Episoder
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If the war against Ukraine has highlighted any truth, it is that the defense industrial bases of the United States and Europe are woefully underequipped for the demands of high-intensity conventional warfare. The United States was and remains the only country that retained the kinds of stockpiles necessary to support Ukraine's defense and future offense, and it faces competing demands for those declining inventories.
Yet, for a country with a nearly $900 billion budget, it seems unable to get what it needs, when it needs it, and at a scale necessary for what it anticipates as future conflicts, not the least of which is with China over Taiwan.
The issue is, fundamentally, one of acquisition and procurement. The speed and urgency that drives the bureaucracy of the Department of Defense has not kept pace with the speed of innovation that drives Silicon Valley. In the age of the iPhone the Pentagon is using the Blackberry, at best (and not a late generation one, at that). There are shoots of growth through the concrete of the military's purchasing systems.
Groups like the Defense Innovation Unit (; formerly known as the Defense Innovation Unit - Experimental or DIUx) have sought to bridge the gap between Washington and Silicon Valley. Authors Raj M. Shah and Christopher Kirchhoff, the former director of DIU and a driver of its creation, respectively, recount the creation of the Unit, its struggles, and its successes in the aptly titled book "".
It would seem to be a tall order, make Pentagon acquisition a thrilling read, but Shah and Kirchhoff manage to pull it off and rather well.
Filled with anecdotes of how the supposedly technologically cutting-edge services of the American armed forces operated in a surprisingly analogue manner, the authors tell the story of how DIU and others sought to match the warfighters' needs with Silicon Valley's innovations."Unit X" rightly focuses on the challenges of rapid innovation and rapid ingestion of new technologies. This is something for which the Pentagon, as the authors demonstrate, is not designed.
"Unit X" is not a story of nifty new technologies alone. It is really about the challenge of how the United States stays ahead of China, the pacing threat in strategic competition. Here, the Chinese Communist Party enjoys considerable competitive systemic advantages. A vertically integrated authoritarian-capitalist system, Beijing can better direct resources - human or capital - with rapid efficiency and arguably fewer bureaucratic hurdles.
China's aggressive corporate and military espionage campaigns have allowed it to leapfrog generations of innovation and trial and error. More alarmingly, the gap between theft and indigenous innovation is rapidly closing, with China able to develop more novel, domestic technologies at a greater rate than once anticipated.
The authors close "Unit X" by focusing on Ukraine (as is de rigueur today), which for many is seen as the standard-bearer for technological innovation, testing, and deployment. Senior military leaders on both sides of the Atlantic look to Ukraine wistfully, as a model of how they wish they could innovate and ingest new technologies - they want the war-time acquisition system without the war. That last part is key - in the absence of a clear driver of change, change is not forthcoming.
The problem is Ukraine is not the model they often think it is - that rapid adoption of new technologies is by consequence, not design. Those impressive and haunting first-person-video drones are used at such rates due to insufficient quantities of conventional artillery (which the United States and Europe are still failing to deliver). Those drone videos are also only the successful strikes.
The ratio of failure to success decidedly favors the former over the latter, especially as Russian electronic warfare improves. Ukraine's naval successes are deeply impressive, but miss key that when included make the lessons of the Black Sea unapplicable to other thea... -
The 6.8mm Elephant in the Room
The United States Army has made the biggest change in a generation to its small arms fleets by replacing its standard infantry rifle (the M4) and Light Machine Gun (SAW) with a 'Next Generation Squad Weapon' (NGSW) multi-calibre system based on a new 6.8mm round with high-performance technology to be more lethal at greater range. Some NATO governments are scratching their heads about what this means for the bedrock of NATO interoperability.
This decision butts up against three important contextual factors:
1. More than two years of war in Ukraine has seen an unprecedented focus on the Russian threat and subsequent multi-lateral gifting programmes to arm Ukraine, and emergency NATO memberships for Sweden and Finland.
2. The 5.56mm 'SS109' round has been the cornerstone of NATO interoperability since 1980, when it was adopted by most NATO countries, while a few influential members have recently procured new 5.56 assault rifles including France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.
3. Since the drawdown in Afghanistan, there has been a growing movement questioning the effectiveness of 5.56 on the modern battlefield.
Putting aside the classified details of the original US Army requirement for the Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) programme, the Americans took a logical approach: start with the threat (the target) and work back to the weapon (the ammunition) and finally the delivery platform (the rifle/gun). This may sound obvious, but the reality is this approach is truly not the norm for military small arms procurement with NATO governments for a variety of reasons.
It is commonplace for the choice of ammunition nature not to be central to the requirements simply because in-service ammunition natures have a very long service life - it is hard to change them.
This article explores the major implications of the US Army's NGSW programme to future NATO small arms procurements to both dispel some myths and assist the NATO community in understanding the situation and the NGSW.
Show us the money!
In 2017, Lt Gen Mick Bednarek testified on the issue of what happens when a 5.56 round hits someone with body armour to a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on small arms (Verger, 2024):
"The US is facing adversaries with L2-3 body armour that precludes our lethality…regardless of range."
"Our capability to eliminate this threat at medium or long range is almost gone, so we must have small arms systems that can stop and can penetrate that increased enemy protection."
"I think the US Army universally realizes that the 5.56 bullet can't defeat Russian body armor."
In the same article, Col Jason Bohannan (Programme Executive Office [PEO] Soldier, US DoD) is quoted referring to the NGSW programme:
"…people get myopically focused on body armor…but there's a series of target sets in the battlefield that will exist for 10 years. And we're trying to balance all of that to put [the] US Army [and the DoD] at large, in an advantageous position."
Fast forward to 2022 when the US Army determined the old standard to be inadequate for the modern battlefield and disrupted the foundation of NATO interoperability by introducing two new squad weapons based on a new ammunition cartridge.
Before we get into the detail here is a big caveat up front - the US 6.8mm GP projectile (the XM1186) is owned by the US Department of Defence, while the hybrid case - the key component to achieving the high velocity that delivers the lethal punch for the NGSW- is owned by American producer SIG Sauer Inc.
Therefore, if NATO governments want to know specifically what this projectile does, they should dust off their bi-lateral defence sharing agreements and speak to their US counterparts; but the capability behind NGSW comes from the hybrid cartridge.
The SIG Sauer hybrid high performance cartridge is a lighter brass-steel composite that allows increased loads and delivers approximately 20-25% more barrel pressure and therefore muzzle velocit... -
Manglende episoder?
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Introduction
The current picture
It's beneficial to acknowledge our men
Are our wellbeing offerings outdated?
How can we help our men?
How can men tell they might be unwell?
What are some barriers to help-seeking?
The 'problems' with talking
Culturally, we must do better
Feature photo by Daniel Reche via Pexels -
The video of a Russian soldier executing a comrade is circulating on social media. To analyse what this execution means, we'll examine another example.
On 30 January 1968 the Tet Offensive erupted. It proved a turning point in the Vietnam War. The decisive psychological blow to American public opinion was expressed in CBS anchor Walter Kronkite's famous 27 February broadcast:
'To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion.
On the off chance that military and political analysts are right, in the next few months we must test the enemy's intentions, in case this is indeed his last big gasp before negotiations. But it is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honourable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy and did the best they could.'
No image contributed more to the growing sense of repulsion over America's commitment to South Vietnam than the street execution of a captured Viet Cong fighter: Nguyễn Văn Lém.
The event took place on 1 February in a panic-gripped Saigon. Hanoi's hope of a popular uprising had failed spectacularly but Viet Cong gangs roamed the streets. Associated Press photographer Eddie Adams had spent a fruitless morning with an NBC journalist and Vietnamese camera crew looking for action. They were in the vicinity of the Ấn Quang Pagoda in downtown Saigon and preparing to leave when they noticed a commotion.
A captured Viet Cong in plaid shirt and shorts was being manhandled by a group of marines. His hands were cuffed behind his back. The unfortunate Lém was brought to police chief Nguyễn Ngọc Loan. In Adam's words:
'When they were close - maybe five feet away - the soldiers stopped and backed away. I saw a man walk into my camera viewfinder from the left. He took a pistol out of his holster and raised it. I had no idea he would shoot. It was common to hold a pistol to the head of prisoners during questioning. So I prepared to make that picture - the threat, the interrogation. But it didn't happen. The man just pulled a pistol out of his holster, raised it to the VC's head and shot him in the temple.
I made a picture at the same time.'
Lém collapsed, a jet of blood spouting from his skull. It was all so matter-of-fact and quick.
Adams at first tried to pass off the importance of the photograph. It was just some guy shooting another guy. But it was so much more than that. Americans wanted to believe they were fighting a just cause. Loan's revolver blew away that illusion.
Loan ended his days as a one-legged pizzeria manager in Virginia, passing away at a relatively young age from cancer. President Jimmy Carter personally intervened to stop his deportation (pressed by House of Representative members on the grounds he had committed a war crime). Adams grew to lament the photograph that won him the 1969 Pulitzer Prize for Spot News Photography: 'Two people died in that photograph.
The general killed the Viet Cong; I killed the general with my camera.' Today there is an Italian furniture shop near the spot where Lém was killed.
Fifty-six years later…
Fifty-six years later, three Russian soldiers were jogging on a dirt track near Robotyne in occupied Zaporizhzhia. They were spaced apart, maintaining a short distance between each other. Only the first and last soldiers were armed. Unbeknown to the trio, a Ukrainian FPV drone pilot had them in his sights. He decided to attack the unarmed soldier in the middle.
This author has viewed scores of these YouTube videos. If the drone strikes the body it splits open the torso like a carcass in a butcher's shop. Heads fly off. If the warhead detonates near the limbs, one or both legs are ripped off. Or limbs are left i... -
The 2024 RUSI Land Warfare Conference's ambition was unavoidably hamstrung by the forthcoming Strategic Defence Review announced by Kier Starmer's incoming Labour Government.
Although many strategic and operational imperatives were explored, little substance was provided on how Army doctrine will evolve, how it will be re-organised and re-equipped, what this means for industry, and how these elements will together enable the future force to deter / counter the quartet of threats posed by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. We have yet to see the Army's revised plan resulting from 2023's Integrated Review Refresh.
We will now have to wait until at least late 2025 before a more current and meaningful blueprint is released.
This is disappointing given the current geopolitical landscape. Two years ago at the same conference, General Sir Patrick Sanders refuted the idea that Russia's invasion of Ukraine would be short-term minor skirmish. Rather, he saw it as something that could foreshadow a larger and wider European conflict. Describing it as our 1937 moment, his call to arms went largely unheeded. At this year's Land Warfare Conference.
Speeches by the new Secretary of State for Defence, John Healey, and the new CGS, General Sir Roly Walker, left us in no doubt about the gathering storm. An unequivocal warning provided by retired Ukrainian General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, now Ukraine's ambassador to the United Kingdom, set the tone for the entire conference: "Evil has drawn near and it is out to kill."
Conscious that time and resources are limited, CGS made his objective clear: the British Army needs to be able to defeat a force three times its size. To do this, he aims to double its lethality by 2027 and to triple it by 2030. The most important point General Walker made was that there is no inexorable path to war. Conflict can be avoided through deterrence.
We must become the porcupine that, through an impressive array of pin-sharp quills, makes any efforts by predators to eat it so egregious that they pre-emptively decide it's not worth the effort.
The most important quill in the UK's defensive shield is its nuclear deterrent. But our conventional forces have been so hollowed-out over the last 14 years that there is a risk of nuclear weapons being our first and only response to unexpected aggression. However, the cataclysmic effect of a nuclear exchange makes it something we should avoid at all costs. This is why restoring conventional combat power across all three services is paramount.
If the British Army is to meet adversaries with devastating lethality, what must it do in practical terms is not yet clear, so this article aims to articulate the key initiatives that will most enhance the Army's combat power. This is not an unrealistic shopping list of new items that cannot be afforded or delivered in two years. It represents projects already in motion or about to start and which are funded by the Equipment Plan.
One - Replace Bowman with a software-defined C4I system.
The current Bowman BCIP 5.6 C4I system is rapidly approaching obsolescence. An ongoing project, the Land Environment Tactical Communication & Information System (LEtacCIS) programme, plans to replace it via the Morpheus sub-programme. The goal is to deliver a fully digitised, open architecture, software-defined C4I system with an upgradable ecosystem able to run a wide range of third-party apps.
A key advantage of a software-defined capability is that, like an iPhone, it can be upgraded on an ongoing basis to maintain system utility and integrity over time. New functionality, such as increased security, AI, machine learning, and algorithmic warfare applications, can be added incrementally with little effort or risk. An open architecture ensures interoperability with our allies. It allows increased technical functionality to be quickly rolled-out.
Unfortunately, Morpheus was derailed by the failure to deliver EVO, a component work stream intended to open Bowman's ... -
Clarifying the People Problem
A thought exercise
Understanding the Why
AFCAS 24 has just been published. The data, as ever, is fascinating and provides an incredible insight into what our people think about Armed Forces life. It also critically highlights pull factors keeping people in service, and push factors which drive people to leave the Services. There are positive and negatives to service life, and AFCAS draws out how our people feel over time. It can give as an insght into which factors have always been there, and which are getting better or worse.
Here are some key extracts to think about:
AFCAS also highlights the parts of The Offer that keep people serving and are most highly valued. Over a number of years now the primary "pull" factors have been Defence medical services, dental services and job security. Are there ways we can capitalise on where we are doing well? Almost certainly, if we are willing to resource a plan to do so.
Do we need even more Data?
A Way Forward
Summary
Feature image credit: MOD -
It's the Policy, Stupid.
Medical Policy
Other Policies
Lessons from America
So, What Can We Learn from the US Army? -
Warfare is changing faster than our military and our military-industrial approach. The warnings of world leaders, including the Prime Minister and Chief of the General Staff, that war is imminent have had little effect on our rate of preparation or adaptation . Almost no one, including those working within it, thinks the speed and scale of change in the UK Defence equipment programme in the last two years are adequate.
If it were, the war in Ukraine and Chinese exercises around Taiwan should have offered little cause for alarm. 'Everything is fine' is a proposition few would defend. Our Parliament states that we are not ready to fight a major war with our current equipment and industry approach. Deterrence exists in the minds of our enemy and ill preparedness undermines credibility; not only does it make us less likely to win, it makes war itself more likely.
If few individuals are satisfied with the status quo, why as a collective have we achieved so little change? Machiavelli would have a suggestion.
"There is nothing more difficult to arrange, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through than initiating changes. The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old order, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new. Their support is lukewarm … partly because men are generally incredulous, never really trusting new things unless they have tested them by experience."
Niccolo Machiavelli
Changing the system that retards Defence's ability to adapt incurs the frictions he described centuries ago. To disrupt the dominance of those too comfortable, before the disaster of war falls, this article aims to pick a fight. Cunningham's law states "The best way to get the right answer on the Internet is not to ask a question; it's to post the wrong answer." This article introduces five provocations.
We hope to provide arguments for the innovators, both inside and outside Government, to use to help drive change. But even here we want disagreement, seeing your own argument played back to you can help you see its flaws. For those that disagree, we hope you'll see that, as John Stuart Mill wrote "the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part". Help us improve our arguments with your challenge.
You came here for an argument (channelling Monty Python). We hope you enjoy it.
5 Provocations - what we are doing now is not good enough; we must:
1. Plan for dissimilar re-armament: What we deploy in month three of the war will not be more of what we deployed in month one.
2. Change the equation: move to $ cost to $ damage model:The economics of war have changed; we must too, or we lose.
3. Link frontline to factory: War is a learning competition, and we cannot afford to be in the slow class.
4. Rethink the roles of air power: Particularly control of the air and attack, in an uncrewed age.
5. Accept that the future is uncrewed: The role of humans in warfare, at all levels, will change much more than is generally assumed. We need a plan for uncrewed technology at scale.
Taken together, these measures increase our chances of winning a coming war, thereby making it less likely we have to fight in the first place.
Dissimilar Rearmament.
By month three of the next major war, the aircraft, ships, and tanks that we start the fight with will be reduced by attrition. But we know now that we will not be able to replace or grow the numbers of the key platforms in the current equipment programme fast enough to keep fighting. They will need replacing, and we will need them in weeks and months, not years. We will need dissimilar rearmament.
Neither side will be replacing their aircraft fast enough, but liberal democracies are far more dependent on airpower.
In contrast, one UK drone manufacturer, Callen-Lenz, developed their uncrewed system from concept to deployed capability, with production rapidly and highly s... -
On 17 February, Russian forces finally captured Avdiivka - once a city of 30,000 people - just ten kilometres from Donetsk. 110th Mechanised Brigade had defended the ruins for the last two years without relief. The end came when Russian forces infiltrated the south of the city using a concealed passage offered by a man-sized water pipe feeding Donetsk filter station.
More units advanced from the north in the area of the Terrikon (slag heap) and dachas adjoining the Koksokhim (Avdiiv chemical coke plant). With 80-110 glide bombs landing on the defenders every day, and with the threat of the city being cut in two, the Ukrainian command took the prudent decision to withdraw.
The next phase for Russian forces should have been an exploitation of the breach in the defence. In fact, the assault on Avdiivka which had started the previous October quite exhausted the attackers. 16,000 soldiers were killed according to a disillusioned Luhansk separatist. A staggering 531 pieces of equipment were destroyed, damaged or abandoned, including 169 tanks.
It was not until the end of March that Russian forces were able to resume the advance in an organised way (although small-scale and suicidal attacks never stopped across the front lines). This article reviews the action since and specifically examines the battle for the Durna river line.
Ukrainian and Russian dispositions
Ukrainian and Russian dispositions are shown on the map below. For both sides, unit and formation names do not correspond to actual size. A 'brigade' may be a weak battalion. 'Battalions' are commonly just companies. Russian prisoners routinely report how a company may start with 100 men but be reduced to as few as ten fit soldiers. Caution is also needed because units are rotated (withdrawn) when exhausted. This is especially true of Russian forces.
The map therefore represents all reported units/formations and where, but they may not have been present all the time, or in strength.
Russian troops on this front are referred to as 'Centre Group'. They are drawn from Central Military District (CVO) and 1st DNR Army Corps. Commander 'Centre Group' is the 48-year old infantryman Colonel-General Andrei Mordvichev. He has participated in the war from the beginning rising from army commander to army group commander.
CVO has been the best performing military district - ironically - as traditionally it is the reserve district in the Russian Federation and least favoured with resources. Ukrainian command in this sector falls under the Khortytsia Operational-Strategic Group (OSUV). The commander is a General Sodel [Sodol].
It is not possible to estimate troop numbers with any certainty. Both sides are depleted. The Russians continue to commit units to destruction further complicating estimation of strengths. Nor is it possible to estimate equipment numbers. With the exception of the battalion-level attack at the beginning, Russian attacks are typically platoon strength involving 1-2 tanks and as many as four AFVs. The ad hoc mix of vehicle types tells the story of Russian problems with replenishing combat losses.
Ukrainian counter-attacks typically involve a single tank or AFV. Artillery and rocket fire on the Russian side involves single guns or launchers that fire one salvo then scoot. Ukrainian indirect fire has been minimal due to 'shell starvation'. FPV and Mavic-style drones rule the battlefield and both sides go to great lengths to conceal themselves, in the case of vehicles, guns and rocket launchers; or to remain underground if infantry. Camouflage is insufficient.
The only true protection is total concealment. Saturated ECM has also become a prerequisite for survival.
Avdiivka front - Russian operational objectives
Cold War students of the Soviet Army probably remember the concept of immediate and subsequent objectives. This echeloning endures in the modern Russian Army. The immediate objective on the Avdiivka front was the Durna river line, just 10 kilometres from Avdiivka... -
Precision: A History of American Warfare by James Patton Rogers is published by Manchester University Press.
"Precision" is an intellectual history of America's pursuit of the titular objective - how to target adversaries, their militaries, and their infrastructure with pinpoint accuracy while, reducing harm to civilians and non-combatants. Author James Patton Rogers surveys the evolution of the American military's noble ambitions that often outreached its technological capacity and how that pursuit shaped the development and execution of strategy and doctrine.
Beginning with the First World War, Rogers seats the genesis of this pursuit in the horror of the First World War, which saw widespread and in many cases pointless slaughter. Morally abhorrent to American (and indeed European sensibilities), military officers sought to prevent the recurrence of such destruction by instead achieving greater accuracy. The advent of airpower began this uneven march towards a perhaps unattainable desire - to make war clean and efficient.
Military demonstrations against fixed, undefended targets with early airpower gave rise to the perhaps misguided belief that precision was indeed possible with the technology of the time.
The first test of this was the Second World War. In Europe, the United Kingdom's area bombardment stood in contrast with America's ostensible 'precision' campaign. Washington sought to target industries, military facilities, and logistics hubs as opposed to applying pressure to civilian populations. Aspirational again, the efficacy of such campaigns remains debatable given the accuracy of bombsights and the cost associated with waves upon waves of bombers pursuing well-defended targets.
In the Pacific, American military leaders managed to convince themselves and the public that the mass fire bombings of Japanese cities were somehow 'precise'. The apotheosis of this precision campaign was the use of the atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki that helped bring the war to a close.
Whether or not the bombings were necessary is explored by Rogers, the debate over which feeds into questions of precision - a single bomb for a single target (military in nature) achieved a strategic effect for proponents of precision.
The nuclear era that followed was, and remains, Strangelovian in the extreme. Rogers' recounting of the torturous debates about nuclear strategy and doctrine is riveting, if absurd. It is hard to argue that nuclear weapons, especially thermonuclear devices are 'precision' by any measure.
Yet, that destructiveness was the source of its precision for its advocates - fewer bombs or warheads per target, an idea that was naturally undermined by the presence of 'overkill' which would only make the 'rubble bounce' in the end. The American military's efforts to develop a Single Integrated Operational Plan and its component plans for nuclear targeting sought to reduce this overkill and increase precision.
It was not until the Vietnam War that technology arguably began to catch up to the ambitions of precision with the first use of laser-guided munitions. Still in its infancy, it was, of course, overshadowed by the widespread, if ineffective, bombing campaigns such as Operation Rolling Thunder. Where precision truly shined, if at least in the public's mind, was during Operation Desert Storm and the allied efforts to eject Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army from Kuwait.
Even here precision munitions were only a fraction of the total used, yet the widespread coverage on CNN of bombs and missiles striking their intended targets created the impression that the era of precision had dawned.
Precision-strike complex
Perhaps the apotheosis of American precision strike emerged in the wake of the events of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror that followed. America's precision-strike complex saw persistent surveillance and highly accurate missiles and bombs develop an extremely tight kill chain allowing the elimination of individual target... -
'The Russian man is glad to see death, including his own - it reminds him of the end of everything that exists. He contemplates the ruins and fragments with pleasure…'
This author has watched thirty YouTube videos of Russian soldiers committing suicide. This has been possible thanks to the revolution that has taken place on the battlefield with the proliferation of cheap drones fitted with cameras. One slit his throat. It took him almost a minute to die. Twenty-two shot themselves.
Seven killed themselves by detonating grenades: the first held the grenade at arms-length and looked away; the second held the grenade to his chest; the third detonated two grenades against his ears (the head vanished); the fourth also blew his head off; the fifth, a corpulent individual of Asiatic appearance, detonated the grenade under his body armour; the sixth was an individual hiding behind a vehicle wreck; and the seventh held the grenade in front of his face.
How many Russian soldiers have committed similar acts unrecorded by Ukrainian drones can only be speculated.
Historically, we might associate such extreme behaviour with the Imperial Japanese Army. More recently we think of the fanaticism of terrorist organisations such as ISIS or Al Qaeda. But we would not normally frame the Russian Army in this way. This article begs the question: is the Russian Army a death cult?
Suicide in Russian culture
In Russia, suicide, or more broadly disdain for life, is modern and rooted in the revolutionary tradition. The most famous suicide is the poet Vladimir Mayakovsy (1893-1930). The cause however was a love affair, not revolution. His funeral was attended by 150,000 people, the largest public mourning event in Bolshevik Moscow after the funerals of Lenin and Stalin.
Rejection of life - as revolutionary act - finds origins in Turgenev's Fathers and Sons (1862) which popularised the phrase 'nihilism' through the character of Bazarov: 'At the present time negation is the most beneficial of all [acts] -and we deny…everything.' Nihilism mixed fanatical asceticism with self-mortification. Life mattered little or nothing.
Turgenev actually created the character as lampoon of the 'men of the sixties', but paradoxically Bazarov became an anti-hero to young Russians seeking change.
The nihilism became violent through the agency of the so-called 'new men' - Lenin's predecessors - the best known of which were Varfolomei Zaitsev (1842-1882), the archetypal nihilist but unknown in the West (and the character of Shigalev in Dostoyesvky's The Possessed); and Sergey Nechaev (1847-1882) (the character of Pyotr Verkhovensky, also in The Possessed).
The 'Nechaev affair' was the great cause célèbre in Russia of the period, but also remains completely unknown outside Russia except to Russian historians. The Tsarist authorities were so alarmed by the young man he was gaoled and deliberately starved to death, dying at the age of thirty-five.
Before he died he co-authored with Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876) one of the most famous tracts of revolutionary literature in world history: The Revolutionary Catechism. It starts with the famous proposition 'The revolutionary is a lost man…no interests of his own, no affairs of his own, no feelings, no attachments no belongings, not even a name if his own.' It then goes on to describe a being who 'despises', who is 'hard with himself', who 'hates', and whose object is 'ruthless destruction'.
It could be a description of 'the Orcs', as Ukrainians describe the Russians they face on the other side of the trench lines.
While it is undeniable that a life-denying fanaticism coloured Russian revolutionaries (and radicals and anarchists across 19th century Europe), we must still ask, but were the revolutionaries born from a wider Russian cultural substratum that disregarded life, or were they atypical of their society.
Suicide in Russian society
Russian men die young. Roughly one quarter die before the age of 55, mostly due to two causes: tobac... -
Over the past two decades, enhancing human performance capabilities for those operating in extremis contexts (i.e., Armed Forces, Emergency Services, and First Responders) has gained considerable traction in policy-making and scientific circles.
To operationalise this concept, the term Human Performance Optimisation (HPO) first emerged within the US Department of Defence (DoD) in 2006 as a conceptual framework to develop the performance capabilities of the military's most important asset - its people. Military tasks, by their very nature, place unique and intense physiological, psychological, and cognitive demands upon all Warfighters.
In addition, the contemporary operational environment is arguably more volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) than ever before.
Indeed, the return of peer-on-peer conflict and the emergence of unconventional, asymmetric, and hybrid threats, combined with the scale and speed of technological change, has, and will, continue to make conflict a challenging and ever-evolving affair contested not only in the land, air, and maritime environments but also in the electromagnetic, cyber and space domains.However, it is essential to note that while the character of conflict may change, its fundamental nature remains the same: it is
a human endeavour that is adversarial, dynamic, complex, and lethal.
Given this reality, it is vital that every Warfighter, irrespective of gender, age, rank, or trade, is prepared for the demands of the contemporary operational environment. The importance of developing human performance capabilities for such demands was succinctly put by US Army Colonel (ret.) John Collins who stated that "Humans are more important than hardware, and their quality is more important than their quantities".
This point was again highlighted more recently by the British Army Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Patrick Saunders, who stated that "We need 'warfighters' - whether they are cyber specialists, drone pilots or infantry soldiers - to be stronger, faster, more intelligent and more resilient." To achieve this laudable objective, the Armed Forces must develop appropriate training strategies to enable military personnel to perform to their full potential.
Indeed, lessons learned over the past two decades have been internalised, resulting in a considerable improvement in the training, competence, motivation, and overall combat effectiveness of the Warfighter.HPO represents part of this evolution and has been defined in the literature as "the process of applying knowledge, skills, and emerging technologies to improve and preserve the capabilities of military personnel to execute essential tasks".
Fundamentally, HPO aims to leverage evidence-based information and best practices to make the Warfighter as resilient, capable, agile, and lethal as possible. In addition, due to a reduced size and budget, the Armed Forces cannot afford large numbers of non-deployable personnel. Therefore, a secondary aim of HPO is to improve individual career longevity and reduce injury rates.
It is Nothing New
Preparing the Warfighter for success on the battlefield is nothing new. Indeed, numerous historical examples of military leadership emphasise the same ideas promoted within this article. However, our collective understanding of the optimal approach to achieve this aim has improved considerably, driven by developments in applied sports science, physiology, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. To conceptualise HPO, the Warfighter should be viewed as a human platform.
This approach allows for the routine monitoring, analysis, and development of critical human performance capabilities no different from traditional military platforms (i.e., weapon systems, vehicles, or ISTAR assets). However, to adopt such an approach, it is essential to define critical aspects of human performance. This typically is done using the Biopsychosocial model whereby human performance capabilities are split into three ... -
"I don't want to get any messages saying, 'I am holding my position.' We are not holding a Goddamned thing. Let the Germans do that. We are advancing constantly and we are not interested in holding onto anything, except the enemy's balls. We are going to twist his balls and kick the living shit out of him all of the time."
The debt owed to those who liberated Western Europe from Nazi oppression will underpin the D-Day 80 Commemorations. Although D-Day was essential to victory in Europe, it was not an end in itself. Study of the wider war to liberate Northwest Europe places D-Day in context and helps the military professional understand the link between the operational and strategic levels of war.
One method of undertaking this study is through educational wargaming which enables learning through active participation, rather than passive receipt of information. This short read, part three of three of this mini-series, will outline how this learning experience can be achieved through use of a COTS wargame.
Success on D-Day allowed the Allies to secure a firm bridgehead. The resulting campaign was a brutal attritional struggle that led to the destruction of German forces in Normandy and a dramatic breakout across France. Subsequent attempts for a quick advance into Germany failed in the face of logistical constraints and German resistance - most notably at Arnhem in September 1944. A German winter counter-offensive in the Ardennes followed and achieved surprise but was subsequently defeated.
In Spring 1945 a deliberate Allied offensive breached the German defences, crossed the Rhine and the German Army surrender in May 1945. How did the Allies win? Interactive study using the wargame 1944: D-Day To The Rhine offers the military professional the opportunity to answer this question.
The map for 1944: D-Day To The Rhine extends from the French Atlantic coast to Western Germany. Units are armies or corps and turns represent a month. Set-up shows how the Germans attempted to defend the region. The Allies are not committed to invading Normandy. Other options are available but come with commensurate variations in air support and German responsiveness.
The Allied invasion will almost certainly succeed. This illustrates the immense and wide-ranging preparatory effort the Allies devoted to ensuring success. A subsequent breakout can be more problematic and will reflect player decision making. The Allied invasion of southern France - Op DRAGOON - opens up a new area of operation to the south of the game map.
Ends, Ways and Means
Balancing "Ends, Ways and Means" are integral to success and reflect the game's strategic level focus. Allied victory is determined by the "End" chosen. These range from the swift capture of Berlin through to securing Western Germany and isolation of the industrial Rhur region. In this way the game confronts the player with the historical choices the Allies faced. Central to the representation of "Means", is the use of resource points. These provide replacements and enable movement and combat.
A fixed amount is given each turn, mirroring the capacity of the invasion beaches. German occupied ports can be captured to increase this amount. The Allied player faces a decision on whether success can be achieved with the fixed capacity available, or if resources must be invested to first liberate ports and increase resources.
The game models "Ways" through the use of resource points for movement and combat. Units can move and fight in any order and this forces the player to think about sequencing of operations.
The overall effect of these game mechanisms forces the player to confront the tensions inherent in balancing "Ends, Ways and Means." Thus the player gains some experiential insight into the historical situation, such as the prioritisation of Op MARKET-GARDEN over clearance of the Scheldt estuary, which occurred in September 1944.
Chance
The "chance" inherent in the nature of war is provided by bespoke combat dice... -
Despite economic headwinds, China will still overtake the US in terms of real GDP
How can power be measured between states?
Key challenges in applying the power as resources approach
China manipulates and likely exaggerates publicly released data on its economy and currency
Net vs. Gross Metrics
While Chinese real GDP is a source of power, it is counteracted by a number of significant economic costs.
Utilising a net approach would account for the significant economic costs that China faces which counteract its large GDP, for example; an increasingly ageing population (contributing to a significantly declining working population); male-dominated demographics; overexploitation damaging much of its arable land; industrialisation and pollution causing substantial water scarcity and negative health externalities; huge welfare and internal security burdens; and increasing infrastructure and
education costs.
Spending money will always increase GDP even if THE money is wasted, as seen with China's ineffective infrastructure investments.
Moreover, GDP counts production costs as output; therefore, spending money will always increase GDP even if money is wasted, as seen with China's ineffective infrastructure investments.
Power Conversion Problems
The USSR reached its military peak in the 1980s despite its economy being in a "death spiral", demonstrating that military power is often a lagging indicator.
The USSR reached its military peak in the 1980s despite its economy being in a "death spiral"
Conclusion -
What is the military recruitment dilemma?
Military recruitment is problematic. And a key issue is that people who get paid good money can't solve it. So after six months of analysing YouTube, Facebook, Linkedin, X, Instagram, and yes, even TikTok comments - perhaps I can. The military recruitment ideas below are not meant to be taken in isolation, and most, if not all of them can be done together.
If any Members of Parliament or the General Staff are reading this, please feel free to help yourselves, I know that your idea buckets must be completely barren now.
1. The Infant-Infantry
Very few militaries on the planet consider children to be the solution to their needs, but very few countries are mentally agile or brave enough to survive the modern world. The British military, however, knows that an SA80 in the hands of a 14-year-old Glaswegian is just as deadly as an AK-47 in the hands of any rascally Russian Vatnik.
From the trenches of Ypres, the decks of the imperial navies, the streets of Kampala and the Killing Fields of Cambodia - children have been an effective part of militaries. Some as young as nine have proven that they can carry ammunition, fit into tunnel systems and the mechanisms of aircraft, artillery and tanks, and in a pinch, they can step into any SO1 role with relative ease.
Because the minimum wage is so low for younger people, this could also be a very cost-effective measure. The UK could easily raise a battalion of these "ten-pound Privates" for about half the cost of a regular one. This solution is also popular with many overworked teachers, who pity those kids clogging up overcrowded classrooms and enduring worthless education. Their hearts desire Call of Duty, Fortnite, the open sea, sky, and glory in battle - not GCSEs!
2. The British Commonwealth Legion
The Enlistment of Foreigners Act 1854 gave the country the power it needed before, and by Jove, Parliament can honour us again. Whilst the concept may be a copy of the French Foreign Legion, just like the class system of the Normans, if it's good enough for the French, it's good enough for us.
The UK already has a long history of Commonwealth and Sepoy armies, and we used international units before to great effect (e.g. No.10 (Inter-Allied) Commando unit in WWII). This system will yield significant numbers, and such great savings, that it can't be passed up. Anyone who's served on Herrick operations knows we could've solved the whole thing in a year for a tenth of the price if only we had a Corps of Gurkhas.
Commonwealth soldiers have been fantastic, but we should open their opportunity to the whole world. Fitness and aptitude assessments, as well as English literacy testing, will be done overseas, and successful applicants will be given a one-way plane ticket and a space in basic training, after which they will fill one of the many empty bedspaces found all over the forces.
They will serve a four-year minimum contract, then with one or two lucky family members (we'll work out the details later) they'll have earned their place in the country. They can continue to serve in the forces or head into the green and pleasant land as a full UK citizen and resident.
3. National Service+
This one is a favourite of the older generation, and for good reason. Wimpy young adults won't be making cringe videos on TikTok when they are getting thrashed up and down Mt Tumbledown and sweeping pinecones outside the Commanding Officer's office.
Youths fighting outside Argos in Kilburn should be fighting international terrorists or the Americans outside the chow hall in Camp Lemonnier! And if they like choreographed dance instead, what better place than as the rear marker on the parade square of Horse Guards?
There won't be a piece of brass unpolished as everyone between the ranks of Corporal and Warrant Officer Class 2 is given a five-person work party, and every Officer rank is issued a batsman and a personal assistant. Watch as productivity doubles, triples, and quadr... -
~ Sun Tzu
Soldiers on the Spectrum
common autism myths
Neuroinclusivity Analogy 1: The Enigma Machine
Neuroinclusivity Analogy 2: Rugby
Governmental Reviews
In Closing -
In light of a number of somewhat braying articles in the mainstream media suggesting excessive 'wokeism' is rife within the military, it seemed an opportune moment to investigate many of the claims of Defence surrounding the topic of Diversity and Inclusion.
By and large, there are now two common uses of the term 'diversity':
The first, more traditional usage is an indication of variety, used such as when highlighting the unrivalled diversity of life within the Amazon rainforest, or the splendid diversity of Heinz' current soup range.
The second, social definition, employed more formally by Defence within this context, refers to an action, being "the recognition of differences between individuals or groups".
In relation to this latter definition, a second element is attached, that of 'inclusion', which the organisation characterises as "the effect of good diversity management ensuring that all individuals, no matter what their unique differences feel they belong [and are therein able to contribute effectively] to the wider team." A prudent step, given that recognition alone without action would amount to no change.
Combined, Diversity and Inclusion within this context therefore seek to optimise the relationships (through inclusion) between all the members of the force, based off understanding and acknowledgement of each individual's identified differences (Diversity). In this sense, diversity is seen as a start state, and inclusion a vehicle of action by which to optimise it.
Challenges?
This dual meaning of the word presents challenges when discussing diversity, as the two meanings are frequently conflated, or employed as if synonymous, which they are clearly not. For the sake of clarity this article almost exclusively refers to diversity in the traditional sense, referring to the prevalence of numerous assorted entities.
The 'Defence Diversity & Inclusion Vision' sees "Defence harness[ing] the power of difference to deliver capability that safeguards our nation…". In so doing Defence relies upon variation to exploit a fundamental assumption: that 'difference' (traditional diversity) is 'powerful' (beneficial).
This assumption is frequently rolled out within the often-used sentiment, or indeed statement, that 'diverse teams produce better results', that 'diversity and Inclusion are operationally essential', or any of the other combinations of similar words to the same effect.
The benefits of diversity
This article investigates the veracity of that assumption, finding, as one might expect, that 'it's a bit more complicated than that', and that actually, poorly managed diversity can be a net negative. In so doing, a large number of academic studies have been interrogated to form this image, spanning numerous categories of diversity, including race, sex, ability, age, culture, cognition, education and nationality.
In making a generalised and reductive summary the author acknowledges that some nuance between specific groups will inevitably be lost, however has endeavoured to summarise the literature fairly thus:
There are many, many benefits of diversity within teams, but also numerous downsides that should not be ignored. Most significantly, diverse teams typically outperform homogenous groups in finding optimal solutions to complex problems, especially those that require creative or innovative solutions. Whilst this sounds ideal, you still have to pay the piper somewhere, and the compromise is that the more diverse a team, the less effectively it communicates.
Finding the 'sweet spot' can be challenging. Extremely diverse teams, being less cohesive and less coherent, are harder to control, and often take longer conducting both complex and simple tasks as a result. This all makes pretty logical sense, as people with increasingly different perspectives may proportionally struggle to understand each other.
By contrast, homogenous teams are generally much more effective at completing simple tasks or those with a clear, directed ... -
With defence in an unheralded period of uncertainty it is always pleasant to find some firm ground. To that end the notion that the use of simulation in military training will increase dramatically over the next 5 years will not cause much disagreement.
Against a training burden that has never been so intensive the MoD is faced with equipment costs increasing, availability of ammunition decreasing and the complexity of training clashing with emerging restrictions. Simulation is a critical tool in tackling these problems.
Given the scale of this challenge, coupled with the breadth (more on this later) of the UK defence industry, integrating multiple systems into a single virtual battlefield (or Single Synthetic Environment) demands simple, understandable, interoperable and effective standards. We are not there.
Where are we?
The world of defence simulation is sufficiently opaque. This piece does not intend to add to that technical layer of fog. Rather it intends to explain the current issues as simply as possible, before offering three potential solutions.
In 2024 we are collectively spoiled. We are accustomed to the concept of "plug in and play" across our lives with HDMI cables, USB plugs, QI charging among others. So much so that one might casually assume that the same level of standardisation would be found in defence simulation hardware.
DIS (or the Distributed Interactive Simulation standard) was created in 1992 from work done with SimNet (created in 1987). Despite cancellation by NATO in 2010 it is still in use within the MoD. DIS's successor HLA (High Level Architecture), formed from a blend of DIS and ALSP (Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol) in 1996, is still 1 year older than the Nintendo64 game Goldeneye, at 28.
Despite iteration, both standards are outdated and limiting. This limitation is exacerbated by the number of adaptations being made with lenient, or in some cases no, centralised oversight (despite the valiant efforts of some in the UK through the Defence Policy for Modelling and Simulation - DMASC). Experimental Protocol Data Units (PDUs for short)are network messages created by all parties to overcome the standard's shortfalls.
Their variance, lack of regulation and lack of standardisation have created a situation akin to the simulation Tower of Babel.
An unwillingness to conduct wholesale change, combined with a broader lack of understanding is now leading to the creation of an entirely unexpected problem - the launch of new products to overcome the shortfalls of DIS and HLA. Far from solving the problem by filling the gaps, this is adding to both the complexity and now the cost of new capabilities. Imagine the entire country having to use plug adaptors, just because manufacturers were unwilling to adhere to the Type G standard.
Nobody would tolerate it there: so why do we tolerate it in defence?
Solution 1: Unilateral not collaborative development.
There are 3 potential solutions to this issue and these will be looked at in increasing order of feasibility.
The MoD likes collaboration and partnerships and with the technological breadth and challenges on the global stage this has it's place. That being said, some of the biggest technological leaps of the last 20 years have been made by singular organisations headed up by empowered and focused leaders.
Nowhere would this difference in approach be more apparent than when comparing Project Purple (the 2005-2007 £120M development of the first generation iPhone) and Morpheus (the now cancelled 2017-2024 £690M component of the development of the next generation of tactical communications)
Collaboration is critical to development but when that approach drifts into "design by committee", both from MoD and industry, things go wrong.
Especially when said collaboration is not being done to ensure best in class but to prop up a British defence industry landscape that is overburdened , when adjusted to a like for like comparison with the US DoD.
One way to simplify... - Vis mere
