Episodes
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1956 Episode 2.12 takes us to the 22-24 October 1956, where the war plan that would create the Suez Crisis was created, developed and signed by Britain, France and Israel in an unassuming Parisian suburb.
This process was, of course, far from straightforward or guaranteed to produce a result. It required the French reassuring both the Israeli and British representatives about the solid nature of their plan, and it also demonstrated the lack of tact which Selwyn Lloyd in particular seemed to possess. One of the most incredible scenes though comes near the end of the episode when, on the evening of 24th October, Britain’s representatives return home to Anthony Eden with a copy of the Sevres Protocol in hand, only to come under rhetorical attack for leaving this paper trail in the course of their top secret discussions.
Eden was well aware that there could be no evidence of what had been done at Sevres, and he would send these men back to France to track down and destroy any pieces of evidence that remained. The Prime Minister, of course, was already planning ahead to what he would say when word of the Crisis got out. For the sake of plausible deniability, Eden wished there to be no evidence and no written record of the collusion. Thankfully for historians since, Eden’s wishes were not fulfilled. Here was the last piece of the Suez puzzle being set in place, so I hope you’ll give it a listen and enjoy!
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1956 Episode 2.11 finally takes us to that controversial moment when Britain, France and Israel began to move closer together.
The Sevres Protocol was neither developed nor signed in a day, and in the first two weeks of October, negotiations critically important to the later conflict were underway. At first, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd hoped to make use of the UN Security Council to gain British satisfaction in Egypt, and for a time he was successful in this aim, because Anthony Eden was ill and unable to order his subordinate around. Once Eden recovered though, Eden ramped up the pressure, and Lloyd was encouraged, alongside his French counterpart, to torpedo the negotiations in the Security Council which had aimed at a peaceful resolution.
While this peace effort was frustrated, a looming conflict aside from all these considerations began to develop. This involved Jordan, Britain’s firm ally in the Middle East, and he difficult relationship with Israel, the newly established ally of the French. Since neither the French nor British wished to see their newfound entente drift apart, the French government determined it would be better to spill the beans on what was being agreed with Israel rather than watch the different allies initiate an unwanted war in the region. Thus, the French travelled to Chequers, Anthony Eden’s swanky manor home, on 14th October 1956, to initiate the first step of the collusion which was to become infamous. At first hesitant, Eden was soon convinced of the genius of the plan – Britain, France and Israel would work together against the common Egyptian foe, and this partnership would surely sink President Nasser once and for all.
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Missing episodes?
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1956 Episode 2.10 takes us to the Commonwealth, seen as so vital to British interests, but fracturing over the question of the best course of action to take against President Nasser.
The Canadian, Australian and NZ governments were all uneasy at the prospect of war, and some, like the Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson, advocated a diplomatic approach. While Eden forged ahead with an aggressive policy, torpedoing another conference on the Suez Canal in the process, he increasingly began to alienate the Americans. The PM didn’t seem to care what other nations thought, though he was eager to make even better friends with the French throughout September. It was around this time in our story that things in France began to change – they were increasingly coming to provide weapons and support to a new ally – Israel.
Largely because of French prodding and intrigue, the Israeli element of the story became all important. While the British were not yet let in on the plan, Franco-Israeli military cooperation and supply deals were paving the way towards a more trusting, beneficial relationship which could soon be exploited. The Israeli government, led by David Ben-Gurion, was also desirous of a war with Egypt, that nation which had threatened his own with destruction time and time again. The dilemma was that Israel could not be seen as the aggressor, but how was such a war then to be crafted and set in motion? Scheming heads were set together, and before long, a solution more incredible than anyone could have imagined was brought into being…
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1956 Episode 2.9 looks at that moment which has become infamous in history – the collusion between Britain, France and Israel.
We are almost ready to see these sneaky meetings take place, and for the infamous agreement take shape, but first, it is worth investigating another important and underrated angle of the Crisis. The key element of the Suez Crisis story that demonstrates how low Britain sank must be the manifest failure of the British Government to develop any legal argument in favour of their interventionist actions. In the past, formulating such an argument was simple – an act of aggression against British interests or allies was enough to provoke a war. Now though, the whole issue was a good deal trickier.
For one, the Suez Canal Company may have been a British ‘interest’, but it was also by no means damaged by the nationalisation of late July 1956. Second, try as he might, Eden failed in his efforts to convince the opposition and many of his peers that legally, Britain had a case in Egypt. Not only was Nasser working hard not to give Eden any excuse at this stage, but he had even compensated British shareholders in the Canal Company in previous months. While many would argue that Nasser’s use of force to nationalise the Canal Company was unsavoury, it was not, in the strictest sense, illegal, because Nasser was only taking what was in his country, and thus his to take.
In this episode we are introduced to Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, a person of foremost importance thanks to his legal work in the British Foreign Office. Fitzmaurice’s task was to find legal justification for an Anglo-French war in Egypt. This, as Fitzmaurice was made aware, was an impossible task. It was to Eden’s immense frustration that Fitzmaurice’s integrity was greater than his ‘loyalty’ or ‘patriotism’ – the legal officer refused to give Eden the legal justification he desired.
While on the surface this seems like an unimportant sequence of events, Fitzmaurice’s convictions here demonstrated clearly at the time, and speak loudly to this day, the fact that Eden’s interventionist policy in Egypt was baseless, and was devoid of the honour or noble intentions he would later claim. If the Prime Minister couldn’t even get his minion in the Foreign Office to see ‘sense’, then how on earth was he going to persuade the rest of the world? This question, as we’ll see, was far from Eden’s thoughts. If he couldn’t get legal approval, then he would move along with the plan regardless…
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1956 Episode 2.8 examines the increasingly secretive plotting which took place behind the scenes in early autumn 1956.
While Eden worked feverishly to make the conflict he desired come together, the countless variables continued to haunt him. We see here a glimpse of a common theme which will occupy us later on – the use of legal arguments to support the Anglo-French operation, on the grounds that Nasser had infringed upon British ‘rights’ and that Britain was thus entitled to compensation. In this episode we also are introduced to one of banes of Eden’s life, the leader of the Labour Party Hugh Gaitskell, who insisted that intervention in Egypt was wrong, and who began to suspect that something unsavoury was afoot despite what Eden told him.
Gaitskell was not the only one. Further abroad, the American desire to have a conference of Suez Canal users was met with private indignation from the British and French, whose governments would uphold to the end that Washington did not understand what was needed to deal with a man like Nasser. Increasingly, comparisons with Nasser to Hitler, and the idea that Britain must not ‘appease’ such figures yet again, did the rounds. Eden was determined to have his interventionist cake and eat it, and he instructed his Foreign Office deputies to look into the Charter of the United Nations as well. With so many different avenues to justification, Eden was certain that at least one of them had to provide a path to conflict. As we’ll see, he was ultimately to be disappointed.
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1956 Episode 2.7 examines the steps which led towards the military intervention in Egypt, by placing the British behaviour in its imperial context.
In spring 1955, Britain remained a premier power in the Middle East, while American representation in that theatre was not particularly impressive, save for the commercial connections which American citizens had with the different oil barons there. In the space of a year though, disquiet in the Middle East and several threats to Britain’s sphere of influence there emerged, crowned by Nasser’s refusal to fall in line. The personality of Anthony Eden stands out during these eventful months, as the veteran Tory statesman appears to have been wholly unable to accept the new status quo, or the rebellious qualities of a once docile corner of the Empire.
Even before the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, Eden was adamant that Nasser was not to be bargained with, and certainly not to be trusted. Convinced of this view, he sought to make all of his peers – both at home and abroad – come to see it this way as well. Such efforts were not wholly successful, as even following the nationalisation, Eden found to his horror that several of his peers in Government, and particularly the opposition, were not convinced that force needed to be used.
Was the nationalisation of the Canal Company really such a big deal, did it really require a war with Egypt? As per the terms of the military plans already made with France, preparations completely out of the view of Parliament were underway. Here Eden followed what was to become his modus operandi during the Crisis – acting with the approval and support of only a few peers, while everyone else was kept in the dark. This policy, while making everything faster, was to prove lethal once everything blew up in Eden’s face…
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1956 Episode 2.6 looks at the increasingly close cooperation between Britain and France in light of the signal defeat of Western imperialist ambitions in Egypt.
We open our episode with a defining scene – President Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The nationalisation of the Canal was not the moment that the world flocked to condemn Nasser’s regime, as Anthony Eden may have hoped. For a time, the Egyptian leader would be seen as unstable, aggressive and unreasonable, but this bad press would die down as the Egyptians proved themselves very capable in handling the new responsibilities which the Suez Canal Company presented.
After convincing himself that the nationalisation of the Canal represented a national humiliation for he and his government, Eden proceeded to cement the Anglo-French commitment in the days that followed. Only 24 hours after the nationalisation occurred, French government ministers and the French premier were talking of travelling to London.
Within a week, military plans were being developed. These plans would be carried out by WW2 era weaponry, under WW2 era ideas of strategy, and even in the same secret bunkers under the Thames which had been used by Churchill to plan a resistance to the Nazis. Yet, this latest iteration of the entente cordiale was to prove anything but glorious, since at its heart was the desire to turn back the clock, and preserve the systems and status quo which held the developing world in permanent bondage. This mission was to doom Eden’s career and lead to the deaths of so many lives, and its planning stage began here.
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1956 Episode 2.5 looks at British commitments in the Middle East, and how setbacks there could massively drag down ideas of British ‘prestige’ in that region.
What did the French have to fear from Colonel Nasser, and how did this tie in with later Anglo-French agreements? The answers can be found here. Also of note in this episode is the moment when the Anglo-American loan to Nasser was cancelled, which meant that the Egyptian leader would be unable to construct his Aswan Dam.
With this setback for Nasser came Anthony Eden’s effort to paint the event as a personal triumph for himself, when in reality, Britain had been led by the Americans. Speaking of Eden, here we receive our first glimpse of the Prime Minister which suggest that he may not have been the flawless, crusading statesmen of the 1930s, and that he was, on the contrary, exactly what Britain did NOT need right now...
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1956 Episode 2.4 examines Britain's embarrassing and dissatisfying efforts to try and make Egypt see sense.
Here we see what kind of Government Anthony Eden led, and how he shook it up, or failed to shake it up, after he assumed the premiership in spring 1955. Anthony may have deserved his turn, but he would quickly exhaust the sense of goodwill he had built up over the years. In spite of his reputation for integrity and bravery when standing up to the appeasement policy of the 1930s, Eden proved wholly ill-equipped for dealing with this strange new world. Emerging from Churchill’s shadow, he felt extra pressures to act as though nothing had changed, and to pursue a Conservative foreign policy mindset as though he was still living in the 1930s.
After setting Eden’s premiership in context, we switch gears to President Nasser’s policy. Nasser had great ambitions for his country, and these centred on getting Egypt on track technologically, and fixing the grave problems which geography and poverty presented. The Aswan Dam was a radical solution which would solve these problems in one go. By the construction of this billion dollar project, the Nile could be harnessed, disastrous floods avoided, and the energy of nature made proper use of for industrial purposes. It seemed like the ideal solution, save for the key problem that Nasser lacked the kind of money required to engage in this building project.
While he was increasingly turning towards the Soviets for arms, for the moment, he was happy to look to the Anglo-American bankers to put up the funds.
The decision of the Americans and British to put up the money for this construction project may seem, in the context of the mid-1950s and especially considering what would follow, like a very odd decision indeed. Yet, as we’ll see, the Aswan Dam was not the investment opportunity which the British had hoped. Instead, once they and the Americans reneged on the deal, it proved to be the nail in the coffin of the already shaky Anglo-Egyptian relationship, and the beginning of a road towards conflict and crisis.
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1956 Episode 2.3 examines British views of Suez and Nasser's new Egyptian regime.
As the British government underwent a change and waved goodbye to great old men like Churchill, it was clear at the same time that this new government had no intention of changing its imperial tune. Egypt was a place to be held onto, not relinquished; Nasser was a figure to be loathed, rather than cooperated with; British prestige, as much as her long-standing strategic and security interests, depended on holding the Canal. That neither Churchill nor his successor in Anthony Eden proved capable of holding Nasser back speaks volumes about the awakening in Egyptian national consciousness which was beginning in the 1950s.
As the men at the top of the coup finished their own struggles and Colonel Nasser surged ahead, it became apparent that Egypt was in something of an ideal position. It had its problems of course, and its legacies of poverty and inequality for days, but it was in an ideal strategic position at the same time. Poised as the link between Africa and the Middle East, Egypt was the crossroads between different worlds. It was also, potentially, a crossroads in the Cold War, but for the moment, Nasser knew that his bread was buttered on its Western side.
Before conflict and crisis had their day, negotiation and diplomacy were allowed to flourish in this Anglo-Egyptian relationship. An agreement for policing the Suez Canal and for mobilising it during wartime was signed with the Cairo government. To insulate these deals, a Northern Tier system of alliances with other Middle Eastern states like Jordan, Iran and Iraq was signed. It seemed, at least on some level, that Britain was giving peace a chance. Yet, the more than the Foreign Secretary, and then the PM saw of Nasser’s Egypt, the less he liked. It was impossible to deal with an Egypt that did not seem to know its place, but with every meeting came a painful reminder that all was not as it had once been. The Egyptian puppets were gone, and it was uncomfortably clear that these new Egyptian men pulled their own strings.
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A French investment opportunity, an ancient idea, and a British masterstroke - discover in this episode how the Suez Canal became so monumentally important for British imperial interests in the latter 19th century, and how this interest was then carried over into the 20th century. After years of defending and expanding their stock in Suez, it was highly unlikely that Britain was going to give up its position there without a fight. Yet, at the same time, decolonisation trends across the world were in full swing, and it was far from certain that Egypt could be held while certain movements were underway.
The most important of all these movements in decolonisation era Africa was found on 23rd July 1952, when a coup against King Farouk of Egypt, that docile and loyal British puppet, succeeded. A cadre of Egyptian military men now held control over the country, and they were determined to be anything but puppets to the British interest. One figure surged forward above all. His name was Gamal Abdel Nasser, and in this episode, we will be introduced to him, as we see what the British establishment was up against. Mindful of Britain’s interests in his country, and its unsavoury record there, Nasser was not about to give ground for nothing. Thousands of miles away, a government change waved goodbye to Winston Churchill, and ushered in his subordinate Anthony Eden. The stage was set for a conflict which was unlike any other yet seen in the British experience.
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In this episode, we will examine the painful post-war experience of France, why it was so reluctant to let go of its colonies and how this caused it more damage in the long run. As an integral, but largely forgotten player in the Crisis, understanding the French angle is essential for us. On many occasions, the fractured French government would be the only thing holding the also fractured plans for Suez together. Here, we discover what was moving the French in North Africa, and how its bitter Algerian pill, which it would put off swallowing for some time, so influenced its government’s decision to weigh in against Egypt.
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1956 now enters its second season, and we are confronted with several pressing questions. How did the British, French, Israelis and Americans become involved in Egypt, and how did these events affect what was ongoing in Hungary? The incredible spectacle of these two simultaneous crises, both caused by very different forces, and hosting very different characters, is what we have to examine next, so I hope you'll join me as we introduce the Suez Crisis - perhaps the greatest error of modern Britain until the decision to Brexit! Get bonus content on Patreon
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1956 Episode 1.15 examines the final moments of Imre Nagy, as the Soviet noose tightened around him.
But the Kremlin was not safe yet. Of particular concern to Moscow and to the Hungarians was the stance of Yugoslavia, as its embassy in Budapest provided asylum to Imre Nagy and 40 other individuals responsible for guiding and leading the momentarily independent Hungarian state. The revolution may have been crushed within a few days, but it was evidently not going to be so simple to remove the memory of Nagy. Although normal Hungarian citizens couldn’t know of his fate, even when he was tricked into leaving this safe haven in late November, behind the scenes the Soviet-Yugoslav diplomacy was only serving to heighten tensions in the communist world.
In addition, the Chinese, soon to visit the Eastern satellites in January 1957, had their own comments to make on the events in Hungary. The Chinese conclusion, and the conclusion which has largely survived as canon to this day, was that Vladislav Gomulka had only gone so far, whereas Imre Nagy had gone far too far in bringing reform to his country. It was not acceptable, in the Chinese mind, that reform came at the expense of Soviet power and stability – a national road to socialism was to be admired, but this road could be bumpy, and on occasion, fraught with danger.
Also worth considering was the American perspective – Eisenhower’s administration was thoroughly distracted by events in Egypt, and while he and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles never really intended to intervene with force in Hungary, the unofficial state organs like Radio Free Europe ensured that the American or at least the Western approach and intentions remained unclear to Hungarians, who felt encouraged to challenge the Soviet domination, and were then bitterly disappointed when no Western aid materialised. Suez was of course a convenient excuse for American non-intervention, yet for Eisenhower’s new ‘rollback’ policy towards the Soviet Union, it was important to blame the Anglo-French-Israeli attack upon Egypt to the end...
At the pinnacle of our narrative was the fate of Nagy and his circle. Two years after the revolution had been put down, Nagy was executed. Even in his final moments he refused to admit error and to denounce what had been done. He went to the gallows courageously, confident that no matter what occurred after his death, one day, he would be reburied, and Hungary would be free. His legacy was to inspire Hungarian politicians and a tacit policy of non-violent resistance to Soviet rule throughout the next few decades. His words would prove correct – Imre Nagy’s reburial in June 1989 signalled the end of Soviet domination, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War all at once. Nagy’s death and rehabilitation put to bed the fallout of Khrushchev’s secret speech, and it also concludes our first part of 1956. Next time, we’ll begin our examination of that other significant narrative which 1956 provided, as we count down to the Suez Crisis.
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1956 Episode 1.14 analyses the Soviet response in the first week of November 1956, as the rug was finally pulled on Hungarian independence.
Having already removed his country from the Warsaw Pact and requested Western assistance, Nagy was persona non grata in Soviet minds, yet this Hungarian communist was not finished yet. If there was any chance at all that this Hungarian state could be preserved, he was willing to engage in whatever to took to protect his people from the Soviet axe. Yet, unfortunately for Nagy and for Hungary generally, there was no chance.
Khrushchev had no intentions of letting Budapest think for itself, and the crushing of the Hungarian revolution and the entry of Janus Kadar into Hungary represented the end note of the Hungarian effort. Kadar, it would transpire, was not the supplicant figure he seemed, but he was ambitious, utterly ruthless and not all constrained by any concept of loyalty to Imre Nagy, a man whom he had known and befriended after several years of close cooperation. This episode contains several primary source extracts which detail the real experiences of Hungarian politicians and citizens as they fled the country, encouraged it, or sold it out to Moscow. It provides us with a great and invaluable window into the Soviet mindset at the time, so I hope you enjoy it, and join us for the concluding episode on this Soviet chapter next time.
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1956 Episode 1.13 examines the unlikely triumph of the Hungarians in Budapest, even as the Soviets schemed for revenge.
After somehow wresting a ceasefire agreement from the Soviet Union, the Hungarian revolution appeared – against all odds – to be secured by 28th October. Yet, this was merely a pause for Moscow, it was not the end. As Hungarians began to dream of life outside the Soviet sphere, Soviet tanks were preparing to move, and figures within Imre Nagy’s tightening circle were preparing to stab him in the back.
What followed would be bitter, bloody and terribly depressing for those that dreamed big in Hungary, yet for us, it serves to underline the chaotic Soviet experience of the eventful, revolutionary year of 1956. Without giving too much away, this longest episode of 1956 yet brings many issues to their logical conclusion, but we’re far from finished with the story of Budapest, of Hungary or of Imre Nagy just yet, so make sure you stick with us to the somewhat sticky end! Show Less
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1956 Episode 1.12 examines a key moment when a Hungarian student protest exploded into something far more encouraging, and for the Soviets, far more dangerous.
The demands of the protesters – joined by workers, peasants, Hungarian communists, soldiers and many more figures besides – were as disconcerting as the threat the protest posed to Soviet control. Still more incredible than the growth of the protest was the transformation of this protest into a riot, and the further transformation of this riot into a revolution.
From these process a rallying cry of hope seemed to spring, as independence and some freedom of action could at last be imagined. Hungarians who had never before dreamed of such things now engaged with all their enthusiasm this most dangerous task – that of standing up to the superpower of the era and their superior in almost every respect. Time would tell if this act would be tragic, or met with miraculous fortune. With far too many individual details to explain here, WDF is so excited to bring its patrons the latest piece of this fascinating story, so make sure you check it out and let me know what you all thought, perhaps by leaving a review in the section of the iTunes store where this series is hosted!
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1956 Episode 1.11 looks at what happened when Moscow decided it’d be a good idea to force Rakosi, the avowed Stalinist, to share power with Imre Nagy, his opposite in almost every respect.
Rakosi wished to maintain the status quo even as his favourite weapons like the secret police were taken away, yet Nagy recognised and appreciated from an early stage that much would have to change. Hungary couldn’t continue on in the manner of a repressed, unhappy vassal, especially if Moscow wished to guarantee the support of all Hungarian people. Nagy proposed limited reforms, but after 1953 it began to become apparent that with Stalin gone and Pandora’s Box opened, it was immensely difficult to keep that box closed.
Every concession granted to the Hungarians provoked calls for greater concessions – every bit of freedom given permitted Hungarians to become braver and more willing to question the apparatus which held them low. Every time Nagy said yes, the Hungarian people seemed to say more, and Rakosi tattled on him to the Soviet leadership. Since this Soviet leadership was undergoing great changes of its own at this stage – as Khrushchev attempted to manoeuvre his way past his rivals – the signals from Moscow were not always clear. Yet after a year it became largely certain that Nagy was on borrowed time.
As we’ll discover in this episode though, while Nagy hadn't done enough to ensure he remained in power, he had done enough to ensure that the Hungarian people did not forget him once he was removed. In a sea of sycophants, the courageous but otherwise bland Nagy stood out, and soon it was his name and his principles, regardless of his political persuasions, that positioned Nagy atop another pole – that of the public affections. As we’ll come to appreciate, this position was to be both a blessing and a fatal curse for Imre Nagy...
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1956 Episode 1.10 continues where we left off last time, and looks a bit more at the person of Matyas Rakosi.
Rakosi was the Stalinist dictator of Hungary from the late 1940s, and he set about establishing a Hungarian Stalinist regime, complete with all the trappings Stalin enjoyed. For every purge, every policy and ever character assassination that the man of steel engaged in, Rakosi felt compelled to demonstrate his loyalty by going still further. He would terrorise the people of Hungary into a burning, resentful, petrified silence, but his hold on power was only as strong as the secret police.
Imre Nagy, a passionate communist and eager reformer of all things Stalinism, was guaranteed to butt heads with a man like Rakosi, and in this episode we examine why this was the case. What were Nagy’s guiding principles, why was he such a committed communist, and what did he bring to the table that a man like Rakosi did not? Nagy was as complex as Rakosi was cruel, but this doesn’t mean we can’t give our best shot at analysing this fascinating individual who became, almost in spite of himself, a hero and then a martyr of the Hungarian people.
This episode is a pivotal instalment as we examine the background to what was to come in Hungary, and how a quiescent vassal became the centre of anti-Soviet sentiment within only a few stormy months. All of this began, of course, in the eventful year of 1956.
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1956 Episode 1.9 takes a somewhat depressing journey into post-war Hungary, to present a story and a people which suffered much over the course of the Soviet occupation – also known as the Soviet ‘liberation’.
Liberation from what, one may ask? Well how about liberation from national pride, freedom of conscience and that all too valuable commodity in history – freedom from fear. Fear was the key ingredient in the Soviet-Hungarian relationship between 1945-56, and in this episode we detail its key characteristics. Why were some Hungarians so eager to serve the Soviets, who were the most loyal Hungarian servants above all, and what were the consequences of this partnership by the time Khrushchev’s secret speech shattered all notions of Stalin-worship?
These are questions we get into in great detail here, so I hope you’ll join us. The story of Hungary is as fascinating and inspiring as it is depressing and tragic, but either way, it is a story worth committing to audio podcast format, because it tells us so much about what life was really like under the Soviet writ, and how the end of the Second World War did not mean the end of foreign rule. The Hungarians had merely swapped one regime, one centre of power, for another, and this one was more determined than ever to hold sway over every aspect of their lives. The Hungarians were desperate for sure, but as 1956 would demonstrate, their spirits and dreams were far, very far, from crushed.
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