companies in the world which provide dedicated small-satellite launch service. The other three being Rocket Lab, Virgin Orbit and Astra (the last of the three companies is an interesting case).
Firefly’s Alpha launch vehicle can carry a payload of just over 1 ton to low-Earth orbit (LEO) and 750 kilograms to Sun Synchronous Orbit (SSO). This puts Alpha in the same category as the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), which is the workhorse of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). The Alpha launch vehicle is powered by four liquid-fuelled turbopump engines that use RP-1 (highly refined kerosene) and liquid oxygen (LOx). The second stage is powered by a single liquid-fuelled RP-1/LOx engine optimised for vacuum.
The company is one of the few success stories in the highly competitive launch market, and success did not come easy. Firefly was founded as Firefly Space Systems in 2014,but the company went bankrupt and liquidated in 2017 and its assets were purchased by Ukrainian venture capitalist (also a tech entrepreneur) Max Polyakov and his company, Noosphere Ventures. Unfortunately, Polykov could only stand at a distance and watch Firefly’s success as he was forced to sell his shares after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
A tough time for small launch companies
Not all companies witness success by the likes of Firefly. In December 2019, Vector Launch filed for bankruptcy before it could attempt a full orbital launch of its Vector-R rocket. The company has undergone restructuring and is preparing to begin suborbital flight tests. Another US-based company, Astra, has been attempting to launch its rocket into orbit since 2020, with very little success, leaving the company to abandon its Rocket 3.3 and move to a new design called Rocket 4 instead. Oher companies in the US
India’s own attempt to launch the Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV) failed to place its payloads in orbit after a malfunction in its sensors. The SSLV is operated by ISRO’s newly- established commercial arm called NewSpace India Limited (NSIL). SSLV, unlike other launch vehicles, uses solid fuel in the first three stages. The final stage is a liquid-fuelled velocity trimming module. SSLV is India’s attempt to enter the small satellite launch market, offering a launch-on-demand service to carry upto 500 kg to LEO or 300 kg to sun synchronous orbit.
Several other launch companies around the world are preparing to tap into the growing small satellite market. Yet, it is unclear how many of these companies will survive in the coming years. More importantly, it is unclear whether these private entities have overestimated the market for small satellites, as a drop in demand puts at risk the sustainability of these companies.
Small launch vehicles for India
Indian private launch companies are not far behind the world competitors. Two companies in particular, Agnikul and Skyroot, have risen to the occasion in their attempt to fulfil India’s satellite launch demands. As an aspiring space power, India can not compete in the global space market by making an average of five launches a year. It requires dozens of launches (along with many many more satellites) to stay competitive on both commercial and national security grounds. India’s forthcoming new space policy (long overdue and still nowhere in sight) must make it conducive for private launch providers to operate and thrive. ISRO, meanwhile, must focus its efforts on improving the reliability of its GSLV series of heavy-lift rockets and allow privateers to cater to the small satellite market needs.
Siliconpolitik: India’s Semiconductor Policies v2.0
— Pranay Kotasthane
Earlier this week, the Union Cabinet approved modifications to three of the four schemes introduced in December 2021 for developing a domestic semiconductor ecosystem. Several news websites have claimed that with the government “sweetening the deal”, investments in this sector will be more forthcoming. I agree, but not without some fundamental reservations. Here’s why.
Semiconductor Fabs
To attract chip manufacturing companies, the original programme promised up to 50% upfront financial support for leading-edge nodes (28 nanometres and below). The promised fiscal support for trailing-edge nodes employing older technologies dropped commensurately, going down to 30% for a fab that produces chips at the 45-65 nanometre nodes. (The node size is a rough measure for the size of a building block in a chip. The smaller that number, the more building blocks that can be packed in the same area resulting in higher performance).
Under the new scheme, the government promises upfront fiscal support of 50% for all node sizes. The change reflects two realities. First, trailing-edge fabs are crucial for India. The demand for older node sizes will not disappear anytime soon. Future applications such as 5G radios and electric vehicles will continue to require manufacturing at these nodes. Most current defence applications also require trailing-edge chips.
Second, many countries are wooing the leading-edge node foundries with much larger incentive packages. Companies such as TSMC are being courted by all major powers, and it’s unlikely they will pick India for the most-advanced nodes. India’s chances are better for securing older technologies.
Display Fabs
Most display panel manufacturers are located in East Asia — companies from China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan dominate this industry. The scheme was designed with the explicit aim of import substitution. The original scheme promised up to 50% upfront financial support subject to a cap of ₹12,000 crores. As part of the changes, this upper cap has been struck off.
To me, this scheme didn’t make sense even when it was announced. I have four reasons for the scepticism.
* Even during the high peak of supply chain disruptions during COVID-19, there was no shortage of display panels, indicating that there are no constraints to increasing production, as is the case for chips. (The only shortage related to displays was for the driver chip, not the panels by themselves).
* Apart from China and Taiwan, South Korea and Japan have leadership in specific segments of displays. So we aren’t dependent on one vulnerable source, as in the case of chips.
* Import dependence on China won’t go away. Even if these fabs manufacture displays in India, the input materials will have to be imported from elsewhere. So the bottlenecks will shift but don’t disappear.
* The industry is moving to newer technologies apart from LCDs and AMOLEDs. Samsung is focusing on Quantum-dot displays instead of LCDs. The scheme might be able to get old-tech here, but for newer technologies, imports might continue.
Thus, to spend ₹12000 crores for a product in the pursuit of a failed notion of import substitution doesn't justify the opportunity costs. Moreover, removing the upper cap after Vedanta-Foxconn got into this game raises concerns about rent-seeking — the tendency of businesses to distort policies to serve their own interests.
Assembly, Test, Packaging Units, and Specialised Low-volume Fabs
For assembly, test and packaging firms, & compound fabs, the promised financial support has increased substantially, from 30% to 50%. More importantly, the original scheme allowed disbursal once a facility had begun production. Under the modified scheme, the financial support will be upfront. Prepaid, not postpaid.
These changes again warrant scrutiny. Is it another case of rent-seeking?
At the margin, I am okay with the changes in this segment. India has a potential advantage because of the need for a large, mid-level trained workforce for this segment of the supply chain, in comparison to conventional semiconductor fabs.
Semiconductor Design
Surprisingly, there were no modifications in the one area where India does have a comparative advantage - semiconductor design and design services. The capital requirement for this segment is at least two orders of magnitude lower than the first three segments. And yet, the response to the scheme for encouraging design firms seems less than lukewarm. We propose two changes in the policy for that segment in an article for Hindustan Times earlier this month:
* To receive deployment-linked incentives under the current scheme, a design firm has to be registered in India with a 50% local stake. That clause could be watered down. Companies should qualify as long as the workforce is majorly Indian and the development happens here.
* Reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers are also crucial for India’s semiconductor design companies to increase operations in India.
On both these counts, the status quo prevails.
To summarise, the modifications reflect the government’s seriousness in attracting investment in this sector. Through these changes, the government is acknowledging that India must start its chip manufacturing journey at the lower end and climb its way up. Getting good at this game takes a couple of decades. At the same time, a thin line separates responsive government policies from regulatory capture by businesses. All industrial policies run this risk, and we need to be vigilant.
Antariksh Matters #2: Planetary Defence and National Defence
— Aditya Ramanathan
On September 26, NASA concluded what it called “the world’s first planetary defense technology demonstration” in a spectacular collision. Ten months after it was first launched, NASA’s 570 kilogram Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) spacecraft smashed into the asteroid Dimorphos. The collision occurred 11 million kilometres from Earth.
Dimporphos is technically a 160 metre-long ‘asteroid moonlet’ - called so because it orbits a larger asteroid named Didymos. While neither rock is headed towards Earth, the DART mission sought to establish the ability to deflect an asteroid from its trajectory.
The DART spacecraft was launched in November 2021 from a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket and Johns Hopkins Advanced Propulsion Laboratory (JHUAPL) managed the mission. The apparent success of DART is likely to prompt more ‘planetary defence’ missions. According to the latest decadal survey published by the US-based National Academies, NASA’s annual budget for planetary defence is more than $160 million. NASA has tracked about 27,000 near Earth objects (NEOs) using this funding. Yet this is barely enough to track naturally occurring threats from space. In particular, NEOs that are between 30-140 metres in size and typically collide with the Earth once every century, can be hard to detect. One such celestial body was responsible for the 1908 Tunguska event.
Ambitious Proposals, Enduring Suspicions
While the DART mission was a kinetic collision, such interventions may not suffice for every contingency. While no civilisation-killing NEOs are likely to be headed Earth’s way anytime soon, smaller NEOs that can still result in catastrophes may be detected too late for deflection. Also, kinetic collisions may risk creating fragments large enough to survive reentry and cause damage on Earth. The most common proposal for dealing with such contingencies is using explosive nuclear devices. One scientific study from 2021 concluded that such devices were likely to be useful in destroying major NEOs headed towards Earth.
While it may be prudent to seriously examine the options available, NASA’s planetary defence project is not without political implications. Any spacefaring capability that can destroy through kinetic collision, or worse yet, nuclear explosives, has obvious military implications. This is especially so because, as we have argued, space warfare is still primitive in character, depending on dual-use capabilities rather than specialised weapons or platforms.
While the military applications of DART-like missions are unclear and fantastical at the moment, states are not known to take chances on such matters. For reasons of both survival and prestige, America’s rivals may initiate their own planetary defence programmes in the near future.
Our Reading Menu
[Book] A History of Near-Earth Objects Research by Erik M. Conway, Donald K. Yeomans, and Meg Rosenburg
[Report] Forecasting th A History of Near-Earth Objects Researche future impact of emerging technologies on international stability and human security by Marina Favaro, Neil Renic and Ulrich Kühn
[Research Article] One if by Land, and Two if by Sea: Cross-Domain Contests and the Escalation of International Crises by J Andrés Gannon
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com -
India Needs a Holistic and Effective Techplomacy Strategy
— Arjun Gargeyas
Earlier this year, the Takshashila Institution published the Techno-strategic Doctrine for India. The doctrine outlined the fundamental principles India must follow to springboard as a technology superpower. As the doctrine mentions, one of the critical approaches for India to reach the status of a technology superpower is by becoming a vital node in the global technology ecosystem and building strong links with states that share its interests and values and with which it enjoys economic complementarities.
Takshashila’s newly released discussion document titled India’s Approach to Technology Diplomacy by Arjun Gargeyas provides a clear and well-defined pathway for India to become a global technology player. A summary of the arguments is the highlight of this edition ofTechnopolitik.
India Needs a Holistic and Effective ‘Techplomacy’ Strategy
Technological advancements in the 21st Century have heightened the role of technology in the diplomacy arena. Technically adept nation-states are developing their own strategies to integrate technology with their foreign policy and diplomatic initiatives. But how can technology be used as a credible diplomatic plank by the Indian State to further its national and geopolitical interests?
The government of India, driven by the nation’s technological growth, has gradually embraced the concept of integrating technology into achieving national and geopolitical goals. Official government documents, departmental strategies and policy changes have increasingly focused on how science and technology can shape diplomatic efforts in the near future.
The Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (STIP) 2013 was one of the instances that an intersection of technology and diplomacy found a mention in an official government document. The document states that the 'policy framework will enable strategic partnerships and alliances with other nations through both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in science, technology and innovation. Science diplomacy, technology synergy and technology acquisition models will be judiciously deployed based on strategic relationships.
This was further cemented in the most recently released draft STIP-2020 document. It discusses the role of science and technology (S&T) in reorganising India’s foreign policy priorities and shaping the global technology ecosystem.
There has also been considerable movement on the political front regarding the role of technology in diplomacy itself. In 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi asserted that science and technology would be put at the forefront of India’s diplomatic engagement in the future. In 2020, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) created technically specialised divisions, such as the Cyber Diplomacy Division, E-Governance and Information Technology Division, and the New Emerging and Strategic Technologies Division.
Apart from India’s policy directives, the government has ensured that technology has been incorporated into different diplomatic agreements, especially with established technological powers. These agreements are in the interest of utilising outside support to build India’s technical competency and technology-based alliances.
While these decisions have showcased movement on the techplomacy front, the Indian state needs a more comprehensive and well-rounded approach to using technology in the diplomatic space. This can be achieved through a three-fold strategy focusing on the pathway for any current and future administration to employ technology as a strategic diplomatic tool. The three principles are explained below.
Principle 1: Focus on Areas of Strengths in India’s Technology Stack
The Indian state should focus on critical areas of strength in its technology ecosystem, which can serve as potential tools of diplomatic leverage. The primary task of employing technology as a soft power tool is to pinpoint certain tech-driven areas in which the country has built expertise. Once identified, these areas can be concentrated and developed further. Investment by the state (both financial and human resources) in these critical areas that India has developed a comparative advantage in can cement the country’s leadership credentials in that particular domain. These areas of strength, when identified and developed, can translate into Indian influence in the global tech landscape.
A framework India can use for this is to analyse the export capabilities and domestic IP innovation levels in certain areas of technologies. If India can export specific technology products on a large scale, it can positively impact the diplomatic aspect of the country as well. The biotech space, including vaccines and drugs, is an area that India can focus on. The other criterion is the ability of the Indian domestic tech industry to own IP and have a high level of innovation in a specific area of technology. The fintech ecosystem, including the digital payments arena, is where India has created a name for itself and has managed to penetrate external markets with international acceptance (UPI and RuPay are now accepted in over five different countries).
A framework for assessing India’s technological strengths
Principle 2: Foster Multilateralism as a Necessity for Tech Development
The concept of self-sufficiency in emerging technologies must be re-examined with the Indian state championing and fostering multilateral efforts in its tech diplomacy outreach. It should be noted that there are no national industries but the existence of global supply chains. So the role of diplomacy will be central, not secondary.
In the technology sphere, diplomacy is not about seeking entry into an exclusive alliance or club but about maximising a state’s integration with the existing global value chains. Multilateralism in different critical and emerging technology fields should be more of an entrepreneurial decision to improve access and combine scientific or technical knowledge. In that regard, promoting the growth of open source technologies (and built on open standards) with very little or no entry barriers in the form of licences and royalty fees must be prioritised on the multilateral front. This can engage more stakeholders, improve accessibility, and increase multilateral efforts toward technology dissemination.
But even with the case of open technologies, India must walk the talk. During the development of Covid-19 vaccines, there was a call by the developing countries to remove the intellectual property and licensing restrictions on Covid-19 vaccine research for public health reasons. However, even after the conversation on open vaccines at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Indian government did not open up the tech behind India’s indigenous vaccine, Covaxin. Hence, if India wants to lead and engage in multilateral efforts, opening up its domestic technology IP to the world should be a priority.
Principle 2: Foster Multilateralism as a Necessity for Tech Development
This expansion of the technology-oriented Sinosphere has made other states take cognisance and increase diplomatic outreach to counter China’s ever-increasing growth. However, India, as a responsible technological power, can learn from China’s tech-driven influence in two ways.
Export Tech Infrastructure through Foreign Policy Projects: The Chinese government has exported digital infrastructure (hardware, software, networks and systems) with the help of their domestic private sector giants to many BRI partner countries. India can rely on its own foreign policy projects and initiatives to build digital infrastructure beyond its borders. This will ensure two things: One, it will build and support a robust domestic technology industry capable of competing on a global scale. Two, these digital infrastructure projects using Indian technologies (equipment, software etc.) will serve as strategic assets for the state and help increase the footprint of the Indian technological ecosystem.
Focus on Key Battlegrounds of Digital Competition: The Chinese state actively pushes for their consumer tech to be adopted in regions such as Africa, Central Asia and South East Asia. The state has actively used its foreign policy projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to get more partners on board and convince them to use technologies developed by China and its technology companies. The Indian state’s main focus should be diplomatic outreach through its domestic private sector firms to help set up infrastructure in regions still developing technologically. For example, Indian telecommunication firms such as Airtel and Jio can be used to set up 5G networks in regions like Africa and Latin America, which rely on foreign import of technology.
Taking Tech-Diplomacy Forward
Tech-diplomacy can only succeed when there is a push within the government, specifically the Ministry of External Affairs. A primary objective would be a foreign service officer within the government who can serve as the state’s official ‘tech diplomat’. The position of Tech Ambassador within Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UK Consul General who serves as a Technology Envoy are specifically given the responsibilities of technology outreach. France's position of Digital Ambassador handles all international technology cooperation and diplomatic engagements as a state representative. The government of Australia appointed its first-ever Ambassador for Cyber Affairs and Critical Technology in 2021.
These are some templates the Indian state can follow and curate a position specifically within the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) to handle technology negotiations for advancing India's national goals and interests. The role of existing Science and Tech (S&T) Counsellors under the Science Wings programme at embassies in Berlin, Tokyo, Moscow and Washington DC can be expanded to include technology outreach focusing on strategic cooperation, military applications and governance frameworks related to emerging and strategic technologies. The number of these counsellors should be increased and provided adequate technical knowledge or expertise to understand certain technologies’ geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects. This can help increase engagement and ensure India drives forward conversations on technology-related foreign policies.
Finally, now that the MEA has specific divisions that have been created (such as NEST and the Cyber Diplomacy Division) under the ministry, a nodal agency can be established by the Indian state which can coordinate between the different MEA divisions, S&T counsellors and other foreign service officers specifically handling technology outreach at the multilateral level. The nodal agency can also rope in the help of the private sector’s international footprint to put forth the country’s case at global technology forums. The agency can eventually take on the role of coordinating India’s tech diplomacy initiatives.
India, in the long run, will benefit from being integrated into the global technology ecosystem and engaging with other like-minded nation-states through diplomacy. This would achieve its key objectives of economic integration and governance participation in the technology realm.
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Antariksh Matters: Putting space ambitions in context
— Pranav R Satyanath
The Artemis 1 mission rocket stays grounded, ready to launch on another day. The North American Space Administration (NASA) made two unsuccessful attempts to get the massive Space Launch System (SLS) rocket off the ground. The first attempt to launch the Artemis 1 mission, the rocket's Engine-3 (SLS has four engines) faced a cooling issue. During the second attempt on September 3rd, NASA aborted the launch due to a fuel leak issue.. But the SLS stands tall to be launched another day.
The Artemis mission has raised the prospect of a new space race in popular media, with some even proclaiming that space is getting excited once again.
But the narrative around the space race is flawed, both in the context of the Cold War and the present day.
True, the United States and China plan to send humans back to the Moon by 2026. By pitting two countries’ space programmes, however, we often forget the domestic politics and organisational drivers of national space programmes. The refusal to open the ‘black box’ of domestic politics often skews our perception as to what really motivates countries to undertake certain actions, whether it is in the realm of national security or civilian space programmes.
During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union had set up their respective space programmes to achieve completely separate goals. In the US, successive Presidential administrations kept the civilian and military space programmes strictly separate, with NASA placed as the heart of all civilian space ambitions. The Department of Defense (and individual branches of the US military) took it upon themselves to drive the direction of the ballistic missile and missile defence programmes. Approval of budgets and high-level decision-making fell on the hands of the President, with each new Presidentsetting the course of the space program and fighting for NASA’s budgets in Congress.
In stark contrast, decision-making in the Soviet Union was decentralised. The Soviet military, in particular, prioritised the missile programme in order to match the numerical and technological prowess of the US. The technology derived from the ballistic missile programme often drove the space programme. In parallel, influential heads of design bureaus, namely Sergei Korolev (design bureau OKB-1), Vladimir Chelomey (design bureau OKB-52) and Valentin Glushko (OKB-546), led the way to propose space missions and rocket payloads to the higher Soviet leadership. The outcome of interpersonal rivalries between these men (and their design bureaus) often led to a disorganised space programme within the USSR.
While the Soviets achieved great success with the launch of the world's first satellite, dog, man and woman in space, the Moon did not capture the interest of the Soviet leadership, led by Nikita Khrushchev until August 1964 — three months after the first launch of the Saturn-1 rocket that carried Apollo astronauts to the Moon. The Soviet Union ultimately lost the “race” to the Moon as the motives and commitment to a Moon race was very different from what the Americans perceived Soviet ambitions to be.
Today, the new race to the Moon is also driven by domestic politics and marketed by domestic politics and asymmetric goals. The US aims to make its Moon landing sustainable with a long-term presence alongside its partners. On the other hand, China's goals are much more modest as it seeks to land humans on the Moon’s surface by 2026. To claim the existence of a space race often takes away the nuances of national ambitions and achievable goals. As policy wonks, therefore, we must be wary of catchy yet flawed narratives,
Matsyanyaaya #1: Where Knowledge is Free and Accessible to All
— Bharath Reddy
A White House directive on 25th August requires agencies to update their public access policies as soon as possible to provide open access to taxpayer-funded publications and research. The move is expected to broaden access to research and yield significant benefits to the public on issues ranging from climate change to cancer research to protecting civil liberties in an automated world. This directive not only makes scientific research more accessible to the broader research community, it could also have implications for research funded by Indian taxpayers.
This White House directive overrides a 2013 directive which required federal agencies with an annual grant greater than $100 million to make their research publicly available. The 2013 directive also allowed for a year-long embargo on the research and accompanying data. As expected, scientific journals use embargos to create exclusive access to research and gain subscriptions. Academics would also prefer to publish their research in journals with a better impact factor, which is a measure of the number of times an average article in the journal has been cited. The new directive expands the scope to all agencies receiving federal funding and ends the optional embargo.
This move is expected to radically transform access to research and has been praised by open research advocates and the research community. The New York Times quotes Mr Tanenbaum of the Open Research Funders Group as saying the policy “broadens the circle of science. It broadens the conversation”. This move could, however, have a significant impact on the current revenue models of journals. It would force them to look at alternative sources of revenue, which might significantly increase article processing costs.
Publishing research in journals has been the conventional approach of communicating research. Journals operate on a subscription-based model. They charge hefty amounts from authors for publication and are only accessible by those who pay the significant subscription charges. These paywalled articles pose a significant cost barrier, and the costs can add up when referencing dozens of articles for a paper. Many people will end up not having access to such research unless they are part of a large institution that pays for a subscription to most of the journals. Studies have shown that across disciplines, freely available articles have a greater research impact. In addition, it is unethical that the fruits of the research funded by taxpayer money should not be accessible to the public.
The trend has been changing, with more research being published in online open-access journals. Open access requires granting all users an unrestricted, irrevocable, worldwide, perpetual right of access with a licence to copy, distribute, transmit and display the work publicly and digital publication in at least one open access repository. Awareness and momentum around open access to research has been growing globally with many institutions across USA and Europe adopting open access policies.
India has had a policy on open access to the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) and Department of Science and Technology(DST) funded research since late 2014. Per this policy, any research partially or fully funded by DBT or DST or performed on infrastructure built with the support of these organisations should be made available in open access repositories maintained by their institutions or those maintained by DBT and DST. If the research is published prior in a journal that insists on an embargo, the policy recommends that the period of the embargo should not exceed one year.
While this policy is laudable in terms of its intent, the implementation and impact have been poor. This can be attributed to poor state capacity and non-alignment of the journal and academic incentives. With the reforms imposed by the White House directive, the incentives and revenue models of the journals are expected to change significantly. This precedent could have a positive impact on Indian taxpayer-funded research as well.
The MHRD must take the initiative to expand the open access policy to all government-funded research. In addition to setting up national open access repositories, high-quality open journals should also be set up in multiple disciplines to provide a credible platform for academics to publish their research. The journal editorial board should include renowned academics from around the world and be granted operational independence to ensure the quality of the research being published. The platform should not be restricted only to Indian research but must welcome excellent research from across the world. Over time the costs incurred will yield returns by providing broad access to research but also in nurturing and growing the research community.
These timeless lines by Tagore can guide us, “Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high, where knowledge is free”, “Into that heaven of freedom, my father, let my country awake”.
Matsyanyaaya #2: How can India use Technology as a Strategic Tool to Advance its Interests?
— Arjun Gargeyas
In the current Information Age, technology has become a ubiquitous part of every country’s society. Citizens are empowered in a wide range of ways with improved access to technology, states’ economic sectors are transitioning into the digital space, and tech development has been outpacing regulations and governance regularly. This is the era where technology is becoming a strategic tool for the state to drive growth and protect its interests.
India, as a fledgling and rising technological power has the ability to leverage technology for the greater good. As seen from the past two decades, tech has simplified policy decisions and has improved the quality of governance in the country. The questions on accessibility, inclusion and levelling the playing field have been bridged by the use of technology to a certain extent. The Indian state should now start viewing technology and its adoption from a more strategic lens. But how can India use ‘technology’ to tackle existing problems as well as try to deploy it as a prospective solution in key areas of governance?
India’s Technology Assets
Frontier Areas of Expertise and Scale - India must focus on identifying and building on certain technology areas where it has made and can make a significant global impact. This can aid its technology exports and help expand its international digital and technological footprint. Low-cost telecommunication operations, renewable energy systems, and digital payment frameworks can serve as model areas that India can use as soft power tools in the technology sphere.
Skilled Labour Workforce in Multiple Domains - India should look to leverage the presence of the abundant domestic human capital in the country to create a strong workforce in specific technology areas that might prove to be critically important in the near future. The availability of low-cost labour must be used to persuade technologically advanced states to look at the Indian workforce as a contributing partner to some labour-intensive supply chains. Semiconductor design and IT services are areas that continue to require large pools of human resources, and India’s workforce has proven to be competent in these fields.
A Notable Presence in International Technology Supply Chains - Though a rising technological power, India has become essential in key areas of the high-technology realm. Other states depend considerably on India for certain technology supply chains because of its comparative advantages and expertise in specific processes. This must be used to India’s strategic advantage and to ensure it remains a factor in the international technology trade ecosystem.
Research and Development
The identification of critical technologies or key areas in technology supply chains to invest scientific and financial resources remains critical. The Indian state must consider extensive collaboration with the domestic private sector to enhance research and match global developments in specific strategic science and technology areas. This can eventually result in increased influence through a dominant domestic technology sector.
The focus on promoting research in technology areas where India-specific solutions are needed and are unlikely to be addressed by the developed world can be prioritised. Encouraging the use of open-source technologies to promote innovation free from state intervention, technology oligopolies, and international politics can help in India’s tech growth trajectory. This would make technology more accessible and more relevant to developmental challenges. Open-source technologies also serve as a counterweight to the dominance of Big Tech and aid technology sovereignty in an uncertain geopolitical climate. It can also bridge the trust deficit between the state and the citizens by addressing privacy and surveillance concerns.
While gaining a foothold in technology product development can create a zero-sum game between two or more parties, the scientific knowledge in the field itself is a non-zero-sum game. The Indian state should prioritise improving the dissemination of technical expertise as part of its technology strategy.
International Cooperation
The Indian state should not favour isolationism especially in the field of technology development. The process of collaborating in high-technology areas to tackle the existing bottlenecks in several supply chains must be one of the sector’s priorities. The principle of ‘plurilateralism being a necessity and not a choice’ while dealing with critical and emerging technologies must be championed if India aims to become a leading tech power.
Leading talks with fraternal multilateral groupings to build technological partnerships can be done. The Indian state should also engage in responsibilities such as improving technology-related trade, facilitating technology transfer agreements between participating states, and setting credible technology standards in critical and emerging technologies.
A good example would be to move forward on the recently signed India-Europe Trade and Technology Council to build a robust technology trade infrastructure. The focus should be removing export controls on components related to critical technologies and reducing import tariffs for high-tech products.
The Ministry of External Affairs must also take up a technology diplomacy approach to include science and technology as a source of outreach through appointed officials leading diplomatic conversations in the field.
A non-discriminatory data-sharing framework between states so long as the data in question does not infringe on India’s national security can allow India to be integrated digitally worldwide. This can include participation in multilateral technology data-sharing agreements if there are no compulsions to share critical data threatening its internal security and ensuring India's access to similar data from other signatories.
Finally, the state can lead global efforts to set forth universally-acceptable and legally-binding instruments on technologies that threaten the safety and security of all states. A techno-democratic alliance that prevents the control of specific technologies by selective groups, especially those potentially impacting warfare and conflict and detrimental to international security, can be led by India and its diplomatic partners.
Technology has become an integral aspect of international relations, foreign policy, military and defence in the recent past. As an aspiring world power, India should focus on utilising its strengths in the technological realm to advance its strategic interests. This would benefit both the Indian and society in the long run.
Our Reading Menu
[Book] The Red Rockets’ Glare: Spaceflight and the Soviet Imagination, 1857-1957 by Asif A. Siddiqi.
[Op-ed] Making the case for a new geolocation data privacy paradigm by Jason Sarfati.
[Blog] Takshashila Issue Brief - Public Access to Knowledge Resources.
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com -
Cyberpolitik: The Internet of Yesterday and Tomorrow
— Bharath Reddy
The foundation of the internet was built on three pillars:
* Reliance on the private sector,
* Light regulatory oversight,
* Free speech and a free flow of information.
The hope was that these values would also be accepted as the internet would be accepted across the world. However this utopian vision is far from the reality of today’s internet. Gradually the internet has become less secure, more fragmented and less free. Authoritarian regimes across the world have been able to leverage control of the internet to shape narratives that strengthen their control. The US needs to recalibrate and adapt to this new reality. So begins the Council on Foreign Relations report titled “Confronting Reality in Cyberspace: Foreign Policy for a Fragmented Internet”.
The authors propose a three-fold approach to confronting the new reality in cyberspace. Firstly, they recommend that allies need to come together to preserve a trusted and secure internet based on international standards. This includes working towards a shared policy on digital privacy, tackling cybercrime, and helping developing nations build cyber capacity. Secondly, there should be discussions and negotiations with adversaries to avoid cyber operations against nuclear command, control and communications systems, election systems and financial systems. This includes holding states accountable for cyber threats originating from their territory. The last recommendation involves getting the domestic house in order, which includes building cyber security talent, minimising domestic cyber security risks and prioritising digital interests in national security strategies.
The predictions of the end of the global internet are growing quite common. The predictions for a fragmented internet range from a splinternet to a bifurcation between a Western and a Chinese internet. With these possibilities appearing more likely each day, India needs to rethink its own approaches to cyber security.
Matsyanyaaya #1: Fission Factor: The Big Bet on Small Reactors
— Aditya Ramanathan
While the world’s attention is drawn to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, where Russian and Ukrainian forces are facing off, there are potentially more significant developments underway for the future of nuclear power.
In July, the United States’ Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) announced that it would certify the NuScale 50 MWe small modular reactor. NuScale’s reactor is only the seventh design which the NRC has ever approved in the history of nuclear power. It is also the first small modular reactor (SMR) that has received the green light in the United States.
China is presently ahead of the US in SMRs. A couple of weeks before the NRC announcement, the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) began the construction of an SMR demonstration plant in Hainan Province. CNNC calls the project the first “commercial onshore small modular reactor” in the world. Once the 125 MWe reactor is up and running, CNNC claims it will be capable of powering 526,000 households.
The SMR Promise
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines SMRs as reactors with up to 300 MWe capacity. As the name indicates, SMRs are much smaller than traditional reactors and modular in their design. For instance, the NuScale design is touted as being only
“about 1 per cent the size of a traditional power plant’s containment chamber, though it delivers 10 percent of a plant’s power output.” SMRs are modular for two reasons. Firstly, assemblies and components can be pre-fabricated on a factory floor and then put together on site. Secondly, additional units to t can simply be added on site to increase capacity.
Proponents of SMRs have advocated their widespread adoption for several reasons. For one, SMRs need much lower initial investments and fewer operators and specialists to run them. Two, unlike traditionally large nuclear plants, finding the right patch of real estate for an SMR is much simpler. Three, proponents say SMRs are well suited to serve small communities and provide a reliable base-load for renewables. Four, the modularity of SMRs allows them to be easily scaled up as the needs of a community grow.
SMR proponents argue that these reactors are safer because they are far less susceptible to human error and rely on passive safety features. For instance, NuScale designs don’t require external power sources to operate the cooling systems for their cores. Finally, if an accident occurs, the consequences with an SMR are likely to be much less severe than in previous nuclear accidents.
While both the CNNC and NuScale reactors feature novel designs, they nevertheless draw from proven technologies. CNNC describes its Linglong-1 design as being a pressurised water reactor, while the NuScale design is a light water reactor. Both reactors appear to use clever design and engineering to simplify traditional reactors.
This is a sensible approach to getting SMRs approved and operational. However, other companies are experimenting with more radical designs. The Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation (USNC) has designed what it calls a Micro Modular Reactor (MMR). The MMR eschews water altogether, using helium as a coolant and transferring heat through molten salt. MMRs also use a ‘Fully Ceramic Microencapsulated’ (FCM) fuel, in which small kernels of Uranium fuel, each about 1 mm across, are encased in layers of ceramic and silicon carbide. According to USNC, this makes the fuel much safer to use and transport, gives it greater temperature stability, and makes it impossible to repurpose for military purposes. In April, the company started running a pilot plant for the production of FCM fuel. USNC expects demonstration units of the reactor itself to be operational by 2026.
Besides these there are several other SMRs under development, including so-called micro-reactors from start-ups like Oklo and NuGen as well as designs from established giants like General Atomics. Finally, there are companies pursuing larger reactors like the so-called pebble-bed design as well as the Bill Gates-backed TerraPower’s molten salt design.
Nuclear Realities
For all the promises of SMRs, it’s worth keeping in mind that they are still a long way off. Even if SMRs are all they claim to be, it may be another two decades before they dramatically impact the global energy mix. Until then, renewables and traditional nuclear plants will remain important sources of low-carbon energy.
There also remain many uncertainties around SMRs, many of which feature completely unproven designs. As with every other means of power generation, there are also likely to be some downsides. For example, a Stanford-led study concluded that SMRs could produce much more nuclear waste than traditional reactors. The study looked at designs from NuScale, Terrestrial Energy, and Toshiba and concluded that these small reactors would experience greater neutron leakage, which would, in turn, create more radioactive material. While such studies are by no means conclusive, they highlight how little we will really know until prototype SMRs run for years.
SMRs are also likely to be subject to the same political and social uncertainties that afflict traditional nuclear power. The supply of Uranium fuel remains highly politicised and dominated by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). And popular perceptions of nuclear power appear to be poor. Nuclear engineers may point out that the chances of a major radiation event at the Zaporizhzhia plant are very low, despite the ongoing fighting in its vicinity. However, popular perceptions are unlikely to make much allowance for expert opinion.
Matsyanyaaya #2: How can the US-India iCET Succeed?
— Arjun Gargeyas
I know we talk about the intersection of technology and international affairs in this newsletter. This time I’m trying something different, elucidating the possibility of a new technology in India which can become the global standard and shake things up in the international E-commerce arena if implemented perfectly.
Over the last few weeks, we met with Mr Sanjay Jain, a member of iSPIRIT and an engineer closely working on developing the India Stack applications. This was to understand better the newly launched Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC) and how it functions. The ONDC was launched by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Government of India as an e-commerce aggregator. The primary objective was to challenge the monopoly of E-commerce giants like Amazon and Flipkart while providing the local sellers a platform to be equally competitive.
After having a couple of conversations with Mr Jain, who brilliantly explained the system’s backend, India had a sense of opportunity to set a global standard through which E-commerce operates.
What is it?
ONDC is a massive network that acts as a facilitator for buyers and sellers. It is not a platform such as Amazon. It is built on leveraging the network effects and positive externalities of E-commerce platforms, while aggregating all existing platforms to be on the same network. It is currently developed on the Beckn Protocol, an open-source software protocol. Now, for comparison's sake, it is similar to the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), which handles all UPI transactions.
Why has it been introduced?
One of the main reasons for introducing ONDC in India is the movement toward E-commerce while making it inclusive and accessible to the country’s large population. There is also the movement from platform-based to network-based technology in the E-commerce domain so that users are not locked into a particular platform only and can choose from multiple options. Including local merchants, sellers and buyers to make the network have over 15,000 retailers is another key objective of the platform itself. Increasing the share of Indians using E-Commerce (from 9 crores to 25 crores) and improving geographic coverage of E-Commerce (covering 75% of PIN codes) remains the core idea behind ONDC.
How can it become the E-commerce domain standard?
ONDC mainly revolves around two principles: Bundling and Interoperability. It helps separate the buyers and sellers while aggregating both on a single network. It addresses lock-in and unbundles E-commerce’s buying, selling and logistics aspects. Sellers need not register on an existing app but can come together with others to create seller apps with other retailers (location-specific retailer aggregation or delivery-specific services can have their platforms for end users to choose from). There’s no centralised payment processor, but seller-side apps determine the commission for whoever decides to get onboarded.
Can India use ONDC and implement it in different countries just like its digital payments system? ONDC can soon be a perfect solution for preventing monopolies in the E-commerce domain. It can also provide local entrepreneurs with a perfect opportunity to reach the end users directly without being bullied by big firms who prefer to prop their own businesses.
The US has long been talking about breaking up Big Tech. Now, in the E-commerce space, ONDC has a shot (albeit a very long one currently) to become a credible alternative to the existing model (concentrated with a few giants who have captured the market) that other nation-states can use. With that, ONDC has the possibility of improving India’s own international reach (like UPI), thus helping the country gain some diplomatic heft in the E-commerce space.
Our Reading Menu
[Book] From Space to Sea : My ISRO Journey and Beyond by Abraham E. Muthunayagam.
[Report] Green energy depends on critical minerals. Who controls the supply chains? by Luc Leruth, Adnan Mazarei, Pierre Régibeau and Luc Renneboog.
[Article] Technology and the construction of oceanic space: Bathymetry and the Arctic continental shelf dispute by Daniel Lambach
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Antariksh Matters #1: Spying on Spy Satellites
— Pranav R Satyanath
In February this year, the United States launched a nondescript satellite simply designated as NROL-87. Those who keep a close of space launches know that the NROL designation stands for national security satellites operated by the National Reconnaissance Office. The satellite likely entered a 284 x 425 km Sub-synchronous orbit with an inclination of 97.25 degrees. The NROL-87, also designated as USA 326, is suspected to be a new generation of electro-optical imaging satellite. This spy satellite, one among many operated by the US, kept to itself with nothing to bother its mission. Until now.
Earlier this month, Russia launched a nondescript satellite on board a Soyuz-2.1V from the Plesetsk launch site. The secret satellite, Kosmo-2558, was launched just as NROL-87 passed above the Russian launch complex. Space watchers like Jonathan McDowell quickly predicted that Kosmos-2558 would likely reach the planar orbit of NROL-87 within 80 km of the American spy satellite’s range. The orbital behaviour of the Kosmos-2558 resembles that of an ‘inspector satellite’, which, in other words, means that Russia launched a satellite to spy on another satellite.
Of course, the presence of inspector satellites in space is not a new phenomenon. Classified under the category of Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO), satellites have been launched to either inspect or potentially attack other satellites in the past. Not all RPO satellites have malign intentions. For example, in the 1990s, Canada proposed using inspector satellites to verify arms control agreements in outer space.
More recently, however, RPOs have been viewed with suspicion. The sharp increase in the number of satellites being placed in orbit has made it all the more difficult to predict the purpose of satellites which may or may not have military utility. Since countries do not disclose details of the satellites they launch, the lack of transparency does little to decrease uncertainties.
Policymakers and policy analysts have considered several possible solutions to the problem of transparency. Some scholars propose a pre-launch notification mechanism under which countries not only notify others of the launches of rockets and ballistic missiles that are set to take place but also provide details about the nature of the launch vehicle or ballistic missile.
Pre-launch notification agreements concerning ballistic missiles have been signed in bilateral settings in the past. The United States and Russia signed such an agreement in 1988. India and Pakistan signed a similar agreement in 2005. No attempt has been made to craft similar agreements for space launch vehicles. One reason might be that providing pre-launch notifications might be because countries fear that adversary countries might take countermeasures against potential spy satellites. Such concerns were expressed as far back as 1958, as seen in the memorandum from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to the President of the United States.
Another solution that has been proposed to avoid the risk of RPOs is to implement a keep-out zone for satellites. While such an agreement does not require a verification mechanism, countries could choose to use space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities to enforce a keep-out zone agreement. SSA capabilities have their limitations as no single national system can currently provide full coverage of Low-earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO). Establishing a global SSA network is also challenging and expensive.
Although RPOs have not been a problem till date, they may become a problem in the future. Analysts have already begun to take notice of the increase in RPOs in recent years. If countries wish to mitigate the risks associated with RPOs, they must start preliminary negotiations sooner rather than later.
(The author would like to thank Aaron Bateman for providing access to declassified documents related to the US space progaramme.)
Antariksh Matters #2: The Indian Army’s ‘Skylight’ Exercise
— Aditya Ramanathan
It would be unusual for readers of this newsletter to find an entry describing an exercise conducted by the Indian Army. However, there was much about the recently concluded Exercise Skylight that was unusual, and that warranted an entry in Technopolitik.
What little is known about the exercise comes from scant official information and a few news stories. The Army’s official Twitter handle described it as a satellite communication exercise. It went on to add:
“100% satellite communication assets were activated to ensure operational readiness of hi-tech satellite systems and exercise various contingencies.”
The tweet would indicate Exercise Skylight tested all of the Army’s orbital communications (which are scattered across multiple satellites) and that these systems were tested for ‘contingencies’. What might be these contingencies? ThePrint cited an anonymous source who indicated the Army wanted to validate its ability to use space-based communications as a redundancy during wartime:
“Conflict situations demand space-based communication because we are going by the assumption that the primary means of communication — terrestrial media — gets disrupted”.
Of course, the Army understands the vital advantages space-based communications provide. This is especially evident in the Himalayas along the Line of Actual Control (LaC) with China, where satellites can enable tactical communication well beyond the line-of-sight.
The Russia-Ukraine war also seems to loom over Exercise Skylight. The Times of India cited an anonymous source as saying the Army was carefully following the use of cyber and electronic warfare in that conflict. In particular, the Army appears to be impressed by the resilience of the SpaceX Starlink satellite internet constellation, which Ukrainian forces have been using to coordinate operations against Russia. In the coming years, the Army is expected to look to acquire easily portable satellite phones and “satellite high speed data backbone,” which would likely require a constellation of low earth orbit (LEO) satellites link Starlink.
Before it turns to LEO, the Army will be most eager to get its own communications satellite in geostationary orbit. In March, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh cleared the path for developing the GSAT-7B satellite for the Indian Army. At present, the Army shares satellites with the other services and civilian organisations. If the GSAT-7B is put into orbit by the planned date of 2025, the Army will join the Indian Navy (which already operates the GSAT-7A) and the Indian Airforce (which operates the GSAT-7C) in having its own dedicated communications satellites parked over the most suitable spot of orbital real estate.
Matsyanyaaya: How can the US-India iCET Succeed?
— Arjun Gargeyas
A couple of months ago, the United States (US) and India decided to enhance cooperation in the technology domain. President Biden and Prime Minister Modi’s meeting resulted in the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) announcement to expand the existing partnership between the two states in specific strategic technology sectors.
One interesting aspect of the iCET remains the departments spearheading the initiative. Both states' National Security Councils have been responsible for driving forward outcome-oriented projects related to the iCET. The defence and national security angle behind the technology cooperation is clearly visible through this initiative. With certain technology sectors attaining a strategic status, the iCET has the ability to help the two states focus on technologies that might have a massive impact on the security and military side.
These agreements, when announced can create a flutter of conversation and remain exciting on paper. But what are the actual policy implementations under the iCET which can actually translate into on ground impact for both the states? Are there areas of focus which can improve the effectiveness of the initiative itself is something to look at.
A People-Centric Approach
The single point of focus in the initiative should be the human capital model to achieve the desired outcomes. Technical knowledge is central to the overall development of emerging technology areas such as 5G, quantum computing and semiconductors. With human capital being the biggest strength for both India and US, the iCET will thrive if it is made individual-centric. The governments should facilitate this exchange of ideas and foster the talent pool that exists in both countries.
One of the goals set by the initiative as per the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) was to forge better linkages between government, academia and industry in specific technology areas. This would entail cross-border human capital movement being essential to achieving those goals. Scientists, engineers and other researchers in both countries who are involved in working on critical technologies can have access to research facilities in both countries under the initiative. The exchange of STEM researchers between universities across both countries and industrial leaders and technology entrepreneurs engaged in developing strategic tech can help translate lab-level research into potential applications.
An important area in the people-centric approach are the students and academic researchers studying in each other’s universities. Although this is heavily skewed towards Indians in the US academic institutions, this initiative can introduce academic fellowships for scholars to work and contribute to specific emerging technology sectors. This would help in IP creation and dissemination across borders as well as cultivate a thriving set of scientists and engineers who can contribute to technology collaboration at the government level.
Focus on Funding Specific Research Projects
As per the White House Press Release, the US-India iCET will involve the scientific government departments from both states. As per the press statement, the National Science Foundation (NSF) of the US, along with the Department of Science and Technology (DST) will drive forward the implementation of research projects under the initiative. The statement also mentioned that the US has agreed to join six of India’s Technology Innovation hubs. This is in the hope of spearheading over 25 projects across emerging domains such as artificial intelligence and data science. This sets the foundation for another area of focus for the success of the initiative.
One of the main objectives of the iCET must be to secure funding (for research and product development) for outcome-driven projects that employ critical and emerging technologies. Enhancing technological cooperation between the two states and improving the efficiency of the initiative can be done when government bodies would indulge in funding crucial research projects on emerging technologies.
The iCET must put its resources into funding and supporting specific research projects that can provide a solid output and outcome. The focus must be on emerging technology areas that have the potential to use said technology to create different applications and products to tackle some of the biggest challenges faced by both countries. Improving agriculture output, mitigating climate change effects and similar research can be prioritised for funding. Another aspect would be to identify areas of technology that might dominate in the near future and focus on them. Developing state-of-the-art quantum computer systems, and building telecommunication networks using 6G are just a few among the plethora of technology areas on which the iCET can spend its resources on.
Our Reading Menu
* [Book] A Technological History of Cold-War India, 1947–1969: Autarky and Foreign Aid by William A.T. Logan.
* [Article] Wargame of Drones: Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Crisis Escalation by Erik Lin-Greenberg.
* [Report] Securing Semiconductor Supply Chains: An Affirmative Agenda for International Cooperation by William Alan Reinsch et. al.
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com - Show more
