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There are many examples, from the ancient world to Nazi Germany, of attempts to protect or to increase the birth rate and hence population size. Slides to accompany Prof David Coleman's talk on birth control from governments. Few can be shown to be successful. France, since 1939, is an exception. The Nazi example put population awareness off the agenda in the West but the persistence of low fertility, with the population ageing which it causes have brought population concerns to the fore in many countries: Italy, Germany , Russia, Korea , Japan. The relatively high fertility of some countries (Scandinavia, UK) is unintended by policy, and probably owes much more to consistent cultural preferences and welfare policies unconnected with demographic aims. Cash incentives probably just bring forward births already intended. Relatively high fertility seems to depend upon a consistent policy of family support, or the ability to make arrangements through the private sector as in the US, on which parents can depend, and a well developed gender equity in which burdens are shared between the parents.
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There are many examples, from the ancient world to Nazi Germany, of attempts to protect or to increase the birth rate and hence population size. Slides to accompany Prof David Coleman's talk on birth control from governments. Few can be shown to be successful. France, since 1939, is an exception. The Nazi example put population awareness off the agenda in the West but the persistence of low fertility, with the population ageing which it causes have brought population concerns to the fore in many countries: Italy, Germany , Russia, Korea , Japan. The relatively high fertility of some countries (Scandinavia, UK) is unintended by policy, and probably owes much more to consistent cultural preferences and welfare policies unconnected with demographic aims. Cash incentives probably just bring forward births already intended. Relatively high fertility seems to depend upon a consistent policy of family support, or the ability to make arrangements through the private sector as in the US, on which parents can depend, and a well developed gender equity in which burdens are shared between the parents.
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Fear of population decline has haunted states ever since states existed. Population size was the basis of the power, security and prosperity of any political entity. Slides to accompany Professor David Coleman's on the fear of population decline. The great disparity of economic and military power between the West and the Rest from the 18th century temporarily put population size into the shade. As that advantage ebbs, population size has emerged once again as a major factor in international relations, especially as population decline has become a reality in Germany, Japan and is forecast for many others. Many demographers believe that world population will begin to fall by the end of this century. However not all concerns about population decline are justified. Being small is certainly no obstacle to very high levels of living standards (Switzerland, Sweden, Iceland) or of reported happiness (Denmark). Some undesirable economic consequences follow the process of population decline but seem likely to be mild as long as long as decline is slow and eventually stops. Considerable environmental advantages would arise from smaller population - it may indeed become essential globally if climate change is not to force it upon us.
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Fear of population decline has haunted states ever since states existed. Population size was the basis of the power, security and prosperity of any political entity. Slides to accompany Professor David Coleman's on the fear of population decline. The great disparity of economic and military power between the West and the Rest from the 18th century temporarily put population size into the shade. As that advantage ebbs, population size has emerged once again as a major factor in international relations, especially as population decline has become a reality in Germany, Japan and is forecast for many others. Many demographers believe that world population will begin to fall by the end of this century. However not all concerns about population decline are justified. Being small is certainly no obstacle to very high levels of living standards (Switzerland, Sweden, Iceland) or of reported happiness (Denmark). Some undesirable economic consequences follow the process of population decline but seem likely to be mild as long as long as decline is slow and eventually stops. Considerable environmental advantages would arise from smaller population - it may indeed become essential globally if climate change is not to force it upon us.
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Traditionally, high birth rates were high. But as they were balanced by high death rates, population growth rates were usually very low. Prof David Coleman looks at family planning in the developing world. Rapid decline in death rates in the non-European world began after the 1940s. As birth rates generally remained high, that provoked an increase in population unprecedented in history - with a billion people being added to world population every 13 years by the 1970s. Some defended the benefit of high fertility and the advantages of population growth -as in Mao's China of the 1950s, and Mussaveni's Uganda to this day. But most believed that poverty and progress depend on fertility and growth rates being moderated. Family planning programmes were developed, starting with India in 1954. By the 1990s the majority of the developing world's governments promoted family planning- the most notable converts being China and Iran. Not all these programmes have been successful, although birth rates are falling almost everywhere, in some cases to very low levels. The population dimension has been eclipsed in the last decade, mostly for ideological reasons - hardly featuring in important discussions such as the Kyoto treaty, the Millennium Development Goals and so on. But a more balanced appreciation is now emerging.
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Traditionally, high birth rates were high. But as they were balanced by high death rates, population growth rates were usually very low. Prof David Coleman looks at family planning in the developing world. Rapid decline in death rates in the non-European world began after the 1940s. As birth rates generally remained high, that provoked an increase in population unprecedented in history - with a billion people being added to world population every 13 years by the 1970s. Some defended the benefit of high fertility and the advantages of population growth -as in Mao's China of the 1950s, and Mussaveni's Uganda to this day. But most believed that poverty and progress depend on fertility and growth rates being moderated. Family planning programmes were developed, starting with India in 1954. By the 1990s the majority of the developing world's governments promoted family planning- the most notable converts being China and Iran. Not all these programmes have been successful, although birth rates are falling almost everywhere, in some cases to very low levels. The population dimension has been eclipsed in the last decade, mostly for ideological reasons - hardly featuring in important discussions such as the Kyoto treaty, the Millennium Development Goals and so on. But a more balanced appreciation is now emerging.
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Fertility in all but 12 countries in the world is now falling. Where will it stop? In this talk, Prof David Coleman looks at the demographic transition in the developing world. Conventionally the demographic transition was expected to end when birth rates reached replacement level. That has not happened. Birth rates in the developed world are mostly below it, some markedly so. What will happen in the developing world? Some populations have been very slow to begin the fertility decline, a handful have not even started. Their populations will become disproportionately large. In others (Pakistan, Kenya) decline has stalled - we do not yet know whether permanently or not. But in many developing Asian countries, and some on Latin America, birth rates have already fallen below replacement. As many such countries have a 'familist' family structure (as in Spain, Italy, Greece) birth rates my reach very low levels - raising the prospect that (outside Africa) NW European countries might have the highest birth rate in the world by mid-century, in a future of demographic diversity and uncertainty.
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Fertility in all but 12 countries in the world is now falling. Where will it stop? In this talk, Prof David Coleman looks at the demographic transition in the developing world. Conventionally the demographic transition was expected to end when birth rates reached replacement level. That has not happened. Birth rates in the developed world are mostly below it, some markedly so. What will happen in the developing world? Some populations have been very slow to begin the fertility decline, a handful have not even started. Their populations will become disproportionately large. In others (Pakistan, Kenya) decline has stalled - we do not yet know whether permanently or not. But in many developing Asian countries, and some on Latin America, birth rates have already fallen below replacement. As many such countries have a 'familist' family structure (as in Spain, Italy, Greece) birth rates my reach very low levels - raising the prospect that (outside Africa) NW European countries might have the highest birth rate in the world by mid-century, in a future of demographic diversity and uncertainty.
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Professor David Coleman from Dept of Social Policy, University of Oxford, gives a talk from his "Demographic Trends and Problems of the Modern World" series talking about the 'Second Demographic Transition'. The early 20th century was a time of very low divorce rates and of births outside marriage. Couples married late and many never married. In Western Europe, and the English-speaking world, all that changed after the 1960s; Cohabitation, divorce, births outside marriage made families much more diverse. The theory of the 'Second demographic transition' explains these trends as the result of new individual autonomy in a society now highly educated, secular and prosperous, with welfare arrangements supporting a variety of family types. As prosperity and education become globalised, the theory predicts that this diversity of behaviour will also be globalised. The lecture examines its scope and sustainability.
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Professor David Coleman from Dept of Social Policy, University of Oxford, gives a talk from his "Demographic Trends and Problems of the Modern World" series talking about the 'Second Demographic Transition'. The early 20th century was a time of very low divorce rates and of births outside marriage. Couples married late and many never married. In Western Europe, and the English-speaking world, all that changed after the 1960s; Cohabitation, divorce, births outside marriage made families much more diverse. The theory of the 'Second demographic transition' explains these trends as the result of new individual autonomy in a society now highly educated, secular and prosperous, with welfare arrangements supporting a variety of family types. As prosperity and education become globalised, the theory predicts that this diversity of behaviour will also be globalised. The lecture examines its scope and sustainability.
