Episodes
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Manuel Hinds shared his experience reforming El Salvador's economy post-civil war, highlighting the importance of stabilising the fiscal situation, reducing tariffs, and privatising inefficient public companies to introduce competition. He emphasised the necessity of cutting the central bank's direct financing to the government to curb inflation. He suggested that investing in human capital and education is crucial for long-term economic growth. Hinds also discussed the need for practical and disciplined policy implementation, cautioning against reliance on populist promises and advocating for a pragmatic, reality-based approach to economic management.
Manuel Hinds has served as minister of the economy (in 1979) and of finance (in 1995-1999) in El Salvador, as division chief at the World Bank (in the 1980s and early 1990s), working with more than thirty countries, and as the Whitney H. Shepardson fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York (in 2004-2005).
Transcript
Tobi:
Let me get a little background into your period during the reform in El Salvador. I know you spearheaded the reform of the economy, the currency regime, and a lot of things. What was the situation like when you came into the picture? What were the problems, and how did you approach it, especially on the political economy side, you know, getting the buy-in of the elites or entrenched interests who might be opposed to the reforms?
Manuel:
El Salvador, when I came into the picture, I came into the picture in two stages. First, I was working with the World Bank, and then I went back to El Salvador and started as a consultant to the board of directors of the Central Bank. It was just one meeting a week, and that was it. Later, I came in as the Minister of Finance.
The situation was this: El Salvador had been in a civil war. We are a small country, 6 million inhabitants, but the civil war was very bloody. We had 80,000 deaths and the country was, for 10 years, in this terrible division. But then, you know, the people became tired of the war and all the population made it clear that they wanted peace. And then with the help of several friendly countries and the United Nations, we had a peace accord in which there was no winner in the war; the winner was the people. We reformed the constitution and we had free elections. And then, the country started on the right foot, i’d say, because everybody in the different political parties were willing to go the extra mile so that things could be done very well.
In El Salvador, the period of the president is five years. I came in the second, after the peace accords. The peace accords were in 1992 and I came to the government in 1995, January 1995. El Salvador was very similar to many Latin American countries, and actually many African countries as well. We had a lot of protection. The protective tariffs went up to 100 and something. We had Central American common market, but that was a very small market still. And also we had a problem with the pensions. We were accumulating a lot of liabilities for the government without enough income. And also we had very ineffective public companies.
So when I came in, the president invited me to give him a presentation of what I thought we should do. And when I made the presentation, he said, "Well, I'm prepared to do this, but if you are the minister of finance." So he put me in a corner, you know, and then I said, OK, I'm going to do it.
And then we started with number one: we had to stabilise the country, which meant that we have to stabilise fiscally the country because we have been spending a lot, particularly, but not only, in the war, the war effort. So when I came in, I had the advantage that we could reduce substantially expenditures just by reducing the army. So the first one was we were up because the inflation at the time was something like 28%. It was between 20 and 30%. It had started to go down in the first period after the war. So when I came in, inflation was probably 20 to 25%.
Also we had very high import tariffs. We had the problem of the pensions. And also this was a time when the communications were starting to have a revolution. This was 1994. So you could already see that this new technological revolution was really connected with communications. And we still didn't have internet. We still didn't have good communications. So we had to do something about it. And also we had very expensive electricity. So I made proposals for each of these things.
In the case of inflation, the problem that we had was that the government had very high deficits and then the central bank would finance them. Because the inflation rate was high, then the interest rates were extremely high. The rates of interest were something on the order of 20 to 25 percent. Since the people didn't trust the currency, it was almost impossible to get mortgages from the banking system and long-term credit for investment. So the government had to spend a lot on subsidies and providing money so that the banks use that money to finance long-term.
When I came in, I was telling you that the inflation was coming down and two years after I was there, inflation was 2%. 2 or 3 percent. So inflation was not the problem, but the rate of interest remained very high, 20 percent. The problem was that people said, "Well, these people, they are not going to devalue the currency, but the next government may devalue the currency because this was what many people in Latin America were doing at the time." So I propose to dollarise, I propose to reduce the tariffs, the import tariffs, also the reform of the pensions, which rather than having a pay-as-you-go, we will have individual accounts and people will save for their own pension in an account under their name. And also the privatization of electricity and communications, the telephone company. But we propose to privatize under competition. You are very young, probably, you never lived in that time when electricity and communications were natural monopolies. And everybody said, "Well, it's impossible to have competition in these sectors because the investments are too high. And if everybody invests in telephone lines, then it will be a waste."
But we said, "No, we are going to introduce competition in the market" because already there were ways in which we could have competition, even with the landlines. But also the mobile telephones were coming. So we issued a law of competition in those sectors. And we privatized these companies in two or three companies, different companies. And also we opened for anybody who could get into these businesses. Mainly in communications, very fast, we had something like 40 different companies with cellular phones. We had this system in which company A could use the lines of company B paying at all. And we did the same with electricity. So this was a success.
Also, the pension funds were created and they started saving a lot and we reduced the protection. This was the most difficult of all the things, because the companies become used to being protected and they don't want international competition. So it became a political problem, really, and we were afraid that we wouldn't be able to pass the new law through the National Assembly. And then the president told me, maybe we are doing too many things. Let's choose three or four and we concentrate on that. And of course, the reduction of protection has to be one of them. We had to increase the value of the tax because we were going to reduce protection and we were going to reduce the income of the government and we were going to need some more revenues and then we increase…and that was also a difficult thing to pass.
Then we dropped dollarisation and all the other things we finished, what we had proposed. Then dollarisation was done by the next government. The country dollarized in 2001. I was no longer the Minister of Finance, but the new president called me just to do that. So I worked with the government just to do the dollarisation with the new government. Dollarisation is not the only way in which you can stabilise or reduce interest rates, but it's a very cheap way of doing it. And it has worked very well. Many people said, if you dollarise, in the first world crisis, you will go out. Because you won't be able to have a monetary policy to survive. And then, you know, in 2008, we had the world crisis. And then in 2020, we had COVID. And actually, El Salvador fared extremely well, better than all our neighbours, because the market controls the supply of money very efficiently.
In 2008, a Marxist government came on board, and they didn't like the dollar for obvious reasons. They asked the IMF to make an assessment of dollarisation. And the IMF made the assessment and they said, well, El Salvador has reduced a dead weight in the economy, which is the currency risk. If you eliminate the currency risk, you can win easily 1% of GDP. So it's a very cheap way of doing it and you reduce the working load on the government because El Salvador doesn't need to worry about the exchange rate or about inflation. It comes automatically, the market does it, so it's very good.
I remember I mentioned this in my plan, but this has not been done in El Salvador. Already in that time, 1994, the world was coming into the knowledge economy. It wasn’t really clear, but now it's crystal clear. The new economy in the world is organized around knowledge. And you can see that in everything. When I was talking about this in 1992, 93, 94, the world's most powerful companies were industrial companies. They have chimneys, they got tremendous industrial production, they produce cars or electric equipment and so on. The largest was General Motors, and they were very noisy companies. Now the largest companies in the world look like universities. It's Apple, for example. Microsoft. All these companies, they produce nothing but knowledge. That's the only thing that they produce, because Apple, they don't produce anything physical. They subcontract that. They outsource the production of the computers and other things. They only produce software, designs, and that's where the big value added is.
So like the industrial revolution, when you have a technological revolution that is very good for us the developing countries, because you can jump without having to go through all the things that you needed to be industrial. Of course it is not easy, you have to invest a lot, but rather than investing in many things, you have to invest in your own people.
When I grew up, people said to have education and health and housing is the social sectors. But before having the social problems we need to produce and we are going to produce this with companies, manufacturing cars and planes or whatever. And then when we become rich, then we are going to spend money on health, education, and housing, and really, now it’s the other way around. Because if you don't have educated people, you cannot grow. What are the countries or the regions that are growing faster in the world? Well, you have Silicon Valley. Silicon Valley, they have Stanford University right there. And also they have many other, San Jose State University, Berkeley, and so on and that feeds these companies with the inputs they need. And the input they need is people, good engineers, good scientists. If I could tell you one thing only, I can say invest in your own people. Invest in education, invest in health, because that will allow them to become more productive and then the country will become rich.
Tobi;
There's so much packed into your answer that I'll have to untangle them one by one, because I feel you are uniquely positioned to untangle some of the questions that I have. You’ve been a researcher, you've been a foreign expert with your work with the World Bank, you've been a senior cabinet member and reformer in your own country, El Salvador. So I would like to start with inflation, right? In my own observation, poor countries in the context of the macro economy stumble periodically and struggle with three crises, which for me are inflation, exchange rates, and debt.
To start with inflation, for example, in Nigeria, we also have double-digit inflation. It's 33% now, food inflation is 40%. It's causing a cost-of-living crisis in the country. And the government through the central bank is struggling to bring this under control, which we have been doing for the past eight, nine years, right? But what I want to ask you is that to the degree that you can generalise from your own direct experience and knowledge, what are the common causes of inflation in poor countries?
And I ask this because there is a lot of mischievous debates when you're trying to talk about inflation, particularly determining whether it is a monetary phenomenon or a non-monetary phenomenon. I feel like people who are addicted or amenable to government spending will tell you, "Oh, it's non-monetary and that Milton Friedman was wrong." And they paint the other side as neoliberal, orthodoxy, textbook economics. So I would like you to help me tease out what are the nuances in the inflation phenomenon in low-income countries.
Manuel;
Yes, well, we can go from the more general to the particular, maybe. Because the problem that you mentioned is the basis of underdevelopment and this is something that Africa shares with Latin America. Do you remember this guy called Sisyphus? Sisyphus was this guy who did something that the gods didn't like, and then they condemned him to push a boulder up a hill. And when he reached the top of the hill, the boulder would come down to the valley again, and then he had to go back and push it back up. And if you look in Latin America and also in Asia, from time to time, you had a good government who come here and stabilise the economy, stabilise the country, the interest rates go down and then you think now we are going in the real path of progress. And then suddenly there is a new populist that comes in and starts promising lots of things to the people. And then they borrow money to spend a lot in the government in things that are not really developmental. And then after a few years, the country is again in the same situation.
Tobi;
Precisely.
Manuel;
In Latin America, you could see the worst case, this happens all over Latin America. But the most dramatic case is Argentina. Argentina in the early 20th century was the seventh richest country in the world. They were very, very, very rich. Because of this thing that they started having high inflation because of populism. You know, people coming, the politicians come and they promise things and get elected, and then they waste the money, and then you start having problems of the problem that you have in Nigeria. Nigeria, compared with Argentina, is moderate. The inflation rate in Nigeria is 40[%], you told me. In Argentina today, it's 300[%].
Tobi;
Yeah. True.
Manuel;
And then because of these things, because of this continuous… this Sisyphus thing, they stabilise, then they destabilise and so on. Argentina now is number 66. Rather than being seventh, now it's the 66th. Because they have spent a century just trying to stabilise the economy.
I think that at the very end, if you analyse the problem, people have the governments they deserve. If they elect populist people, then you have destabilisation. You have there [in Nigeria] a problem of education, exactly like in Latin America, but it is a certain kind of education for that problem. The education is the self-assurance that you can do it without needing a miracle and then “we are going to work hard for one generation. The developed countries, they work for one generation or two generations and we are going to really build a new country.” And the other one is, “no, there is this guy who says he is going to solve all the problems and that this will make us rich.” You know that Latin America has 200 years of independence, 200 years. And in 200 years, we are back in the same position, relative position to Europe that we had in the early 19th century. And Argentina went from rich to poor and Latin America remained poor.
This is an education in common sense, okay? People have to come to the realization that miracles do not happen. That even when they tell you, “well, there is the Japanese miracle,” but that's because the Japanese had educated the population a lot before. And the same in Korea. So what we have to do is we have to invest in the people like Singapore. Singapore was much poorer than Nigeria. It was much poorer than El Salvador also. But they invested in education, in common sense, in saying, OK, we are going to work and then we will become rich. And we are not going to expect a miracle, because expecting miracles, you see what has happened. We are in the same position as 200 years ago.
The question is, why is [it] that countries create so much money? They create so much money because they want to spend, they want to go into very big fiscal deficits and to pay for them, they print money. - MH
So that's the first problem that you mentioned. And that is the basic problem, Tobi, I think that if you solve that one, then you will start seeing solutions for the other things. Because people themselves will find the solutions to the other problems. The other problem is, is inflation a monetary problem or is it a fiscal problem? I think it all depends on what is the angle that you are looking at. I think that inflation is definitely a monetary problem. The question is, why is [it] that countries create so much money? They create so much money because they want to spend, they want to go into very big fiscal deficits and to pay for them, they print money.
In El Salvador, many people believe that we reduce inflation because we dollarised. And that's not true. Inflation came down because we forbade the central bank to finance anybody. A new law for the central bank said the central bank cannot lend to the government ever. Period. And it cannot lend to the banks except in the case of financial crisis. Only in those circumstances. And then the inflation went down, the inflation went down from 20 something, almost 30 percent to 2 percent within three years or something like that (three or four years). But of course, you need the discipline to really not lend into the government. So I was the minister of finance and I could not borrow money from the central bank. So the only possibility I had to do that was to reduce the deficit and also borrow money abroad. And of course, when you borrow money abroad, you are subject to a certain discipline, you know, because you have to convince other people. When you want to finance the government just with the central bank, then the minister of finance just takes the phone and calls the president of the central bank and [says] sell me so much billion. But when you have to go to the international markets or to the World Bank, or to the African Development Bank, you have to justify why you need the money, how you are going to pay, and so on. That introduces discipline to the government. So I think it's very important to separate the monetary and the fiscal, so that you cannot use the authority of the government to force the central bank to give you money. And you can attain that in two ways. One is to have a strong law and applying the law. Or you just outsource the supply of money to the government of the United States, to the Federal Reserve, in the case of dollarisation. Or you could adopt the Euro. But the point is, cut that link. It's like a drug addict. The solution is not to give them drugs, period. That’s it!
Tobi;
That's so deep and apt because, again, with the Nigeria example, we had eight years of unrestricted monetary finance by the central bank, more or less just printing money and borrowing the government to the extent that the existing law, which places a cap on how much monetary financing can be done, was broken several times. Which leads me to my next question to you is that, so you can pass a law, but how does the subject of central bank independence and the politics of it play in here? Because laws can be broken if the political leadership is highly motivated to do so.
Manuel;
The thing is, I am 78 years old. I have worked as an economist for, I don't know, 50 years. And I can tell you, if there is one lesson, there is no perfect system. There is no automatic system. It's people. If you buy a car, and it could be maybe a Ford, you buy a Ford, which is not very expensive, a small Ford. And then you give maintenance to this car and you take care of it, you don't drive it in dangerous circumstances and so on. That car could last for decades. But you can buy a Rolls Royce, and if you go and you crash it ten times, you drive it on the beach and then you go into the ocean with it and the saline water comes in and so on. You will destroy the Rolls-Royce. And it is not because the Rolls-Royce is a bad car, it's because you are abusing the car. And that is what happens. You can have a good central bank and a good government in which you establish a rule, as we had in El Salvador. We had a law saying the government cannot lend money to the government. And we met that, you know. We met that condition. It would never again happen. We were one of the worst risks in Latin America, even if we never defaulted. El Salvador is one of the few developing countries which has never defaulted. But we had a very bad risk ranking. Five years after the war, we became investment-grade. So we could borrow at very low interest rates and so on because we were meeting the conditions we ourselves had established and people respected us. But now, 30 years later, inflation is very low because we are dollarised and the rates of interest for the private sector are very low. But for the government it's 16% because they have been borrowing like crazy in the international markets. And it is because the new government, it's the Sisyphus story, they found that the country had a very good possibility of borrowing money and they borrow and borrow and borrow and they are compromising the stability of the country.
So that's why we go full circle. If we vote into power a populist government which will spend money like crazy, then we will go back. There's no other way. So I think that what you do, for example, is a very good thing. You have your podcast, you are instructing the people so that they can learn. In Latin America, we have a literary style called magic realism. You are familiar with that or not?
Tobi;
Yes.
Manuel;
Yes, magic realism. And then we have been infected with magic realism in economics, which is that you think that you can float in the air, that you can levitate and so on. People have to understand you cannot levitate, you cannot borrow because you will have to pay for this money.
But now I don't know, Tobi, what is happening in the world, because look at the United States, uh?
Tobi;
Yeah, it’s crazy.
Manuel;
They are going down the drain. The same as Nigeria, the same as El Salvador. It's incredible. It's really incredible. I think that at some moment we have to hit rock bottom and say, no, no, no. We have to start over and start seriously and so on.
Tobi;
I hope so.
Let me talk to you a bit about exchange rates. Another thing that poorer countries or low-income countries or what we call developing countries struggle with is this exchange rate problem. In Nigeria, for example, the source, the main source of foreign exchange, which is oil, has collapsed due to incredible corruption, lack of productivity and investment in that sector, years of neglect. The law that was supposed to reform the governance of the sector was held in the parliamentary system for almost 20 years, and the version that got eventually passed was an inefficient one, evidently.
Now, poor countries run into this exchange rate crisis when they run out of dollars, basically, and what you hear is that, oh, you need to diversify your economy in order to bring in more dollars, you need to export more because then you start rationing, the system becomes corrupt, you introduce a peg, suddenly the black market in currency becomes thriving. What are the common sensical ways to manage currency risks? I would emphasise that besides dollarisation, I'm a big fan of the dollarisation idea, but it's just that, for example, in Nigeria, it will be almost like a non-starter. For example, we have a law, I know laws can be changed, but the constitution of Nigeria bans any other currency being used for transactions besides the Naira. Even though that is the law, but in reality, people do transactions in dollars and different currencies all the time because the local currency itself can be so volatile and unreliable as a store of value. So besides dollarisation, how can poor countries manage currency risks? Like in the mood of this conversation, what are the common sense insights that we are missing?
Manuel;
You can do what we did, because we dollarised after stabilising the country. When the inflation was already 2%, then we dollarised. One thing was not the consequence of the other. It was that we dollarised to reduce the interest rates, to reduce the risk. But then a new government came into power when the war was still going. And then with an economy in war, the central bank had done exactly the same things that you are talking [about]. They control the exchange rate. They had strict exchange controls. If you were an exporter, you had to deliver all the dollars to the central bank. If you were an importer, you needed a special license to import. Then there was this black market, and there was incredible corruption. Everything that you described to me, that was happening in El Salvador. So this government, the first thing they did was to say, "We are eliminating all the exchange rate controls." Flatly. That if you want dollars, buy dollars. If you want to take your dollars out of the country, take them out of the country. We are not going to intervene. This goes to the private sector. And then you know what happened? Before that, the money was leaving the country. Whenever you had an opportunity, you took the money out. When the government said, "You want to take it? Take it out." And then money started coming in.
Tobi, it is like I invite you to two parties. In one party, you go there and you can leave whenever you want. And in that one, you can bring your own whiskey. And in the other one, you can come in, but you cannot leave. Once you enter into the party, you cannot leave the party. Which of the two will you go to? If you tell the people you cannot take your money out, people will not bring their money in. We proved that in El Salvador. And there was a war, Tobi. So the problem of the scarcity of dollars stopped just by saying, "If you want to bring dollars, bring them. If you want to take them out, take them out." And then, in net terms, the dollars started coming in. Because people say, "If I'm going to invest, I will try, I will bring dollars. And if I want to take the money out, I can take the money out. And if I want to have interest rates paid abroad or whatever, I will be able to do that." So the first thing, I would liberate the market. And the second one is the other rule I gave you, because we reduce inflation without dollarisation. What we did was we forbade the central bank to lend money to the government. Period. And we complied with the law. That was it.
Because, for example, Argentina has done things like this, but they don't comply with the law. It's the same as not having a law. It is worse. It is actually worse because then you are destroying the rule of law. So it's very simple. For me, the political economy of development is very complex, it's very interesting. It has to do with education. It has to do with opening ways to the world but keeping the economy stable with the inflation rate low and without problems getting dollars is very simple. You don't need an economist for that. Anybody can do it. You call a driver and say, "The only thing that you are going to do is not allowing the central bank to lend money to the government." Period. And then if he does that, he could be a barber, he could be a dancer or whatever, and he will stabilise the country.
Tobi;
Still about reforms, and it goes back to your first answer, which is that as a policymaker, you have to make some very hard decisions, some tough decisions. Reform packages have to be sequenced and well coordinated. So how do you make the trade-offs if you are trying to stabilize a country and get it out of an economic crisis and facing all these problems like you did in El Salvador, a currency crisis, high interest rates, high inflation, high fiscal deficits. What are the quick wins, the first two, three things that you can do?
Manuel;
That's a good question because you say, what are the first ones? Because it's a process. What I would advise, go for the low-hanging fruit, the things that are easier to do. Because if you succeed in doing that, then people will trust you and then you will be able to do the more difficult ones. So in that sense, I think that the simplest thing, simplest, I'm not saying easiest, will be to stabilise the economy. Because it's a simple thing to do. But then look at what is happening in Argentina. You have to do it in a way that you don't destroy the country while stabilising the economy. Because if you just stop printing money or just reduce the fiscal deficit to zero and then it happens that you cut education expenses or you cut the money for the hospitals, as it is happening in Argentina, then you are killing yourself. You are taking a medicine that will kill you in the long run. So what you have to do, I think, is to structure a very good plan so that you can reduce printing money but you don't have to cut all the expenditures immediately. You can go down in expenditures choosing not the most important things. But also you mentioned corruption, there is a lot of money that goes with corruption. So give yourself time, let's say, two or three years to reduce the expenditures in a way that will not reduce the rate of growth of the GDP by reducing corruption, by improving the efficiency of government expenditures. I'm sure that you can probably cut your budget by 50% without really affecting the growth of the country because the resources are being wasted, because there is corruption, and these kinds of things. But you cannot do that in one go because you have to understand how the government is working and then you reduce the waste. So you need some financing during those two or three years and then borrow. Borrow abroad. Borrow abroad, not inside the country. Do not create currency. And then you are going to get money to do that if you present a very good plan. If you show that you have done your homework and then you have calculated how you are going to reduce the expenditures and so on, then you can do it. And I think that is the first thing. Also, you can easily liberalise the exchange rate and the foreign exchange markets. You say, "Well, the central bank is not going to intervene." The price of the currency will be set by the market and you can take the money out if you want. Do it. The currency will not go out. It will come in. You will see.
Tobi;
You talked about having a good plan and one that reflects having done your homework. Which then brings me to my next question. Earlier, you talked about investing in people and human capital generally. And sometimes I do wonder about the human capital in government itself, even at the most senior level. So I would ask you, what are the qualities, intellectual and psychological qualities, that make a good policymaker?
Manuel;
You know, I could bet, Tobi, that you have good people in Nigeria.
Tobi;
Of course.
Manuel;
The thing is how you are going to identify them and get them. But I agree with you that it is fundamental to bring the best people to work in the government, best people in terms of education, in terms of common sense, and in terms of being honest, not corrupt. I'm sure, because for all the waste and for everything that happens, I'm sure that you have very good engineers, oil engineers. You have very good... it's a big country. You must have good people and then bring those people to the government because you don't need to change everybody. You have to change the key people, the people who are going to manage the government, the big policies and so on. And then they will introduce discipline in their own ministries and state-owned companies and so on. You don’t have to change everybody. I'm sure there are many people there who are very good engineers, but they are not producing because the bosses are corrupt or something like that. People have to understand that you cannot arrange all this in one go. The important thing is to start growing consistently, like Singapore.
Tobi;
There's so much I would have loved to talk to you [about], but maybe sometimes we'll find some time particularly on sovereignty and globalisation and your excellent book with Benn Steil. But before I let you go, a couple of quickfire questions. Economics, the field of economics, is getting a bad rap everywhere these days. What has your own experience as an economist, especially in areas of policymaking and the influence of economics on policy generally, what has your own experience been? What are the good and the bad of the influence of economics and policy? And also relatedly, did your earlier education and career as an industrial engineer make you a better economist in any way?
Manuel;
Yes, well, of course, economic theory is very important. It's basic. But the most important thing is to be pragmatic. I am an economist and I am an industrial engineer. Engineering puts you in close touch with reality. If you are going to be a good economist, I think in one way or another, it could be engineering, it could be some other thing, but you have to keep yourself close to reality. That's number one. And number two, never believe that you know everything. Because, for example, I worked with the Soviet Union. I remember many people from the West were coming to the Soviet Union to give advice. And before they left Washington, they knew what they were going to tell the Russians, before knowing Russia. I always found that absurd. You have to approach your work with humility, you know, because normally, what I have found is people themselves give you the solutions. If you know how to ask questions, if you explain these things, if you work with them, then you will find solutions that are workable. You don't want to have economists that come here from any other country to apply the solutions they have applied over there, just like that. Because every government, every country has a difference. You have your own nature, the way things work. And then there are things that you do better than your neighbours also. So if you really know a country, you can produce much better solutions.
Tobi;
Final question. And again, this is a bit of a tradition on the podcast. What's the one idea that you would like to see spread everywhere? It may be your idea. It may be from someone else. It may be from something you've read. But what is that one idea that you would like to see spread everywhere, have a lot of influence, and get people excited?
Manuel;
The best thing that you can do is invest in your own people. Invest in their education, their health, because human capital is not the product of growth. Growth is the product of human capital. The thing that you have to do is educate your people.
Tobi;
Thank you very much, Manuel.
Manuel;
It's been a pleasure.
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Tiago Santos joins Tobi on this episode of the podcast to discuss Parliamentarianism. Tiago believes that if African countries had adopted parliamentary systems during their democratization wave, they would have likely seen better development outcomes, citing the success of Botswana and the economic growth seen in parliamentary countries. He also highlights four main flaws in presidential systems according to political scientist Juan Linz: lack of clarity in authority, rigidity, winner-takes-all nature, and personalism. These issues often lead to ineffective governance, coups, and excessive polarization, which hinder development and political stability. Tiago further argues that better governance structures, like those provided by parliamentary systems, are crucial for economic development. He emphasizes that parliamentary systems lead to greater political stability and more inclusive decision-making, essential for fostering long-term growth and escaping the "Malthusian Trap."
Tiago Ribeiro dos Santos has been a Brazilian career diplomat since 2007. He has a law degree from Pontifícia Universidade Católica in Rio de Janeiro, a professional degree from Instituto Rio Branco (Brazil’s national diplomatic academy), and a master’s degree from the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy. He is the author of the excellent book Why Not Parliamentarianism.
None of the opinions in the interview reflect the views of any institution he has been associated with - and you can find the full transcript of the conversation below.
Transcript
Tobi;
You're, I would say, a strong advocate of parliamentarianism. I wouldn't call myself a strong advocate, but I'm fairly biased towards your point of view and became even more convinced when I read your book. Particularly in Africa, a couple of countries went through long periods of military dictatorship. And around 20, 25 years ago, there came another wave of widespread democratisation on the continent. What happened was, maybe due to the influence of American foreign policy or some other global forces, a lot of these countries opted for the American-style presidential system. And in my own observation, maybe I'm wrong empirically, a lot of these countries, my country, Nigeria included, struggled with the workings of this presidential system, such that there had been constant agitation for a kind of return to the parliamentary system that Nigeria had immediately after independence. My question to you then is that, are you willing to say or assert that perhaps if a bunch of these countries around 20, 25 years ago had opted for parliamentary system, would they have done better development-wise?
Tiago;
I don't think anybody can say for sure, but I'm convinced that they would probably, very likely, had done better. With respect to Africa, I think, yes, there is a strong influence from the American model because it's obviously a very successful country. So it's very easy to model after them. But I think that there is something else also in the choice of presidentialism by African countries. I've read a paper by James Robinson and Ragnar Torvik that argues that there is a tendency for endogenous presidentialism, which is that exactly because in presidentialism the leader has more chances to exert their powers without much resistance. So back in the 60s, a bunch of countries in Africa, I think most of them, had a parliamentary constitution, not only Nigeria, but many other countries had a parliamentary constitution and basically all of them switched to presidentialism at some point. If you look at Botswana, the economic performance that they had since the 1960s is very impressive. I wish Brazil had the rate of growth that Botswana has been experiencing consistently. So looking at the countries in Africa that have adopted parliamentary constitution, I think that it would be the case, yes, that had these countries adopted a parliamentary constitution back when they democratised again, they would probably have done better.
Tobi;
I mean, Nigeria is so loud. that the word restructuring, which is a shorthand for reconstituting the political system, is so common in political parlance and, you know, we kept shouting restructuring, restructuring, and it never really comes to pass.
But given the ubiquity and the allure of presidentialism, at what point, particularly historically, did you become convinced enough to write this book about the superiority of parliamentary systems?
Tiago;
It wasn't something that particularly interested me during the first 40 years of my life, before writing the book. So I wrote a book on the economic effects of the Brazilian Constitution. So the idea was to make this research and check every article of the Constitution, what economic effects we could expect to have in Brazil with my then boss, Otaviano Canuto, in the Brazilian constituency in the Board of Directors of the World Bank. And one of the things that I started researching on was exactly the difference between presidentialism and parliamentarianism. And I started to find some striking results. This was too big to go into the article, so we don't mention it in the article that we published. We mentioned other aspects of the Brazilian constitution, but then I couldn't stop researching this. And I was always also checking myself, trying to push my good economist friends. I was trying to also get comments from many people that have thought about this problem very well and to check that I wasn't thinking something that was completely out of base. And I was increasingly convinced because of the feedback that I got, the continuation of my research, it was then when I combined all the elements that I think are in favour of parliamentarianism that if we just look at countries that are parliamentary or countries that are presidential, you see that parliamentary countries perform better in just about any indicator.
If you look at the history, if you look at the informal theory, if you look at formal theory from economics, if you look at the evidence that people try to do with studies that are not just correlational, but that introduced good statistical controls for things, If you look at complementary evidence from companies - so companies can adopt a parliamentary model, which is having a board of directors and this board of directors can control the CEO. And no company elects a CEO by the shareholders directly. And this CEO will have a checks and balances relationship with the board of directors. This figure doesn't exist. And I think the market is in a very good position to choose the best arrangement. And finally, the council management system in the U.S. that I learned when I was doing this research is a system that is very similar to parliamentarianism. And cities that adopt the council management system perform much better than cities that adopt a strong mayor system, which is similar to the presidential system.
Tobi;
So what are the key flaws that you mention in the book? Perhaps there's more now since you wrote the book. What are the key flaws in presidentialism that you think a parliamentary system addresses effectively?
Tiago;
We were discussing before you started recording. I don't try to be original in my book. I try only to convey the knowledge that's already there. And in this, the most influential thinker is by far Juan Linz, a political scientist. And I think that he has the best frame for this. And he talks about four main flaws in presidentialism that parliamentarians doesn't suffer from. So these flaws are in presidential countries, you don't have a clarity of where the authority lies. So what happens in the end is if you like the policy that Congress is trying to push, then you will stand on the side of Congress and if you like the policy that the president is trying to push, then you will stand on the side of the president. And there will be lots of undermining of initiatives by both the Congress and the president. They won't agree on many things and it will be difficult to have a coherent proposal. Daniel Diermeier has an article on this, on how parliamentary systems are more cohesive.
So the second thing I think is a big problem, also from Juan Linz, is the rigidity. So if a country is presidential and the president is working badly, there's nothing we can do. We just have to wait for the mandate to end. And if this is bad enough, if some sectors of society perceive this to be bad enough, you have often coups that derive from a perception that there's no way that the president can stay in place. And then a majority of the powerful actors in a society will install a coup. So that's why the prominence to coups in presidentialism is so much greater than in parliamentarianism.
Then you have a winner-take-all situation. So if you win the presidency, you have so much power that you will be able to implement so many things and you have almost complete control over so much of government. Whereas if you are the losing side of a presidential election, then you are out of government completely. So there's too much at stake. And this incentivises the kind of polarisation that we see in many presidential countries, a type of politics that is very visceral, that is very combative. That's not the kind of politics that we would hope for. And lastly, it's personalism. The presidential system focuses way too much on the figure of one person instead of different institutions in society, different sectors and different voices. And it's often the case that in many presidential countries, people don't love the candidate that they see. They would never support that candidate if not for the reason that they hate the other candidate that will have so much power. And then they try to minimize the flaws that they would never accept in a normal situation on the candidate they support. And this leads to a race to the bottom sometimes. So the personalism is a disastrous characteristic of presidentialism, too. So I think the Linz framework is still the best description.
Tobi;
Yeah. Two common pushbacks that I get when I try to discuss parliamentarian systems whether amongst friends and other people so i want you to help me respond to them is that first is the issue of capture of the political system. So most presidential system have what we call term limits. In Nigeria, in the U.S., and some other places, you say, oh, a president can only serve two fixed terms concurrently. And after that, it becomes unconstitutional. Even though some countries, their president have successfully overturned constitutional time limits to become de facto dictators. But, I mean, let's leave those aside. Whereas in parliamentary system, it's possible to have the same party, the same ruling coalition in government sometimes for decades, right? So what is the nuance between something like presidential term limits in the presidential system and the prospect of having the same, basically, the same government in power for decades? How do those two systems compare in that regard?
And the second pushback I get is stability. The recent case that comes to mind is the Netherlands, for example. They had an election recently where a controversial candidate and party basically won the election. But at the end of the day, it became impossible to form a government, which is what you don't get in a presidential system. The system is such that there is the emergence of a clear winner who then forms a government and then proceeds to govern. Whereas in some parliamentary systems, in some cases, you can have this persistent chaos for a while, like in the UK now where they've had at least three prime ministers in about six years. So those two push back, how do you respond?
Tiago;
With respect to the first, I think there's a strong consensus in political science that term limits actually are a negative quality for an institutional system, because if you recall in the book, I discuss a model by Persson and Tabellini, two economists that studied this question. And they are the only model that I know of. For the only model that thinks that presidentialism is superior to parliamentarianism, one of the most important characteristics is that there are no term limits. Because the idea is that if there are term limits, then a president will try to grab everything that he can before he loses power. Or try to stay in power forever by demolishing the democracy completely. Because he knows that he will never get a chance to be in power once again.
Whereas in the parliamentary system, there is no ending to what he can do. He can stay in Congress, in Parliament, for as long as the people want him there or her there. So what I would say is that even though there are some countries where you see that happening, that some parties stay in power for decades, they are pretty rare. It's not a very common situation in parliamentarianism. And one thing that I stress in the book is that you cannot expect there to be a guarantee that it will be better, you just have to have an expectation that it will be better. So you have Japan, you have Botswana, they are countries that have parties that stay in power for long. You see that even though these parties stayed in power for long, there was not that much repression of the opposition. And in many cases, at some point, the opposition did win an election.
Whereas in presidentialism, you also have cases where parties have remained in power for very long, like in Mexico. So this particular problem that you point to, I don't think presidentialism solves. And the other thing is that sometimes for the opposition to gain power, they subvert completely the regime. They change the constitution. They get into power by force. So even though there was a change in power, it wasn't a desirable one. So for that, I think one of the advantages of parliamentarianism is exactly that it doesn't need to have term limits because any presidential country will have term limits, at least on the president. Because if you do not have term limits on the president, the chances that they will stay in power, be reelected indefinitely, and thereby destroying the democracy are very high.
So since it was invented, presidentialism, you have that problem. With respect to stability, I think that we need to look to what kind of stability that we want. So I think that presidentialism has an illusory stability often. Because you have the very clear legal mandate for the president and the president has a very clear legal mandate to name whoever he wants to government. And of course, one person will always be able to name a cabinet. You have the illusion that there is a functioning government. But this functioning government will be very often completely disconnected from the true forces of society that want to move in a different direction. Whereas in parliamentary governments when there is disconnect, when there is this fight, it becomes apparent and sometimes you have shuffling of cabinets, very frequent. Sometimes they are not frequent at all. You can have Angela Merkel in Germany that stayed in power for some 20 years, and then she left like nothing happened. It was a very smooth transition. And so parliamentary has this flexibility. If something is working, then they stay in power for very long. If something is not working, they don't stay in power.
And you mentioned the Netherlands. I don't know about the Dutch situation right now, but I recall that Belgium also was without a government for a while. And when we say without a government, we really mean without a cabinet. It's not that there is no government in Belgium. They're still doing all the things. There's still police, there's still courts, there's still schools. So I think that if there is not enough consensus in a society, then not having a cabinet pushing for policies might be a good thing. And if you look at the Netherlands right now, I don't think it's chaos, right? I think it works very well, as Belgium did, still worked very well, even when it didn't have a cabinet. If you look at the Netherlands is one of the most successful societies in history and is still one of the most successful societies right now. So I would never describe their situation as chaos. So what I would say is that, well, if we have to deal with situations where there's no cabinets, then fine. I'm not as bothered by that as I am by a lack of basic sanitation or a lack of economic growth or a lack of health services or a lack of safety in streets, that sort of thing, which presidential countries have much less than the Netherlands.
Tobi;
I would like to stretch that point a little bit. So perhaps it's a good thing that the Netherlands has a parliamentary system and that they are in their current equilibrium because the party that won the election and the individual vying to be prime minister is controversial, is internationally disliked and has some positions that are quite disagreeable. But it's also easy to imagine the opposite. where his party his platform his ideas and his policies might actually turn out to be excellent for the country and for the region and perhaps influential enough for the world but here you are in a system that prevents that person from getting to power. So i'm trying to gauge how earlier, many three systems respond to the good leader, bad leader argument because some would say one of the strengths of the presidential system is if you're lucky enough to get a good leader, he or she can then use all that power, all that legitimacy to then drive transformation and growth and all the good things to the maximum and transform the country within a few years.
What's your response to that?
Tiago;
First of all, I don't think countries have been lucky enough that we would still bet on that. If we look at the history of presidential systems, the evidence shows very clearly that this hope for a very good leader, it's like playing the lotto, I think. The chances are very small. And I think that even if you had a person that had all the vision and the capacity to implement very good policies, if he doesn't command enough support in his society, there will be sabotaging, there will be opposition, there will be people that have capacity to interfere with society, trying to undermine his efforts. Even with this great leader, you wouldn't have the great outcomes that one would expect. So I think the crucial thing, and I think it's central to democracy, is exactly that there is a wide consensus. The thing is that presidential elections do not create wide consensus. They create two rival candidates, two rival sides, and then at the end of the day, one of them wins. And this goes to late[r] part [of the book], which stressed the importance of consensus, the capacity to take into consideration the interests of different sectors of society at once. So this is why I still like parliamentarianism better.
Tobi;
So for the benefits of people that haven't read the book, I'll go through perhaps a few more questions that you should explicate on before I go into what actually interests me, which is how you then relate your argument on parliamentary systems to development or economic development more broadly. So one thing I also want you to clear up is you talked about corporate governance and how they are better under parliamentary system. Can you elaborate on that a bit?
Tiago;
So corporate governance, we usually think of governments and companies as completely different walks of life, completely different situations. But in fact, they are not. So governance is not a word that came about by chance. It does come from the same principles. And when you look at how boards make decisions, they use something called parliamentary procedure. They use some books like Robert's Rules of Order, which is taken by, I think it was a colonel, it was someone in the military that was very frustrated by how meetings were being used and then he used exactly the sort of decision that was being taken in the United States Congress to take these decisions. And we see, I forgot the name of the author right now, but this book, Shareholder Democracies, he explains how the modern public company takes a lot of how it's governed from the evolution of government, particularly because there was a time that the modern company was started in England.
And there was a time when you would need to have authorisation by the government to create one of them. And then the board members would be often people from government as well. So there was this very intense relationship and this very intense exchange of methods of approaches to problems. And then they had tried many things, many approaches, boards with lots of members, boards with very few members and all sorts of ideas until they ended up with the model that is replicated in basically every public company that we have now, which is the shareholders elect a board of directors, the number may vary, and this board will choose the management of the company, particularly the CEO, which will be kind of like the prime minister, but maybe different from the UK, because in the UK, the prime minister must be from parliament. But in the Netherlands, for example, it doesn't have to. But the board elects the CEO and then they can fire the CEO at any time as well. So this is something that allows for a much more efficient handling of the affairs of the company than the situation where you would have the shareholders elect the CEO themselves. I wrote to one of these authors about this parallel, and he thought it was perfectly applicable… “And yes, yes, I completely understand what you're saying about the presidentialism.” He couldn't think that it had ever been tried by any company, the exact presidential system. One thing that was tried is the shareholders choosing some people in management already. And this didn't work. So I think that this is very strong evidence for that because markets, they have the greatest incentive to perfect their governance systems.
Tobi;
What is the attenuation bias and how does this bias feed into our common understanding of presidential and parliamentary systems?
Tiago;
So attenuation bias is something that I put in there because when I was discussing this during the process of writing the book, I got a lot of pushback by people. And recently I also had one pushback by people saying, well, but it's hard to classify countries in presidential or parliamentary forms because there are many types of intermediate situations. So you have semi-presidential countries in Africa. We have lots of semi-presidential countries where the president has power, but the prime minister does have power too. So there is this combination where not everyone agrees about which countries should be considered parliamentary or presidential. And also many other political scientists first need to decide if a country is a democracy or not and then classify it as presidential or parliamentary, because they say if it's not a democracy, then it doesn't matter what the Constitution says. The dictatorship can do anything it wants. The Constitution doesn't have any bite.
I disagree with that view. I think that constitutions matter even in situations where you don't have a full democracy. But in any case, people would be saying that this would make the results in terms of stability, political stability, in terms of economic growth, less strong. And then I argue the exact opposite, which is the attenuation bias is the mathematical fact that when you have noise in the explanatory variable, the effect that you see will be smaller than the real effect. Whereas if you have noise in the explained variable, the dependent variable, there's less precision, but the size of the effect is in expectation the same as the real effect. So what I argue is that, yes, there are debates about what countries are parliamentary, what countries are presidential. And if this is hard to classify, then we should expect the effects to be even larger. Many people criticize academics and scholars that raise the issue of attenuation bias because people often raise the issue of attenuation bias even before they convincingly demonstrate that there is a relationship in the first place. But I think that at the point where I make the point about attenuation bias in the page that I make that, I think that I was able to demonstrate that the relationship does exist. So if it does exist and we do have difficulty classifying countries in parliamentary or presidential, then we should have attenuation bias and we should expect the effects to be even larger.
Tobi;
I would say how your research, your writing, your argument does relate to economic development, or maybe development for shorthand, is what I found most interesting in your book and most relevant to my passion. Because I don't know if you caught this yesterday, Jishnu Das, I don't know if I'm saying that correctly, wrote an essay titled, let me quickly check, "Did Development Economics Lose Its Moral Compass?" Yeah, you're not making similar arguments, but how I see them connected is the fact that development, the field or the development industry has more or less given up on governance. And now everybody is obsessed with whatever tiny interventions you can make that get people from $1.90 to $2.90, and then we can sing hallelujah that we've ended poverty. Whereas I, and I imagine yourself and some other people that we both admire, like Lant Pritchett, are interested in changes that we can make in Nigeria, in Chad, in Ethiopia, that can get those countries to middle-income status and possibly greater than that. So how do you see the relationship between economic development and the system of governance or the political system generally? How does this tie in your head when you were writing the book?
Tiago;
Okay, so I think that in theory, we should expect this to happen. When we look at the institutional school of economics, they say that the central aspect for growth is institutions. So you go back to Douglas North, you go to Acemoglu and Roderick and those people, and Douglas North in particular. Not all institutionalism put the emphasis that North puts on parliament and he puts because he sees that as protecting property rights, specifically. And I think he goes for too narrow an approach. But if you look at the consensus that there is around institutions being central to economic development, and the consensus that there is in political science that parliamentarism is central for political stability, and if you just connect the dots and say, well, political stability must be important for institutions to work well, right? If you just connect these dots and think that also, if institutions are key and a country doesn't even have political stability, will it have capacity, which is something that Pritchett talks about too, about state capacity for many other things. So if it isn't even able to have stability, will it have the capacity for development to be promoted? And I think not.
And then, going back to Pritchett once again, one thing that I talk about in the book is the Pritchett test. I learned this from Paul Romer in a blog post. He mentions that urbanization passes the Pritchett test. And this is a series of requirements that don't seem to be very stringent, but that Pritchett proposes that any policy that you say will have development should pass this test. And this was relating to the frustration that you were talking about that you have and that I share. And I think that he is the person that talks about this best, which is we are promoting very modest, very unambitious proposals that we don't think would possibly have an effect. And then the test is this. In a cross-sectional comparison of levels, do countries that are more developed have more X? And this is easy. I showed this in the beginning of the book, that parliamentarism does have many more developed countries than presidentialism. There are much fewer presidential countries that are rich or developing in any way.
And then he goes in a cross-sectional comparison of growth rates. Do countries that have rapid growth also tend to experience a rapid increase in standards of living? And I present evidence that we do have that. In my blog, I have a post on how parliamentarism passes the Pritchett test. When we look at the few countries for which we have long historical records, do the ones that become much more developed also acquire much more access? And then we see, this is very interesting, that it's exactly in the two countries that first parliamentarize in Europe that we see the end of the Malthusian Trap, the escape from the Malthusian Trap. So it's the Netherlands and the UK, in England. And then this parliamentarianism spreads around Europe and then Europe itself becomes much richer. A very parliamentary tradition establishes in the U.S., so we tend to think of the U.S. as much less parliamentary than it really is. And you have Canada, you have Australia, you have New Zealand, they are countries that for more than 200 years have had this sort of constitution and also have done very well.
And lastly, if we look for countries that switch from a regime of slow economic development to a regime of rapid development, we see a prior shift. So this is for us to think of this just conceptually. And then we have some studies that show a very strong connection of growth and parliamentarianism. So we have Gehring and other authors from 2009 that shows stronger growth in parliamentarianism. And we have one specific study by Richard McManus and Ozkan from 2019 that shows much stronger growth in parliamentary countries from 0.6 to 1.2 percentage points per year, which is huge. And it would explain a country being developed. If a country did grow 1.2 percentage points per year in its per capita GDP, it would become developed over time, of course, but it would be enough. So that's why I think that the connection between parliamentarianism and development is very strong.
Tobi;
I guess what I'm trying to get a sense of from you, you're a career diplomat, you've been in some of the rooms where some of these decisions are made, what has become so broken about development in general that we've stopped being ambitious in the sense that trying to change your political system can actually get you more benefits development-wise than whatever tiny little cash transfer you're doing in whatever village in Kenya or Nigeria or… how did development become so unambitious?
Because one of the points you touched on in the book is this fallacy of having tried everything, you know, and, oh, so this is what we have… because the state of particularly development economics for me, the state of things are so terrible in my view. The so-called evidence landscape has become so broad that you can find evidence for anything. For example, if I'm the president or the chairman of a local government in Nigeria and I choose to not fix the road, for example, or choose not to build a power station, I would rather take a fraction of that money and do a cash transfer program. I will find evidence and possibly researchers that will tell me that that is a good thing. So how did development become unambitious from your vantage point?
Tiago;
I think that's hard. That's something that I will speak with, but without as much conviction as the other things that I'm saying here. But I think there are some different processes going on. One is the idea that there have been some, we haven't tried everything, but we have tried some things. And these things, these specific things that we've tried, the big push theory and some other things like that, did not work out as expected. And then there was this too quick giving up on trying other things. I think there is a fear of being perceived as a failure on part of policymakers, so they would rather be unambitious than being perceived as a failure. And I think that has been married to an academic predilection for precision. So academics are more preoccupied by doing the randomised trial and getting the precise estimate of the effect of something. And then they only care about it being significant in the statistical sense and not on the practical sense. “Oh, this is statistically significant. It makes a difference. Then let's do this.” So I think that these two tendencies have worked.
And lastly, one thing that hopefully I'm not being too centered in parliamentarianism, I think that the fact that we have forgotten key benefits of parliamentarianism has made us look basically anywhere else instead of here and this has consequences because I think that a society that does not have the correct, the best institutions for it to develop will have a very hard time and then any policy that is tried will be perceived as a failure because they don't have the conditions that allow the society to really develop.
Tobi;
I don't want to dump all my frustration about development on you. So let me move on from that.
So practically speaking, now, suppose you get a few elites, leaders in your country that are ambitious and courageous enough to want to make a change from a dysfunctional presidential system to the parliamentary one. What are the useful key elements steps that can be started without tearing their political system apart? Because a lot of the fear also comes from not causing too much political turmoil or alienate an influential group that can then go ahead and form chaos in society. So what are the useful first steps you can take towards parliamentary governance?
Tiago;
So I talk a little about in the book what one can do. And as I said on the last part, these are things that I'm not as sure as I am that parliamentarianism is better. On the how we implement it, I have much more doubts, but I still have some suggestions. And I think that we should try to make the proposal of parliamentarianism similar to the proposal for democracy. Because when you ask for more democracy in a country, it's very rare that anybody will push back. “Oh, this will rock the boat here. Our country doesn't have a strong tradition of democracy, so we should just keep without tradition.” These are not arguments that are accepted by someone that's promoting democracy. They say, “no, no, this is a better situation because this will be able to really convey it the will of the people, so it's not a matter of tradition or not.” So what I would do is try to make this conversation within academic circles, with journalists, with policy makers, and that type of person, because I think the things that do get implemented, they are downstream from these people. I don't know if you read the Stefan Dercon book, Gambling on Development?
Tobi;
Yes, he was also a guest.
Tiago;
He was a guest too?
Tobi;
Yeah.
Tiago;
Oh, that's great. I’m in very good company. So he talks about the importance of an elite bargain for a country to find development. In this sense, I would mention the book to convey the importance of trying to convey this through the elite. I don't think it's as disruptive as we make it to be, because if you think about it, think the issue with presidentialism, the winner-take-all. In the winner-take-all, it means that for a presidential candidate that loses the election, it might very well be the case that losing the election has more negative consequences for them than actually switching to the parliamentary system. So he will expect to have a better participation in the political system of his country if they switch than if he loses the election. And I think this is very true. And I see politicians in many countries are favorable to parliamentarianism. In my country, I see that the politicians are the easiest class to convince. I think that because they live it, they know how dysfunctional presidentialism is, and because they perceive that they would themselves benefit. So they are the easiest class. I think that the journalists and the academics in many of these countries are much harder to convince.
In Brazil, it's definitely the case that this happens. So even though there is this strong consensus regarding the superiority of parliamentarianism in political science in the US and in Europe. In Brazil, we don't see anything like that. The political scientists in Brazil are very skeptical of Linz and other authors and there's specifically a Brazilian scholar that's very influential that tries to undermine Linz's arguments. I think that he doesn't do it satisfactorily. But this is how I would do it. And then, I don't know, I think that we should try to do the things that we do for other causes that we see. So climate change, what do people do for climate change when they try to fight climate change? They create think tanks, they create campaigns online, that sort of thing. That's what I miss.
Tobi;
So, I mean, if you look at the world today, especially the trend in global politics with the rise of populism, nationalism, trade wars, the state of global governance generally at institutions like the UN and the prospects of cooperation between the EU, the US, China, Russia, and what is called multi-polarity generally, do you think that parliamentary systems put global diplomacy on a better, steady footing?
Tiago;
I definitely do, yes. And this makes me sound like, oh, I think it's a panacea. It's a problem solver for all things. And anticipating that, I would argue that it's actually presidentialism, personalism is really bad. And when something is really bad, it can harm you in every area of your life. So parliamentarianism solves the problems that presidentialism causes. And with respect to diplomacy, we see that the democratic peace theory is one of the most, I think, the single most established empirical fact in international relations, that democracies don't fight each other. And there are some attempts at trying to make this look not as solid as it is, but it's widely perceived as the most important empirical fact in international relations. And if we think that parliamentarism is so central for democracy, for the democracy level, for democracy duration, then I think that it becomes very clear that parliamentarism will have this effect.
And I think of a book written by Chris Blattman, a professor at UChicago [University of Chicago], Why We Fight. And then he explains the few reasons why countries will fight, because he argues very convincingly that conflict is much rarer than we try to make it to be because the news cycle is so prone to publishing on conflict. But conflict is rare. And then there are several failures that are related to countries fighting. And many of them relate to a country being presidential. So one of the failures is that the government does not reflect enough the will of the people. So the utility function, more or less, the interests that the government is taking into account is not the interests of the population as a whole. So it may make sense for the government to fight a war, even though it will be disastrous for it’s own people. And parliamentarianism is supposed to better convey the interests of the people of a country into government much better than presidentialism does. So this is just one example. And just a better functioning government also will help in diplomacy.
Tobi;
I'm curious, as a way of steel manning your argument, what is the one critique of parliamentary systems that you find persuasive?
Tiago;
Many people ask me that. I have a hard time thinking of something. So the one thing I really think is that it's very counterintuitive. It's something that people just have a very hard time accepting that might be true. People would like to have a good leader and they would like presidentialism to work. So it's very unpopular. It's very hard to convince people that this is indeed the case. I think that it's a lot like, I don't know, like markets in general. I think that people are suspicious of markets in general when they shouldn't be. And I think that parliamentarianism has this flaw. But on a performance level, I really can't think of anything. I know this makes me look like more of a radical than not. But I've looked for it and I couldn't find it.
Tobi;
Final question. This is also a bit of a tradition on the podcast. By the way, you're not allowed to say parliamentarianism. What's the one idea that you would like to see spread everywhere? It might be your idea. It might be from something else. It might be from someone else. What's that one idea you like to see spread around the world? You like to see people get passionate about?
Tiago;
Opening borders. That's one thing that I think would have a huge effect.
Tobi;
So you're very much a card-carrying member of the open borders movement.
Tiago;
I am. I think that, yes, as I said, I'm a fan of Pritchett and others too, Bryan Caplan, Alex Nowrsteh. There are many people, Michael Clemens, there are many people that are working on this. The economic effects of opening borders would be just transformative, double GDP, according to the Clemens estimate. And that would happen exactly by helping the people that are the poorest. So it would also have a great distribution effect. So I think that it's a policy that I would definitely like to see being more discussed on high levels.
Tobi;
Thank you so much, Tiago Ribeiro Santos, for talking to me. It's been wonderful.
Tiago;
I thank you, Tobi, for the opportunity to talk about these ideas and congratulations on your work. And let's hope for more ambitious developing ideas.
Tobi;
Yeah, thank you.
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In this episode, Tobi talks to David Pilling, Africa editor for the Financial Times. They discussed his book "The Growth Delusion", exploring the significance and limitations of economic growth, particularly in poor countries. David challenges the conventional reliance on GDP to measure economic success, proposing a more nuanced approach that considers wealth distribution, environmental impacts, and overall well-being. He argues for a balanced view that recognises the necessity of growth for development while advocating for policies that prioritise human and environmental health. The conversation also touches on broader development issues in Africa, including the misuse of resources and the political challenges hindering effective governance and equitable progress.
The transcript of the conversation is below, and many thanks to David for coming on the podcast.
Tobi;
This is Ideas Untrapped podcast, of course, and my guest today doesn't need much of an introduction, anybody who reads the Financial Times knows David Pilling. He is currently the Africa editor of the Financial Times newspaper, he used to be the former Asia editor of the newspaper, and he has written many fantastic columns and essays covering a wide range of subjects. And recently he's been writing a lot about Africa, especially stories on development and other related matters. It's a pleasure to welcome David Pilling today.
Welcome, David.
David;
Thank you so much. It's a pleasure to be here.
Tobi;
I want to talk about your book for a bit and one question that keeps popping into my mind as I kept reading, that was a couple of months back last year, the general tone of the book, which is called The Growth Illusion was, you know, one of skepticism, right?Also, the impression that jumps at me from reading your economics-focused stories about Africa is that growth is important. So has your work in Africa forced you a bit to reconsider some of the positions you take in the book?
David;
Yes and no. I mean, the book never said growth isn't important. It is called The Growth Delusion. It's true. And that is a, you know, deliberately, I suppose, provocative title to some extent modelled after The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins. So it was a kind of an echo of that. So, yes, you're right. It was a sceptical title and journalists ought to be sceptical. And what I was doing was I was prodding at the concept of growth, what it is that we measure, how we measure an economy's success.
What I was not saying is that growth is not important. And I think growth is particularly important for poor countries. You know, we can put richer countries aside for one second, but in a poor country where there are not enough resources for people to have what Amartya Sen, the Nobel winning economist, calls sort of what we now know as agency, really. You know, choices over their lives, where they live, what work they do. And those choices can be denied by very simple things. Lack of food, lack of a roof over your head, lack of work, lack of safety and security. Unless those things are satisfied, then I believe that people aren't able to live their full potential. And for that, you need an economy that's firing at a certain level. In other words, you need to go from an economy that isn't firing to one that is. Then, of course, many other things need to happen, including the wealth that is therefore generated to be, you know, relatively equitably shared, for people have to have access to economic opportunities.
But my book was never saying, you know, growth is bad. We need degrowth, which I know is a trend of thought out there. But my book, despite the title, was really looking at other things, which I'm happy to go into if you'd like more of a discussion. But just to make it clear, I was absolutely not saying that if you have an economy where people lack what I would consider the absolute sort of basic minimum to live a fulfilled life, you know, those economies absolutely need to grow and they need to grow fast as the experience of Asia shows with the rapid growth in places like China, which has transformed hundreds of millions of people's lives and opportunities.
Just occurs to me that what just happened, you know, the power going out is in a sense a tiny example of what I'm talking about. You know, there you are making a podcast that you want to be a world class podcast and it's interrupted. I mean, in the end, it's not such a big deal and we are able to carry on. But it's just a little window into, you know, if Nigeria had a decent power system. then you and millions, in fact, tens of millions of other people would have much easier lives, would have much higher productivity, would be able to worry about other stuff. I mean worry in a good way. And, you know, we could call a better power station growth or a better power system, if you want. The money, the resources, the expertise, the systems to produce a good power system for all Nigerians so that all Nigerians can just rely on it and forget about the lights ever going out will make an enormous difference to people's lives. We can call that growth. And so I'm not against growth. I'm for growth.
Tobi;
Especially for the benefit of listeners who haven't read the book that perhaps I didn't frame that first question very well. The book not in any way suggested that growth is bad. And, of course, I urge everyone to read. It's a fantastic book. So what I'm trying to get at is there seems to be a big debate, even in the subfield of development in economics, about the appropriate measure for growth. The measure that best captures what makes a difference in people's lives, what people value, and you do a little bit of that also in the book, particularly in your discussion around GDP. So please just walk me through the history of the GDP, your critique of it, where it falls short, and what are the things, what are the other dimensions of well-being that it doesn't capture, and why is the field or policy reluctant to expand what we mean by growth?
David;
Yes. Okay. That's this very big subject when I wrote 250 pages on it. But let me try to encapsulate a few things. So GDP was invented, if I remember right, invented is probably the right word, in the 1930s, 40s by a guy called Simon Kuznets. And the aim, in a sense, was trying to encapsulate what was happening to an economy. And as hard as it is to believe before the invention of GDP, which really sort of measures all the products and services that an economy produces in a given period, before that invention, a single number to encapsulate what an economy is doing, there was no such number. So you could say, well, things feel good, people have work, the stock market is going up, there seems to be a lot of delivery of coal or whatever.
But there was no single number that said, you know, GDP is this and it grew by this. So the first thing to acknowledge, I think, is that this is a very clever number and it's an important number. And if you only have one number, it maybe is even the best one. Although somebody said in Mozambique, a finance minister, that he used to watch the May Day Parade and he judged the quality of people's shoes. And if people were wearing decent shoes, then he thought things were getting better. And if they weren't, he thought things were getting worse. But clearly, that's a very crude measure. So GDP, I'm saying, is not a bad measure, but it misses an awful lot and it distorts an awful lot. Let me give you a few examples. So the first thing to know about what we call growth, what we call GDP, is that it's a measure of what you might call flow. It measures what an economy produces, let's say, every year. It doesn't tell you anything about the wealth, which is the assets of that economy.
So let's take Nigeria as you're in Nigeria. If you take oil, which is an asset, and you take it out of the ground, you can turn that into GDP, into a flow of wealth. But eventually that oil is going to run out. So if you keep just taking out oil, selling it, spending it, take it out, sell it, spend it, eventually you've got no oil and you've got no money. And you could argue that maybe that's in part what Nigeria has been doing. The best thing to do with wealth like natural capital as it's called, is you turn that into other forms of capital. So you turn it into productive capital, which means infrastructure. So you'd build with those billions of dollars that have come out of the ground in Nigeria, a world class health system, world class transport, world class airports, world class universities, and you'd build human capital. Some of the same things with healthy, well-educated people who can then go on when your oil has run out and do many other things.
Now, it doesn't take a genius to work out that Nigeria hasn't done particularly well in that. Of course, there are brilliantly educated Nigerians and there are some lucky Nigerians in the elites that have access to good healthcare and good education, but often outside the system, sometimes indeed outside Nigeria. But what I would argue that Nigeria and many other countries have failed to do is to move that wealth into different sorts of wealth that will produce GDP again going forward. Because otherwise what your GDP has measured is a kind of a one shot. We took oil, we sold it, it's gone. So that's the first important thing about GDP is it's a flow, it's not the wealth.
Let me give you another example, and this moves into the environment. If you have a forest from the perspective of GDP, the absolute best thing you can do with that forest is chop it down as quickly possible and turn it into something else like a table. Turn your wood into a table or burn it or do something to produce energy or goods that you can sell and forget the forest. The forest is worth zero as far as GDP is concerned. But of course, the forest has its own value and once the forest is gone, it's gone. And our measures of economic progress take no account at all of the environment around us that I would argue has been a perverse incentive that has enabled us to think that we're doing extremely well producing all this growth, all this economic activity, but forgetting that there's a cost to that, which is the environment that we've been ransacking and polluting and degradating. And that can come back to bite us as we're seeing in global heating and in all sorts of other ways. Let me go to just a third thing and then I'll stop. So you can produce GDP and for all its limitations, it does tell you an awful lot. If you're growing at 10% a year, your economy is doing well, as China found out. China grew at 10% a year for 30 years, more or less and it transformed China from a poor country to a middle income one. However, how you distribute that income is also very important. There's a joke that economists tell, which I think is in the book, about Bill Gates, who walks into a bar. On average, everybody in the bar is a billionaire. But of course, the averages don't tell you anything. So you could have very fast growth in an economy.
Let's take Equatorial Guinea [which] grew very fast on the back of oil but most of the population continues to live in poverty. There's really been no attempt to spread that wealth. So no attempt to reinvest that wealth in the health and education that will produce more wealth, like science and development and all of that that will produce more wealth going forward. And also very little attempt to spread it equitably. So again, GDP doesn't tell you really much about that. And so these are three, I would say, fundamental limitations and fundamental different ways that we need to think about, you know, what is it that we're producing? If you say an economy is growing at 10% a year or 0% a year, what lies underneath those numbers? And what are they telling us about how people are living in those countries and the opportunities they have, which after all is the objective of growth. We don't want growth for its own sake, that's pointless. What we ought to want, I think, is to improve people's lives and opportunities. That's what we should be really measuring. And growth tells you part of the story, GDP tells you part of the story, but certainly not the whole thing.
Tobi;
These are important things you've raised. It's an important critique. I would not say that a lot of people who work on policy or who study these things are not aware of some of these things and the illusion of averages around GDP and what it captures, what it doesn't. My question then is, isn't this more of a critique of the politics or should I say the priority of the political class of a particular country as opposed to a critique of the measure itself, because the limitations are well known and how it falls short is known. So if you then persist with this measure that you know does not quite capture the wealth of the country, does not tell you anything about how income is distributed in the country, it does not tell you how much you are destroying the environment, and thus possibly future growth of the country, isn't that then a political problem?
David;
Yes, a very astute observation. Martin Wolf, a very sort of gifted, a brilliant, actually, economist at the FT, in a sense thinks my book is nonsense. I mean, I don't think he would go quite that far, but he would say, look, the problem isn't the measure. The problem is what you do with it. And to some extent, I absolutely agree with that. However, I do think that what you measure in a sense is what you get. If you set up, you know, we want the economy to grow by X amount, let's say, and you're going to be judged by that politically and to some extent you'll miss out on the other things, let's say the impact on carbon emissions, which clearly we have missed for 150 years. I mean, it's not as though we've managed to do both at the same time. We have missed this.
Now, in the end, you're absolutely right. It's a political decision. But I think if you took a political decision that we're going to do things slightly differently, you would probably want to measure different things as well. A lot of these things are measured, actually. If you go to the Office of Statistics in Britain, you'll find that they measure a ton of what I'm talking about. So I'm not after alternative measures or fancy indexes or whatever. In a sense, I'm after slightly different political priorities. So in a rich country, for example, I mean, even in a poor country, it doesn't really matter. You know one thing you might target is life expectancy. Not just life expectancy, I would argue, but healthy life expectancy.
So you might say, look, we think that it's reasonable in a country of our wealth and prosperity for people to live on average, and clearly it's going to be an average, 75 healthy years. And sure, the last couple of years, they're going to be unhealthy. That's just nature. And that's just what happens. But we're going to aim for 75 healthy years. And if that became your political target, lots of other things might change. You might start pumping more money into your health sector. You might start thinking more about primary health care, about preventative medicine, all sorts of things. Because you've tilted what you're measuring and your priorities, as it were, you then begin to tilt how you organise this.
And again, look at Nigeria. I'm bringing it back to Nigeria. If you take the GDP per capita of Nigeria and the GDP per capita of Ghana, I know this is a tetchy, tetchy subject to compare these two countries.
Tobi;
Go ahead.
David;
You know, I think I'm right in saying that the life expectancy of Nigerians on average is 11 years lower than Ghana. So I would say, well, what on earth is happening there? What does that tell you about the priorities of successive Nigerian governments? Now, it's obviously true, tweaking your measure here and there is not going to solve that. I think the life expectancy on average is 54. A lot of that will be because of very high child mortality. So a lot of kids not making it until the age of five. So, you know, you could have a government that says, right, by the end of our term, we're going to raise that to 60 as a start. A big country like Nigeria with all this oil wealth, this incredible talent pool, and anybody who goes to Nigeria knows that, you know, with doctors and nurses who, unfortunately, are all around the world helping other people. We can pull ourselves together and push life expectancy, let's say, to 60 as a starting point, not as a final point. And you could see then government policies shifting potentially in that direction.
So you can kind of see that measurements can lead to policy changes. Maybe they just focus the mind or maybe they're just a shared ambition. The public and the politicians who have entered into a contract, which is what an election is, “we’ll vote for you on the basis that you'll try and do A, B and C. If we don't like you, we'll kick you out.” That's kind of a highly crude definition of democracy. So you can see, potentially, you might say I'm being idealist or unrealistic, or maybe I am, but you can see how that could work as a guiding principle. So how you leave the confines of GDP to push another priority right up your list of what you're going to do politically, and then you're judged against that. That's where politics and measurement kind of meets.
Tobi;
With due respect to my Ghanaian brothers and sisters, there might also be a little bit of statistics going on there because the life expectancy in some parts of Nigeria may actually be higher than Ghana because Nigeria is quite a big area. But your answer, let me pull you into another debate from that answer, which is income versus, should I say, the rest of other measures of well-being. As you've written about, you're familiar with the SDGs and the predecessor - Millennium Development Goals. And I've had guests on the show, maybe someone like Andrew Nevin, who would say that poor countries can do better with alternative measures like what you have on the SDGs, zero hunger, this and that, as opposed to the annual churning out of GDP statistics.
But a different class of economists or thinkers will tell you that what really makes a difference is for the income of the population to grow and that higher income is highly correlated with all of these things that you say, including life expectancy. If you have more money, you will be able to eat better, afford better quality care, and your life expectancy will go up. It also pulls into what some in the economic subdiscipline and some global charities have been doing, which is interventions - deworming, cash transfers, bed nets, and so many ways that they measure that. But again, some economists will insist that, yes, you can do that and it's not a bad thing to do. But if you have the policies that are able, like you mentioned the example of China and some other countries that have been able to transform radically in just decades, South Korea is a fantastic example, then all this other things that we use as a critique of economic statistics become irrelevant once the majority of the population are able to increase their average income. So what's your reaction to that?
David;
Well, I agree with when you were saying there's some economists. So the second half. So if you have to choose between however many SDGs there are, all these different multiple complicated targets versus let's increase the income of each of our people. I'm definitely on the latter side. And in that sense, income, I think, is absolutely key. You'll find a curve when people go from a couple of thousand dollars per capita income towards 15,000, 20,000, things get better along that curve. Of course, you can blow it. You can have terrible policies. But assuming that you have reasonable policies and reasonably equitable distribution of that income, then there's a pretty good correlation. And you're absolutely right. You will move up that curve. Your health will get better. Your opportunities will get better. Your education will get better. Probably you'll have fewer kids. You'll put more money into each of those kids. They'll do better, et cetera, et cetera. And you'll get into an upward spiral. And in that sense, you're absolutely right. Yeah, then, you know, your bed nets become irrelevant because you've got middle income, educated people who know what they need to do and besides, you probably don't have stagnant pools of water. And besides, you probably have enough money to have a mosquito eradication thing. And, you know, a well-organised policy, which is producing that kind of growth is likely to, in a sense, be kind of self-fulfilling.
So absolutely. In that sense, I don't have a beef at all with income as a measure of the potential to improve people's lives. And I think I can hold the two ideas in my head simultaneously. I think I can prod the measure of GDP, particularly, I would argue, or wealthier countries, as well as saying it's probably the best measure, particularly as you go from the poverty, let's say, of a country like, it's invidious in a sense to name countries, but let's say Democratic Republic of Congo, you know, up through middle income, you know, your kind of Malaysias or whatever, there you'll find that rising income. And I keep saying, reasonably, equitably shared among the population, which is important, of course, then that will have your number one transformative effect. I have no argument with that at all.
Tobi;
Maybe I've been, I don't know, unfair to you by putting your book in the context of poorer countries, because certainly that wasn't the primary cohort of the analysis of the book. So, I mean, you talked about healthcare. You cited the American example, which was such a big, big, big talking point until Obamacare, and it still continues to be. For example, if you compare the American healthcare system with the Canadian healthcare system, and I know so many public policy analysts and other forms of thinkers look at Canada and say, oh, that's what we should be when they talk about America. But there are lots of Canadians and other people from countries with fantastic healthcare system who wants to move to America, who would move to the United States in an instant. So, again, does that tell you that a lot of these things that we worry about is not what people care about on average?
David;
Well, this is a very different question, I think. I mean, look, the American health care system, I would call inefficient, unequal and at its best, excellent. And it can be all of those things. So if you're a wealthy American or if you're an American with good health insurance, you probably have among the best health care systems in the world. The problem is if you're not wealthy, you don't have good insurance, then you have a pretty average, even a bad health system. The Canadian health system is probably more equal and certainly more efficient. The Americans also spend too much money for what they get. So they spend, I think, 20% of a very big GDP per capita on healthcare or of their entire GDP on healthcare. And that's quite inefficient. A lot of that is kind of litigation, it's profits, it's insurance and all of that. So it works for a good proportion of the population. As I say, if you're middle class, upper middle class, you probably have the best or among the best health care systems in the world. And that will figure in all sorts of things. Healthy life expectancy, for example, a very crude measure, but worth looking at. But if you're not in that category of people, then you probably have a pretty average health care experience.
And again, averages can tell you something. You know, life expectancy in the US has dropped for 20 years. Tiny, tiny, tiny amount. But what's going on? The economy has been growing, you know, with a few bumps, but it has been growing. There are wealth being created and yet that's not transferring into better life expectancy. You know, there are things like the whole OxyContin issue, et cetera, that begin to explain that. There's what people call lives of despair [Deaths of Despair], you know, suicide and people who just feel pushed out of the middle class. So it's affecting a subset of the American population, but that's enough to kind of bring the average down. So I think you have an unequal system. And that's how I would compare it with the Canadian system. I'm not familiar with the Canadian system at all, but I can imagine it's sort of like a UK style, free at the point of service, roughly like that. And the UK system has all sorts of huge problems. But again, if you have a health emergency, it's probably going to be a pretty good system. It's less good at dealing with sort of preempting health problems and preventing health problems. But again, I think this is possibly leading a little bit off the subject of GDP, but that's how I would explain the differences in different health systems.
Tobi;
Yeah, so my question then is, but a lot of people still want to move to countries where they think they can get rich really fast, where they think their skills can be better compensated and more often than not, that is usually the United States, despite the inefficiencies and inequalities of the health care system at the lower end. So, now does that mean that people do not know what they want or they value growing their personal income better than a lot of these other things that we talk about?
David;
I mean, America is still the biggest economy in the world, measured in dollar terms, not in PPP terms. So it's the biggest economy in the world. It's clearly very dynamic. If you're in tech or IT or AI, this world leading technology, world leading universities. You know, if you're making it in America, you're making it pretty big. And immigrants tend to be people who are ambitious. They're driven. That's why they picked up and left their country and gone somewhere else. You know, America can seem quite attractive. You kind of think if I'm going to roll the dice somewhere, I'll roll it in America. Now, if you're American, social mobility actually is not as good as it has been in the past. And it's not as good as in some European countries. That's quite a counterintuitive. But I've read a number of papers and data to suggest that. But still, you've got a big, powerful, high-tech economy that kind of sucks up labor, that's bounced back much quicker from the global financial crisis, that's bounced back quicker from COVID than most other equivalent economies.
You know, if you're thinking, where am I going to go? Where have I got my best chance of making it? You know, it's not irrational to think, well, America's big enough for me, you know? So I don't see the two in contradiction. I don't think people are saying, I'm going to go to America because on balance, it has the most rational healthcare system that's the best use of resources. People don't think like that. They think like, where am I going to go, fit in, have a chance? So I would say that's what attracts people to the US.
Tobi;
Yeah. Let's talk about the environment a bit. I don't know if I have the right phrase here, but it seems to me, as recently demonstrated by the recent spat on BBC between the host and the president of Guyana, by some countries, again, on the poorer end of the global wealth spectrum sort of fighting for their right to pollute, i would call it, Which is that you cannot tell us now to care about the environment, sustainability, low-carbon green economy, when you've had 150 years to basically do what you want, which sort of then got us into this problem. I don't necessarily agree with that argument and I do think that there's no part of the world that is insulated from some of the big, terrible changes we are going to see from global warming. But what's your reaction generally to that argument?
David;
OK, well, I do have some sympathy with that argument, but again, like most things that are worth talking about, it's complicated. So let's just start with a few basic facts. And, you know, I've never really written about the environment as a core subject, although I have written about it quite a lot both from Asia and increasingly actually from Africa. So bear that in mind. But let's take the per capita carbon emissions of Uganda. When I last looked, I think there was 0.1 tonnes per capita per year. And compare that with America which I think is 20 tons per capita per year. Now, if you say to a Ugandan, you have to be really careful because the world's on the brink of catastrophe so you guys need to cut your carbon emissions. I would agree with people who say, well, that's nonsense. I'm not cutting my carbon emissions. What Uganda needs to do, I would argue quite strongly, is to increase its carbon emissions.
Now, of course, that doesn't mean to say Uganda's ideal path of development is to copy in its entirety everything that went on in the West, which would be massive, crazy pollution with coal-fired power stations and whatever destruction of the environment, followed by a kind of, oh, my God, what have we done moment, drawing back and then are trying to kind of address the problems. Often, by the way, outsourcing your pollution to some other poor country. But anyway, I'm not saying that that is the path to go. But I am saying that from per capita carbon emissions of 0.1 tonnes, then yes, the only way is up for a bit. Because I don't believe that you're going to be able to get out of poverty without increasing those carbon emissions a bit.
Albeit that we have solar power, we have wind power, we have all of this. And clearly one doesn't need to emulate the old fossil fuel model in its entirety. But I think that it's reasonable to assume that, say, in Mali, where per capita people use the same as British people use to boil their kettle. So that's the power consumption in Mali, what we in Britain use to make our tea, basically. And you're saying to a Malian, sorry, that's all you've got. Now, that I think is totally unfair and is unsustainable politically and rightly so. So I think that the Malis and the Ugandas of this world will have to increase their carbon emissions a bit as they become wealthier.
But as soon as possible and wherever possible, they ought to embrace new technologies, green technologies, which in some cases will be cheaper and more efficient anyway. But, you know, we still don't really know, for example, how to make cement using green technologies. It's there or thereabouts, I believe, but it's not really proven technology at scale. And we can't say to Uganda, sorry, you missed out on concrete. You know, that one that one passed you by. Clearly this is ridiculous and unsustainable. So I do have sympathy with the view.
Of course, you can abuse that view. You can say, you know, you polluted for 150 years. Therefore, we're going to just carry on recklessly as normal. Let's take the conversation back to Nigeria. There is a conversation in Nigeria, you know, how dare you tell us that we can't use our oil and gas? Now, I have some sympathy with that, but the corollary and the additional argument is we need to electrify. We need to bring power to 600 million people in Africa and to a 100 million people in Nigeria who don't have power. I completely agree. But I would say, what have you been doing the last 30 or 40 years? The oil's been pouring out of the ground the last 30, 40 years, and that did not translate into electricity for all Nigerians as it should have done.
So it doesn't follow that if you're allowed to follow this fossil fuel path, that all will be right with the world. Policies need to be intelligent. And intelligence means to the extent that you do use fossil fuels, you must use them efficiently and for the benefit of your people. And where possible, you stop using fossil fuels, you embrace new technology. South Africa has a ton of coal, for example, but it also has among the best solar and wind potential in the world. Its problem in transitioning, and of course, as you'll probably know, South Africa is having trouble keeping the lights on. Its problem in transitioning from coal to solar and wind has not been primarily a technical problem. It's been primarily a political problem with people trying to protect the coal industry. That is a mistake. But I don't think you can say to the Ugandans of this world, sorry, you missed the boat. We don't really know how you're going to prosper in this new green world, but good luck. I think that does not wash. So in that sense, I have sympathy with the Guyanas and the Malis and the Ugandas of this world, yeah.
Tobi;
But not Nigeria.
David;
But clearly, you know, you need governments that use their oil wealth better. I don't think you would find a Nigerian that would disagree.
Tobi;
I agree with you. Again, I'm not trying to frame this as a direct consequence of your work or what you've written, just trying to expand the scope a little bit. So I want to get your sense about where you think policy should go in trying to strike a balance. Because as you know, a lot of African countries are in financial distress from sovereign debts. The domestic investment environment is not that great so even if you want to keep insisting that, oh, we're gonna pollute we're going to do this we're going to do that, if the global investment appetite for fossil fuel continues to dwindle as policy in the West is forcing companies to divest, you might not have a choice, even if you want to pollute at the end of the day, because nobody would be willing to invest in that in the next 20 or 30 years. So my question to you then is that how do you think that the policy environment, especially around all these global gatherings and perhaps even some more pragmatic measures can strike the better balance between these two views.
David;
Okay. Well, again, a complicated question, but definitely one worth asking. There are a few things going on there. The first thing I'd say is that finance just sort of cutting off all carbon, all fossil fuels is almost certainly unfair. And the idea that gas, for example, could be a transition fuel is one worth considering. But there's a big caveat here. And the caveat is the following, really. I don't really believe that there are many governments in Africa that have a serious plan for development. I mean, that's quite a big, harsh thing to say. But, you know, you had Stefan Dercon on your program. Gambling on Development was the name of his book. You know, if you're going to use fossil fuels to improve the lives of your people, fine. But where is that being done? Maybe in Senegal, maybe in Ghana. You look around the continent and you struggle to find these success stories where people are saying, no, no, no, world, we're not listening to you, we're going to use our fossil fuels because right now we're in this fantastic phase of growth and development, and, you know, if you cut off our fossil fuels, you're going to stymie that. You've got a lot of countries that are hardly at the starting line, I would say. And again, that sounds quite harsh. But, you know, you take Ghana, which is a relatively successful African economy. But Ghana had the same GDP per capita. This is oft used. In fact, I think it has had a higher GDP per capita. But probably these measures are imperfect, as we’d suggested at the beginning of our discussion. But somehow it was not dissimilar from South Korea.
South Korea is now 20 or 30 times as rich as Ghana in per capita terms. South Korea has done something that Ghana never did. And Ghana is a relative success story. So South Korea has certainly done something that Democratic Republic of Congo or Niger or Angola or Liberia or Zambia have never done. It's managed to take off economically. Yes, using fossil fuels. Now what we're being told is, you know, you can't use fossil fuels. But I'm also asking, where is the plan for development? Where is that big transforming development happening on the continent? That's what's necessary. That's what I want to see. But you have to kind of look quite hard to find it. And you're going to be finding the kind of the beginnings of it. Let's say in Ghana, in Senegal, you know, maybe in Rwanda, maybe in Ethiopia before it blew up politically. But you do have to look quite hard to find it. So yes, the world's saying fossil fuels, you can't have them. We're not going to finance them. That's potentially a big obstacle to growth and development. But just as big an obstacle to growth and development is governments that don't seem to be there in the fight to produce growth and development. And I think this gets back to politics. There are too many governments who get to power And their reason for getting to power is to extract, extract wealth for, you know, themselves, their families, their regions, maybe, if you're lucky, but not for the whole country.
Tobi;
It's an interesting observation. I'm going to ask you a speculative question and trust me, I don't want to put you in any kind of trouble. So, I mean, if you look at a set of countries that I call the tragic trio, which is the three biggest economies on the African continent, Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, it's a useful comparison to me because they sort of went through a major transition in terms of power right around the same time. Nigeria it was 2015 when we had the first opposition leader coming to power since democratic governance started in 1999. South Africa, I think, was 2014. And I think Egypt was around the same period. If you look at that decade for all these three economies, what you see, it's not a pretty picture, unemployment is quite high. Youth unemployment particularly is through the roof. All three economies are chronically indebted. Inflation and the general macroeconomic policy environment is just a terrible mess. So I'm asking you, as someone who has been on the ground a couple of times in some of these countries, what do you think from an outsider's perspective, has gone seriously wrong with the political class in countries that can actually pull their weight on the continent if they are doing better.
David;
Sure. You mentioned, obviously, the three biggest economies on the continent. Now, first thing I should say is I can't really talk about Egypt because I don't cover it. For whatever reason, the Financial Times' definition of Africa is sub-Saharan Africa. So I cannot really talk with any legitimacy about it. But Nigeria and South Africa, you know, I've been to, I don't know, 20 times each. I've thought about them both quite hard, I suppose. And I would first say that they're just very, very different cases. The overriding factor of South Africa was the apartheid regime and the liberation from this horrendous apartheid policy, which deliberately impoverished a section of the population, the non-white section of the population, particularly the black majority. And extricating South Africa out of that is proving extraordinarily difficult. And South Africa is failing at that. And I could go into that in much more detail if you want. Nigeria, I think, is a whole different case. Nigeria never really had, well, it didn't have an apartheid system. It had a colonial oppressor: Britain; colonial occupier: Britain; then Britain left. But Nigeria doesn't have the terrible racial legacies of apartheid that South Africa suffers from.
In that sense, I actually think Nigeria starts from a better position than South Africa, albeit that South Africa had much more sophisticated some kind of world-class industries, manufacturing base, etc. Still, I would argue that the politics in South Africa is so complicated that Nigeria weirdly starts in a better place. However, one of the things that I think has gone wrong in Nigeria, and again, I don't think there'd be many Nigerians that would disagree with me, is that you discovered oil and lots of it. So you discovered oil and lots of it, but weirdly not enough. So if you take a Qatar or a Kuwait, one of these rich Gulf states, they have huge quantities of oil and very few people. So it doesn't take a kind of genius government to be able to spread that wealth kind of around, you know, to bring in foreign labor if required, et cetera.
Nigeria has a lot of oil, but not enough oil for 200 million people. If you gave all that oil wealth to each of 200 million people, you wouldn't have very much, which creates an incentive to try and get your hands on it. So it creates a perverse incentive, I would say, and the resource curse sort of starts there and did start there. And so the point of government becomes to share oil wealth, get your hands on the oil wealth, share it, share it among the political class, keep out everybody else and use your political influence to get as much of that oil wealth as possible. One obvious sort of result of that is the highly logical thing to do if you have oil is you begin to move up the value-added chain. This is what you should do if you're trying to develop any economy. So what do you do with oil? Well, you turn it into petroleum products, into the fuel you put in your car, to heating, electricity, all of this stuff. And again, you don't need me to tell you that Nigeria has not done this. It has refineries that have not worked. Now, of course, you have the Dangote Refinery, And there's a lot of hope, some hope anyway, attached to the Dangote refinery.
But in the past, what the Nigerian elite, and I can only blame the elite because they've been the ones in charge, what they've done is they've taken that oil, they've sent it abroad for somebody else to add all the value, and then they've bought it back, spending all the money that you've earned from the oil in the first place to somebody else because they've got a refinery. I mean, this is crazy, crazy policy and crazy politics. And this, I think, has been the curse of Nigeria that has informed much else. Of course, there have been many, many other problems, some of which go all the way back to colonialism and the colonial legacy. The fact that Nigeria was kind of jammed together by Britain, that it's a nation state if you draw it on a map, but it struggles to be one in reality.
And you could argue that Nigeria has been successful in creating this kind of feeling that there is such a thing as Nigeria, that we're all in it together. But you can also say that the elites, those who reach and by that, I guess I mean those who reach political power and those who enable them to reach political power, they have not really treated Nigeria as a nation because otherwise there wouldn't be 10 million kids out of school. There wouldn't be these massive disparities between different states, some with very much better health outcomes, et cetera, some with much lower levels of people in school, some with much better infrastructure, some with much worse infrastructure. That wouldn't exist to the same extent if your elites had treated the country as a real state and the purpose of the oil being to fuel that state and to fuel its development. That has not been what's happened. You've had an elite that has, in a sense, followed a colonialist model, which is to extract wealth and sometimes to send it abroad, which is why a lot of people go for their health and their education abroad, because they haven't bothered building it to the extent that they ought to have done in Nigeria itself. So these are very different stories. They may lead to the same or similar positions. You started by asking about why these three big economies have not fulfilled their potential, let's say, to put it kindly. So I think the reasons are quite different, particularly in the case of Nigeria and South Africa. But your end point is similar, if not exactly the same.
Tobi;
I want you to talk a little bit about South Africa, and especially in the last 10 years, what has gone, maybe that's not fair, but what has gone really, really wrong? I mean, to paraphrase someone I listened to during the lecture, I'd rather not say his name, is that South African elites care more about making the elite structure blacker than making South Africans wealthier. How should you think that conforms to reality?
David;
Well, that is a controversial statement. I mean, I think the ANC has become increasingly a kind of a black South African party. And it's to some extent losing some of that kind of rainbow nation, colourblind, non-racialism that was kind of, in a sense, so inspiring in 1994. So there's a couple of ways of answering that question. I mean, you said the last 10 years have been bad. I mean, I know that some people think the following: It's been 30 years since apartheid they kind of compare it to a football match - first 15 years, first half, pretty good. Second half, pretty disastrous. Lots of own goals. And that's one way of looking at it. The cutoff point is Zuma. So you have Mandela, you have Mbeki, sort of technocrat, reasonable growth that's growing at 5%. You do have a commodities boom, it's true. Then the financial crisis hits and Mbeki is dislodged by his own party, only a year before he was due to leave anyway, but still dislodged. Zuma's put in and Zuma starts the process of state capture and the real kind of erosion of some of the institutions that South Africa had maintained for those first 15 years. So that's one way of looking at it.
I think there's another really sort of, in a sense, more interesting way of looking at it, which I first read, again, in a Martin Wolf column. And he talked about the concept, which was originally applied to Brazil, actually, of Belindia. And Belindia is a combination of Belgium and India, a small, in this case, white economy. It doesn't really matter what the colors are, but a small white economy surrounded by much, much poorer black economy. That's what South Africa looked like in 1994. It had been deliberately engineered by a white racist system. So that's what you got. The question is, what policies do you have to deal with that? Because you've got two economies.
If you think about the trouble that Europe had when Europe joined and you were trying to set interest rates across Europe for different economies, for Spain and Germany, let's say. Now you've got Belgium and India. What policies do you put in place to maximise the potential of both of those? Because one of the things that you obviously try to do is you basically raid Belgium. You redistribute from Belgium to India, which is what's been done. And that's, I think, perfectly fair and a perfectly rational thing to do. You redistribute from the wealthy part of your economy to the less wealthy part of the economy. But that's not all you can do, because if that's all you can do, then eventually you're going to just impoverish Belgium and you're just going to have an impoverished country. So you can't do that. You've got to somehow turn India into Belgium. And it's not really clear how you devise policies that can do that.
You know, if you're India, it's much easier. You're a poor country and you trade, in a sense, off your poverty like China did. You know, China moved people from the countryside in China into factories in the cities. So it transformed inefficient farmers into increasingly efficient players in the global supply chains. But it did that via low wages. It's not really possible in South Africa because of the political inheritance that it's had. So one of the policies, for example, that the ANC tried was black empowerment. Which is, again, rational and completely understandable. They wanted to create a black middle class and people like Cyril Ramaphosa, who was put on various boards and given shares in various companies. He became very wealthy through that. And a black middle class was created. But you can also see how there are problems there. One is that this can lead to corruption. You know, you get those opportunities based on who you know and who you know means knowing the ANC. So you can see how that reinforces or could reinforce bad politics and cronyism. And indeed, that is exactly what's happened, unfortunately.
And second, you can see how it can lead to inefficiencies. So a well-known example was that, you know, even the airline needed to buy its planes. you know, Boeings, et cetera, through a black empowerment business. So, of course, no planes are made in South Africa. So the only way of doing that is a black company is set up to buy planes and then they sell them to South African airways with a markup 10 or 20 percent. So immediately you have an airline that's 10 or 20 percent less efficient. And that's kind of mirrored in the rest of the economy. So in trying to adjust to the hundreds of years of historical injustices that you've had, you kind of fall into policies that are going to be counterproductive and make your economy inefficient. Having said that, the ANC has also just failed flat out, right, in some policies that it also have got right. The biggest of all being education. Under apartheid, you had an education system that was deliberately tailored to keep black people poor and to limit their education so that they could work in the mines and work as domestics in people's houses. A vile system.
That was the starting point. It ought to have been really easy to improve that by leaps and bounds. And South Africa has actually put quite a lot of money into its education system. But for one reason or another, some of which I don't fully understand, to be honest, it's failed. And the education system for most people is failing. And so it's failing to transform people's opportunities via education, which would be not a simple, not a salvo either, not a panacea, but certainly it ought to be a very important part of the ANC's armory in transforming that society. And it's failed.
Tobi;
That's deep. And I agree it's a complex problem. I mean, They have an election also this year, and in Nigeria we had ours last year. From the field currently and how the political dynamics is evolving, what do you think is the hope of turning some of this around, at least for the people?
David;
Sure. Well, there are a few things. I mean, like you often say with development, well, I wouldn't start from here. I mean, it's not a particularly good place to start from. That Belindia image, I think, is quite powerful. And you can't just wish that away. That's history. That's going to take a long time to overcome. What is going to happen in this election, what is likely to happen, is that for the first time, the ANC's majority, i.e. its 50% plus of the vote, is going to be challenged. So last time it got 57.5. In previous iterations under Mbeki, for example, it got, I think, in the high 60s, certainly in the mid 60s. So the ANC sort of was dominating politics. Now, I think disillusion with the state of the country is such that that majority will be challenged. So it's possible, it's not definite, but it is possible that the ANC will fall below 50%. That opens up all sorts of possibilities, some of them more promising and some of them less promising.
So if the ANC does very, very badly, let's say it gets 40%, I think this is unlikely, but possible, then it's It may go into coalition with a party like the Economic Freedom Fighters, Julius Malema, who's a breakaway, sort of a radical breakaway. They want to nationalise the commanding heights of the economy to expropriate a lot of the land without compensation, maybe nationalise the central bank and then sort of change central bank policy so that it's much more in favour of growth distribution than in sort of tackling inflation. Now, you know, maybe this will all go brilliantly well, but experience and history tells you that that's not likely to go very well, that project, and could impoverish South Africa further. So the loss of the ANC majority, while important and necessary, I think also sort of opens up the country to danger.
I think much more likely is the ANC will get in the mid 40s or high 40s and therefore will go into coalition with some of the smaller parties. And this, I think, is where the hope lies. So you have a number of smaller parties, some of which are pretty terrible, but some of which are really good. There's a party called RISE Mzanzi, for example. A former journalist, Songeso Zibi, has formed this party. A lot of people really think that this is a good guy, progressive, forward-thinking, not attached to the ANC, not attached to the DA, which is the right-of-centre kind of party that has tended to be a very white party and therefore is really not electable in the country as a whole. So I'm not saying that RISE Mzanzi is the great hope of South Africa. I'm not saying that at all. I don't really know that much about them. What I am saying is that you can see how the breakdown of this ANC monopoly could lead to new ideas, some of which will be bad and some of which could be much more hopeful and progressive. And, you know, come the next election in five years' time, you could see some of those parties that have established themselves now growing their support base and maybe changing the policies of South Africa for the better.
But I do think that the ANC, you know, as amazing a movement as it was and as necessary a movement as it was to overthrow apartheid, after 30 years of unchallenged power, it's hardly surprising, is a sort of a pale shadow of its former self. And it'd be difficult for it to reform within without losing power, or at least having its power seriously challenged.
Tobi;
For the sake of the millions of South Africans whose lives depend on their government getting things right, I hope they do. My final question before I let you go, David. So I'm going to ask you one big question and maybe a couple of two or three more rapid fire questions. And this is a bit of a tradition on the show, which is talk to me about one big idea. It may be yours, it may be an idea of someone else, but just one idea that you are excited about, that you love very much and that you would like the world to be excited about as well. Possibly could change the world.
David;
That is a… you should have warned me about that question type. So my mind's going blank. The thing I'm thinking about is so far from what we've been discussing that I don't know that it's relevant. I mean, let me name two things and they're quite different. What is very well established, but I think very important, and I'm not trying to be trendy here, but I think the idea that if you concentrate on giving women opportunity in society that a lot follows is very promising in development.
If you look around, women kind of hold families together, their kids' health and education, they are the guardians of that. If they're empowered, given opportunities, I think huge amounts can follow. And if you want to kind of a way of unlocking growth and development, you could do a lot worse than thinking, what are we doing for women at all levels of society? This doesn't mean women in boardrooms or women in this. Of course, it means that, too. But it means policies that enable women to take control of their finances, take control of their bodies, take control of their education, take control of their destiny. If you get that right, I think an awful lot follows.
Second, totally different and something I hardly know anything about, but I keep hearing about it. It's something called eDNA. This is a way of measuring biodiversity. As far as I understand it, you take a measurement from water or soil and rather than counting the number of animals or trying to count, you know, the number of bacteria or worms or whatever it is, you kind of have a baseline of the biodiversity of an area.
And given that baseline, you can then work out, are we improving this area or are we degrading it? And it may be the kind of the GDP of the environment, let's say, a one shot measure that enables you to say, let's leave this country, this wetland, this region, this forest in a better state for the next generation than we found it. I think that could be a very powerful idea.
Tobi;
Charter cities, which is something you've written about, are something with a big potential for change, especially in the context of Africa. Do you find it promising or a fad?
David;
I'm highly skeptical. You can see where it comes from. You know, Shenzhen in southern China, you could say it was a charter city. You could say Singapore kind of acted like a charter city, Hong Kong. If that's what you mean by a charter city, then maybe. But look, if you have policies that are good, then you should roll them out to the whole country. Why should they be in some isolated little part? I don't see why you need to start from scratch. You could say, yes, we could experiment. We could try Charter City A, Charter City B, Charter City C, see which does better and then roll that out to the country as a whole. Fine. Okay. But the idea that you can get around government, you know, outsource public goods to the private sector, start totally from scratch. I am quite skeptical of that idea. I find it intriguing and I've written about it in a way that may not necessarily show my skepticism. But if you ask me, do I think it's a great hope or a fad? I lean towards the faddish end of the spectrum.
Tobi;
Senegal, Nigeria or Ghana, who has the best jollof rice?
David;
Yeah, if you make me answer that, then I'll never be allowed back in Nigeria again. So the best jollof rice I've probably ever had was in Lagos, actually. Not meaning that there's not fantastic jello fries in the other two countries, but the best one that I happened to have had was in Lagos. Kind of spicy, pretty good.
Tobi;
Okay. Generally, from your travels across Africa, where to you has the best food scenes, the best restaurants, best coffee shops?
David;
South Africa is an obvious example that has good food. I like some of the food I came across in Madagascar, in Antananarivo. And in West Africa, I'm going to say Lagos and Accra draw, just to be diplomatic. But there are certainly some very cool places in both. And I've noticed that, I mean, clearly in Lagos, Some things happened in the last few years because there's been a kind of a mushrooming of places, some of them very high end, which, you know, have limited use for me. But, you know, there is clearly some interesting stuff happening.
Tobi;
Finally, Labour or the Tories, who do you think will win the next UK general elections?
David;
Labour.
Tobi;
Thank you, David Pilling. It has been a pleasure to have you on Ideas Untrapped.
David;
Thanks, Tobi. I really enjoyed it.
This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe -
In this podcast episode, Tobi interviews Rasheed Griffith - who is the CEO of The Caribbean Progress Institute, and host of The Rasheed Griffith Show explores the adaptability and policy implementation in smaller countries compared to larger ones, noting that smaller nations can change more swiftly due to simpler institutional structures. Rasheed contrasts this with larger countries like China and India, where changes, although rapid, are often driven by cultural homogeneity and authoritarian governance, which may not be desirable in Western democracies. The discussion also touches on the impact of leadership and institutional capacity on economic development, emphasizing that the quality of governance often outweighs the mere structure of political systems in influencing a country's developmental trajectory.
You can listen to episodes of Rasheed's brilliant podcast (The Rasheed Griffith Show) here. You can also subscribe to the Carribean Progress Institute newsletter here, where you can read many interesting and important writings.
Transcript
Tobi;
Welcome to the show, Rasheed.
It's great to talk to you.
I want to start with something that you mentioned in our first conversation, which has stayed with me. I haven't been able to stop thinking about it since, which is that small countries are somewhat more amenable to change than big countries. You know, when we talk about ideas and policies and economic development,
I just want you to expand on that a bit. I know I'm paraphrasing, but I want you to expand on that a bit.
Why do you suppose that is?
Rasheed;
Small countries have less people to influence politically, economically, socially. So ideas can spread faster and ideas can spread deeper in small countries. So for example, if you have a country like Nigeria, you have over 200 million people, you have vast, vast institutions that are captured or incentivized in very radically complex ways.
Compare that to a country like Saint Lucia that has 180,000 people. Very small institutions, very small number of schools, very small number of just social actors.
For the difficulty of idea spread and idea capture, it's a lot less in a very small place, and yet these are still essentially independent sovereign UN vote countries that have as much rights in that league as Nigeria.
You know, Walmart...Walmart in the US has more employees than all of Saint Lucia has population. Or even Saint Vincent, or even Trinidad, Walmart has more employees.
So, when you talk about turning the ship of these small countries, it's a lot less complicated than trying to influence Nigeria or Ethiopia or the US or Canada.
Tobi;
I want to square that a bit with what we saw in China in the last 40 years.
China is obviously a very large country and some people would say that it went through a process of rapid change, I mean, after the 1978 reforms. How did a country like China and to some extent what we are seeing in India recently, do you think that having, even if you're a big country, having a homogenous culture, language, ethnic population, does that also help speed up the process of change.
China, obviously, communism being the central guiding ideology and of course, majority of the population is Han Chinese. And we're seeing Modi, you know, rally around Hinduism as the national identity of the country. So, how does homogeneity play in here? And you see some pretty screwed up small countries, you know, Haiti…
What are the constraints and what are the catalysts?
Rasheed;
So China is obviously a good example, but China didn't just transform itself via ideas. It transformed itself via a dictatorship. And I think most people would not want that trade-off. You know you go to Shanghai, [which] I've been to many times, you go to Shanghai and you say “it's so great here, the transportation is fantastic the skyline is amazing, all this happened in 30 years” but then the problem is this; the way [and] how it's done, the effects, the results are quite spectacular but for most people in Western countries, you are not willing socially, morally, to make that trade-off even if the trains are so nice. Because you don't want to have the authoritarian system that China has.
So, you know, you can describe China as communist and of course the party structure is very Leninist communist structure [but] of course how the economic stuff operates is very open in terms of price mechanisms that you typically find in other capitalist operation. But, you know, don't make no mistake, this was a very harsh trade-off that the Chinese people did not have a chance to make particularly because they had a very authoritarian, still has a very authoritarian party.
And I would also say that a lot of the transformation of China that has happened it wasn't particularly directed by the party. People always use Deng Xiaoping as the start point for the opening up policy. But when you look at the proper historical literature, he really just allowed the people to do what they were starting to do already.
The market reforms were a very bottom up process. So it wasn't like they kickstarted the actual change themselves. As usual, it's a market system that happened first. So, again, I don't think in Western countries that have a history of democracy, a history of institutions, history of social liberties would want the kind of trade-offs needed that China used to rapidly push in one direction.
Now, India is tricky because India, of course, had a lot of growth, but India has very weak institutions. You know, when you are there on the ground, there is a massive difference between India and China, even states like Bangalore, for example, or New Delhi.
It is still quite a developing country because there's so much development, the numbers kind of look good but in my opinion no unit, no particular place itself can be called developed yet and a lot of the really massive growth in India… again, its government has not really been very good at capacity building, although at some measurements of state capacity India still runs very high for some strange reason but it is always a bottom-up process in India. However, depends on where you go in India, again, there are some parts that are still very far, far behind and some parts that are very, you know, far forward.
Again, same in China. You go to Western China, it's as poor as it was 50 years ago. Because those are big places, very big populations, it's very difficult to look at macro measurements as like default indicators, whereas if you go from Shanghai to even like Jiling, it's a very, very, very difference in economic proportionalities.
Tobi;
Yeah.
It brings me to this question of democracy versus autocracy in the context of economic development. As you know, a lot of African countries, especially around 20, 25 years ago, after a very long history of military coups and dictatorships, started democratising, you know. And if I use Nigeria as an example, the challenge and why there seem to be a pining for autocracy, especially if you look across and, you know, compare what East Asia was able to do, there seem to be no continuity.
For example, in Nigeria, the way I describe Nigeria is bad ideas are immortal, but good ideas have no continuity, right? So what is the nuance, precisely, in this democracy versus autocracy debate when you want to kickstart development and sustain it, you know, and try to reach for high income?
Rasheed;
See, it really depends on what people mean when they say democracy, because oftentimes I get the sense people really mean just voting and competitive elections.
Is that what you mean by democracy or they mean something deeper?
Tobi;
Well, that's a good distinction because I think loosely we use democracy basically to mean that, okay, you have cyclical elections, you have a constitution that grants people relative freedom, on paper, in practice might actually be very different. You have a somewhat independent judiciary and there is separation of powers.
So that's how I would describe what I'm talking about.
Rasheed;
I see that's tricky, right? Because England does not have separate powers. It doesn't have a separate judiciary. People still call it democratic. So it's a complicated question there.
Also they don't even have an actual constitution either.
Tobi;
Yeah, they don't. I'm fascinated by how that works, by the way, but i'll say maybe from the 2000s upward, most new states or newly democratising states have gone for the American-style presidential system, you know, and i feel like that is part of the struggle with a lot of states especially in Africa. For example in Nigeria, after independence it was a parliamentary system of government then there was the war and the coups and then during the second republic we kind of went the way of the American presidential system and then there's always this constant debate about: do we really have a federal system, how do we handle things like state independence, how do you balance minority rights versus rule of majority, right?
Now, for states that have opted for this American federal system, you know, without having the same history and the same institutions, they seem to struggle. And I'm trying to understand why.
Rasheed;
So the basic premise on which you structure your electoral process is not enough to govern a country. And new states tend, by definition obviously, don't really have a history of institutional capacity behind the electoral process. And many states probably of course in African states, also even Latin American states to be honest, they never actually stabilise on a particular path of institutional growth, capacity building, and so on. So you can look at Nigeria, Burkina Faso, you can even look at Peru or look at Guatemala and Nicaragua, these countries have very constant states of flux all the time. And, you know, a lot of that is obviously a remnant of how the independence movement happened and what happened after independence and things were essentially kind of, you know… the the way how the state itself was set up, the initial premises, obviously caused a lot of problems going forward but it's [a] difficult question because in my mind the literal category of electoral process you have isn't really that important.
The important thing is who are actually working in the governance mechanisms.
What kind of people are working in the public sector?
What kind of trainings do they have?
What are their histories?
How much power do they have to actually form ideas and make choices and so on?
Those things are the more critical things in governance, not the electoral process per se.
Well, yes, we need to have an electoral process that is fair, but so what?
I mentioned in England, they don't have a separate court, really, up until 10 years ago in 2013.
The parliament and legislature are the same thing, they don't really have that either, the separation…so you don't need, even in theory, to have these things all separate. But the difference is that in England the institutions that govern so you manage your finance and treasury so on, they have very high capacity people and they are allowed to make decisions and the people in charge follow the decisions that they make because they have these reviews they have these regulations that affect how you make choices in governance. Where[as] in new countries, they don't have these things, they don't have these systems of stability. I don't know how one creates these things because these are such old states, we really have no idea how these things form themselves. You could say, yeah, if there was one very strong impactful leader who happens to be governing very well, then yeah, let's pass forward. You know, we all use the Singapore example but that's a minefield full of history. There's nothing you can do to create the conditions to make that happen.
You can say also maybe Rwanda, maybe, is another example - Kagame - of this, but again, before Kagame, there's no way to a priori determine if a particular strong leader will actually be a good governor. You can't decide those things a priori you kind of have to go with the luck of the choices. So I don't have a good answer to you because I think no one has a good answer to that question.
How do you build institutional capacity in countries that don't have it and have never had it that well is probably the most important question in development economics that no one actually tries to think about that much or at least outside of very niche academic circles.
Tobi;
Another thing that comes to my mind is the people question - speaking about the policies themselves, I know you can't separate it from the people, but a lot of policies especially around economic governance is more towards socialism and leftist ideas… I can say for Nigeria and of course a lot of African states.
So my question then is, did colonialism, for example, or the history of exploitation, especially in countries that have a history of such, did it make capitalism a bit of a tough sell?
You know, because during the Cold War and before that, the fight for independence and the liberation of these states was supported by the communist bloc and there was a lot of knowledge transfer, there was a lot of personnel transfer within that period. Was that why we still have this persistence in terms of socialist ideas which are clearly not working but are very very difficult to get rid of. Nigeria is going through a period of extremely high inflation and macroeconomic distress right now, and what you still hear from the people that are responsible for policies are still the same ideas that we have tried that have failed.
A Lot of Statism, A Lot of Protectionism.
Why do these ideas have such persistence?
Is it history?
Rasheed;
So history is a very, very big part of it.
So you pointed out that the decolonial movement, a lot of the ideas were anti-colonial powers.
That was the basic premise. England, France did this, therefore we need to do X, something different. And at the same time, as you mentioned, at the time, a lot of the Soviet bloc, East bloc at the time, were communists, very pure communists. Then that kind of influence also went towards their anti-imperialism, which was again, anti-Western.
So everything kind of fused into one thing.
I don't know, really, how much you can call it anti-capitalist, I think it's most anti-imperialism and by default it means anti-Western institutions and I'm trying to sort of grouped in capitalism as the exploitation, you know, is clearly not a very strong argument of course but that's what they did and the same thing happened in Caribbean, same thing happened in Latin America and it still persists the same way also in Latin America, also in Caribbean, also Africa.
And the persistence is really a matter of ideology. You can't really think outside your own ideology if you don't have any interest in thinking outside your own ideology. So [the] leadership who come up [is] all Marxist training, all socialist training, very anti-imperialism, those kind of things, and they don't have any instinct to think about alternatives that they would never try.
But in Tanzania, after Nyerere, the next president, I think it's Mwinyi, I don't remember his name properly unfortunately, he was much more pro-market.
And why was that?
I don't know, actually.
It can't be education. He had the same, essentially, education notice as Nyerere, and Nyerere was a shrugging, you know, socialist believer.
So what was the difference between those two people?
I don't know that much about it.
But he had an instinct that was much more pro-market, pro-capitalist, pro-freedom, where he really transformed […] policies in Tanzania. And his son is now the president of Zanzibar and again [with] that same instinct of openness and more free market liberal policies. So you see that now play out in Zanzibar.
So you have an instance where the two leaderships, one family, has had a massive impact on these policies.
But why do they have these different views?
It's hard to say.
Why does Kagame, for example, have the view of more liberal policies while having also very strong, strong, state arms on security and so on. Economically, he has more liberal policies. He doesn't have any distinct, highly distinct educational backgrounds, not much, but instinct-wise, he is very liberal.
Why is that?
These are the kind of questions I think people don't really grapple with. Because it's not a theoretical issue. It's a leadership problem. So why do leaders that should come up in African states, but again, same for Latin America, same thing in Caribbean. Like, why don't more of the people who have more liberal instincts go to vie for leadership in countries like these where we live?
I don't know.
But that's the key point.
That's the key change.
The people that have an instinct of liberalism must lead the countries.
Tobi;
Sticking with the colonial question, as someone who work with ideas, I really want to know what is the persuasive framing for this debate around exploitation and growth, right?
You have this movement, not just individuals, who are absolutely convinced that not just modern economic growth that started with the industrial revolution was built on slavery, but that the extension of that or the correspondence of that period with colonialism was the instrumental thing. It's a bit similar to the 1619 project in the history of capitalism in America. And this group of people, sometimes very loud, are absolutely convinced that they are right.
And they use history as their evidence.
Do you want to deny that X happened?
Of course it did.
How then can you say that it was this exploitation that gave these people prosperity and obviously retarded us?
What is the place of better balance in that debate? And what do you think is the persuasive framing to make people understand that exploitation by itself is not what gives you productivity? You can't really exploit your way to TFP growth.
Rasheed;
These are two different questions.
The first part is the historical thing.
Now, the historical problem is very challenging because the people who are based on the idea that the colonial exploitation is the thing that made the West rich and the thing that made Africa poor versus people like me or, I guess, you that have the view that, no, that was not the base reason. The problem is coming to a centre point is that we exist in two different planets, unfortunately. Because history happened. It's in the living past but how you interpret history is the really important aspect of it.
So you say, oh, they use history. They don't use history. They use interpretations of history. And it’s similar on our side as well.
But the problem is that it's very difficult to get someone to drop their interpretation of history for a different interpretation of history when they have emotional resonance towards their own interpretation.
It's very difficult.
In some cases, perhaps even impossible. If you have a very strong view on this topic, it's very difficult for people to change your view because it's not actually based on fact it's based on interpretation. Because, again, ideology is almost like a religious view at that point in time but it's not actual quote-unquote fact. Now people, the general audiences, don't have as much strong view as someone who has a firm ideological commitment on the view and that is usually people you need to target.
Because they don't really know the names, they don't really have any dates, they don't understand the actual contours of the argument, they just come up hearing something all the time and those are people that have a better chance of changing their mind on things. And especially in Africa, especially in the Caribbean, this argument about historical exploitation of colonial capitalism is the reason why the country is poor is extremely persistent in a very perverted way and I feel in some ways the governments that currently exist…
I think some of them do really believe that's true but I also think many especially in the Caribbean where I'm from use it as an absolution. They don't want to really put any hard work to get things done so they admit this argument and say hey it's not our fault it's 200 years ago fault. Therefore, that’s why we can’t get anything done properly now.
So they kind of absolve themselves of responsibility in the present by using history, bad history, as a clutch. At least, in the Caribbean I know that’s true and Africa also, I can’t really say definitively. So that's the big issue.
Now, on the other side, in terms of the present and what has changed or and what has not? Again, if particular leaderships don't have an instinct of liberal change, i don't know if there's any education you can do, particularly speaking, to change their minds about how things should be done. Especially also [somebody] who have so much power, so i think it's very difficult in that situation that's why I'm saying when it comes to changing big countries it's so hard because the entrenchment is so deep that where do you pull levers to get things done? Who's actually in charge of this particular thing? You don't know.
In small countries you know exactly who's in charge of what, from when, and who they know, why they know it, and so on. So the tapestry which you can go about plotting change is a lot more direct in small countries. In big countries, it's a lot more difficult.
But I say I'm telling you, the thing you have to do is obviously encourage the spread of more liberal ideas, but in reality, the really, really key things that the people who go up and try to transform states, they need to have the gut instinct of liberal thinking.
Tobi;
That brings me to reparations and one of my favourite essays of yours. Uh, the reparations movement if we can call it that has gained some traction obviously in the Caribbean of course, and to some extent, perhaps not as loud, in Africa as well. What is your case against reparations?
Rasheed;
Reparations is based on a few things at the same time and I think people really kind of fuse it all together as one argument. And I say that in the Caribbean part because that's the most vocal element of the British Reparations Caribbean-Africa, a lot of it actually is very Caribbean-driven which is actually very surprising because the Caribbeans do a lot better off than African states on any metric.
But again, it's not too surprising given that the very most famous books about the exploitation argument is How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, which is a very famous book actually written by a Caribbean person.
So I suppose it's not too surprising when it's a Caribbean-led movement in that sense.
Now, the arguments are based on history, economics, and philosophy. Those are the three primary basic categories of the argument.
The history argument is simple in the sense that sugar plantations in the Caribbean were the main economic engine of industrialisation in England. That is the really core argument. But the problem here is you can look back in economic data to see how big the sugar industry was as a percentage of all industry in the UK at that time, the 1700s and early 1800s but, you know, mostly late 1700s. You can look back at data and see at best, sugar production was about two percent of overall income in England. That's very very small. That's as much as other industries, for example like agriculture, for example, like imports of copper from Ireland is about also 2%. But no one makes the argument that copper imports from Ireland was the reason why you had industrialisation in the UK.
No one makes that argument.
So why make the argument sugar?
You can go back to, for example, and see things like the amount of slave trading you could get. You should also see numbers and impact and revenue numbers.
All these data are collected. England, luckily, was very anal about numeric analysis of their economy and their systems so if you go in the British archives [there’s] so much written, captured reporting on numbers through time. One of my favourite time series is the Millennium Time series by the Bank of England that goes back A Thousand Years of Economic Growth in the UK.
So you can make accurate measurements of all these things going back a thousand years and definitely 300 years. When you read the arguments of the pro-reparations people about the economic impact, you will notice they never actually give a good economic analysis of the sugar production to impact in the UK.
They literally never mention actual econ numbers on these things.
They say, yes, this happened, believe me.
And they go as far as saying, if you don't believe me, you're racist.
That's also part of the argument, it's literally in the books. I have it in my essay. Another aspect is the… let's call it the philosophical or moral argument. I think at this point anyone would say, slavery was bad, it was evil. Okay. I don't think people debate this. I don't debate it, at least. But they leap and say therefore you owe me money and that therefore is where all the work needs to be done and they don't actually do the work. Because of the Caribbean centre argument, it's a very difficult one to do. Because, again, the Caribbean is actually doing decently well. It's not doing great, you know, comprehensively like Singapore, Taiwan, sure, okay, but it's doing good.
And if you look at the Caribbean data when it comes to this, the bulk of Caribbean economic growth happened in the late 50s, early 60s, late 60s, literally right on the beginning, even before independence and going into very early independence. So the time when it had the most colonial influence still is when it had the most growth.
And then as the colonial influence goes down, growth actually also went down in the Caribbean.So also, you can look at the other counterfactual, which is the Caribbean still has British colonies. You can look at the other counterfactual, which is there are independent Caribbean countries that were part of the British Empire. They are not independent. And at the same time, concurrently, they have Caribbean countries that are still part of the UK, like Bermuda, BVI [British Virgin Islands], Cayman Islands, you know, those countries and all of them are performing better than the equivalent independent Caribbean country.
So if the British part is exploitation, there's something breaking down where the British colonies have better performance than the independent ones and that is very difficult to square off and the reparations debaters or pro-reparations never try to discuss this point either, they always avoid it. Actually I don't even think they even think about it as a thing to think about in that sense.
So then you look at the moral part. Now you realise that the decline in growth happened well into independence, so it can't be the British exploitation that made the growth worse because you were already independent countries when you had a decline in growth after the late colonial period actually growth started to happen. So who's to blame if you're going to blame someone for post-independence growth, given that pre-independence growth was higher?
It has to be the independent countries, not the British.
Black, it's the leaders of those countries that have failed to do good policies to bring up the countries. Again, this is another way to absolve themselves of responsibility.
It's not our fault we have bad policies that don't grow the country. It's 300 years ago that put us on this path, even though most of the growth happened while you were still a colony. So the pro-reparations argument really based on nothing. However, it's ideologically soothing so you think it's good.
Tobi;
That's deep.
How do you reckon that their influence, especially in terms of policies, in terms of how they influence the general direction of what young people think and believe, how would you gauge the influence of the reparations movement, their ideas, their arguments?
Rasheed;
At least in the Caribbean, it's quite, quite impactful.
I think, not I think, every Caribbean country, these are independent English Caribbean countries are pro… as official policy, pro reparations from the UK. All of them.
So it's very impactful.
And I think if you talk to the average person on the street in Barbados or Jamaica, they will likely also be pro reparations too.
They haven't thought about it that deeply, to be clear, but just growing up in this context you will probably also be pro this thing. You know, there are people who are not either, of course, but I say on average people will be more leaning towards, yes, the idea is good and as an official policy that you should get reparations in the independent English Caribbean from the UK. So it's one of the most impactful movements, I think, in the entire region.
Again, it's not new, it's an old movement, but it has had very big impact.
And then on the UK side, it's gaining more traction by, for example, the Labour Party in the UK.
On the UK side, you know, I guess you call it woke liberalism these days as the term people use in America.
That's more why they believe it's correct. Not for any historical reasons either. So when those two things combine themselves you have a very powerful movement.
Tobi;
It will be really hilarious to me, at least, personally, if a pro reparations government actually that comes into power in the UK because I doubt the UK can afford what the reparations government is asking for.
Rasheed;
The thing that the people are, so Labour Party is very likely going to win the next election and they are going to discuss this topic a lot more, but the things that the reparations people are asking for isn't pure money.
I think that's a misconception.
I think maybe years ago that was the main thing they wanted but they're not actually asking for cash per se. So they're asking for things like better education support, perhaps even more scholarships to the UK, they're asking things like better funding for health systems in the Caribbean, they're asking for funding to do like arts and museums to have more African Culture in the Caribbean and people can understand African culture.
Things like that, also for like debt cancellation, things that still cost a lot of money, but they're not necessarily asking for direct cash transfers, particularly speaking.
Tobi;
You follow Latin America pretty closely. Are you bullish on Argentina, especially in the light of Milei's election?
Rasheed;
I think bullish would be a very strong word to use.
I would say, I think Milei has a 30% chance of getting this things done, which is, I think, so high. It's a high chance for Latin America. But I'm not going to use the word bullish. I think that's too strong a word to use in this case. It's a very, very tough road ahead.
I think people are a bit too optimistic about Milei's administration. I like Milei, I love Milei's policies and his administration, but you have to understand in the context of Argentina, the institutions are so captured by Peronist people, socialist interests that is very difficult to get really deep change happen and, of course, also the countervailing forces like the the trade unions for example, the population themselves, generally speaking, is very very pro socialist policies. The different governors in different regions are also often very pro socialist policies. So getting all of that on a correction path is going to be very very difficult.
So because of the different administration levels in Argentina the governors, the trade union leaders, the people working in the public sector, the population, it's still very directionally socialist.
See, saying the word Peronism is difficult in Argentina because Perón himself was actually a lot more liberal than Kirchner. But they're both called Peronists so it's difficult to use that term but the socialist leaning governors and people and so on make it very difficult to get really hardcore liberal change happen in Argentina. So I want it to work to be clear. Now, if he gets the dollarisation plan pushed forward and actually implement dollarisation, I think that would be a very good sign that many other things will get done. But they're really delaying dollarisation and I think they need to push that forward ASAP.
That should be the first thing they've done, but they went a different route to do it.
That was a very incorrect move.
So I wouldn't say bullish, but I'm 30% optimistic about Argentina.
Tobi;
Do you think countries that are poor today or I would say low income, that is below middle income, do you think that they can benefit from this multipolar world where global trade is fracturing and there are now talks of nearshoring and friendshoring. What are the chances that some of the countries that are poor today can, you know, seize those opportunities?
Rasheed;
See, generally speaking, I think these are more concepts in the academic sense than in practical sense.
You hear about nearshoring, for example.
What does nearshoring actually mean?
A lot of manufacturing has really been put in China but that hasn't actually changed in the last two years. People always use the examples of, oh trade between Mexico and the US are going up; okay, fine, yeah, but the manufacturing concentration in China didn't go down. [It’s] still as high as it was. So it's very difficult to really understand what these concepts really mean in practice
I don't think multipolar world makes anyone's life any easier. It probably makes it more difficult. I don't think nearshoring will have a very big impact on anything in the short term. What would happen, or what will happen, is that China, as they go up the income ladder, in theory, will be more expensive to manufacture goods in China, some goods.
Again, these are very basic goods.
It'll be more expensive to manufacture in China and therefore they might go to Bangladesh and so on. The problem there unfortunately is China is still very poor in terms of population proportions. There are 40 percent of China so literally poor. So the next China will still be China in this sense. They already have the baseline manufacturing talent, machinery, managers, you know, chemicals, all the know-how is still there. So they can just essentially push that game for at least 20 more years as things go on.
So I don't know if you want to wait 20 years for China to be completely middle income for thinking about if that kind of near-shore, offshore benefit can benefit countries in Africa, for example, as that's too long a period.
So I don't think that will have a material impact in any way as a strategy particularly to use it as growth in these small, currently poor countries.
Tobi;
Can you see a future where the Commonwealth, for example, can be a trade bloc or maybe even a loose political union like the EU?
If no, why not?
Rasheed;
No.
And the Commonwealth is not a real thing for 50 years.
Like, the only thing, the only thing the Commonwealth has in common is the English language.
Tobi;
That's something.
But go on.
Rasheed;
Well, that's a nice thing, right?
Netherlands speaks English better than some states in the Commonwealth, right?
So that's not enough. There's no core in the system. There's no common policy. There's nothing. There's literally nothing you can do to put Sri Lanka, Barbados, and Canada in the same block politically.
There's nothing you can do.
And no one wants it, it's not going to happen.
Tobi;
Would it be a worthwhile economic project though?
Maybe something like NAFTA? Or…
Rasheed;
No, it would not be. Again, you import things from China, not from, you know, the UK. So if China is not inside the bloc, the goods don't change prices. Also, you export to the US and there's no way the US is going to give you preferential taxes.
Tobi;
We are seeing things flaring up in the Middle East.
There's Russia and Ukraine.
There's Sudan, Central African Republic that is getting really ugly. Do you see a sort of global conflict similar to, say, World War II in the next decade?
Rasheed;
It's obviously very difficult to predict things like that.
If we were to assign a probability, maybe 5% chance, which is, I think, too high, but perhaps 5% chance in a decade.
A decade's not that long, so probably 5% chance.
Tobi;
Final question, which is kind of a tradition on the show. What's the one idea that you would like to see spread everywhere?
It might be your idea. It might be something you're working on. It might be an idea from anywhere.
But what is that one idea that you would like to see gain a lot of prestige, like to see spread, like to see have a lot more influence?
Rasheed;
Small countries should get Rid of Their Local Currency and Use the US Dollar.
Tobi;
Why?
Rasheed;
It is better for them because it doesn't allow their governments to monetarily finance the deficit. It allows you to have more economic freedom because you are not constrained by local capital controls. It also allows obviously low inflation because the U.S. inflation will be there for your inflation. And I trust the U.S. Central Bank a lot more than I trust Nigeria Central Bank, for example. And also it allows you to trade a lot more easier because you don't have to worry about currency exchange risk.
In terms of foreign investment, that's also a lower barrier to entry because foreign investors don't have to worry about things going, spiraling around in Nigeria where they have high inflation, they have exchange rate risk, or if, for example, the government decides, okay, we are going to put laws so you can't take your money out of the country.
So dollarisation is the general term that's used to call this concept I'm talking about. It’s actually one of the most pro-liberal, pro-free market, pro-freedom policies a country can do that doesn't actually require that much work.
Tobi;
That's interesting.
Thank you very much, Rasheed. It's been fantastic talking to you.
Rasheed;
You're very welcome.
This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe -
In this episode, I had a conversation with economic historian Johan Fourie, who is a professor of economics at Stellenbosch University, and the author of one of the most enjoyable books on economic history called Our Long Walk to Economic Freedom. We spoke about the resurgence of economic history, particularly in Africa. Johan attributes this revival to multiple factors, including an interest in understanding past economic patterns, technological advancements enabling data analysis, and scholarly work drawing global attention to the field. We discuss Africa's economic development, noting the continent's reliance on primary goods and the impacts of political and economic policies on growth. Johan stresses the heterogeneity within Africa and warns against generalizing the continent's economic narrative.
The discussion then delves into the role of ideas in shaping economies, with a focus on industrial policy. Johan highlights the importance of empirical evidence in policymaking and warns against the potential misuse of industrial policy for political gains. He emphasizes the need for a more inclusive research ecosystem in Africa, advocating for better representation and the promotion of economic history as a vital sub-discipline.
Johan also addresses the importance of economic freedom, defining it in simple terms and discussing its implications in policy decisions. He touches on the challenges of racial history and representation in academia, emphasizing the need for diverse voices and a marketplace of ideas for better policy formulation.
Finally, Johan discusses the optimism inherent in economic history, acknowledging the significant progress humanity has made while remaining cautiously hopeful about the future. He advocates for policies that ensure the equitable distribution of the benefits of increased productivity, highlighting the potential of new technologies to contribute positively to Africa's economic growth.
Transcript
Tobi;
Welcome Johan. It's good to talk to you. I guess where I’ll start is economic history is enjoying a bit of a renaissance, I'd say. Personally, for me, I'll say in the last five years I've read more economic history books and papers than actual economics itself. So I just want to ask you, what was the turning point, at least in recent time, why does economic history seem to be having a moment or its moment right now?
Johan;
I think there are many answers to that question. I'll focus on African economic history because I think that's something, firstly, that I know a little bit of, and secondly, that the factors that affect African economic history might be slightly different than those that make economic history attractive to, kind of, global audience.Although I do think your sentiment is true also for for global economic history, that there's certainly been a resurgence in interest. Of course, they were previous episodes where this also happened in the 1960s there was a great interest in econometrics, but that kind of died down by the 80s and 90s. And certainly I think in the last decade or two that's made a comeback, but certainly in African economic history, also by the 60s and 70s, for different reasons, again, because of the end of the colonial period and many Africans being interested in their own economic pasts; it was, you know, certainly intended to improve the development outcomes of many of these countries. And so studying what had happened in the past became important. And then by the 80s, you know, for reasons like the shift in history towards more cultural aspects of African history and, perhaps, also, to some extent, the fact that economics became more technical, more mathematical.
The fields really, economic history really, had kind of dialed down interest in Africa's past, but perhaps also to some extent, the fact that many African countries were struggling to grow. And so there was little interest in understanding of why these things had persisted. But by the 2000s, of course, African growth turned around and, you know, this is a continent [where] there were several countries that were growing quite rapidly and you had this covers of The Economist and Time magazine and all that was talking about Africa Rising, all these things, but also, I think, an interest by scholars, often scholars based outside of Africa, to understand this resurgence or what Morten Jerven called the, kind of, recurring African growth. So we know actually in the past that this had happened, that there were periods of growth. But understanding why there are these fluctuations became quite important. And then that combined with the ability to transcribe large historical data sets. Find many of these sources in African archives and then transcribe them and analyze them. So access to computing power also.
So it was both from a demand side like interest in Africa's past and also the supply side, the fact that they were now tools that would help us analyze what had happened in the past, that really kind of created this resurgence or Renaissance as some might call it. Of course, you know, initially led by economists in some of the leading universities. Work by, you know, James Robinson and Acemoglu, Nathan Nunn who wrote a book on slavery that was quite prominent and really pushed interest into the field. And so various kinds of groups of people, you might kind of think of them as two types, the one with the economists interested in kind of causal persistence studies. So thinking of how past shocks still affect the present outcomes and others, who're more kind of classically more like an old school economic historians that are interested in actually understanding long term patterns. So thinking of wages or standards of living or trade statistics that are actually trying to collect them and rebuild them for many African countries, because we don't actually have long term series for many of the regions across Africa. So I think that's really the main reason why we see this kind of renewed interest. And you can see that in, you know, participation of African Economic History Network meetings where you see papers maybe 10 or 15 in the early 2010s. And now you have, you know, the most recent conference in Pretoria was about 100 people attending. So it's a really massive growth in the participants and researchers trying to study Africa's past.
Tobi;
What immediately comes to mind, and when I talk to people, ordinary Africans, I should say, is that how did Africa sort of missed the boat on prosperity? I mean, as you said in your answer, growth has been recurring in Africa, but it has not been sustained enough for Africa to really join that group of countries that had a sustained growth spurt for decades. It happened a little bit in Latin America. Of course, East Asia is the most famous example of this. I mean from history what happened in Africa?
Johan;
Yeah, I think the thing to stress is that Africa's experience has been quite different from, say, you know, a Western Europe, or if you want to take the kind of country where it'll started… this sustained period of economic growth - Britain or, you know, England more specifically. So what you find is you also find periods of quite rapid growth in Africa. But then, as you've just mentioned, there are periods of stagnation or even decline in many countries. I mean, that's a very valid question, is why is that? And again, there are, you know, a myriad of different reasons. I think one of the things that one should keep in mind is that Africa's economies are often tied very closely to kind of mineral resources, and even before that, before the mineral era, to cash crops. And these prices often fluctuate quite a lot. And so you would find periods when there's a boom cycle, you would find obviously countries doing quite well. But then when these prices collapse, then of course these countries suffer. So that's a very obvious reason. And of course there are other countries in the world that also are tied to kind of cash crops or minerals, and they seem to have experienced less of this. And that is also, of course, true.
But it's worth keeping in mind that for many African countries, they have a pretty short history of independence. So it's really only in the last 70 years or so that African countries are independent and where the economic policies are not determined by some, you know, European power. Of course, you can think of pre-colonial times before the kind of mid-19th century, but even then, these were mostly kind of subsistence based or focused on trade in commodities, cash crops and, even before that, of course, in slave individuals. So it's really only in the last 70 years that we can think really of kind of modern economic growth in many of these economies. And then, for example, think about industrialization, you know, growth of manufacturing and more recently, service industry. But many countries are still very much tied to primary sector exports and therefore are closely correlated to these international price fluctuations. So that's kind of one reason.
Of course, one could also think of political economy reasons that we see quite also large fluctuations in terms of political regimes. Often we find coups that undermine kind of longterm economic planning. Many people will also argue that, you know, there was involvement of international organizations setting certain rules for African countries, certainly in the 1980s and 1990s [that] put them on a different trajectory. But I think the kind of point is that actually many African countries were relatively young and therefore tied to very much primary goods exports and it's only really in the last 3 or 4 decades where we could see this kind of shift. And in fact, by the 2000, when we do see some growth, I suspect we do see lower levels of fluctuations than we did, say, 50 years earlier. So maybe we’re just too soon yet to think of African countries as echoing some of the trends that we would see elsewhere in Europe, maybe from the early 20th century.
Tobi;
I want you to, like, disentangle this for me a little bit more. So I'll give you one example. There is a famous graph. I think I've made my own versions of it as well of income per capita growth, say, for Nigeria in 1960 and, say, South Korea. And you could see this huge difference as time goes on.
Johan;
Yeah.
Tobi;
And you speak to an average African, and especially in today's world, what you hear is that why can't it be here? You know, what is so different about Africa, especially given the experience of other countries that started seemingly at the same level over the same time period, same 60 years or 50 years, or however it is you want to slice and dice it? So really, what are the factors that we can point at? Because, I mean, this leads to various speculative theories, whether it is culture, corruption or the kind of leaders we have, you know, so many things. So just disentangle for me, what makes Africa… I don't want to say different, but why has growth really been sluggish?
Johan;
Yeah.
Tobi;
Because people are impatient.
Johan;
Yeah.
No, no, and I understand fully the impatience. I mean, I'm also impatient. Right. And so when I was a student we had many of these issues and now we still have many of these issues and then, you know, you study economics often with the hope to help improve [the] living standards of people obviously in [your] own area, own country, but also across the continent. And yet, you know, it doesn't happen as fast as you hoped it would. I think the one thing to say, first up, is to say Africa is obviously a large continent. So there's also a large variation within the continent. And I think we tend to forget this.
You know, we treat Africa quite often and when I say we, I think scholars often treat Africa is a kind of homogeneous place when we talk about Africa or sub-Saharan Africa. But in fact, there are many, many lessons on the continent where different countries experience very different things at different times. They might be, you know, a stereotype of, in the 80s and 90s things were bad, in 2000 things were better. And so, you know, a generalization guess. But even within that, you know, the fastest growing country in the world in the 1980s and 1990s was Botswana. So there are exceptions to that rule. And I think those are the helpful exceptions, because they help us understand that perhaps these things are not kind of cross-cultural. Right. So it's not the Africa dummy, for example, the famous 1990s papers that try to understand this coefficient that was called the Africa dummy that you would always throw in in Africa coefficient and it would come out negative. And so it seemed to be this universal truth that there were something different about Africa. And the kind of underlying message was that it was something wrong with Africa. But in fact, you know, again, if you look at within continent variation and even within country variation, you find very different stories that there are certain places that are doing quite well and others that are not. And so it can't be just some unilateral thing that's true for the entire continent.
But you are indeed correct, right? So if you look at 1950, 60, South Korea versus African countries, that many African countries, cities, the labour, the average wage rate of unskilled labor in African cities were higher than those in South Korea or several other Asian countries. And so what has happened in the last 50, 60, 70 years that meant that, you know, South Koreans became much more prosperous versus Africans? I think the one thing leads back a bit to the earlier conversation we had about minerals in Africa, had minerals and focused on cash crops. Again, Africa's geography means that there's a lot of variation and so different countries focus on different things. In South Korea, what many thought was a disadvantage in that they weren't any minerals. agriculture is not a main export commodity for South Koreans, which meant that they we're almost forced to go the industrialisation manufacturing route. Right. So focus a lot on education, perhaps bringing in some imports that will allow them to disentangle those things and rebuild them much cheaper and then export them. So an export-oriented view of their industrial policy versus African countries that often try to do their own thing.
They say, well, we're going to substitute our imports. We're not going to import. We try and build our own factories here, produce our own cars here, models very similar to what had happened in Latin America, which, you know, clearly wasn't the kind of successful model that many had hoped it would be. And so it's in some sense a policy decision of what had happened, what was available, and the potential for growth choosing a sector that perhaps in Africa means some growth in some years. Right. So the minerals again, but in other years stagnation and decline, whereas South Koreans would shift their focus towards really building on the inputs that are necessary for an industrial society. So focusing on education, it's not to say that it wasn't education in Africa in the 50, 60s and early 70s. There was a lot of spending on it. To some extent perhaps too much almost on basic education and too little on the higher education, which is also like those incredibly valuable technical skills that you need mathematics, engineering, you know, to build a manufacturing base. So it's a policy choice. And it, again, kind of linked to the fact that there wasn't immediate successes, meant that there was always an opportunity for political rivals to make the case that change is too slow. Right. So we see in Ghana, for example, Kwame Nkrumah comes to power with promises of growth and in fact does.
In the early 1960s we do see some growth, right, with advice from leading experts, investments in infrastructure, big plant, you know, massive dam that is built, hydropower, but that comes almost too slow. And a few months after the dam is completed, he is replaced in a coup. And so it's the frustration with the slow progress that ultimately puts Africa in this… well, I make the same mistake, generalisation. But in many African countries, you see this kind of process of growth and then kind of decline, stagnation, either because of declining prices, international prices, or because of local politics that intervene.
Of course, there are many other things to also add to that story, but I think that kind of summarizes it quite well. And the idea now, I think, is by the 2000s, we, again, see this surge in mineral prices. We see a surge in many African countries’ economic growth. But, you know, can that be sustained? In some cases we see in the 2010s it has been sustained. You know, Ethiopia was shifting towards a manufacturing base. Of course, there were other political concerns that had happened since. But in other places like Angola, you know, quite rapidly growing country, but then when the oil price collapsed, again, struggling. So, again, experiencing that volatility that is so characteristic of many African countries. I'm not sure if that answers your question, but that at least is. So, you know, I will just end by saying it's not just something that's innately Africa. I mean, think that's exactly the wrong conclusion to come to because that doesn't help us. Right? So that doesn't leave us with any policy interventions that we can, you know, lessons that we can learn. It basically seems like it's deterministic, it's fatalistic. In fact, that's just, I think, the wrong approach. I think it's really trying to understand what are, in fact, in each country, the reasons that we see growth and then stagnation, and then trying to understand what could be done differently now to prevent that from happening again.
Tobi;
I mean, I will say that I am also guilty of generalization, and I do take your point on variation very seriously. So when I do say Africa, just know that there's a caveat to that. Um, so let's talk a little bit about ideas and the role of ideas. Ideas do not exist in a vacuum. They do have influences. And also in my own experience, I've seen situations where you have scholars making arguments that are highly contextual to their environment, and you see those same ideas being used either in policy or as justification for an existing policy here in Africa, I would say in Nigeria more personally to my own experience. So I'll take one example with industrial policy which is back in fashion right now, and you see arguments from … I mean also quite relevant to a recent blog post. Industrial policy is really, really, sexy right now. It's in fashion and many people are talking about it in the context of what is happening in the United States, in Europe, in China. But the point is, over here in Africa, in Nigeria specifically, we've been here before. Industrial policy works rather differently here. And what I mean by that is, it is very, very sensitive to capture, you know. But you do not get that carefulness when scholars are making such recommendations, you know, so it's always like industrial policy works and if you are against it, you are an ideologue. So the role of ideas, especially, also historically, post-independence, you talked about this a little bit in your book, how ideas influenced the trajectory of growth and social development generally in Africa, of course with variations, I know.
Johan;
Oh, yeah.
And I think that's a great point, is that ideas do matter. Right. And sometimes you do feel like you're swimming against the tide when you make a case for, you know, let's use the example of industrial policy, when you make a case for, well, we should be cautious for using certain industrial policies in countries like South Africa or Nigeria, when, you know, you're indeed right that everyone seems to be on the bandwagon of yes, industrial policy can work and should be implemented if you are at all concerned about, you know, development or growth. And that's very difficult. And I must also add that you're also right that politicians in a very rational way, from their perspective, abuse some of these ideas, right? So they choose which ideas suit them in a specific context. You can always find an economist that, you know, would be able to convince you of a certain policy. Right. If you think of kind of labour policy like minimum wages, you can find economists that will say, yes, minimum wages is a great thing. And then you would find someone that would cite the first year textbook saying, no, it's a terrible thing, right?
My hope, I guess, and I'm not sure this is in fact viable, but it is that we move increasingly towards a more empirically based, and certainly economics has done that over the last two decades. To focus on what can we actually prove? Maybe we've gone a little bit too far. But the idea that we can actually test whether, you know, something like a minimum wage works is a very useful way of saying, okay, well, instead of focusing too much on theory and making certain assumptions and thinking what might happen, let's see what has happened in the past and potentially then make decisions based on that. Industrial policy, in fact, as you say, that there's a new literature on this, and many of these scholars actually make the same claim and say that we haven't actually indeed tested the impact of industrial policies to any great extent. And the cases where it has happened, we find actually evidence that in some cases it worked and in others it hasn't. And so understanding when it works and when you know when to say works mean really leads to actually, you know, economic growth and where it really seems to have made very little difference.
We need to understand why that is. And this is really where history is very valuable, that you can construct the theory and test it in one setting, and it seems to have a positive impact. But if you use that same theory and test it somewhere else and it doesn't, then clearly we need something more in that theory, right? We need to have the factors that affect the success, the outcome of these policies. We need to understand what they are. And this is really where context, I think, is incredibly important. I think some of that just to, kind of, you know, make the point about industrial policy. One of the things that seem that these new authors, [when] I say new authors, they, you know, they are not young authors necessarily, but they’re returning a discussion on industrial policy that, perhaps, was lost for a decade or two. I think what they have now agreed on is that, [and] one of the things that I find striking is that actually it's more likely to work in big countries than in small countries, and that almost all countries in Africa are small. And so that's something very important think to take note of, which also to me is a signal that we should be more cautious than optimistic about the likely effect of these policies. But as I've just said previously, politicians tend to also abuse, you know, these things. And certainly from a political economy perspective, for a politician, an industrial policy seems like something that can sell to voters. So to say that I am going to build a, you know, special economic zone and we're going to attract X number of jobs. And, you know, I'm going to be at the ceremony where I can cut the ribbon and show you that this has been done. That is a very, very attractive thing. Whether that actually in 5 or 10 years down the line have any impact, that's a very separate thing. And by the end, the politician’s probably not really in the game anymore.
And I think, my sense is, I'm not sure this is what the authors have said, but my sense is that that is far more likely to happen in a small country than in a much bigger economy. So that's partly why I think in smaller countries, with smaller I don't necessarily mean, you know, few people, I mean low GDP per capita, I think politicians have a greater ability to exploit the weaknesses of industrial policy than in larger economies. And so that's why I am a little bit wary of these policies. That's, again, not to say that the state shouldn't have any involvement in the economy. Right. So they are certainly places where the state, of course, it should provide public infrastructure. Right. So, you know, no private sector should just have 100% authority on what infrastructure is built. The state has an incredibly important role there, and that inevitably does imply industrial policy. If you choose between an airport or a harbour or, you know, new a telecommunications cable or whatever, that's an industrial choice that you make. So it's inevitable that you're going to make industrial policy choices. But I think where it gets to policies here where you can have politicians exploit that for their own benefit, I think one should be very cautious, right, where it’s, you know, favoring certain industries with tax policies or these kinds of things that just seems like you're setting yourself up for failure.
Tobi;
I mean, still on that particular idea and the role of ideas generally, one could also come to my mind and that I'd like you to help me understand historically is the issue of state control. Because I mean, like the title of your book, and a theme that you consistently explored throughout the book, the importance of economic freedom seem to be something that a lot of African countries struggle with.
There is an overwhelming sense that the state has to be involved in everything, not just the political life, the economic life, the social life. And sometimes I find that very contradictory, especially given the history of repression that happened all over the continent with slavery and colonialism. So how has this evolved into what it is now? Why is economic freedom or the idea of freedom generally, but don't want to see freedom because no democracy is quite popular. You cannot struggle to find democratic movements anywhere in Africa. So, but, especially getting the government relatively out of the economic life, why is it such — sometimes you feel like it's a taboo idea. It's almost unAfrican to even suggest it. You’re labelled a libertarian or a neoliberal. You are someone that is bringing unrealistic ideas that is not African.
Johan;
Yeah.
Tobi;
So, where did that come from?
Johan;
Yeah. So I think that's a great, great question. It's something that I've thought about a lot. And sadly I don't think I have an easy answer. I think where economic history can help… So so let me start with economic freedom before I get to where history can help is, you know, there are many different definitions of what economic freedom is. Mine would be very simple. And that is that you've got the freedom to choose what you produce, how much you produce and what you consume, and how much you consume and from whom you consume. And so that's a very simple definition, but it's a very valuable definition when you think about any state policy or government policy. You know, if there's an increase in taxes, does that remove people's freedom to produce or consume, or does it add to their freedom to produce or consume? Almost always, when the state enacts a new policy, it seems like it removes people's freedom. If you raise the tax rate, obviously, so let's say you've got a value added tax, if you increase that, obviously you remove people's ability to consume, right? Because they now have to pay more to the government. And so prices increase and therefore they can consume less.
Industrial policy often means that it benefits one sector, but at the cost of others. Then you have to weigh up the freedoms to produce for different sectors in the economy. In my own country, of course, for very long, black South Africans before 1994, they were forced to live in certain areas. They were forced to own certain land in certain areas, they were forced to buy from certain retail stores and not from others. So it's a very, very clear limitation on their economic freedom and the, kind of, to some extent, ironies of post 1994 is that for the area that was considered white South Africa before 1994, these freedoms, well, these unfreedoms were removed. So they gained the freedom, black South Africans in those areas, but actually in many of the former homelands, the previous unfreedoms, right, so, because, again, there, you're not allowed to own private property in many of those places, there is traditional systems that stood in place, property owning systems, you actually see that those unfreedoms have remained.
So if you look at a map of South Africa today, a third of South Africans still live in the former homelands, the only way you really escape from those unfreedoms is if you move to the cities, right? And so it's a very useful way, I think, to think about the underlying things that allow you to prosper. The underlying factors, the ability to consume and produce what you want. You know, the kind of classic Adam Smithian invisible hand that should be able to be dictated by market forces. Now, again, that's not to say that the state has no role to play, but every additional policy that the state intervenes with does have limitations on freedom, and one should keep that in mind. Now, of course, you know, certain state policies promotes freedom, right? So in South Africa we have a large grant system. So we tax the very wealthy part of the population. It's actually one of the largest transfers anywhere in the world. We tax the rich and we provide grants, 350 rands a month, to the poorest of the poor. A very well targeted grant, I must add as well. So that lifts the freedom of the poorest, which is correct. Right. That's exactly what the purpose is. It provides them with some form of income which allows them to buy the basic necessities. So I would argue that actually a pro-freedom policy, even though it's a state policy, it's not determined by the markets. But in many other cases, we find where policies are actually doing the opposite. They actually promote coercive involvement in the economy. And actually that leads to inefficiency, which is, you know, terrible for promoting prosperity, for annihilating poverty, all of these kind of things that we actually care about.
And then to kind of get back to your question about whether this is, again, like, something very uniquely African, I don't think that it's something that is particular to this continent. I think even if you just look around the world today there are unfreedoms everywhere in many countries. But I also think if you just look in history and this is really why I think the study of economic history is so important, that this was true for almost any society before the 1800s. So, basically, the state was there to kind of coerce people into producing certain things and consuming certain things. And it's only through a very kind of slow process over decades and centuries that these freedoms were relaxed. Right? Often competing elites and, you know, the one elite will promote the freedom the other one wouldn't. And then ultimately, these economic freedoms were relaxed. It was combined with the opening up of democratic freedoms and political freedoms, which, as you have rightly mentioned, is something that is very valuable in Africa. Right. And that's exactly why we want to promote that further, right? That people ultimately have the right to vote against policies that limit their economic freedom. And so I am kind of optimistic that ultimately, you know, again, this won't happen next year or the year after, but that more democratic freedoms will lead to greater economic freedom. But of course, with kind of a large confidence bound. Right. So there will be some variations. Some countries will slip back becoming more authoritarian or coercive, and others will hopefully allow people their economic freedom. And then those should act as lessons for other countries who suffer from the poorer standards of living, to hopefully see what is happening elsewhere, and then learn from that and enact the right kind of policies.
Tobi;
My next question is a bit of a two part question. So the first part would be if you look at the policy circle today, I'll say it's been, you know, monopolised by the development industry or development community. So you do not get a sense that policymakers think that we can learn anything from economic history. So if you can just tell me a few things that you think economic history can teach us, especially on development.
Johan;
Yeah. I think you're right to say that there are many policymakers who don't even know about economic history. So maybe that's a good start, right?
Tobi;
Yeah.
Johan;
Ecause it's not a field, a subdiscipline of economics that is very well known. But I think to make the case for it is to say, we are all humans and often the only way we learn is by telling stories. If you're a politician and you cite statistics to an audience, no one's going to remember the statistics, right? Then certainly if you tell them something about economic theory, they're not going to remember that, but they are going to remember stories. I mean, I think politicians know this very well. […] has called this analogical reasoning. So you take some event in the past and you turn it into a story analogy for today, and you repeat that story, and then people tend to get on board. Right. And so the famous example, of course, is the Great Depression that was used as an analogy for the Great Recession in 2007. You know, Ben Bernanke, who had been a student of the Great Depression, could tell that story to policymakers, to the public, and convinced them that, actually, what happened in the 1950s, you know, there were these different policy interventions that were illthought through and ultimately had bad consequences, and we should do something different. So quantitative easing in 2007/08 was the, kind of, response to that. And, in fact, that was why it turned out to be a recession and not a deep depression for many years.
So those I think are valuable. So your question is about, you know, what do we learn about development? You know, this is massively broad. So but I want to return to the to the industrial policies of Latin America and to some extent many African countries. Where you find these import substituting policies that were implemented. This idea that, you know, we should make our own stuff, we should build our own cars, we should build our own manufacturing, our toys, our own manufactured goods. And then that will give us, you know, the factories that will ultimately lead to an industrial workforce and, you know, make us prosperous. That's a very attractive story to tell, right. And think, by the 1950s, many of the leaders in Latin America and in 60s in Africa could tell these stories because they could witness what had happened, say in the Soviet Union, maybe even an illinformed opinion about what was happening in China. And this gave them the stories to convince their electorate or their constituents that this was really the way forward. Right. And the attraction there that it's an active intervention, right, that we can do something about it as a state rather than just say, you know, laissez-faire and things would go on as normal. The sad reality is that, actually, agriculture in Africa was doing quite well by the 1950s and 60s. It would have been far more sensible thing to support those sectors - and these were African farmers doing very well, they were producing for the international market, they were exporting their goods - instead of taxing them.
So, what was the ultimate implementation of the policy was that agriculture got taxed with the intention to build these factories of manufactured goods that were clearly, you know, inefficient and failed dismally. But in fact, if agriculture had been supported, you could have imagined a very different outcome. And I think that's really a lesson that hopefully we don't see a repeat of what we did in the 1950s and 60s. But there are, of course, many, many other lessons as well. Education. You can think of health spending. You can think of various kinds of monetary policies and, you know, high levels of debt. With the expectation that they will be very high growth many countries borrowed excessively. And then when the growth didn't materialize, then, of course, they fell into massive debt and they had to cut back and there were all these structural adjustment programs.
So almost in any subfield of economics I think there are lessons from the past that you can learn. I think that the challenge that economic historians have is to sell those, right, to sell those lessons in a way that is attractive to a policymaker and to a broader public, because I don't think there's enough of us that's trying to do this. This is partly what I'm trying to do through the blog. But of course, you know, this is only one blog and I don't have any direct links to governments, but I hope that there would be a new generation of African economic historians who would be able to do that, that would be able to tell these stories. And so, you know, I've studied what happened in Ghana. There's great work being done by Emanuel [...], for example, at Harvard on this period. And so taking those lessons and saying, you know, what is it that we can learn from this for industrial policy today? I think that would be a wonderful contribution to economics, rather than simply saying, okay, you know, let's just look at what economic theory tells us. Not to say that that's unimportant, but I don't think that's how you sell policy interventions to politicians, because ultimately what they want is they want the narrative, they want the story - how do I convince my electorate or my constituents that this is the right thing to do? And so we need to be storytellers. And I think Africans are great storytellers. We just need to tell the right stories. So, hopefully we can see that happening in the next couple of years.
Tobi;
One of the things I like most about your work is not just the output itself, but the kind of research ecosystem that you're building around you, and how do we get more of that in Africa? How do we expand the research ecosystem? Not in an exclusionary way, but I think it helps bring the evidence, the practice, closer to the policy and the politicians and the other people of social influence that matters. So, what are the levers to pull to expand economic research, scientific research and other things in Africa generally?
Johan;
Yeah, I think there are multiple levels to answer that question. The first is, I mean, if there are any listeners that are keen, you know, that are economists or historians and keen on economic history, then signing up to the African Economic History Network, for example, where every year there's a conference and that network is supported by some of the leading economic historians of Africa, often based in Europe or the US, some also on African soil. And that is a scholarly environment where you can really get to the frontier of what is happening in the field. So that would be a great first step, I think, even for students, right, that are, you know, keen to follow this kind of path of economics or economic history and just to see what's happening at the frontier. So that would be. But of course, and I've mentioned before, there is quite a lot of, still, education spending and high levels of literacy in Africa. But often where we lack is the higher education level, and even at the higher education level, we don't really see this kind of broad-based approach rather than a focus on specialisation. So I do think that there's scope for African universities to expand their offering of economic history specifically, but also focus on economics.
And here I should mention, Leonard Wantchekon at Princeton, who is investing an incredible amount of time and resources in building what he calls the African School of Economics, right? So he started in Benin and then expanded to other West African countries and now he's also planning to do this in East Africa and Southern Africa, which is an incredible, you know, achievement to build these universities from scratch, to engage students in there, and then hopefully some of the best students, to send them to the US, to top universities. And to build, really, a cohort of new trained economists in some of the frontier fields of their disciplines. And hopefully those economists could either stay in the US and train more students or come back to Africa and become policymakers themselves, or at least interact with policymakers. So that's at the kind of the macro level.
At the micro level, I would say just getting more people interested in economic history, turning economic history into courses that economists can take. There's a wonderful textbook produced by the African Economic History Network that is freely accessible on the website that would serve an undergraduate course very well. I would also note that my book textbook, of course, would be able to do that. But there are resources available, and the hope is that more Africans actually access it. The wonderful thing is, if you look at the statistics of these textbooks, most of them do come from Africa. So that's really great, so it is already being used, but that's a very kind of at the undergraduate level. And the hope is that more graduate students in economics specifically would take up economic history, an interest in economic history, and then do their PhDs, you know, somewhere in Europe or the US, and then return.
And think at the macro level, Wantchekon’s African School for Economics is a great model that can be expanded across the continent, where you can have a large cohort of really excellent students. And I'm not saying that, you know, those are the only universities where you can study, of course, Stellenbosch and UCT and University of Pretoria, all are great universities to also study it. And then of course move to the US or Europe where you can do a PhD, but ultimately build up the capacity at that very high level of specialization, where you can interact with policymakers and say, you know, these are the lessons that I've studied or that my peers have studied, and that we can now replicate and ensure that the policies are at least not disastrous. I think that's almost often the best we can hope for, is that we just make sure that we don't implement terrible policies.
No policy, I don’t think, you know, a single policy will be able to turn a country around. But what it certainly can do is to destroy a country's economy. So we should just make sure that, at least, the lessons we learned from the past helps us to not implement those terrible ideas that often quite popular and can sell to an audience, but that we try and avoid them as much as possible.
Tobi,
Final set of questions. Um, so this question is motivated by a recent experience I had which is rather depressing, I should say. So I was planning a conference and I wanted to invite a very prominent scholar, I'm not going to mention his name, who is also South African, and the organizers basically said no, because he's a white South African. So I want to ask you, how have you being able to navigate that as a historian who ask and study the questions that you do, given the racial history of that country and apartheid?
Johan;
Yeah, that's a great question. So, of course, I understand something about the history of South Africa that allows me to acknowledge that, you know, I am fortunate to be in a place where I can do research, where many other South Africans who would have probably been equally or better researchers don't have that opportunity. So that's the first thing, is to say that in South Africa, it remains a very unequal place, often very clearly along racial lines, although not exclusively so. But understanding that it is a privilege to do research, that's a very important point to start from. And so that also allows me to set agenda, research agenda, where many South Africans who would probably be, again, focused on different things in doing research, are not able to do so. Right. So one, I think, important aspect of that is that I try and build a group of scholars and, at least, some of that at Stellenbosch, but but not exclusively at Stellenbosch, where we do try and make economic history accessible to a larger cohort or a more representative cohort of scholars. And that's difficult to do because, you know, as economists, we understand market attractions. And so, if you're a black South African student, to remain in academe is almost an irrational decision because the private sector will simply pay you much, much more certainly as an economist than what we can pay you at a university. So these are not easy problems to solve. If they were easy, we would certainly have done so already. But it is something that I tend to think about a lot. Right? We want to make the field as broadly accessible as possible, of course, with the focus on the exceptional. So we want to bring in the exceptional students from all across South Africa to do research with us.
I think in asking certain questions, I think there are certain topics where I certainly know that I'm not an expert in, and therefore I would make sure that I am not the one who try and write the expert pieces on this. Right? So I, for example, would not be the one studying Nigerian economic history simply because I think you need a lifetime almost of research to know the diversity of Nigeria's both current society and historical trajectory. And the same is true for many other West African countries. So much of my own research is focused actually on South Africa, and even in fact more narrow on the Cape Colony, simply because I do have a little bit of that historical awareness of the different influences of our own place, of our place here in the Western Cape of South Africa. So I think it's important to have that awareness that, you know, I'm not an expert on all aspects of African economic history. And certainly, I don't think anyone can be given what I've mentioned before about the diversity of the continent.
What I do think I can add is, again, this emphasis on making economic history an important subdiscipline of economics. So more than just the pure content of producing new research on a specific area or other specific time period, it is to emphasize how important understanding our contexts are and then making that accessible to a broader audience. And think there are wonderful scholars already doing some of that, historians doing great work in writing more broadly accessible histories of Africa. And of course, I would challenge some of my historian colleagues to say that I think more economic history should be included there, and some of the latest research can really help in doing that. But, you know, my position here at Stellenbosch is really to try and encourage as much, and a kind of inclusive, broad-based research endeavor, and in helping that research or supporting that research to become accessible to a broader audience, both public audience and policy making audience.
I mean to, kind of, you know, get back to your very sad example is, I mean, to some extent understand the response that they are representative claims in who should inform policy and given Africa's history for how long, you know, white scholars or European scholars have acted as if they, you know, understand exactly the local context and have a full grasp of local knowledge and how that was, you know, illfitted to the advice that they gave, just simply didn't fit the kind of local context. So I think one needs to be aware of that history. Right. It will certainly be wrong to ignore that and say, you know, this is a move that, for whatever reason, seems illogical. I don't think it's completely illogical. I think history matters in explaining this behavior. What I hope is that there will be multiple voices, so that people can interact with one another, that it's not simply only one group or one person or, you know, one ideology we can pick and the others are not allowed, but that there will be engagement. And, in fact, that’s exactly what you are doing now is a great example of that, that there would be engagement and that we could be able to listen to one another and think all… well, maybe not everyone's voice. It's difficult to incorporate everyone's voice, if we say that. But ultimately, I think there should be a market for ideas, right? And ultimately the right idea with the right empirical support should be the one that wins out. And the only way we establish that is to contest ideas in this marketplace. And if we don't allow that, then sadly, I think we are going to sometimes hit it lucky and we can have the right idea for the right time and great. But often, more than often, we're going to miss the right idea and then the consequences would be sad. So i think that's the way I would think about it.
Tobi;
Mhm. I mean, I realize I could spend another hour barraging you with questions, but I think market for ideas is a good way to close this out. So my last question would be: what's the one idea, it may be something you're working on, may be an idea from someone else, but what's the one idea that you think deserves to be more popular, deserves to be more influential? It could be anything. What's that one idea for you?
Johan;
Oh, it's a tough question. I guess if you asked me a week ago, I would have one, and the next week I would have another. But let me try. I think there's a really fascinating area of research and this is I mean, might even to some [seem] quite controversial, but I think it's the idea of beliefs, of how much beliefs matter in shaping our economic behavior, and when I say “our”, I mean both at an individual level and at a kind of group or society level. And there's some wonderful work that's been done on the DRC, on the Democratic Republic of Congo by some Harvard economists. And that's been expanded now to other settings also outside of Africa. But understanding why people believe certain things, so, again, this obviously has close ties to history. So, you know, to what extent, for example, does the slave trade affect people's beliefs today or colonialism affect people's beliefs today, or, you know, access to education that might have changed certain beliefs in the past and now is reflected still in the present. Simply because one belief, to mention a single, you know, there are many different kinds of beliefs across the world, but there’s something that I would call the monopoly mindset. It's actually a blog post that's coming out soon, but it's basically this idea that the world is a zero sum game. So for you to win, I need to lose. And this seems to be quite prevalent across the world, but also in Africa. And so I want to understand firstly, how prevalent is this? Because if that is true, right, if people think the world is a zero sum game, then that also means that they would be unlikely to be entrepreneurs because basically what then believe is entrepreneurs must exploit, you know, either their workers or someone.
You must basically obtain profits that you make from some other poor soul that then loses out. Which is, of course, you know, the world is a positive sum game that entrepreneurs are profit seeking, yes, but the profit is simply a signal that they’re doing something right. That the market really enjoys the product or the service that they deliver. Right. And ultimately, we've seen over the last two centuries remarkable increases in our material welfare. So the world as a whole has become fabulously rich, 18 times more prosperous than they were 200 years ago. And even in the poorest places in Africa, you see that the average person is almost six times as affluent as they were 200 years ago. So, you know, these are rough GDP per capita estimates, but in general, that is true, right? We live longer. We live with more access to various kinds of goods and services. So clearly the world must be a positive sum game and yet many people believe it isn't. So understanding how prevalent it is and then most importantly, what determines it. Right. So what causes people to believe that the world is a zero sum game? Or, you know, to have a monopoly mindset? And if we can understand that and then change that, we might open up a much larger and, hopefully, younger generation to the possibilities of progress. Right? So entrepreneurs, innovators, so it can unlock, in some sense all, of this and empower is probably a better word people with opportunities that the market society offer. And that really is to me a fascinating question. I'm not sure to what extent I would be able to contribute to that, but I think that's an idea worth studying, and especially if we then identify those factors. So it might be very difficult and intractable to study or to change. But if we do find those factors that can shift this mindset, then I think that's an incredibly powerful tool in the hands of a policy maker to build a prosperous society.
Tobi;
I realise I cannot let you go without asking you this question. And full disclosure, I'm trying to cheat because I'm currently writing a review of your book. So this is like me trying to cheat, in a way. So I find that attitude towards history, that is, speaking about beliefs and positive sums and zero sums… attitude towards history seem to be divided, in my opinion, between pessimism and optimism. And I like the strong opening in your book, especially with the metaphors of the monopoly game and Settlers of Catan. So do you think that history has an optimistic bias? Does history always favour the Optimist?
Johan;
So is the question whether it's historians that fail the optimist, or whether it’s the arc of history? So who… do the winners…
Tobi;
The long arc of history itself. Like, will things always be better?
Johan;
Yeah. No. Because, I think firstly, to answer the first one, I think historians are quite pessimistic people. So I don't think they’re necessarily…[laughs]
That's probably why often like we don't get to hear about economic history because it is an incredibly optimistic story to tell. Right. And so if you're a pessimist, you typically are not going to tell that story. But the point is that we have made incredible progress. Not to dismiss the fact that there are major challenges in the world today, of various kinds, but we are certainly living in a better world than we did 500 years ago. But the question is whether that will continue or not. And If I knew it, I would be rich. I don't know. The one thing I would say is that there were over the last two centuries, there have been multiple scholars, intellectuals, experts that have predicted the demise of societies or the end at least of this progress that we've seen. And they've been wrong every time.
So it would be a pretty bold move now for me here at the South of Africa to claim that, you know, progress is ended. Even though there certainly are a lot of people in the world that at the moment think that, you know, either progress is too fast or the consequences might be too negative and so we need a degrowth movement or something along those lines which which I think, you know, for someone living in any developing country would find quite strange. It would be very strange for me to go to a poor neighborhood in South Africa and convince people that your incomes shouldn't grow. That's a strange idea. So I think the one thing we have that's going for us is that most people, certainly in South Africa, would agree that we still need to grow. There's still a reason to have policies in place. We might disagree on the policies, but we still want policies that ultimately lead to economic growth. Yeah. So I think that's something worth keeping in mind.
And now I've completely lost track of what the initial question was. Oh, okay. This long arc of… whether we're going to make progress? At least we want still progress in South Africa. That's the point I wanted to make. And I think that's true for many other African countries. Whether we will achieve that, you know, I simply don't know. I hope so. I think they are major innovations that are fundamentally changing our productivity. In the book, I've mentioned Joel Mokyr’s two rules that we've learned. The two things that we've learned in history is the fact that we need to use our knowledge of science to make ourselves more productive. We are doing that at a rapid rate at the moment, we are learning things in bio sciences, in natural language processing. Between all of these things, we are learning things in robotics. And you know, we're flying to space at much cheaper rates than before. So we are learning in many different industries, things, and that will certainly make us more productive. So that's great.
The second rule is or the second lesson is that we should use those surpluses that we generate and ensure that everyone benefits from it. That might be more difficult. But again, the only way you do that is through kind of a democratic system, which again, even though there has been some coups and some shift back in political freedoms in Africa in the very recent past, I still am hopeful that, you know, ultimately we will implement policies that will allow those surpluses to be shared. But Acemoglu and Johnson in a very recent book, say that, you know, some of these innovations in AI are very limiting and they will only benefit a small few. I'm less pessimistic than that. I think the ability for every African, whether that's rich or poor to access these systems is incredible and so I certainly am of the view that they are massive gains to be had in productivity. And then my hope would be that we implement the right institutions that allow these surpluses, these benefits from this higher level of productivity to be shared more equitably across the distribution.
Tobi;
Thank you so much. It's been amazing talking to you.
Johan;
Thanks, Tobi. It was great being here.
This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe -
In this episode, I had a conversation with Kurtis Lockhart who is the executive director of Charter City Institute - a non-profit that thinks and executes governance models for cities to power developing economies into growth and productivity.
Our conversation started with an update on the concept of Charter Cities and how they differ from traditional models like Special Economic Zones (SEZs), particularly in the context of economic development. Kurtis describes Charter Cities as new cities with distinct governance models designed to drive sustained economic growth and alleviate poverty, primarily in lower-middle-income countries. This approach is seen as an alternative to the model first prescribed by the economist and Nobel Laureate Paul Romer, which involved a high-income country importing its governance to a low-income nation. Kurtis emphasizes a public-private partnership (PPP) model, where a host country collaborates with an urban developer, ensuring local involvement and sustainable development.
The conversation addresses concerns about Charter Cities being enclaves for the wealthy, clarifying that the Charter City Institute (CCI) focuses on broad-based economic growth and poverty alleviation. Kurtis highlights the importance of political buy-in and stability, acknowledging the challenges of expropriation and policy consistency across different political regimes. He suggests mitigation strategies like revenue-sharing agreements, equity stakes for host countries in city developers, and political risk insurance.
Discussing the geographical constraints, Kurtis acknowledges that location and economic geography play a crucial role in the success of Charter Cities. However, he argues that geographical advantages can evolve with changing technologies and transportation networks, as seen in historical examples like the Erie Canal.
Addressing concerns about existing urban challenges and inequalities, Kurtis talked about CCI's involvement in upgrading existing cities and supporting secondary cities, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, where most urban growth is anticipated. He shares plans to collaborate with Kenya's State Department for Housing and Urban Development to empower select secondary cities through the Special Development Zone initiative, leveraging their success as models for other cities.
Transcript
Tobi;
Welcome to Ideas Untrapped. It's fantastic to talk to you, Kurtis. I've been wanting to do this for a long time.
Kurtis;
Yeah. Thanks, Tobi. I know we've been trying to do this for a while. It's good to finally be on with you.
Tobi;
So let's start from the absolute basics. I'm trying not to get carried away because Charter Cities are something that sort of excites me as well. I should also say it annoys me, possibly in equal measure. So I'll try not to get carried away, but if you can just give me an elevator pitch, so to speak, but you can go as long as you want. What are charter cities and how are they relevant to issues surrounding economic development, particularly in the 21st century?
Kurtis;
Yeah, so thanks again. And I'll start at the highest level I can, and then you can ask more specific questions as we go on. So at the very basic level, the definition of charter cities is new cities with new rules to improve governance. And so why do we think that that's really important? Zooming out, the best way to lift people out of poverty at scale is through sustained economic growth over one, two, three, four- decades. That's what happened in East Asia, in Japan, in Taiwan and South Korea. It's what happened in China, and I think it's what's happening in India now. You then have to ask yourself, how do we increase economic growth rates over sustained periods of time? Economists are pretty agreed that the single greatest determinant of long-run economic growth rates is governance, right? It's institutions. And the problem with governance and institutions and getting good governance is many countries, especially across the global south, lower-middle income countries are, you could say, stuck in poor governance traps.
So the question becomes, okay, how do we reform and change this governance institutional structure to improve governance? It's really hard to do that, it turns out, at the national level. And so we see charter cities as a mechanism - a localised mechanism - in a concentrated geographic area where there are no incumbent or entrenched special interests in that localized area. You can get a lot deeper governance reforms at this local level and that gets people rich within that jurisdiction, within that concentrated space, number one, as well as number two, it's able to serve as a demonstration effect to the broader host country that then hopefully sees that demonstration effect and scales up those governance improving policies across the whole country. And this is what you saw in China when Deng Xiaoping instituted the opening up and reform in 1979-1980, with four Special Economic Zones in the south, Shenzhen being the most famous. But we can get into that if you want to later. Anyways, that's the high-level pitch.
Tobi;
Yeah. So for a lot of folks like me, and I'm sure some other people in the international development community when they hear charter cities, you immediately go back to Paul Romer, the Nobel Laureate economist Ted Talk in 2009. That's the popular conception of charter cities. But like you and your colleagues have reiterated over and over again that your model and the vision that you are pushing differs from that. Can you spell out the differences from Romer's charter city model?
Kurtis;
Yeah, I'm glad you asked this. So basically to go back first, so Paul Romer in 2009 gave his now pretty famous Ted Talk on charter cities, and he basically proposed that a high-income, well-governed country like a Canada come into a low-income, poorly governed country. His example was Honduras. Honduras would then cede [a] city-scale chunk of land to Canada. Canada would then, "import its good institutions" into that city-scale chunk of land and therefore that better governance within that concentrated piece of land would crowd in investment, it would spur business formation, job creation and sustained economic growth. That's the very high-level Romer model. And we can call that the Guarantor Model, [with] Canada as the foreign guarantor. CCI's model is different. We advocate for a public-private partnership between a host country and an urban developer, a city developer. So we don't think, number one, Romer's Foreign Guarantor model is either feasible or number two, very desirable.
Why isn't it feasible? I think you saw in the feedback in the response to Romer's Ted Talk. It smacked a lot of people - this foreign guarantor model smacked a lot of people as a form of neocolonialism. I don't think that's a very fair characterization, but still, it got taken by a lot of people in the international development world as a form of that. I don't think it's fair because charter cities as Romer proposed them were completely voluntarily entered into. It was a free choice among both parties to enter into these things, whereas colonialism was a form of coercion usually done at the barrel of a gun or through some sort of violence. So I don't think that's necessarily a fair critique, but it nonetheless was a critique and speaks to the feasibility of this model. I don't think it's desirable, number two, because I think a lot of the process of institution building needs to involve the host country in the institution building. And I think when you have a foreign guarantor like a Canada just stepping in and bringing in their institutions without involving or partnering with the host country, that kind of cuts off the learning and the muscle building that needs to happen in order for the host country to develop itself more broadly. So, we propose this public-private partnership because we think it's a lot more feasible, number one, especially if you're partnering as a host country with a domestic urban developer that knows the context and what‘s not. And then, number two, we think it's sustainable because developers they have an incentive to maximize land values over time. That's how they make their profits. How do developers maximize land values? They attract as many firms and residents to their cities as humanly possible. How do you do that? You create a fantastic city with urban amenities, good public goods and service provision, with a great business environment, so firms are attracted to locate there. So we think it aligns incentives in that way and also has a mechanism to be financially self-sustaining over time through the profit motive. So that's why we think our kind of PPP approach is both kind of more attractable and more desirable over time.
Tobi;
Okay, so another key distinction I like you to make before we go on is usually when we talk about charter cities, special economic zones come up a lot. Is there a particular distinction between a charter city and a special economic zone or multiple variations of SEZs like export processing zones, free trade zones and the likes?
Kurtis;
Yeah, so this is a great question. So really CCI's version of charter cities, this PPP model is what we can call the next generation of Special Economic Zones. So a lot of Special Economic Zones are restricted to what sectors can operate and get incentives in that zone. So there are textile zones or there are, you know, manufacturing zones or high-tech zones, etc. And then oftentimes these Special Economic Zones are small in scale, so they can be limited to smaller industrial parks where you don't really get the agglomeration benefits that come with bigger size urban agglomerations in cities. So the big differentiator between a charter city and Special Economic Zones is around those two things. So charter cities would be mixed-use developments. So it's not just industrial uses that are able to operate in the city, but also commercial uses and really importantly residential uses. Right? Because then you have people not just moving and commuting to a charter city for nine to five and then they all pile out of the charter city and leave it vacant overnight until the next workday like most special economic zones. Instead, these city cities are places where people not just work, but play and live as well. So you're generating those agglomeration effects that economists hold so dear.
[The] second is size. Right. I mentioned zones are often restricted and become like small industrial parks or export processing zones around ports. Charter cities are city-scale developments, right? And so the big one we use here is Shenzhen was technically called a Special Economic Zone, but it's really a proto-charter city because it was 326 square km (the zone). And this is what we're talking about when we're talking about city scale and you're able to get a lot more co-location of firms and people spillovers from that and then the positive effects of agglomeration can spin out from there. And then the third really important differentiation is decentralized or devolved powers to the charter city. A lot of the time when a zone has and is empowered to operate via a Special Economic Zone piece of legislation at the national level and when they figure out at the zone level that, okay, we got some of the provisions in this legislation wrong, we need to amend this legislation. In order to amend it, they got to go to higher tiers of government like the state level or the national level and negotiate and barter with the parliament for months or sometimes years to get these changes passed. And you and I know that that really stifles business dynamism that slows down an ability of a zone to adapt. And so we think by a charter city having devolved powers over things like business registration, land administration, land registration, immigration, taxation, things like these, and their ability to really adapt on the fly as the environment in that city changes, that'll allow the city to be a lot more dynamic to a rapidly growing city.
Tobi;
I know recently there was a Wired profile about a project you're working on in Nigeria. And one thing that also comes up a lot is, given the sort of informal or affiliation with the sort of libertarian seasteading community, how would you respond to people who say that charter cities are just a way for the rich people or people who don't like government to create an enclave for themselves and not live within the rules of a particular country? So, like, this is a libertarian non-state project so to speak. How would you respond to that?
Kurtis;
Yeah, I'm really glad you asked this because in that Wired article, we spoke with the journalists, we had a good conversation and kind of explained how CCI works with these projects, including Itana and E [Iyinoluwa Aboyeji]. The main push-back that I and CCI give when we're asked this question around, “Well, aren't charter cities just this libertarian kind of project for having political exit?”, is, no. These are co-development strategies [that] you enter into with the host country. As I said, CCI envisions charter cities as a public-private partnership between these urban developers and a host country. And again, I use the term charter cities in our version as the next generation of Special Economic Zones.
Special Economic Zones are a very common form of industrial policy used throughout the entire world. The vast majority of the world's countries have Special Economic Zones within them. There are some 5,500 zones across the world. Not to mention, you have complete UN agencies like the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) dedicated to pushing forward industrial parks and Special Economic zones. Right? And the UN is, like, the main upholder of sovereignty and sovereign nation-states across the globe. I don't think the UN would be involved in anything [that has to do with] subverting these nation states projects as that Wired piece suggested. So that's my main response - is like given most of the world's countries are engaged in these special economic zones that allow for unique rules within their own jurisdictions and given organizations like the UN are involved in promoting these special economic zones and industrial parks, the notion that these are a tool to undermine territorial sovereignty or get these “stateless vacuums” [which] is the term I think the article used is, I think, a total[ly] misleading exaggeration.
Tobi;
But again, I'm trying to look at the nuances here, because taking a broad view and a sort of micro view, at the same time, you've had circumstances or situations where even within the legitimacy of a sovereign state and a national government, a certain class of people who can't find ways to create different space for themselves where they don't have to experience dysfunctions, they don't have to interact with much of what is wrong or bad about the state itself. So how do charter cities, at least your model and your vision, sidestep some of this critique around, you know, inequality, class differences and things that regularly come up, especially low-income countries?
Kurtis;
So I would, number one, grant that some of these new city projects proposed around the world, they're like real estate development projects that are kind of catering to higher income segments. So I'm not going to deny that there are projects that some developers are making that are kind of totally marketed towards being enclaves for the rich. Those exist. Those are not something that CCI cares about, right? Those are real estate projects. We're interested in these city developments. Our vision is to empower these new cities with better governance, to lift tens of millions of people out of poverty. So if we're not having an impact on poverty alleviation and we're solely engaged with projects that only focus on the rich, we're not achieving our mission or our vision. I'll just put that out there.
Now, on your inequality point, I view inequality as like… the Kuznets curve is talked about a lot in economics. I don't like to talk about the Kuznetsk curve because you lose people in the abstract. I think Albert Hirschman, who is an economist that wrote about Voice and Exit, he talked about this analogy of the highway where he said inequality is a bit like being caught in a traffic jam on the highway. Once you're in the traffic jam and you see the other lane beside, you start to go, even though you're still stopped, the fact that the other lane is moving means that the roadblock up ahead, whatever it is, has been removed, and you'll likely be moving ahead soon as well. It's only when there's a huge delay such that you see that other lane going and you guys still have to wait another four or five, six minutes that you start to get really frustrated and angry. So too with inequality and economic growth.
If growth picks up but is only concentrated in, say, upper and upper middle-income segments and is not fully broad-based, some people [to] most people would prefer that to the situation of complete stagnation, right? At least some parts of the population are moving. That's good. It's only when that growth doesn't become more broad-based over time that frustrations will arise. So our hope is that charter cities will kick-start growth no matter how, and then eventually, the growth can become more broad-based over time. And you even have some projects and zones and parks and new city developments that are able to be extremely broad-based from the very outset. So I'd use examples like the garment industry operated through industrial parks in Bangladesh. This garment industry employs, like, 80% women, right? And these women, it's often their first jobs in the formal sector, their first time getting formal wage labour, their first active time in the labour market. And they have upward mobility to go from sewers to middle managers to upper management. And so, sure, some of these are enclaves for the rich. But equally, on the flip side of the coin, some of these projects can be mechanisms for alleviating inequality.
And I want to give one other example above and beyond the Bangladesh garment industry example in lifting up women. I’m a Canadian and in Vancouver, I got to talk about this project called Senakw in Vancouver, where this First Nations indigenous group called the Squamish Nation in Vancouver, they were kicked off their land in downtown Vancouver in, I think, 1910. And fast forward about a century in 2002, I think, the First Nations sued, and the court ruled that they were to receive some of their downtown Vancouver land back. And so the First Nations got this land, this scarce urban land that was undeveloped, and they were like, what are we going to do with this? So they decided overwhelmingly, I think 90% of the First Nations group voted in favour of entering into a public-private partnership with a Canadian developer called West Bank. It's a 50-50 partnership. So the First Nations group would get half of the proceeds and West Bank would get the other half. And the bottom line or the upshot of this is that if this project is successful, it would generate, over the lifetime of the project, $8 billion in the coffers of the Squamish Nation. And that would be the biggest economic empowerment program in Canadian history. So if you structure these things right from the get-go, far from being mechanisms for exacerbating inequality, they can serve just the opposite.
Tobi;
I want to return a bit to the legitimacy question, especially within the sovereign authority and political capabilities of the national governments. I see a bit of a self-selection problem in special economic zones/charter city projects, in that they are successful within the context of a national government that takes development policy seriously. Because when we talk about Shenzhen and China, we know that that project came about out of a shift in national policy when Deng Xiaoping, along with key members of the CCP, chose to open up China and modernize. If you compare with, say, a country like Nigeria, Nigeria's first Special Economic Zone was in 1992. So they are not really particularly a new idea, but they haven't had equal success everywhere. So how does your model sort of control for this? We'll get to the PPP problems much later, but how do you solve the self-selection problem?
Kurtis;
Yeah. So, I mean, there are a few above and beyond the self-selection problem. There are a few other points implicit in your question. Number one is, like, the success of zones and industrial policy and these new city developments in China and East Asia versus the largely kind of lack of success we've seen with things like Special Economic Zones in Africa. Let's take China as the example because it has by far the most special economic zones of any country on the planet. So China's approach to zones, I think, largely derives from its history as a country with a high degree of state capacity and a long history of statehood. It's the most ancient state in existence on the globe, I think. It's been in existence for a long time. And so a lot of special economic zones across China were driven by the public sector, and they were extremely successful. Not all of them were as successful as Shenzhen. Right. The first four were established in 1980. They demonstrated the success of this policy such that they were scaled up again in 1984 with a few more zones, [in] 1988 with a few more zones and more such that by 2010, some 90% of China municipalities had some form of Special Economic zone within them. And these were again largely driven by the public sector.
If we then go to sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa does not have the same history of statehood or the same level of state capacity as Africa China, right? African states emerged 60, 70 years ago in the independence era in the 50s and 60s mainly. And so we just don't have the same level or ability of the state to be driving forward these massive industrial policy projects as China did. So that's number one. I think the zones will be a lot more and charter cities will be a lot more successful in Sub-Saharan Africa if they are driven largely by the private sector or as we say at CCI, through a public-private partnership. That's number one.
Number two is the location question. In China, special economic zones were paired very closely with urbanization. Shenzhen where 326 sq km of that city were declared a zone, likewise in the other initial four zones, those two things went hand in hand. Whereas in Africa, a lot of zones that are declared, for whatever reason, are declared in the middle of nowhere. So they're not piggybacking off of existing labour markets in already existing cities. They're not piggybacking off of preexisting infrastructure. So, it's oftentimes really costly to build infrastructure completely from scratch in these complete greenfield sites. And so I would say those are the two key differences between why we saw [the] success of these zones in East Asia and China, and we've seen largely a pretty lack of success across Africa with zones. And then that's the first part of my answer. The second part, just to get back to the self-selection problem that you mentioned, I mean, I think you've had Stefan Dercon on your podcast, Tobi, and this gets back to his point that because we envision these not as a form of political exit, because CCI does not mess with sovereignty. These projects are by definition part of the broader host country. And so you do need a degree of political buy-in. So to Stefan Dercon's point, you need the political elites, a group of the political elites on board and backing these projects. And ideally, you have long time horizons as well. This is why, for example, we're operating in and have partnerships in the countries that we're working in. So, [in] Zambia, President Hichelema was just elected relatively recently, I think if he gets a second term, he'll have nine more years in office. We're about to sign a partnership and engagement in Kenya, right? And Ruto was elected last August, so if he gets a second term, he'll have ten more years. In Tanzania, President Hassan took over from the former president who died of COVID and so she has two more years in his term and then another ten years if she gets a second term. So that's twelve years. And so we're in places, number one, where we have some political elites on board and bought into this, and number two, we have long time horizons available to us.
Tobi;
So that sort of gets into my point, right? Because, yes, you may have buy-in for now, but there's also the question of consistency. I'm sure before Hichilema in Zambia, the previous guy was not excited. Or I would say would not be excitable about a project like this. And what if someone that succeeds Hichilema says, “Oh, well, charter cities will only take you so far, I have other priorities. Let's concentrate on the mineral sector, this and that,” and then regulatory and bureaucratic barriers to this kind of project…[inaudible]
I'll give you a specific example. The Lekki Seaport in Lagos is usually celebrated as a win for this kind of big project, public-private partnerships. But, and I'll put up a link to that in the show notes, there was an interview by the CEO of one of the key participants in the project, the Tolaram Group, along with the Chinese investors, that basically, I'm paraphrasing… that basically said that his experience working with the government on this project left him deeply scarred and he does not envision ever doing this kind of project again. So that's my point. Like, how do you get around the consistent issues, the succession issues, the things that come up in a context where development, economic growth in itself are also burdened by this same problem? So I guess that's my point.
Kurtis;
Yeah, so this is a great point. So basically your kind of question is, okay, given these charter cities, as CCI proposes them, what do you do about the expropriation problem? Right? This problem of how do you prevent the host country government, across regimes, over time, from killing the goose that laid the golden egg? Or how do you get political regimes, different political regimes across time, credibly committing to what former regimes before them committed to? Right. That's the biggest kind of question. And because [in] our proposed model, charter cities are part of the host country, they are not sovereign entities. There are multiple things that you can do to mitigate the risk of expropriation to better align the incentives such that it nudges the host country to want the project to succeed rather than want the project to be expropriated and fail. But at the end of the day, if the government is determined to expropriate and undermine this project, there's not much you can do. But I would argue that's the same thing for any type of project. If the sovereign government of a place is determined to have malaria bed net interventions fail or the ZEDE projects in Honduras were pretty much Romer's model of charter cities, and yet still the regime that succeeded the original regime was able to repeal the ZEDE law. Right? So it's not just our model that suffers from this goose that laid the golden egg problem. I think it's other models of charter cities as well as all kinds of development interventions.
Okay, given there's this problem, how do you mitigate the risk of expropriation? And CCI, we thought about this and there are several ways. So number one, we think that there should be a revenue-sharing agreement embedded in the public-private partnership such that the host country gets a percentage or proportion of all the land rents, all the taxes, all the user fees raised in a given year should be to the host country so they have a stake and they receive a sort of stream of revenue every year from it. The other similar point around these kinds of financial inducements is we think that the host country should have an equity stake in the developer, in the city developer. That way, if the city developer is a success by creating a thriving city, the host country will have a significant financial windfall from that success as well. Other things that can be done: I know there's something called the New York Convention of 1958 that recognizes and then enforces arbitral awards. So for example, if the developer is expropriated in year eight or nine by the host country, it's then able to go and sue in arbitration for compensation for those seized assets and then have those assets enforced overseas.
So this convention is basically a form of enforcement of international arbitration. Now, the question there is like, okay, well, if your host country, say you're operating in Zambia, the future Zambian regime after Hichilema expropriates, and you then get an arbitral award in Dubai, in DIFC or something, how do you get the Zambian government to actually kind of pay? One thing that you can do, it's called political risk insurance - so MIGA [Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency]. It’s under the World Bank Group. They have political risk insurance. That Political Risk Insurance product says if an entity like this developer receives an arbitral award in international arbitration and the host country refuses to pay, we, the political risk insurer, will pay the amount of that arbitral award quickly, right? So that the developer quickly recoups its cost. So that's one. Another thing that could be done is the developer could float its company on the stock exchange and that way you get influential entities from the business sector, for example, investing in the developer. So entities like powerful domestic business constituencies like pension funds, if they are invested in the success of the developer and they have significant influence and clout with the existing political regime, oftentimes supporting various parties and whatnot, you don't as an incumbent politician want to piss off these pension funds that are helping you and your regime stay in place. And if the pension fund has invested in this development, then you don't want to jeopardize that development. There are a few other things you can do, but I've gone on long enough on these various ways. The main point here is you can do a lot of things to mitigate the risks, to adjust both benefits to the government of hosting and having a thriving charter city, and increase the costs of expropriating that charter city in such a way to skew the development such that the government buys into it over the long term. But you can't, because they're not sovereign entities, totally get around this risk entirely.
Tobi;
When we look at Shenzhen again, for example, its location is sort of unique. And I think that contributed a great deal to its success. The proximity to Hong Kong, and particularly the fact that it's a place that had a lot of potential to do better had it not been deliberately held back, if I can use that phrase, by the security concerns of the Mao government and, you know, so many other things. Because, as a matter of fact, when the original plan was proposed for Shenzhen, the Bao’an County government already had a plan on building out the city, of populating the city, the industrial zone and so many other things. But these are natural advantages that are not replicated everywhere, especially in Africa. You see so many places that are landlocked. If you take a place like Nigeria, most of the investments would likely come to Lagos being the economic nerve of the country and the only city that has the functional port. So are Charter Cities also implicitly limited by the location advantages or disadvantages of the host country, by economic geography, basically?
Kurtis;
I mean, I'll give a pretty short answer here, I think, undeniably, yes. If you picture a spectrum or a distribution of unsuccessful to hugely Shenzhen levels of success on the other side of the spectrum, geography kind of limits that distribution. Based on things like proximity to international trade routes, for example, I'm pretty bullish on East Africa for this reason. It's on the Indian Ocean, I think India, South Asia, Southeast Asia, these are rising regions in the next few decades. And so proximity to that bodes well for charter cities established on the coast in East Africa. Things like, locationally, are you piggybacking off of preexisting cities? Are you kind of on the outskirts of a Dar es Salaam or a Mombasa or a Lagos or a Port Harcourt? The reason being, and I alluded to this earlier, it costs a lot to build infrastructure, especially in the middle of nowhere in Africa. If you can instead locate on the edges, on the extension of a fast-growing preexisting city, you get to piggyback off of their roads, their other modes of public transit that they've already built, so you lower your unit infrastructure costs.
And number two, you get to piggyback off of their labour market. Right. And in places like Nairobi and Lagos, they're known for having, among African cities, like, very highly skilled constituencies of people. So to the extent that you create this new, thriving, dynamic charter city that is a space where talented people are attracted and entrepreneurs see a lot of opportunity, it's a lot easier for [a] highly talented, highly skilled individual from Lagos to go move to a city that's on the outskirts of Lagos than in the middle of nowhere in Nigeria somewhere. So my short answer to your question, Tobi, is absolutely these projects are constrained by geography. It's not the sole determining factor. There are places…you know, I would consider Abuja a pretty successful new city, and it's not on a port or seemingly has many other key geographic advantages other than being a strategic spot between Nigeria's north and Nigeria's south, but it is a significant factor in its ultimate success.
Tobi;
I disagree on Abuja but I would save that for another day. So I guess my final question to you would be… so I know that embedded in…uh…
Kurtis;
Can I? Sorry, Tobi, Can I add to that? I'll just add a little something to my last answer too.
Tobi;
Yeah, sure.
Kurtis;
I want to say, like, geography, contrary to a lot of people's opinion on it, I don't think it's this static factor. Geographical advantage can change given changing technology and changing transportation networks across time. And we've seen this in history. For example, when in the 1800s, the Erie Canal connected New York City to Lake Erie, that new canal, that new mode of transportation created and resulted in the rapid, rapid growth of a bunch of Midwestern and Western cities. So Buffalo was at the other end. It was created as a direct result of the Erie Canal, but also Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis. You could even say New Orleans, right? Because it was at the end of the Mississippi that created this huge water arc from New Orleans to New York City. And so I'll just say, you know, analogous to the Erie Canal, a comparable big infrastructure building project that could result in a bunch of new cities becoming much more viable as a result of changing the geographical advantage of these urban agglomerations is the Belt and Road Initiative, right? You have a bunch of large infrastructure projects and ports and highways and all these things being built and that means that at the nodes of this new infrastructure, it's a lot more viable for some new cities to sprout up. And we're actually seeing this across Central Asia, the Middle East, and to a lesser extent Africa.
Tobi;
I think you sort of got into my next question with that answer which is, what's the intersection or should I say affiliation of CCI as an institution and the model of charter cities generally that you're pushing with this new network-state type of digital city enthusiasm that is sort of everywhere, that's sort of driven by technology, driven by virtuality and the likes. Is there an intersection with your vision of new cities?
Kurtis;
So there are a couple [of] things. So, first, the big differentiation is at CCI, our focus is on poverty alleviation. So we're focused on low- and lower-middle-income countries. And oftentimes these countries are far away from the technological frontier. So we're focused more on catch-up growth, right, which is very substantively different than growth at the technological frontier. And so I would say the network state people, a lot of them come from cryptocurrency and tech in San Francisco. And so they're focused on pushing the technological frontier and the frontier of innovative governance, and we're focused on catch-up growth. So that's number one. Distinction number one.
And I guess commentary number two is kind of my thoughts on the viability of network states. I tend to think that, you know, this has been tried in the past, basically using not online communities, but like the kind of analogous concept to an online community before the Internet was shared values over a large number of human beings, right? Not necessarily territorially connected human beings. And there have been a few moments in history when leaders have tried to channel those shared values and relocate large numbers of people in the physical world that share those values, which is basically the network state concept, right? That was tried, for example, in the US. I think a bunch of libertarians, I believe this was in the early 2000s, tried to find a small state in the US to say, “Hey, if all of us libertarians that share these particular ideological inclinations all move to the same state”, I think they ended up choosing New Hampshire. They said, “Okay, let's all make an oath to move like ten years from now. And if we do so, we'll then be the majority in New Hampshire because it's a pretty small state, therefore we'll be elected to powers of government and we can kind of control policy and swing it in our sort of direction.” It turns out [that] in year ten when that move was supposed to take place, a lot of the people who had made that commitment, they had had families, they now have a spouse, they have kids that go to particular schools. Their spouse has a job that he or she really likes. That individual also has a job that it's going to be hard to relocate from. And so it turns out that community, like place, is actually pretty rooted and it's hard to just uproot yourself and your family from kind of a community that's been established and go to this other kind of community that has no sort of binding glue that you currently have. So that's number one.
And number two, the kind of historical example that happened, but almost didn't happen, is Israel. Right? Judaism is this millennia-old religious tradition. You could say that it's a millennia-old tribe that has its traditions, its values that are thousands of years old. And it had this other historical event that happened at the time of the formation of the Jewish state [Israel] being this Holocaust, a genocide that tried to wipe out this tribe and that also resulted in this really unifying force calling for a place where the Jewish people can practice their religion in peace and tolerance. And even with those factors, even with this thousand-year history and this kind of world-changing genocide, the Israeli state was very close to not being successfully established. Right? It was kind of Truman's recognition of Israel that actually kind of resulted in the thing happening. Without that, I don't think it would have been a success. It was sort of 51-49 as to whether this thing would take off. And so my point with Israel is like, even with these enormous advantages and crazy factors in your favour of pulling off a network state-y situation, it almost didn't happen. And so that gives me pause about the tractability of this model.
Tobi;
My final question and I'm happy you mentioned poverty alleviation and fast broad-based growth as the things that motivates the model of charter cities that you are pushing. So this question would be one of my critiques of charter cities and I want an answer from you, which is, at the heart of this model is political decentralization particularly because like you said, there is a lot of stasis and constraint at the national level. And also, talking about governance innovation, do you think that the charter city space, if I can call it that, is leaving a couple of low-hanging fruits unplucked in the sense that where are the plans of fixing existing at a very local, decentralized level, of fixing some of the, should I say, existing problems in actually existing cities rather than building new cities? Where is the plan, for example, for upgrading slums in existing cities? Where is the plan for transforming Makoko, for example, in Lagos? So do you think that those are low-hanging fruits that you're leaving unplucked? If yes, is there a reason? Is it because there is no obvious potential gain for private capital? And of course, if "no", is that something you are working towards in the future?
Kurtis;
[The] short answer is yes, we are involved in this area. So I'll just give the example of one of the reasons I'm here in Nairobi right now is to push forward our MoU with Kenya's State Department for Housing and Urban Development. So this department, well, they just finished its [program] called the Kenya Urban Support Program, the 300 million dollar program under the World Bank that's ending I think on June 30. And then a new KUSP program, KUSP Two, another 300 million dollar program supporting local urban institutional capacity building at the local level is happening in the next fiscal year, July 1, here in Kenya. And so we're talking with the Department for Housing and Urban Development on this list of 71 secondary cities that they've selected with the World Bank to channel this 300 million dollar KUSP 2 program over the next three, four, five years. And my prior on these big development programs is that rather than spreading this 300 hundred million dollars across a swathe of stuff, you should prioritize. And so I said, okay, you do that with the World Bank. Why don't we CCI, we identify three to four bright spots on that list of 71 cities, secondary cities - existing cities, that are already doing well with their current resources and we empower those three to four cities by designating them as a Special Development Zone or Special Economic Zone or Special Economic City, basically a charter city. And that way not only, you know, presumably if they're already doing well with their existing resources by empowering them further, they just double down on that success, number one.
But number two, if they are then successful, they serve as a much, much greater and more powerful demonstration effect to the list of the other 67, 68 cities on that list of the KUSP 2 program. Right? If I'm a mayor in Kenya, my neighbouring mayor, if they are one of these three to four bright spots, and I see them and they're doing amazing stuff, that's way more influential to me and shows me that it's very possible to do this as my neighbour is doing it than some world banker coming in for a couple of weeks and giving a workshop. Right? So that's one way in which CCI is working with existing cities.
And I think one of the low-hanging fruits, to use your term, is these secondary cities, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. I think, like, a large swathe of the urban growth and the growth in urban population is going to happen in small, secondary cities and towns of kind of 100,000 people and under. And I think most of the oxygen in the room, whether that's time, attention, funding, gets sucked up by these mega-cities of Lagos and Kinshasa and Nairobi and Jo-burg. But a lot of these secondary cities have number one, less capacity than these mega-cities and are going to see growth rates that oftentimes surpass the rates of growth of these mega-cities at four, five, 6% per year. And so focusing there could be hugely impactful. Plus, I mean, I'll just say, Shenzhen, at the time it was designated a Special Economic Zone in 1980, had a population of between a 100 and 300,000 people. So by all intents and purposes, it was a secondary city at the time of its initial takeoff and so you could consider what I just outlined an analogous situation.
Tobi;
Okay, I hope to see that workout. Thank you very much, Kurtis. It's been fantastic talking to you. It's been an amazing hour. Thank you very much.
Kurtis;
Likewise, Tobi. Thanks so much for having me. And I'm glad we finally got to schedule this. Thanks so much.
This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe -
Welcome to another episode of Ideas Untrapped podcast.
In this episode, I spoke to Portia Roelofs who is a Lecturer in Politics at the Department of Political Economy at King's College London, and also a research associate at the African Studies Centre in Oxford. She is the author of a fantastic book titled Good Governance in Nigeria; Rethinking Accountability and Transparency in the Twenty-First Century.
Portia critiques the "good governance" agenda, arguing it's a continuation of structural adjustment programs from the '80s and '90s, which focused on market-driven development, privatization, and state withdrawal. She asserts these reforms didn't consider the social and political realities in African countries, leading to significant challenges, including a narrowed policy scope and "choiceless democracies."
Portia proposes a more socially embedded approach to governance, emphasizing the need for government officials to be accessible and accountable in more culturally resonant ways, beyond just transparency and efficiency. She suggests practical steps like politicians residing in their constituencies and being directly reachable. The conversation also explores the tension between technocratic and populist approaches in Nigerian politics, highlighting the importance of addressing immediate social needs alongside long-term developmental goals.
Despite the critique of current governance models, the conversation acknowledges the complexity of governance in Nigeria and the need for nuanced solutions that consider both the efficiency of the civil service and the broader economic and social goals of the state. The discussion concludes by reflecting on the need for a more comprehensive discussion on the role and aims of the state in Nigeria, beyond just improving civil service efficiency.
Transcript
Tobi;
I'll start with where you started your book. I should say I enjoyed your book very much.
Portia;
Thank you.
Tobi;
It's very interesting, and I really connected with it as a Nigerian. So, what you described as the good governance agenda and its challenges, its failures, and way it has come short in the context of Africa and Nigeria, in this case, is where I’ll like us to really start. So just give me a brief rundown of that, because what you call the good governance agenda or the technocratic World Bank-type description of what good governance is, is still the popular and, I should say, acceptable form of discourse in the popular mind about how we think governance should be. So, just give me a brief rundown of your critique of that.
Portia;
Okay, sure. So, I think to understand a good governance agenda you really have to understand what it was a response to and, kind of, the immediately preceding history. So in the 1980s and the 1990s, you have the structural adjustment programs which are promoted by the World Bank and the IMF and adopted by many, many countries both in Africa and in the global south. And these are programs that take aim at the kind of bloated state and too much state intervention in the economy. And they say the economy needs to be structurally changed to allow market forces to drive development. So you see a kind of consistent pattern of privatization, liberalization, devaluation, removal of capital controls. And that was driven by a strongly ideological belief that the market is the best allocator of resources and the best driver of development.
And Nigeria, in 1986, under Babangida adopted something that was basically the structural adjustment programs, albeit not quite in name. And then by the kind of 1990s, the early 1990s, the late 1980s, people were starting to realize, actually, these structural adjustment programs don't work. They don't achieve what we wanted them to achieve. In many places, they had absolutely disastrous results. And a lot of the critique of that is coming from places like CODESRIA (Council for the Development of Social Science in Africa). So African scholars, from a more heterodox perspective saying: you can't rely on the market to just fix all of Africa's problems. And actually, in doing so, you did things like eliminating much of the middle class, these are hitting a lot of people who were otherwise in the professions. So there are lots of controversy over the structural adjustment, and it's seen as being a very ideological project.
And then in response to this, within the World Bank, there was thinking about, okay, maybe the problem isn't necessarily at the level of the policies, it's at the level of how does government itself operate. And so you see this move - you've got reports from the early 90s like governance and development, this move towards saying, okay, we need to reform how government operates. And this is actually applicable to all governments. All governments should be accountable. All governments should be transparent. All governments should be made more efficient. And if we do this by focusing on how government itself operates, then that's a better route to development. It's kind of like way of answering some of the critiques of structural adjustment.
However, many people say that the good governance agenda was really just a continuation of much of the structural adjustment policies. That the core ideas that you need to withdraw state intervention in many, many areas of the economy, privatize, liberalize, adopt private sector methods of operating and import them into the public sector, kind of lived on. So there's as much continuity as there is rupture. And so in practice, a lot of what the good governance agenda was doing was things like public finance reform or civil service reform and that kind of lives on. But I should also say that the word good governance has been used to cover many, many different things. And so people aren't always talking about the same thing when they use the term.
For example, in the early 90s, you have this, like, third wave of democratization. And in some ways, the good governance agenda was a bit interwoven with this. It was seen as multiparty democracy, elections. So there are definitely different debates to be had. But the one I guess I'm interested in is this one that says good governance is accountability, transparency, and the public-private divide. And the interesting thing there is it really promotes this idea of good government is technocracy. And so that means the people who are making decisions really should be the people with technical knowledge. That's often like public finance experts or economists. And the interesting thing is that that immediately sets up a bit of a tension, not necessarily with politics, which I know we've touched upon already, but with democracy.
Because if you've basically got, like, philosopher kings, wearing suits, with their degrees, then what's the role for the people? What's the role for mass participation? So the Thandika Mkandawire's critique of this was he said that you create choiceless democracies. So at a time when African countries were often opening up to democratic governance, in 1999, in Nigeria, for example, it also came at the same time that the kind of menu of policy options that it was acceptable to pursue and that were permissible within this kind of good governance framework and aid conditionality and increasing controls from the IMF and the World Trade Organization was really narrowing.
So finally people have the vote, but what can they vote for? Actually, quite a narrow set of kind of pro-market policies that pursue development in quite a narrow way as defined by international institutions. So that's kind of what I see as being some of the central tensions of the good governance agenda. And in the book, I kind of explore how does this play out at the level of state government in Oyo State, for example, or how is this playing out in debates in Lagos State government’s new agencies or whatever. So, yeah, I'm really standing on the shoulders of other people like Yusuf Bangura, and other Nigerian political scientists, people who were critiquing the good governance agenda as it was developing in the 90s.
Tobi;
We'll get into your field work in Oyo States, and I'm curious what the Lagos model really is, and I know a lot of people in the audience are curious as well. But I want you to help me contextualize the good governance argument better. So I think where I share your sentiments, especially around the Structural Adjustment Program and other donor driven programs of the like is that they are very antidemocratic, they are not even accountable in the sense that they define accountability to be. And I think we share similar sentiments in that regard.
So let me take one very popular example that sort of intersects with the discourse around governance, which is that in Nigeria we've been talking about corruption for decades, right? There are always stories in the news of bureaucrats, civil servants and even politicians misappropriating public funds, you know, and the way the good governance narrative sort of feeds into that is that if you then have a process of rules that holds people accountable, it then becomes difficult to misappropriate public funds. Funds that should be invested in social programs or infrastructure that then find their way into people's accounts via very clever and, in some cases, not so clever means.
But what we have seen is that despite all the talk of instituting all these frameworks and rules, we haven't really solved the corruption problem. It never really goes away. Even under a President Like Buhari who was strongly seen as clean and incorruptible, there were still massive news reports of corruption under him. So help me use corruption to contextualize the failure, I would say, of the good governance agenda. And what's the alternative to that? How can we better understand the concept of good governance?
Portia;
Yeah, so this is such an important thing to talk about. And actually, when I first came to studying southwest Nigeria, I thought that my project was going to be about corruption, because I thought, why not? I'm coming to Nigeria, that's a constant critique Nigerians have of their own country. And what I found was, first of all, trying to research corruption, the interviews were often quite boring. Because it's almost like there's this script. You ask people about corruption in Nigeria and they have a lot to say about it, but it often covers kind of very, very similar sort of themes. I kind of got used to hearing the same things over and over again. And I found this interesting of, like, if this feels like there's a very, very standard kind of script, maybe more conceptually, what I realized was that something happens when we talk about corruption - and when we focus on critiquing corruption as a kind of, like, dominant aspect of Nigerian politics - is it creates a false illusion of consensus.
Because if we spend all of our time talking about what's wrong, it gives this impression that we agree about what corruption is, thus we must agree about what the opposite of corruption is. As if we all want the same thing. If only we could get rid of corruption, then we could do X, Y, or Z. And actually, X, Y and Z are quite different options. And that's why we have democracy. That's why we have political debate and contestation. Because actually, people's visions of what the state should do and what society should look like are not all the same.
So I decided that it would actually be much more interesting to look at what are the positive visions that people have of what they think government should be doing if it weren't corrupt. So that's kind of why I wanted to start finding out, okay, what are people's kind of visions of good governance? Also on that, I found that there were some interesting instances where we think that corruption and good governance are the opposite of each other, and yet there were things that people were doing where some people thought, oh, that's an epitome of corruption, and other people would think, no, Hooray, this is the epitome of good governance.
And I think by understanding those more ambiguous, more puzzling, more tricksy cases, we learn much more about the underlying values of what good governance could mean. And I think this comes out maybe most clearly in the study of transparency, for example. So one of the things that governments have kind of position themselves as succeeding in this good governance agenda, one of the things that they did was tend to put more documents and budgets and statistics and data online. And this is seen as an unambiguously good thing. It makes them more transparent. There are lots of NGOs and civil society organizations in Nigeria like BudgIT that are pushing for this, and it's broadly seen as like a measure of transparency.
And yet at the same time, there's also a kind of popular suspicion among people about what this data and these budgets and these documents hide as much as reveal. Or the idea that, well, you know, if you're educated enough to put together these very complex accounting documents, maybe you're also smart enough to kind of use them to cover your tracks or to bamboozle people. And so in the chapter of the book where I talk about transparency, I give a couple of examples. And first of all, is this kind of Nigerian idiomatic idea of speaking grammar. That you're using very fine, beautiful, elevated language, but that doesn't mean, oh, you're upright and trustworthy. It means you're kind of obfuscating. And that actually it'd be more truthful if you spoke in a more accessible register.
But also there's a debate from before the 2015 Oyo state election that was on the radio, where one of their other candidates is talking about Ajimobi, and Ajimobi says, oh, you know, we built this bridge, and you can't say it's corrupt because we spent this much, this much, this much. Look at the budget. And his opponent says, oh, my brother is very good at giving statistics. And there's a glint in his eye or a smirk on his face, and the implication is like, you know, statistics is not everything. So I think it's really important to probe into that suspicion of these traditional good governance methods, because otherwise we don't understand why something that we think should work and be a solution isn't necessarily working. And it also helps us understand why when you have governors who are really performing kind of good governance in these standard ways that we expect, they're not always reelected and they're not always locally popular. And I think the standard account or the standard kind of interpretation of this by academics and commentators is, well, when you fight corruption, corruption fights back. And there's this idea that Nigerian voters are incorrigible. They're just totally committed to just taking rice and chicken from people and giving them their vote, and just that they're so kind of entrenched in these patrimonial ways of thinking that even when they're offered something better, they don't take it.
And I think I'm a little bit skeptical or hesitant about embracing that narrative in an uncomplicated way, because I think actually voters are often doing something much more sophisticated. They're looking at what politicians are doing, and they're comparing them to more popular or more kind of broad based ideas of what accountability and transparency should mean. So we shouldn't see it as a war between accountability and corruption, but we should see it as a conflict between different ideas of what accountability might mean. And that would require us to take Nigerian voters much more seriously.
Tobi;
That's interesting. There’s also… if we look at even the last election, which the issue of vote buying was really a big issue around the elections and it was even one of the reasons why the central bank engaged in the really expensive and economically destructive currency change policy. And I've never really agreed also with that narrative of voters being stupid and they are selling their votes and basically selling their future for stipends. And I think it's condescending and it gives people less credit about their ability to make choices about their lives. So which then brings me to… I think it takes me back a little bit to early in the book where you talked about the sort of progressive era in Southwest politics. One of the things I love about the book is the concept of olaju - enlightenment - which you used really well, where you had this political movement that grew out of olaju, the enlightened participation in governance. And, of course, how Awolowo was a key figure in that and how there was so much focus on technocratic governance. And the trouble it eventually ran into with voters and some of the local political dynamics. So, walk me through the… I should say I don't want to use the word failure or the challenges of technocratic conception of what governance should look like. Sort of walk me through that.
Portia;
Sure. Yeah. So, I'm so glad that part of the book resonated with you because it was a really interesting part to kind of research and think through. So with this concept of olaju, which is this Yoruba word and apologies, I can't do tonal pronunciations, but this is drawing on the work of people like Wale Adebanwi or J.D.Y. Peel and Olufemi Vaughan, who've looked at this historical thinking about the evolution of Yoruba ideas of what it means to be a good leader. And even if we look in precolonial times, there's this idea that the leader should be the point where power and knowledge meet and that a good leader is someone who has maybe a type of knowledge that other people don't have. So we see, up to 150 years ago, this idea of leaders and enlightenment being overlapping. And then this takes on certain forms in the establishment of the colonial bureaucracy.
You know, in precolonial Ibadan, to be powerful, you had to be a really good warlord. You had to be a powerful head of household and show virtue in war. And then the bureaucracy comes, and actually, you need to start to be able to read and write and to be able to kind of participate in these kind of Westernized forms of bureaucratic control as well. So this is detailed really beautifully in the work of historian Ruth Watson as well. So you have this evolution of what does that enlightened knowledge that leaders need look like? And then you have Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who's very influential in Yoruba politics. He's not from Ibadan, but he's called the Sage. And he takes on this figure of being, like, leader of the Yoruba, whatever that might mean, and he's seen as being a perfect fulfillment of Olaju and this idea of enlightened leadership. And he sets up the party - Action Group, which is a progressive party that starts first under colonialism and then leads into the First Republic, and later also founds the UPN - Unity Party of Nigeria, which carries forward similar ideas, which many of your listeners will be familiar with.
So I characterize this in the book as being a form of government that not necessarily is technocratic, but maybe it falls under a wider umbrella that I call epistocratic. And so we take the word like epistemology means a study of knowledge. So epistocratic is the rule by people who have the knowledge. And it can include technical knowledge, but can include other thoughts as well, kind of. And so this kind of Yoruba progressive movement that I should say is also linked into certain ideas of Yoruba cultural nationalism that maybe I can't really touch upon in this discussion, but are important to it as well, the formation of the Yoruba ethnic identity, cultural practices, linguistic practices, et cetera, et cetera.
But the problem with focusing on a kind of epistocratic approach to governance is often it means that you neglect other elements of governance that are equally important. And so the one I kind of emphasize in the book is the social dimension. I think there's also the material. And I think when we study African politics, we're often obsessed with the material. Like, what are people doing? What are they giving people? Are they giving public goods or private goods? So I try to set that to one side and then kind of bring it in a bit later. So this kind of progressive form of governance inspired by Awolowo has a certain position in terms of the social relations it posits between leaders and followers, which is one of elitism. And you see a really, really interesting use of the idea of elites and what's a relationship between elites and masses. And you have this idea that, okay, well, if the elites are the people who have enlightened knowledge, they've been exposed, they've been abroad, they have Western education, then their job is, first of all, to set the direction of society, because the masses don't have their abstract knowledge, they're not enlightened, they don't necessarily know where we should be going. But also that it's the job of the elites to make the masses more like the elites. And that means you don't necessarily need to listen to what the masses are saying. It has certain antidemocratic threads running through it because you're basically saying that the masses don't know what they want.
And so in the book, I link this to something that Governor Ajimobi says in one of his speeches, where he says, a good leader takes people where they want to go, a great leader takes people where they need to go. Actually, if you're enlightened leader, you don't necessarily need to be accountable to what the people want or what the people are saying that they want to happen. You need to be accountable to serving their best interests. And so you often get this kind of idea, what I call the Lagos model, the Tinubu project, followed up by Fashola and extended into the southwest of wait and see what we can do in four years. And then at the end of the four years, look at what we've done, have we performed? And if so, that means everything that we did during that four years was worth it. So you often had this idea also of accountability to performance, but also the legitimacy and the necessity of sacrifice. And in some of my other work, I look at this in the context of urban renewal, which in Ibadan and Lagos basically entailed the demolition and destruction of thousands, if not tens or hundreds of thousands of small scale shops, for example. So people losing their livelihood where they'd been based for decades, potentially.
And what was really interesting in places like Ibadan, under Ajimobi, was Ajimobi wasn't downplaying the cost of demolition. He wasn't saying, no, no, it's fine. He wasn't ignoring it. He wasn't trying to silence people when they complained about it. So very pro-Ajimobi newspapers were recording people saying, you know, my life is a disaster now, I can't make money. And he was saying, yes, but it's a sacrifice. So this very explicit acknowledgment of you need to trust what we're doing. And he uses the image of sometimes when you're a parent, you have to make the kid take the bitter medicine because the parent knows what's best. So this is all a very long way of saying, why is it that this kind of progressive project runs into trouble? And I think it's because it neglects the kind of appropriate social relations that say that the constituents want to be connected to their followers, they want to be taken seriously, they want to be listened to. Whereas if you kind of position yourself in this progressive mindset, you don't necessarily need to listen to voters that much. Because they're not the people who have the answers. So I think often you've seen, running parallel to this kind of Yoruba progressive line, an equally deeply rooted and equally historically established, more kind of populist conservative line in Yoruba politics. Which is embodied by people like Adedibu, Adelabu, these kind of figures who like, if you go to the streets of Ibadan, people are still singing songs about them. They still remember them now in 2023. And they're seen as being the people who care for the people. They're sensitive to their needs. And often this has been performed in ways that are very, very material.
So, in Oyo State we talk about amala politics. Amala is a staple food, it's like a swallow that you have in Oyo State. And people like Lamidi Adedibu would literally have people gathering outside of his house and he'd feed them amala and gbegiri. And again, there are lots of dominant conceptions of politics in Africa that say this is just standard patrimonialism. This is just standard getting people to support you politically by catering to their most base needs. But I think it's not only the kind of material exchange, but it's also the symbolic and the ideas of sociality that this conveys, which is you're hungry, so I'm going to take that seriously. I care for you. I care for the everyday people. Yeah, I think that's why it runs into trouble. And whenever the progressives have become kind of too elite, too enlightened, too like haughty, there's always been this alternative line waiting to step into the vacuum when they're not able to kind of meet popular demands for both epistemic and social rule.
Tobi;
So in a contested kind of way, as you posited in the book, isn't this also like a kind of political entrepreneurship? So it's kind of like two rival products going to the market and see who can persuade the consumer.
Portia;
Yeah, absolutely.
Tobi;
How much of that was going on at the time time, as opposed to maybe like a failure of technocracy. And you're absolutely right about the progressive era in Southwestern politics, by the way. I recall that I've seen copies of Bola Ige's letters to students every term during their resumption. So there was this idea of, you know, we won't really run a progressive, elitist government. And I also think that some of their goals were not necessarily bad. Even some of their policy positions or proposition or programs and agendas are also quite populist as well, like universal education, universal health care and things like that. So I wonder how much of the failure we saw was due to political entrepreneurship and just the savviness of their political rivals being able to look at the people, look at their complaints and find a way to sort of appeal to that.
Now, it may not be in the Patrimonial Condescending way, but we see you, we look at you, we know what you feel and this is where these people are messing up and we are offering something better. Because when I look at the outcomes of, should I say, these two rival conception of government, even in cases where the amala politics, to put it that way, was able to weaponize people’s discontent to sort of kick out the progressives, the rivals generally often do not do better. Right? You often find people at the end of it almost complaining about the same thing. This person's out of touch or we got him there, but now… so just walk me through that. How much of it is the failure of the progressive project per se, as opposed to just the contested nature of politics?
Portia;
Yeah. Yeah. So I think that's a really great point, and I love your characterization of, like, can we think of these two things as different products which are being offered to the electorate? And so I should issue the caveat that the story I'm telling of Yoruba politics is a stylized narrative. And I do believe that there are these two kind of like ideological threads that we can trace, which is somewhat contested in the history of studying Nigerian politics where people say there's no ideology. But to make that point, you have to erase some of the details and the complexity. So if any historians of Yoruba politics read the book, I'm sure they'll have many points where they're like, oh, but it's more complicated. So, you know, Adedibu, he started his political career in the Action Group, so I'm taking him as the embodiment of the kind of opposition to Awolowo. But he actually has very strong links as well to these guys. And also, everyone in Ibadan knows each other. So there's definitely more kind of complexity there. But I think it's still a useful way of thinking about how politics has evolved.
And I also wanted to…you know, you're saying these progressives, they've done some good things as well. And I really want to emphasize that many of the achievements that have put the Southwest Zone in the position it's in today of having often the highest socioeconomic indicators, highest levels of education, high levels of human capital, whatever, they were achieved because of the kind of four pillars of the Action Group and the kind of transformative decade under Awolowo. And that's kind of part of my academic motivation is it's easy to critique the bad guys. It's much more interesting to critique the good guys. And for many people, they quite rightly feel that Awolowo is the best president that Nigeria never had, that he's the best offering that Nigeria had. But I think we find out most from then saying, okay, but still, what's missing? Even from the people who we wish that they could have done more. That has relevance when you're thinking about the Lagos model, because the Lagos model was really, really popular with donors. So organizations like USAID, the EU, what was formerly DFID, the British Department for International Development. I quote some things in the book where development professionals are looking at Lagos, and they're like, there are reforms that we've been trying to push in Nigeria for 20 years at the federal level, and we've had no success. And here's a state government which is taking on these reforms and driving them of their own accord.
So not necessarily saying, oh, everything they did was a failure or their approach is totally wrong, but saying where we have these examples that many people think are the best offerings Nigerian politics from the last 30 years, we still need to be aware of where do they fall short? And why might they fail to command popular legitimacy in the ways we might expect? And then finally, in terms of thinking about political entrepreneurship. So when I talk in the book as a whole, I kind of conclude that what we need to be thinking about is socially embedded good governance. Which is defined by more socially embedded conceptions of accountability, accessibility, transparency in people, et cetera, et cetera. And I'm not saying that this approach is something that the populists are doing. And I talk about a number of quite unsavory figures, people like Ayo Fayose in Ekiti State, and I'm definitely not saying, oh, let's copy them, or they've got the solutions. But what I think we see is that there are kind of a number of underlying either reference points or demands that voters as a whole tend to have.
They tend to want some attention to the epistemic dimensions of government. Like, you definitely don't want a leader who's not enlightened, but that's not enough on its own. And there's some demand to have appropriate social relations with leaders or leaders who perform the appropriate social relations and kind of has socially embedded forms of governance. But again, that on its own is not enough. Yeah, you need a government that can deliver, whether that's long term infrastructure or immediate economic benefits.
One of the figures I talk about in Oyo State is Lam Adesina. A very highly regarded public intellectual, you know, he was a teacher, he was a really smart man. But it's not just enough to do that kind of enlightenment side of it. He wasn't able to deliver that kind of material element of government quickly enough in response to those demands immediately after the return to democracy in 1999. So I'm kind of saying there's like a triangle at the heart of what good governance means. And if you neglect any of those points, then other people will step in. And these, like, political entrepreneurs, as you say, will see an opportunity and say, actually, we can step in and offer some of what you're neglecting to offer. And what I would say is that it's Populists who have a natural affinity with the social element of government. So they're often the people where we see the most exaggerated, almost like pantomime versions of accessibility and socially embedded good government, because it's often something that they kind of have an instinct for, but that doesn't mean that what they're doing is actually being accessible or actually having appropriate social relations. Often they're kind of like…
Tobi;
Performative…
Portia;
Yeah, it's like a kind of very exaggerated performance. So, yeah, I hope that kind of contextualizes a little bit how I see these two lines of politics, and it's a stylization, but I still think it's useful.
Tobi;
We've been talking about certain things in the course of the conversation that we haven't really clearly defined yet. So, tell me what and I know a number of my audience would be very interested in this, especially given the current political climate. So what is the Lagos model? Because we know the current president more or less ran on his record in Lagos. Record of performance in Lagos. He is generally seen as the man who built Lagos, but this isn't about him personally. So just what is the Lagos model as conceptualized in the book and your choice of Oyo State as the sort of case study to look at that. Why?
Portia;
Yeah, so the Lagos model is a term that I coined, but I also think it describes something that a lot of people are talking about, but maybe in other kind of terms. And so at its most basic, it's the form of governance that Tinubu initially develops and then extends under the Fashola leadership from 1999 2015 in Lagos state. So it's kind of what he's doing. And then this is replicated in other southwestern states from 2011 onwards. Okay, so what is the content of the Lagos model? Well, we've talked a lot about its historical, ideological antecedents, so it draws a little bit on this, like Awolowo progressivism. That's definitely part of the picture. But Tinubu's position within that history is a little bit ambiguous. He's definitely not the clearest example of a descendant of Awolowo, politically.
Tobi;
Yeah, his Awoism is contestable.
Portia;
Yes. He's also informed by what was happening in the southwest in the 1990s under Abacha. We have the leadership of General Babangida in the 80s and early 90s. We says he's going to open up to democracy. We then have the June twelveth election with MKO Abiola, who's a Yoruba Muslim businessman. But basically you have the prodemocracy movement that uses this June 12 election that was annulled. And we have the arrival of General Sani Abacha, who becomes the most despicable, violent, despotic dictator Nigeria has ever seen. And under Sani Abacha, you have various kind of slightly younger politicians organizing as part of the prodemocracy movement and NADECO, and that's where we see the rise of some figures like Tinubu, Dr. Kayode Fayemi, who also goes on to be governor of Ekiti State. So you have these variety of influences and then what we see in Lagos is a kind of package of policies and reforms and approaches that comes to characterize the Lagos model more specifically.
So I would say that it is a model of development that involves a very strong state, but the state using its power to drive private sector driven development, or to kind of facilitate private sector driven development. So common policies that make up this model are the expansion of the tax net with the intention of driving internally generated revenue. Interestingly, this kind of serves a variety of ends. So, as you talked about at the very beginning, this was partly a way of enabling Lagos State to have financial autonomy from the centre in a country where many states were just relying on the statutory allocation of oil revenues from the Federal Government, which was very patchy and erratic.
In the case of Lagos State, which was often knocking heads with the Federal Government at the time, you often see like a digitization of tax records, a professionalization of the tax department, in this case Lagos Inland Revenue Service. This tends to come along with civil service reforms. So one of the things that Tinubu did, and that often is then created in other states, is the creation of kind of executive agencies or new forms of trans-urban governance. So in Lagos you see things like LASTMA, LAWMA, Kick against Indiscipline, so a real changing of the structure of urban governance. And then we also see the embrace of certain kind of private sector driven initiatives or ways of bringing the private sector into development, especially in the promotion of public private partnerships. In Lagos state that often took the form of things like the Lagos State Security Trust Fund, which is a collaboration between state and the private sector.
And behind this is this wider justification that you need to bring in investors and that the state needs to bring in investors by controlling and changing public space, which is why urban renewal and the improvement of transport infrastructure in big cities is so important to this model. So you see a lot of discussion, especially in the work I did in Ibadan, on people in Ibadan need to learn to see their city through the eyes of investors. They need to learn to see their city through the eyes of people who are coming anew. And they need to realize how dirty and old and backwards and African the city looks. And we need to make it look more new and modern and international, and otherwise we won't have the investment we need to kind of grow our economy and grow our internally generated revenue. There are some critiques I can talk about with this, but maybe I'll leave it there. I'm aware you also asked, why look at Oyo state for this?
Tobi;
Exactly. Because Oyo state kind of like…
Portia;
It's not Lagos.
Tobi;
Not that. I find that interesting choice because I can see why it makes sense. It sort of clearly demonstrates the way you sort of built your narrative in the book and, I mean, with the Fourth Republic and Lam Adeshina coming to office, who is as Awoist as they come, as progressive as he is and who also possess the sort of technocratic mindset and the challenges he then had in governance. And then you had someone like Ladoja coming into government and his own struggles also with the Adedibu brand of politics and the challenges he experienced before he was impeached and then brought back in the government. And we then saw the rapaciousness of Alao Akala…
Portia;
Yeah, ATM.
Tobi;
Yeah. And how the other model of governance can run away and then culminating into Ajimobi finally getting into government and to sort of bring back the professionalism and the technocracy. So the choice of Ibadan and Oyo State clearly comes alive in the book and the story you were trying to tell.
Portia;
So maybe in the interest of transparency I should set out both my academic justification, but also my practical justification. I mean, in a lot of ways, Oyo State is like the heartland of Yoruba land. It's kind of like the psychic heartland. Ibadan itself claims to be often the seat of the Yoruba, even though that's contested. So there are various reasons why it kind of makes sense to talk about Oyo State in terms of its resonance in the Yoruba imagination. Also, what I wanted to do, I wanted to look at the Lagos model without Tinubu. Because in our discussion, we've often been conflating them. But I think it was really useful to go somewhere and say, okay, how can we study this package of policies, reforms and kind of practices and ideas without necessarily always talking about the man himself?
And what we also lack is we lack the money and the economic base of Lagos. And so at the time I was studying it, Ibadan's state budget was about 10% that of Lagos. And so you're looking at often the contradictions and the tensions within the Lagos model become a lot sharper in somewhere like Oyo State because they don't have the money just to buy people off. And so where we saw in Lagos the ability to do things, for example, achieve security by demobilizing the area boys, but by also incorporating them into new forms of state patronage, which is what LASTMA, LAWMA, Kick Against Indiscipline, a lot of the waste management staff…
Tobi;
Yeah, yeah.
Portia;
You know, it created a lot of new jobs. Then it was kind of possible to say to people, this is a sacrifice, but there's going to be a reward to the sacrifice. Whereas in Oyo they were much more constrained. And also at the time I was there in 2015, they'd been suffering from very, very low oil revenues, which had led to plummeting budgets in states across the country. So across the country, civil servants hadn't been paid for a very long time. And suddenly the priorities of how you spend the scarce funds that you had became a lot more highly charged. So I think that also enabled the kind of ideology behind this to come out much more clearly, because people are having to really say, what are your priorities in politics?
Whereas, as you say, Ajimobi's predecessor, Akala of the PDP, was known as being the most profligate, the most venal. There were times when Obasanjo had be called in to try and make up with some of the local traditional leaders because Akala had offended them, because he was just so kind of difficult to tame. So there are a variety of reasons why it's worth studying the Lagos model in Oyo State. And also, it gives a nice kind of story of transformation.
Before Ajimobi came to power, there was this idea that you go to Ibadan and you have to sleep with one eye open because the insecurity was really terrible.
Tobi;
Yeah.
Portia;
And Ajimobi is able to do very similar to what Tinubu did in terms of Operation Burst, which is its security operation and the demobilization also of the NURTW, which is for listeners who aren't familiar with it, it's the National Union of Road Transport Workers. So the people who control the buses and the motor parks, and under Lamidi Adedibu had been the kind of foot soldiers of street violence and the source of a lot of that kind of insecurity. So those are the kind of analytical or academic reasons, but I also have to be transparent. So, one, Ibadan is a lovely place to stay.
Tobi;
Okay.
Portia;
And there are really great research networks there. So you have the University of Ibadan, and I had a lot of support from the Political Science department there, so I really have to appreciate that. I also had support from the French Research Institute in Ibadan, which is called IFRA, they were able to host me. They're the center of a lot of academic organizing. You have organizations like NISER (Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research), so there are various reasons it makes sense to be an academic researcher hosted and based in Ibadan. And so I think sometimes as researchers, we have to be a little bit honest about [how] we also have to try and have an easy life. So that was kind of part of the picture as well.
Tobi;
I mean now, extending the Lagos model, like you said, which I sort of agree with [is] Tinubu looms too large in discussions about governance in Lagos and he has been out of power for a long time, as a matter of fact. Now, looking at the Lagos model and how it extended to other parts of the country, in this case in Oyo State, which was your primary focus in the book, and also you touched upon Ekiti State. Now, how did it play out? And what were the… I know you talked about the constraints, resources…what were the other tensions you found in this extension of the Lagos model of governance, which is a very strong state that is then trying to use the power of the state to get private businesses and economic growth and transformation going locally? What problems did it run into?
Portia;
So something…when we were talking about before, this idea behind a lot of the active state of intervention was this idea that we need to attract investors. And so what is it that investors need? Whatever it is investors need is the top priority. And this led to, I think, sometimes a slightly confused understanding of different political priorities. Something I look at, and I don't think it's actually in the book, but it's something I'm looking at in a subsequent article, is I often found that people were talking about Maslow's hierarchy of needs. So, in general, this is like a little pyramid that says the most basic needs that people have is for material survival, and then it's psychological survival, and then at the top is something like self fulfillment or whatever. The meaning it was given in different political discussions was about how do you rank the priority of different needs and priorities in government? And it was often used in kind of opposing ways. I think it helps us kind of understand some of the contestation that was going on in Ekiti and also Oyo.
So if we take the list of priorities from the kind of Ajimobi progressive train, there's this idea of, first of all, we need to attract investors. To attract investors, we have to make the city attractive and accommodating to them. And there's explicit discussion of, like, so we need some good nightclubs, and we need a five star hotel, and the government should be active in creating these things. Which is rather odd because we tend to think of the government's obligations primarily in the spheres of things like health and education and security and whatever. And definitely there were elements where the Lagos model in Oyo state was very attentive to these things as well. So I'm not saying they ignored them. But what was interesting was you have this situation where we say the top priority is for the state to make sure that there are good nightclubs and recreational facilities for investors coming from outside. And we do see the development of things like Agodi Gardens… I forget the name, is it Premier Hotel, the one on the top of the hill?
Tobi;
Yes.
Portia;
And basically being told that this is the number one development priority. And yes, at the same time, people who are more everyday people in the state maybe who don't have that much money or who are struggling with unemployment or whatever, they're looking at this and they're thinking the government says that it won't do amala politics, it won't give out up small, small money to ordinary people on the street. It's knocking down our shops, it's doing demolitions, it's making our livelihoods hard, it's telling us we have to be making sacrifices. And yet the elite seem to be getting all of these benefits as if it's the most essential thing for development. I think you see this kind of debate about what should be prioritized? Who is it who has to wait for development? And often the outcome of this is that the poorest people are being told they have to wait and that the immediate benefits are going to go to the richer people. So, for example, one of the achievements of the Ajimobi governorship was that they built a flyover in Mokola in Ibadan, and that speeded up journey times. But who benefits from that? It's people who own cars, because often the buses are not even allowed over the flyover.
And so, in a very kind of everyday, direct way, people were seeing infrastructural development and they were seeing that it benefited the richer, more elite people. And I think there are genuine ideological tensions there over, like, what is the best route to development? What are the models we should be pursuing? But this came out really clearly in the Ekiti State election. So in 2010, there's the election of Dr. Kayade Fayemi, who in many ways is like the prime example of a technocratic politician. Very highly educated. He actually has a PhD from my own institution, King's College, London. Really smart guy. People describe him as omoluabi, so very cultivated. Not only is he smart, he has the correct moral dispositions, you know? And so he came to power in 2010, and he was seen as delivering this long term progressive vision. And yet in 2014, he came up for reelection, and his opponent was this guy, Ayo Fayose the Populist, this kind of pantomime expression of all of these more patrimonial tendencies. And from the Fayose campaign, we get this idea of “stomach infrastructure”.
Tobi;
Yeah. A phrase he popularised by himself, no less.
Portia;
And so we have, like, a challenge. Okay, well, Fayemi, he builds infrastructure. Me, I'm going to build stomach infrastructure. And there's a phrase that originates in Yoruba, I only know the English version of it, which is, you cannot tar a road without tarring the stomach. And so he was famous for distributing bags of rice, chicken, just very short term goods that fill people's bellies, but don't necessarily contribute to long term development. I know a lot of people who are more progressive just see this as an example of corruption fighting back. But I think it's important to pay attention to the temporality, by which I mean, like, how does this connect to different ideas of time? So if on the progressive approach, the kind of Fayemi approach, we have this idea that you have to wait for development. It's a long term project. You have to make sacrifices. You won't see the benefits today. And yet the people who are benefiting today are often the kind of people at the richer end of the spectrum, and then you're saying to the poorer people, you have to wait. It's not surprising that you have political entrepreneurs, as you say, emerging, who are offering much more short term benefits.
And this is in a country where a lot of people don't know how they're going to get to the end of the week, the end of the month. So telling them they have to wait is quite unrealistic, or this is the kind of argument that was put forward. So I think these ideas around what does development look like? What should the priorities be? They were real areas of contestation in places like Oyo and Ekiti. And the interesting thing was that so in 2014, Fayemi loses the election, and this becomes like a warning sign to all of the other Lagos model governors who were elected in 2011, because it shows, you know what?
Tobi;
It was a real shock.
Portia;
Yeah, like, people were shocked. And if you look at what progressive commentators are writing around the time, they're really despairing at the state of Nigerian democracy. And there was a sense of, well, we thought we were doing everything right, but maybe our diagnosis was wrong or maybe our approach was wrong. So there's also a real moment of soul searching among progressive politicians. Then the 2015, the following year, when a lot of those state elections were taking place, including in Oyo, they were kind of in the shadow of Fayose's victory in Ekiti. And when I was doing my fieldwork, everyone in Oyo state knew who Fayose was. Sometimes they laughed when I mentioned him or they gave me this look, but he kind of loomed large, this specter of even if you haveTinubu support, even if you have all of the donors cheerleading what you're doing, there's still this specter, this ghost…
Tobi;
They’re still vulnerable.
Portia;
There's still this vulnerability. And I guess my book is really trying to make sense of that vulnerability and get beyond this kind of corruption fights back narrative and ask was there something maybe deeper going on?
Tobi;
So one of the things I was able to and you can correct me if I'm wrong about this… one of the things I was able to abstract from the book and even from your answer right now, is that I think part of the failures of the progressive kind of governance and epistocratic model of the Awosit movement, which Fiami also kind of sort of represents in a way, though he’s from a different era, is that sometimes I think economic transformation for that model is not really about the people. Because it's one thing to ask voters to wait, but they have to know what they are waiting for. The signs really have to be there that things really will get better if we persist with what we are doing. It's not a case of oh wait, your tone will come, you know, it may never come. This is politics. There are other dynamics at play. Like you said, these are places where some times the livelihood of the population is really vulnerable. Many people live on daily wages, even from their micro businesses. So I feel perhaps maybe the progressives and this whole idea of technocratic epistocracy, you know, they have the wrong priorities sometimes. Like you said, the hotels, the bridges. Imean if we compare with Asia there are also transformative policies and public spending that you can do even alongside your hotels - things like agriculture that really touches upon the lives of the everyday people. Oyo state is very, very huge in agriculture. Ekiti state, I imagine the same thing. So I see your point that they are really out of touch, and I see how that can be quite vulnerable to the brand of politics of Fayose who will sit with you and eat corn on the road and convey the image of a guy who really feels the pulse of the street.
Portia;
Yeah, I think what you said, you're asking people to wait their turn, but their turn may never come, I think is a really interesting way of thinking about it. And all I can say on this point, really, is that I think this debate is only more relevant today than it was when I was writing, because we've had the announcement of the withdrawal of the fuel subsidy. I'm sure most of your listeners will know what this is, but the Nigerian government subsidizes the price of petrol, which means it's available at a cheaper rate than it would be at market prices. And for many people, this is the only thing they get from government, right?
Tobi;
Yeah.
Portia;
They're paying taxes. Government makes their life hard in terms of getting a visa or a driver's license. There are so many ways in which they are suffering from government and the only thing they get is they get slightly cheaper petrol. It's been on the table for a long time. There have been multiple attempts to remove it and Tinubu has, again, committed to remove it. And talking to people, being in Lagos kind of this past week and talking to people, people are really worried that they kind of think it's going to happen. And I think this will be a test case for how is Tinubu and the people around him, many of whom have long experience, but some of whom are kind of young, more technocratic, fresh blood, how are they going to navigate this point when exactly what you say [that] you can't ask people to wait for that long without giving them something in the meantime? I guess it really just demands statecraft of how do you maintain legitimacy whilst withdrawing the kind of one benefit that a lot of people see that they have from government? Especially at a time of massive economic depression and the currency, cash crisis, all of the other things that are kind of making life in Nigeria hard for many, many people.
And I should say, when I talk about people are struggling to get to the end of next week or the end of next month, this isn't people who lack education, this isn't people who lack the skills. You know, oh, we should empower them to give them some skills, they have the skills. They probably have a university degree. You've got people out there with pharmacy, engineering degrees and they're in exactly the same position. So just to say that, just to prevent against kind of mischaracterization of the Nigerian voting public. So I guess, yeah, it's a test case. Tinubu has been a great political operator. He's been able to achieve some of these things where you demand sacrifices of the population, but you kind of keep them on board. You carry them along, as perhaps Nigerians might say. And so on this front, you know what? Maybe it's unwise, but I do have a little bit of optimism. Because I feel like if someone is able to balance the competing demands and to push something through and really make something happen? You know, Tinubu does have track records in this regard in a way that Buhari just was not active. Like he wasn't proactive. He wasn't able to balance different competing groups, different competing elites, different competing demands. So a little bit of me is looking to the President and hoping that he's able to pull off a miracle.
Tobi;
Two things I would love us to touch on before we wind down this conversation. And one is, you know, it’s one of these things like corruption that never really goes away, which is accountability. If we look at the technocratic sort of conception of good governance, accountability then means that there's a rule book and there are things you have to conform to. For example, in the context of the new government; we are talking about asset declaration, and early in the conversation we talked about the use of numbers and statistics and this is what it really means to be transparent. Transparency as accountability.
But one point you drove home in the book which I found relatable was sometimes for the voters, accessibility is what they find accountable. How accessible are you? How approachable are you? How much of you can they see and interact with? From there I want us to then move into this your idea of socially embedded governance, because sometimes the challenge when we talk about the social dimension of governance is that they do not acquire the necessary inertia because they are weakly institutionalized. So where I want you to sort of close off is how can we then practically institutionalize some of these lessons that we have learned from looking at the social dimension, not just the material and the technical dimensions of government?
Portia;
Great. Thank you so much. So I want to get to accessibility, but if I can just come back on this idea of is technocracy always a case of setting stronger rules and setting up the rule? But I'm not sure that's always what's happening. And this is actually one of my critique of the kind of newer forms of governance reform that a lot of donors and the World Bank and DFID and the British government are pushing. And I think sometimes it's lost in the debate. So traditionally, yeah, the critique of the African state, the post colonial African state, is it's weakly institutionalized. So it's neopatrimonial. Like, maybe it has some of the trappings of rules and this idea of having, like, a Weberian rule bound state, but in reality, it's run like a private household. The big man sitting at the center just gets to decide what to do.
So the goal has always been stronger rules, greater institutionalization, more predictability. And yet this has kind of been intention, this idea of good governance as being mimicking the private sector. We don't necessarily always talk about, oh, government would be better if it had more rules. We say government should be more agile, it should be more lean, it should be more innovative, more entrepreneurial. And actually, some of the things that we see be these good governance, kind of friendly, donor friendly, Lagos model governments doing actually lead to the kind of underinstitutionalization of the state. So I'm thinking of things like outsourcing, the creation of public private partnerships to deliver infrastructure and services and the use of consultancies. And so this often leads to a situation where actually the rules that govern how the state behaves, so the civil service or laws are basically being circumvented and bypassed by the bringing in of private sector agents to do things that the state would otherwise be doing. And often that's seen quite favorably, like, great, the private sector is more efficient, it has better ways of working, maybe it brings in international best practice, these are people who've worked in very high achieving international environments.
But we see things like consultants, they're not necessarily accountable to the people, they're accountable to their shareholders or kind of the pursuit of profit. And I'm not saying they aren't doing good things at the same time, but there are definitely democratic concerns around that. And I'd also really highlight the case of PPPs. So, public private partnerships. So it used to be that privatization was at least quite straightforward. We had a state water company and then we transfer ownership of it to a private water company and we can try and work out what the private water company, are they doing well or are they doing badly, et cetera, et cetera. The form of public private partnerships that we're currently seeing emerging and backed very, very strongly by international financial institutions are some of the most complex legal and financial instruments you've ever encountered. It's often hard to work out even who the private partner is, because they come around via special purpose vehicles that are created by consortia, by asset managers, often bringing together very complex financial arrangements, often hosted offshore. So there are kind of confidential and kind of tax arrangements that mean we don't even know who run them.
One of the things I have concerns about is that we think that these kind of technocratic, PPP, private sector led development is going to bring in clearer rules and less corruption. And yet often they're creating a situation where it's impossible to know what the rules are because they're so complex. And you need to be, like, quite an advanced kind of corporate lawyer to even understand what's going on. I guess I'm raising it because it's a bit of a kind of concern of mine, and I think it's something that we really don't understand enough as scholars or commentators. So I just wanted to kind of flag that. And I think it's something that I'd really like to see more discussion of within that kind of, like, Nigerian public sphere. Because my sense is that people have a very, very positive understanding of public private partnerships without necessarily knowing on a case by case basis, are these working in favor of the people or are they just kind of a big shift of risk onto the state? But I know your question was much more tightly linked to this question of accessibility.
Tobi;
Yeah.
Portia;
The idea of accessibility, for me, it's an example of how we can learn from Nigerian politicians and voters. How the rest of the world can look at what Nigeria is doing, and actually, you know, you're able to articulate something that's valuable for the rest of us. So in political science, we don't really have a term that captures what accessibility gets at. And yet whenever I spoke to people, okay, you said, you think this politician is doing a great job, why is he doing a good job? Oh, he's accessible. Or contrastingly, when people criticize politicians, they often said, well, he was arrogant, he was aloof, he was inaccessible. And so something I try and do in the book is I try and delve down into, okay, but what does accessibility mean if we had to give it an academic definition? And I define it as the maintenance of space for direct communication between the ruler and the ruled. So in practice, this normally means face to face, but it can also be by, like, telephone or something. And the thing is, in that moment when you're directly communicating with your ruler and with your kind of followers, is a moment where accessibility can happen through social sanctions. So all politicians, no matter how rich they are, no matter their control of party structures, the one thing they don't like is being booed or being heckled. And if they know that they're going to be booed, they often try and hide. They don't want to be accessible. So it doesn't necessarily happen all of the time when people in communication with their leaders, but there is a kind of possibility for alternative forms of accountability to play out in those moments of communication and accessibility. So this often relates to things like people say, we voted for this politician, he ran off to Abuja, and we haven't seen him in four years. How can you be accountable if I've never seen you? And this is something that people say in Nigeria, but it's also something that I found in studies of politics in places like Ghana and the UK. So a bit further afield.
So this is why I think we have it's a case where we can say that Nigerians were the initial originators of this idea, but it's actually universally applicable. And then you asked, okay, if accessibility is one of the elements of socially embedded good governance, how can we institutionalize it? How can we create rules or procedures or expectations that enable us to kind of put this into practice? And so I do this in the book. I give some very, very basic suggestions, and yet they're rather different from what you would see in good governance agenda set of recommendations. So one thing, maybe you should live in your constituency. If you're a politician, you need to live where your constituents are, because otherwise, how will they have access to. And maybe that sounds kind of willfully simplistic, but I think it's kind of a good, provocative idea, especially as people often like to run away to the nicer, richer areas. But also there's something that Nigerians are already doing that I think kind of captures this idea of accessibility. So if you go on the website of a lot of government agencies, and Lagos State were really the forerunners of this, you'll see the personal telephone numbers of the people who are running these agencies. And that kind of speaks to this level of accessibility of, like, the state is both a bureaucracy, but it's also a set of people. And you need to have access to those people. And often this is being seen as a liability for government that if the people have access to politicians and elected officials, they'll ask them for money or chop or they'll make these personalistic demands. And I address some of the kind of critiques around that in the book. But I also think that we have to think about how can we open up government and have more accessibility rather than less? So that, for me, would be like an example of how we could institutionalize socially embedded good governance.
Tobi;
I mean, I asked that question because I think and this is more of a personal point for me and it's a bit of a Marxist point, if I should say, is that my personal frustration with the works of people like. Thandika and the rest is that they are often very short on practical proposals. Whereas what you're critiquing, at least if we look at Washington Consensus, there's a list of ten clear policies that you should pursue. But there's always a shortage of, okay, so if this falls short in some very important ways, then what next? What should we do? If I win office tomorrow and we've done this and it doesn't work, then what do I do? Now. So it's always short on practical part. That was why I asked you. I like your answer. It sounds simple, but I like it. Live in your constituency is something we can really, really make a hard rule, because, like you said, you're right. My local government chairman does not live in my neighborhood here in Lagos, actually. [S]he lives in a much more nice, richer, high part of the state. And, I mean, she only comes around for party constituent meetings. It sounds very simple, but it’s a very…
Portia;
Maybe let me add to that a bit then, just because sometimes I wrote this book, it's like 80,000 words long, it took like seven years to write. And then people are like so your conclusion is we should put telephone numbers on websites, that's it?
[laughs]
So let me maybe add to this a little bit. So I think there are a number of things that already happen in Nigerian politics, almost like traditional conventions of how you do politics. And I think we can understand them in terms of accessibility. So there's a long history of rulers holding court by sitting outside of their residence or their palace and being accessible to the people. So they might come with with petitions, they might come with complaints, but they basically have to spend some of their time sat on view, not so surrounded by security that you can't reach them at all. There are these ways of making those who have power have to be on show and have to be visible. You know, there's a Nigerian tradition of the courtesy call. And when I first arrived and I started reading Nigerian newspapers I couldn't understand why every… so many of the stories were this head of government office has paid a courtesy call to this traditional politician, this head of this party has paid a courtesy call to the… and I was like what is? It was clear that there was something going on that I didn't fully understand. And so my attempt to make sense of this over time has been that what they are saying is I was accessible. I created a moment of communication between me and this representative of this social constituency or this trade union or this community. It's showing that they are keeping open the lines of communication. And of course we don't necessarily know what is said in those places. And what is said in those places may be negotiations or demands that we're not very happy with. But at least I think it's the signaling of respect by maintaining communication.
So I think maybe we need courtesy calls from the leader of Islam or an informal settlement. Maybe we need more courtesy calls. And this was something that came out if you look at the campaign materials of Ayo Fayose in 2014, this kind of big populist figure, something that really stuck in my mind was on his website. He said what is the most common phone number in Ekiti? It's my phone number. Everyone has access to me. Not only that, but he says if you call this number I will pick it myself. What he's saying is, it's not like you call my number and you get through to a secretary or a handler and they'll just fob you off, and actually you'll never get to talk to me. Which was often the complaint made of Ajimobi that these civil society groups that had been working for many years, they'd go in and they'd say, we want to see the budget, we want to talk to the governor, and they would wait hours and they'd come back day after day and they'd never get to speak to him. So I think this idea of being accessible and available is really, really important. But think the wider point is also to think that you can't monopolize accountability with only one understanding of what it means. And so when I talk to these people who are in this technocratic class, they often think like, well, all we need to do is deliver and perform. What is it that we need? We need roads, fine, we'll build roads.
But that, I think it gives you a very fragile understanding of accountability that doesn't serve everyone, it doesn't meet everyone's demands. But also, maybe this is a pessimist in me, but there are going to be times when even the most fantastic government cannot deliver and cannot perform, because there are certain factors beyond the control of the government - world oil prices, currency fluctuations, and increasingly, as we look to the future, Nigeria is very, very vulnerable to climate change. So there may be years where even the most fantastic, technocrat, highly educated leader is not able to deliver much that is visible to the population. And so the question is, how will they remain accountable? And how will they keep some trust and legitimacy among the people, even when things are going really badly? And I think that's where you need to be attuned to these alternative understandings of accountability, so that you can carry people along with you, even when that village is flooded and there's nothing you can do, even when there's drought, whatever it is. So I think the wider argument for socially embedded good governance is that it makes states more resilient, and it makes that legitimacy deeper and stronger and kind of more multilayered. Rather than just relying on this idea of, okay, we can perform, we can build the infrastructure, we can give people the public goods that they need, because that's only one strand of it.
Tobi;
Like you said in your allusion to Fayose, I was going to say that accessibility has never been a problem for amala politics. I mean, you can, at least, relatively…you can see Adedibu on a Friday. The chances of you seeing Adedibu and having a very short conversation with him on a Friday, the chances are very high, unlike some other political figures who are a bit more progressive or technocratically minded. And I'll tell you one interesting story about Akala, actually. But on this point of accessibility in his hometown in Ogbomoso, he comes around every weekend. And I've also seen scenes of this, so it's not just hearsay. So he comes “home” every Friday and you see lines of people. Pool that are in his house just to collect cash, not just handouts, oh, I want to start a business, I want to pay school fees. And he just hands out cash, sometimes unbelievable sums of money to people. But the funny story I have about Akala, which made me laugh when I read that part in your book, of him being an ATM. So I think this was in 2011 when he was campaigning. So I was traveling, I was driving to Ilorin, so I stopped in Ejigbo to buy fruits. So after buying a very large basket of mangoes, I was out of cash. So I wanted to go to the... I think it was just one bank in Ejigbo at the time, Skye bank it was called back then. So I wanted to get some money. Unfortunately for me, Akala was campaigning in Ejigbo that day. So he basically walked into the bank and after making a withdrawal, the bank had to shut down.
So I think a bank staff sort of told us that he collected 200 million naira and the bank just had to close shop that for today, no cash. So Akala was really an ATM.
Portia;
Yeah. So like this point you make about if you wanted to see Adedibu, you could probably see him. And I think that links to a critique that sometimes I've got from people when I presented my work, which is maybe what you're talking about accessibility, maybe it works at the village level, maybe it works at the local government level, maybe it works at the city level. But like realistically, in a country of 200 million people, is this an idea that can actually work at the macro level? Because it's impossible for 200 million people to see to newborn on a Friday. And so what I'd say to this is when we think about accessibility and what are the correct social relations that politicians are meant to have with their constituents, it's not necessarily about direct personal experience necessarily. So it's not necessarily the question of how does the governor treat me, but it's often the question how does the governor treat people? So what I really noticed in the run up to this most recent election is that we saw one of the candidates, Mr. Peter Obi, often celebrated for this exact reason that he was accessible. And people used this word he's accessible. They're not saying necessarily that they themselves met him. What they're saying is that maybe they saw a video online of him interacting with someone he just met in an airport or someone in the street. And so it's about people's understanding of the social relations that these leaders have even if it's not with them directly. And I think this is why in the book, when I get into the more like analytic, academic, theoretical part, I really emphasize that I'm not talking about personalistic relations or private relations between me and you as individuals. I'm talking about social relations which might just be what are the sort of relationships that someone cultivates, what are the sorts of ways of behaving and then judging someone on the basis of that. And often when we talk about clientalism, we talk about relationships where the followers of the voters are directly known to the leader or the person who's their kind of patron. And that's not really what I'm talking about in the book. I'm talking about more this intermediary level of kind of social relationships that can go beyond just individuals. And so that's why I think it's possible for even the president to demonstrate that he's accessible without having to be directly accessible to every single Nigerian citizen. But that's one, I think, very sensible critique that sometimes people do raise to this argument.
Tobi;
Also, I would like to respond to something which relates to your point on what you are seeing as an increasing embrace by the donors of a different way of doing things in government. So I did election special for the podcast. I'll send you a particular episode we did with one of the persons that used to run the Lagos State Emergency Service Management. So we did a very interesting episode on some of the challenges in trying to run public service and provide public goods alongside.
And one thing that actually came up, which it's not a defense of that approach, but which just sort of made me see maybe as a runaway pragmatism, is that sometimes and you see this with the federal government as well, the civil service, the rules around hiring are very amorphous, they’re not very clear. So sometimes using consultants are sort of the easiest way to get things done and not be buried in the bureaucracy. I used to live in Abuja and you have cases where literally your file go missing trying to get approval for one thing or the other. Your file just sits there in somebody's desks who wants something or forgot or doesn't think it's priority enough. And I think that civil service, which then sort of feeds into what you talked about with the Lagos model and how sometimes public services and the civil service is usually used as an employment creation scheme and sometimes very loose culture, or should I say ethics around professionalism and what the job actually entails and how that can then slow down the process of execution of policies in some cases. So, and I think that using consultant sometimes is [practical]….it’s not an ideal solution. Personally, I don't like it as well, especially on the accountability point. But I see it as a sort of runaway pragmatism.
Portia;
Yeah. So I think your point about the civil service and the challenges of getting things done really resonates with so many of the critiques of the state in Nigeria. And a lot of the people I've been talking with in my new project have shared similar concerns, and it's obviously like a major issue. But again, I think I would kind of return to the question I posed at the very beginning of our discussion, which is that often when we spend spend a lot of time thinking about the critique decrying corruption in Nigeria, it creates, again, a false consensus about what it is we actually want. And when we come to that kind of positive vision of the future, there's no guarantee there's going to be full agreement. And actually, that's where the contestation lies. So my question would be, if we want a more efficient civil service in Nigeria, what do we want it to do more efficiently? To what purpose do we want to put that efficiency? So, again, if we want to build state capacity, okay, but what are the goals to which we want to direct that state capacity? And it makes me think of an article again by Thandika Mkandawire where he talks about monocropping and monotasking, and he talks about how the good governance agenda and public sector reforms in the 1990s basically prepared states to do one task and one task only, and that was to attract FDI and to guarantee the property rights of foreign investors.
So that basically is taking risk away from foreign investors and allowing them to do what they want, but also not demand from them to really give back or kind of guarantee any benefits. And that you can build up a state to be very, very efficient for some things, and yet you don't necessarily have kind of democratic consensus on what those goals should be. And so I think there are different things that the state in Nigeria could be aiming for. And it relates to conversation we were having before the recording started as well of, what actually is the economic ambition of Nigeria. And people put it very simply of, oh, we want more investment, we want more growth. But what is it that you want to do? Do you want to build up domestic firms? Do you want to enforce economic activity that is maybe more decentralized or more labor intensive? There are a whole number of different ambitions. The word that's often the elephant in the room is redistribution. Maybe you want a stronger state so that you can radically redistribute and eliminate the kind of off the charts inequality that we see. But that's definitely not the sort of thing that the good governance agenda or public finance initiatives are going to equip you to do. No one is talking about a cap on earnings, for example. And again, I'm not saying this is necessarily the solution, but I just want to highlight the way that there are certain things which are not currently on the menu. And if you're going to have a full discussion of the full range of things that Nigerian state and government could work towards, these need to be some of the options just so that you know that you've kind of explored all of it. And people say there's no ideology in Nigerian politics, and here I'm borrowing from the work of Saeed Hussaini, but often the ideology happens before you even notice it, in limiting the menu of options of what it is a state can do. So I think even in what seems like quite an uncontroversial discussion about the civil service, it probably should be more efficient. There's still something hiding there of what is it exactly that the civil service would be able to do in ideal situations? To what ends do you want to kind of make it work? In that regard, I'd kind of highlight the work of people like Mariana Mazzucato and the idea of the state that is much more focused on specific agenda, whether it's around climate change or whatever else, or if you look at the experience of the South Korean government and their kind of industrial policy. So I think we should be alert to just having an efficient civil service does not exhaust the discussion of what it is that we need to be doing in civil service reforms.
Tobi;
This has been a very interesting conversation.
Portia;
Thank you very much. And thank you so much for having me for this really fascinating and insightful discussion. It's such an honour to have someone read it so thoughtfully and intelligently and then connect it to clearly a very wide kind of political experience and insights.
Tobi;
Yeah. Thank you. Thank you very much.
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Hello everyone, and you are listening to Ideas Untrapped podcast. This episode is a continuation of my two-part conversation with Lant Pritchett. It concludes the discussion on education with the five things Lant would recommend to a policymaker on education policy, how to balance the globalized demand for good governance with the design of state functionalities within a localized context - along with RCTs in development and charter cities. I also got an exclusive one of his infamous ‘‘Lant Rants’’. I hope you find this as enjoyable as I did - and once again, many thanks to Lant Pritchett.
Transcript
Tobi;
Yeah, I mean, that's a fine distinction. I love that, because you completely preempted where I was really going with that. Now, on a lighter note, there's this trope when I was in high school, so I sort of want us to put both side by side and try to learn more about them. There's this trope when I was in high school amongst my mates, that examination is not a true test of knowledge. Although it didn’t help the people who were saying it, because they usually don't test well, so it sort of sounded like a self serving argument. But examination now, or should I say the examination industry, clearly, I mean, if I want to take Nigeria as an example, is not working. But it seemed to be the gold standard, if I want to use that phrase. It's as bad as so many firms now set up graduate training programs. Even after people have completed tertiary education, they still have to train them for industry and even sometimes on basic things. So what are the shortcomings of examination, the way you have distinguished both? And then, how can a system that truly assesses learning be designed?
Lant;
Let me revert to an Indian discussion because I know more about India than Africa by far. There are prominent people, including the people around JPAL and Karthik Muralidharan, who say, look, India never really had an education system. It had a selection system. And the ethos was, look, we're just throwing kids into school with the hopes of identifying the few kids who were bright enough, capable enough, smart enough, however we say it, measured by their performance on this kind of high stakes examination who are going to then become the elite. So it was just a filter into the elite, and it really meant the whole system was never really in its heart of heart geared around a commitment to educating every kid. I've heard teachers literally say out loud when they give an exam and the kids don't master the material, they'll say, oh, those weren't the kind of kids who this material was meant for. And they leave them behind, right? There's a phrase “they teach to the front of the class.” You order the class by the kid's academic performance, and then the teachers are just teaching to the front of the class with the kind of like, nah, even by early grades. So the evils of the examination system are only if it's not combined with an education system. So essentially, an education system would be a system that was actually committed to expanding the learning and capabilities of all kids at all levels and getting everybody up to a threshold and then worried about the filter problem much later in the education process.
So if they're part of an education system like they have been in East Asia, they're not terribly, terribly damaging. But if they're part of a selection system in which people perceive that the point is that there's only a tiny little fraction that are going to pass through these examinations anyway and what we're trying to do is maximize the pass rates of that, it distorts the whole system start to finish. My friend, Rukmini Banerjee, in India started this citizen based assessment where it was just a super simple assessment. You need assessment in order to have an effective education system, because without assessment, I don't know what you know or don't know, right? And if I don't know as a teacher or as a school what my kids actually know and don't know, how is anybody imagining that you're giving them an effective education? So I think the role of early assessment and the drive to integrate teaching with real time assessment, I think is hugely, hugely important. This is why I had the preemptive strike on the question of testing [which] is that I want radically more assessment earlier, integrated with teaching. And there are still some educationists that will push back against that. But if we put in a bundle, formative classroom assessment integrated with effective pedagogy and high-stakes examinations, then everybody's going to hate them both. So we have to really unbundle those two things.
And the hallmark of an education system is that it really has targets that every kid can learn and believes every kid can learn, and builds a system around the premise and promise that every kid can learn. There's this example out there, Vietnam does it. And Vietnam did it and continues to do it at levels of income and social conditions that are very much like many African countries. So if I were a country, I'd kind of hate Vietnam as this goody goody, that, you know. You know how you always hated the kid in school who would really do well, and then the teacher would go, well, how come you're not like that kid? On education, Vietnam is that country. It's, like, out there producing OECD levels of learning with very little resources and starting at least in the 1980s, at very low levels of income. So they're proving that it's possible. They're the kid who, like, when everybody goes, oh, that exam was too hard, and like, Bob passed it, like, how hard can it be? Anyway? So I think radically different bases for assessment versus examinations. And to some extent, the only integrity that got preserved in the system wasn't the integrity of the classroom and teaching, it was the integrity of the examination as a filter.
Tobi;
I want to ask you a bit about the political economy of this a little bit. So if, say, you are talking to a policymaker who is actually serious about education, not in the superficial sense, but really about learning and says, okay, Lant, how do I go about this? How do I design an educational system that really does these things? I've written quite a number of reports here and there that rely so much on your accountability triangle. I would have sent you royalty checks, but it wasn't paid work. Sorry. So how exactly would you explain the political economy of designing a working educational system? I know people talk a lot about centralization versus decentralization, who gets empowered in that accountability triangle? Where should the levers to really push, where are they? So how exactly would you have that conversation?
Lant;
So let me start with the accountability triangle and design issues. I think people mistake what the accountability triangle and design issues are about in the following sense. If I'm going to design a toaster, and the toaster is going to turn my untoasted bread into toasted bread, and it's going to be an electric toaster, there are certain fundamental things that have to happen, right? I have to have a current. I need to get that current running through something that heats up. I need that heat to be applied to the bread. I need it to stop when I've applied enough heat. Now, those fundamental principles of toaster design can lead to thousands of different actual designs of toasters. So I want people to get out of the notion that there's a single best toaster and that the accountability triangle or any other mode of analysis is to give you the best toaster and then everybody copies the best toaster. The principles are, design your own damn toaster, right? Because there's a gazillion ways to toast bread. Now, [for] all of them to work, [they] have to be compatible with the fundamental principles of electricity and current flow. You know, so I'm trying to get to one size doesn't fit all, but any old size doesn't necessarily fit everything either.
You raise the question of decentralization, right? The thing is, if you look across countries that have roughly similar learning outcomes from PISA and other assessments, they're radically different designs. France is an entirely centralized system. Germany is a completely federalized system. The US is almost completely localized system. The Low Countries, Netherlands and Belgium have money follows the student system into the private sector. They have the highest private sector enrollment of any country in the world because they allow different pillars of education between the secular, the Catholic and the Protestant to coexist. So then if you ask is decentralization the best way to design your education system? It's like, no, no, no, you're missing the point. The point is, if you choose a centralized system, there are principles in how you design the flows of accountability that are going to produce success and those that are going to produce failure. If you choose a decentralized system, there are systems of the alignment of accountability that are going to produce success and failure. So the analytical framework doesn't determine the grand design, it determines the mechanics of the design. And I just want to get that straight up front.
Second, as a result of the eight year research project of RISE, we have a policy brochure that has, kind of, here are the five kind of principles and here's the 15 minutes if I have five minutes with a minister or leader of a country, here are the five things I want to tell. And the first of those things is, commit. A lot of times we want to skip the most fundamental stage. And what I mean by commit is you actually need to create a broad social and political consensus that you're really going to do this and that you're committed to it. This big research project, RISE, which is based out of Oxford and I've been head of for eight years, we included Vietnam as one of our focused countries because it was a success case. Hence, we wanted our research team to partly do research about Vietnam and issues that were relevant in Vietnam. But we really wanted to answer the question, how did Vietnam do this? Why did they succeed? Right? And five years into the research effort, I was with the Vietnamese team and they had produced a bunch of empirical research of the econometric type. Is Vietnam success associated with this or that measurable input? Nothing really explains Vietnam at the approximate determinant input level. And finally, one of the researchers said to me, Lant, we're trying to get around the fundamental fact that Vietnam succeeded because they wanted to. And on one level it's like, my first response was, I can't go back and tell the British taxpayers that they spend a million dollars for a research project on Vietnam, and the conclusion to why Vietnam succeeded was because they wanted to.
[Laughs]
Tobi;
That’s kind of on the nose, right?
Lant;
Yeah. On another level, it's a deep and ignored truth. The policymakers ignore it, the donors ignore it. Everybody wants to ignore it. Everybody wants to assume it's a technocratic issue, it's a design issue. I think the fundamental problem of these failing and dysfunctional education systems, it's a purpose problem. The purpose of education isn't clear, understood, widely accepted among all of the people from top to bottom responsible for achieving results. And once that leads to what I call norm erosion. Within the teachers, there's this norm erosion of what does it really mean to be a teacher? So again, the first and maybe only thing I would say if I had five minutes with a leader is, how are you going to produce a broad social, political and organizational commitment that you are really going to achieve specific, agreed-upon learning results? The technical design issues have to flow from that commitment rather than vice versa. And you could copy France’s system, you could copy the Vietnamese system. I think you've heard the term from me and others, isomorphic mimicry. You can copy other people's systems and not have the same effect if it isn't driven by per purpose. Like, if you don't have the fundamental commitment and you don't have the fundamental agreed-upon purpose, the rest of the technical design is irrelevant.
Tobi;
It sort of leads me to my next theme. And that is the capability question in development.
Lant;
Yeah.
Tobi;
First of all, I also want to make a quick distinction, because lately, well, when I say lately that's a little vague. State capacity is all the rage now in development.
Lant;
Really? Is that true?
Tobi;
Yeah,
Lant;
I'm so happy to hear that. 3s I'm glad that you think so. And I hope that that's true, because it wasn't. It really wasn't on the agenda in a serious way. So, anyway …
Tobi;
But I also think there's also a bit of misunderstanding still, and usually, again, maybe I'm just moving with the wrong crowd. Who knows? People focus a lot more on the coercive instruments of the state and how much of it can be wielded to achieve certain programmatic results for state capacity. Revenue to GDP in Nigeria is low, how can the states collect more taxes? How much can the state squeeze out of people's bank accounts, out of companies, or the reverse. That, the reason why the state collects very little taxes is because state capacity is low. But, I mean, nobody really unpacks what they mean by that. They just rely on these measures like X to GDP ratio.
Another recent example was, I think it was in 2020, when the pandemic sort of blew over and China built a hospital with 10,000 bed capacity in, I don't know, I forgot, maybe 20 days or…
Lant;
Yeah. It was amazing.
Tobi;
A lot of people were like, oh, yeah, that's an example of state capacity. It's very much the same people now [who] are turning around and seeing China as an example of failure on how to respond to a pandemic. So I guess what I would ask you is, when you talk about the capability of the state, what exactly do we mean?
Lant;
In the work that were done and the book that we wrote, we adopt a very specific definition of capability, which is an organizational measure. Because there are all these aggregate country level measures and we use them in the book. But in the end, I think it's easier to define capability at the organizational level. And at the organizational level, I define [that] the capability of an organization is the ability to consistently induce its agents to take the policy actions in response to circumstances that advance the normative objective of the organization. And that's a long, complicated definition, but it basically means can the organization, from the frontline worker to the top of the organization, can it get people to do what they need to do to accomplish the purpose?And that's what I mean by the capability of an organization. And fortunately, unfortunately, like, militaries, I think, make for a good example. It's amazing that highfunctioning militaries have soldiers who will sacrifice their lives and die if needs be, to advance the purpose of the organization. Whereas you can have a million man army that's a paper tiger. No one is actually willing to do what it takes to carry out the purpose that the organization has been put to of fighting a particular conflict. And I think starting from that level makes it clear that, A, this is about purpose, B, it's about inducing the agents to take the actions that will lead to outcomes. And the reason why I'm super happy to hear that capability is being talked about is (you're doing a very good job as an interviewer drawing out connection between these various topics) the design of the curriculum is almost completely irrelevant to what's happening in schools. And so there's been way too much focus in my mind in development discourse on technocratic design and way too little on what's actually going to happen in practice. And so my definition of capability is, you measure an organization's capability of what actually happens in practice, what are the teachers actually going to do day to day? Right? And having been in development a long time, I often sit in these rooms where people are just, you know, I go out to the field and teachers aren't there at the school. Teachers are sitting in the office drinking their tea while the kids are running around on the playground, even during scheduled instructional time. And then I go back and hear discussions in the capital about higher order 21st century skills. You know, I wrote this article about India called Is India a Flailing State?
Tobi;
Yeah.
Lant;
And what I meant by flailing is there was no connection between what was happening in the cerebrum and what was being designed at the center. And what was actually happening when the actual fingers were touching the material and the nerves and sinews and muscles that connected the design to the practice were completely deteriorated. And therefore, capability was the issue, not design. So that's what I mean by capability. I mean, you use the example of tax. I think it's a great example. It's like, can you design a tax authority that actually collects taxes? And it's a hard, difficult question. And I think by starting from capability, I was really struck by your description of capability being linked to the coercive power of the state because that's exactly not how I would start it. I would start it with what are the key purposes for which the state is being deployed and for which one can really generate a sufficient integrated consensus that we need capability for this purpose.
Tobi;
Now, one of my favourite blogs of yours was how you described… I think it was how the US escaped the tyranny of experts, something like that. So I want to talk about that a bit versus what I’ll call the cult of best practice…
Lant;
Hmm.
Tobi;
Like, these institutions that are usually transplanted all over the world and things like independent central bank and this and that. And you described how a lot of decentralized institutions that exists in the United States, they were keenly contested, you know…
Lant
Yes.
Tobi;
Before the consensus sort of formed. So I'm sort of wondering, developing countries, how are they going about this wrong vis a vis the technical advice they are getting from development agencies? And the issue with that, if I would say, is, we now live in a world where the demand for good governance is globalized. Millions of Nigerians live on the internet every day and they see how life is in the industrial rich world and they want the same things. They want the same rights. They want governments that treat them the same way. Someone like me would even argue for an independent central bank because we've also experienced what life is otherwise.
Lant;
Right.
Tobi;
So how exactly to navigate this difficult terrain because the other way isn't also working. Because you can't say you have an independent central bank on paper that is not really independent and it's not working.
Lant;
Your questions are such a brilliant articulation of the challenges that are being faced and the complex world we live in because we live now in an integrated world where people can see what's happening in other places. And that integrated world creates in and of itself positive pressures for performance, but also creates a lot of pressures for isomorphism, for deflecting the actual realities and what it will take to fix and make improvements with deflective copies of stuff that has no organic roots. I've written lots of things and even though you love all of your children, you might have favorites. One of my favorite blogs is a blog I wrote that is, I think, the most under cited blog of mine relative to what I think of it, which is about the M16 versus the AK-47.
Tobi;
Oh, yeah, I read that.
Lant;
It's an awkward analogy because no one wants to talk about guns.
Tobi;
Hmm.
Lant;
But I think it's a really great analogy because the M16 in terms of its proving ground performance is an unambiguously superior, more accurate rifle. The developing world adopts the AK-47. And that's because the Russian approach to weapon design was - design the weapon to the soldier. And the American approach is - train the soldier to the weapon. And what happens again and again across all kinds of phenomena in development is the people who are coming as part of the donour and development community to give advice to the world, all want them to adopt the M16 because it's the best gun, and they don't have the soldiers that can maintain the M16. And the M 16 has gotten better, but when it was first introduced, it was a notoriously unreliable weapon. And the one thing as a soldier, you don't want to happen is as you pull the trigger and the bullet doesn't come out at the end. That's what happens when you don't maintain an M16. So I think this isomorphism pressure confuses what best practice is with assuming there's this global best practice that can be adopted independently of the underlying capacity of the individuals and capabilities of the organizations. So I think huge problem.
Second, I think there is a super important element of the history that the modes of doing things that now exist in the Western world and which we think of as being “modern,” I'm using scare quotes which doesn't help in a podcast, but we think of as being modern and best practice had to struggle their way into existence without the benefit of isomorphism. In the sense that when the United States in the early 20th century underwent a huge and quite conflicted and contested process of the consolidation of one room, kind of, locally operated schools into more professionalized school systems, that was politically contested and socially contested. And the only way the newer schools could justify themselves was by actually being better. There was no, oh, but this is how it has to be done, because this is how it has been done in these other places, and they have succeeded. And so there was no recourse to isomorphism, right. So in some sense, I think the world would be a radically better place for doing development if we just stopped allowing best practice to have any traction at all. If Nigerians just said, Screw it, we don't want to hear about it. Like, we want to do in Nigeria, what's going to work better in Nigeria? And telling me what Norway does and does not do, just no. Just no, we don't want to hear about it. Like, that doesn't help because it creates this vector of pressures that really deteriorate the necessary local contestation. My colleague Michael Wilcock, who is a sociologist, has characterized the development process as a series of good struggles. And in our work on state capability, we say you can't juggle without the struggle. Like, you can't transplant the ability to juggle. I can give you juggling lessons, I can show you juggling videos. But if you don't pick up the balls and do it and if you don't pick up the balls and do it with the understanding that unless you juggle, you haven't juggled, you can never learn to juggle. So I think if development were radically more about enabling goods, local struggles in which new policies, procedures, practices had to struggle their way into existence, justifying themselves on performance against purpose, we would be light years ahead of where we are. And that's what the debate about capability has to be.
And I think to the extent the capability discourse gets deflected into another set of standards and more isomorphism, just this time about capability, I think we're going to lose something. Whereas if we start the state capability from discussion of what is it that we really want and need our government to get better at doing in terms of solving concrete, locally dominated problems, and then how are we going to come about creating the capability to do that in the Nigerian context, (I’m just using Nigeria, I could use Nepal, I could use any other country). That's the discussion that needs to happen. And the more the, kind of, global discourse and the global blessed practice gets frozen out completely, the sooner that happens, the better off we’ll be.
Tobi;
So I guess where I was going with that is…
Lant; 78:25
Yeah.
Tobi;
One of those also fantastic descriptions you guys used in the book is” crawling the design space” on capability. So now for me, as a Nigerian, I might say I do not necessarily want Nigeria to look like the United States. Because, It wouldn't work anyways. But at the same time, you don't want to experiment and end up like Venezuela or Zimbabwe. It may not work to design your central bank like the US Federal Reserve, but at the same time, you don't want 80% inflation like Turkey. So we're ate the midway, so to speak?
Lant;
I get this pushback when I rail on best practice. I often get the push back, well, why would we reinvent the wheel? And I've developed a PowerPoint slide that responds to that by showing the tiniest little gear that goes into a Swiss watch and a huge 20 foot large tire that goes on a piece of construction machinery. And then say they're both wheels. Nobody's talking about reinventing the wheel. There are fundamental principles of electricity that a toaster design has to be compatible with. So, again, there is a trade off. There are fundamental principles, but there's a gazillion instantiations of those principles. We don't want to start assuming that there's a single wheel, right? When people say, don't reinvent the wheel, it's like, nobody's reinventing the idea of a wheel. But every wheel that works is an adaptation of the idea of a wheel to the instantiation and purpose for which is being put. And if you said to me, oh, because we're not going to reinvent the wheel, we're going to take this tiny gear from a Swiss watch and put it on a construction machine and expect it to roll, it's like, no, that's just goofy, right? And what I've really tried to do in the course of my career is equip people with tools to think through their own circumstances.
Tobi;
Hmm.
Lant;
Coming back, the accountability triangle or the crawling the design space. What I'm not trying to do is tell somebody, here is what you should do in your circumstance, because my experience is what's actually doable and is going to lead to long-run progress is an unbelievably complicated and granular thing that involves the realities of the context. But what I do want to do is help people understand there are certain common principles here and some things are going to lead to, like, Venezuela like circumstances, and we've seen it happen again and again, but there are a variety of pathways that don't lead to that. And you need to choose a pathway that works for you. And the PDAA isn't a set of recommendations, it's a set of tools to help people think through their own circumstances, their own organization, their own nominated problems and make progress on them. The accountability triangle isn't a recommendation for the design of your system. It's a set of tools that equip people to have conversations about their own system. And I have to say, at one time was in some place in Indonesia and it was a discussion of PDAA being mediated by some organization that had adopted it and was teaching people how to do it in Indonesia. And I had the wonderful experience of having this Indonesian woman who was a district official working on health, describe in some detail how they were using PDAA to address the problem of maternal mortality with no idea who I was. And I was like, oh, just for me to hear her say, here is how I use the tool to address a problem I've never thought about in a context, in an organization I've never worked with. So I think equipping people with tools to enable them in their own local struggles is my real objective rather than the imagination that I somehow can come up with recommendations that are going to work in a specific context.
So the don't reinvent the wheel is just complete total nonsense. It's like every wheel is adapted to its purpose and we're just giving you tools to adapt the idea of the wheel to your purpose. Adapting a square to the purpose just isn't going to work. So I agree. We want to start from the idea of things that work. And there are principles of wheel design that you can't violate. You can't come in and say, I have a participatory design of a water system that depends on water running uphill. No. Water runs downhill. That's a fundamental principle of water. But I think the principles are much broader and the potentiality for locally designed and organic, organically produced instantiations of common principles are much broader than the current discourse gives the possibility for.
Tobi; 83:47
I can't let you go without getting your thoughts on just a few more questions. So indulge me. I've stayed largely away from RCTs because there's a bunch of podcasts where your thoughts can be fairly assessed on that issue, but it's not going away. Right? So for me, there's the ethical question, there's the methodological question, and there's the sort of philosophical question to it. I'm not qualified to have the methodological question, not at all. Maybe on the ethics, well, there's a lot of also biases that get, so I'm not going to go there. For me, when I think about RCTs, and I'm fairly close here in Nigeria with the effective altruism community, my wife is very active, and I have this debate with them a lot. Surprisingly, a lot of them are also debating Lant Pritchett, which is which is good, right now. The way I see it is. The whole thing seems too easy in the sense that, no disrespect to anybody working in this space at all… in the sense that it seems optimizing for what can be measured versus what works.
So for me, the way I look at it is, it's very difficult to know the welfare effects for maybe a cohort of households. If you put a power station in my community, which has not had power for a while. So, but it's pretty easy if you have a fund and you distribute cash to households and you sort of divide them into a control group, and you know… which then makes it totally strange if you conclude from that that that is the best way to sort of intervene in the welfare and the well being of even that community or a people generally. I mean, where am I going wrong? How am I not getting it?
Lant;
No, the people listening to the podcast can't see me on the camera trying to reach out and give you a big hug. I think you have it exactly right. I think we should go back and rerecord this podcast where I ask you questions and your questions are the answer. So I think you've got the answer exactly right. So first of all, by the way, the original rhetoric and practice of RCTs is going away, and roughly has gone away. Because the original rhetoric was Independent Impact Evaluation. All of the rhetoric out of JPAL and IPA and the other practitioners is now partnerships, which is not independent, but essentially everybody's adopted the Crawl the Design Space use of evidence for feedback loops in making organizations better. So they've all created their own words for it because they don't want to admit that they're just, again, borrowing other ideas. So to a large extent the whole community is moving in a very positive direction towards integrating, seeking out relevant evidence for partner organizations in how can they Crawl the Design Space and be effective. And they're just not admitting it because it's embarrassing how wrong they were first, but they've come to the right space. So I want to give them credit.
When I gave a presentation at NYU called The Debate About RCTs Is Over And I won. It's not a very helpful approach, it's true, but it's not very helpful because I have to let them do what they're now doing, which is exactly what I said they should have been doing, and they are now doing. So, to some extent, asking people to say, yeah, we changed what we're doing is a big ask. And I'd rather they actually change what they're doing then they admit they did that. So to some extent it is going away. I think it's going away as it was originally designed, as this independent white coat guys, descend on some people and force them to carry out an impact evaluation to justify their existence. They're much more integrated, let's Crawl the Design Space in partnership with organizations, let's use randomization and more AB testing ways. And so I feel it's moving in a very positive direction with this weird rhetoric on top of it.
Second, I think you're exactly right and I think it's slightly worse than you said. Because it's not just about what can be measured, but it's about attributability. It's not just what can be measured, but what can be attributed directly, causally to individual actions. And my big debate with the Effective Altruism community is I'm hugely, you know, big, big, big wins from the Effective Altruism movement attacking kind of virtue signaling, useless kind of philanthropic endeavors. I think every person should be happy for them. But if I were African, I would be sick of this philanthropic b******t that you guys are going to come and give us a cow or Bill Gates talking about…
Tobi;
Or chickens.
Lant;
Chickens. My wife doesn't do development at all. She's a music teacher. But when she heard Bill Gates talking about chickens, she think, does Bill Gates think chickens haven't been in Africa for hundreds of years? Like, what does he think he knows about chickens that Africans don't know about chickens? That's just such chicken s**t, right? But again, I'll promote a blog. I have a blog called let's All Play for Team Development. And I think what you're raising in your thing is that it's not just what we can measure, it's what we can measure and attribute to the actions of a specific actor. Because, you know, your example of not having power in a village, that we can measure. But all of the system things that we've talked about so far - migration, education, state capability - these aren't going to be solved by individualized interventions. They're going to be solved by systemic things. And with my team on education, we've had this big research project on education standards but I keep telling my team, look, if you're not part of a wave, you're a drop in the ocean. The only way for your efforts to not be a drop in the ocean is for you to be part of a wave [of] other people around you working on the same issue, pushing in the same direction, to build that. And that kind of thing gets undermined by attributability. So with my RISE project, I sometimes tell my funders, you can have success or you can have attributability, but you can't have both, right? Because if we're going to be successful at changing the global discourse in education, we're not going to do it by ourselves. We're going to be part of a team and a network. So, anyways…
By the way, like early, early, early in the Effective Altruism movement, I had an interview with Cari Tuna and I think Holden Karnofsky, when they were thinking about what to do, and I made exactly this point. It's like, look, being effective at the individualized interventions that are happening is one thing, but don't ignore these huge systemic issues because you can't measure the direct causal effect between the philanthropic donation and the outcome. And that's your point, I think, which is, Nigeria is not going to get fixed by cash transfers.
Tobi;
No way.
Lant;
I mean, for heaven's sakes if Nigeria had the cash to transfer to everybody and fix it, well, then the national development struggle wouldn't be what it is. It's a systemic struggle across a number of fronts.
Tobi;
Why not just get Bill Gates to donate the money.
Lant;
But again, even Bill Gates, his fortune relative to the…you know, impact you could have through these programs, relative to what happens with national development, is just night and day. So to the extent that the adoption of a specific methodology precludes serious, evidence-based, hard struggle work on the big systemic issues, it's a net negative.
Tobi;
Again, to use your term, “kinky ideas in development.”
Lant;
Yeah.
Tobi;
I was reading a profile in the FT, a couple of days ago, all about charter cities, right?
Lant;
About what?
Tobi;
Charter cities. It was an idea I was kind of into for a while, I mean, from Paul Roma's original presentation at TED. But you strongly argued against it at your CATO debate. So what is wrong with that idea? Because there are advocates, there are investors, who think charter cities are this new thing that is going to provide the space for the kind of organizational and policy experimentation. And China's SEZs are usually the go to examples, Shenzhen particularly. So, what do you have to say about that?
Lant;
I like discussing charter cities.
Tobi;
Okay.
Lant;
And the reason I like discussing charter cities is because they're not kinky. Right. My complaint about Kinky is that you've drawn this line in human welfare and you act as if development is only getting people over these very low-bar thresholds. So conditional cash transfers are an example of Kinky, and conditional cash transfers are just stupid, right? Charter cities are wrong.
I mean, conditional cash transfers are just stupid in a trivial way.
Charter cities are wrong in a very deep and sophisticated way. So I love talking about charter cities. The reason I love talking about charter cities is A, they have have the fundamental problem posed, right? The fundamental problem is countries and systems are trapped in a low level equilibrium and that low level equilibrium is actually a stable equilibrium and so you need to shock your way out of it. And the contest between me and Charter cities is I think there's good struggle paths out of low level equilibrium. So I'm a strategic incrementalist. I want to have a strategic vision, but I want incremental action. So I'm against the kinky, which is often incremental incremental, it doesn't really add up to a development agenda. So I like, yes, we need to have a way out of this low level equilibrium and state capability in the way education systems work, in the way economic policies keep countries from achieving high productivity, et cetera. But I'm a good struggle guy. And charter cities want Magic Bullet. Right.
Now, the rationale for Magic Bullet is that good struggle is hard and hasn't necessarily proved successful. And these institutional features that lead to these low level traps just are resistant to good struggle methods out. And I think that's a really important debate to be having. But I think the right way to interpret China's experience and Yuen Yeun Ang's book on how China did it is, I think, a good illustration of this is China was Good Struggle. Using regional variations as a way of enabling good struggles. It's instructive that difficulty with Charter Cities always goes back. You keep going deeper and deeper of who's going to enforce this, who's going to enforce this, who's going to enforce this, you know. They're caught in their own catch 22 in my mind. So the first proposed, what appeared to be feasible Charter City in Honduras eventually got undermined by governance issues in which the major investor didn't want to actually be subject to rules based decision making.
So, I love talking about charter cities. I think they're on the right set of issues of how do we get to the institutional conditions that can create a positive environment for high productivity firms and engagement and improved governance. And they have a coherent argument, which is good, that, it's a low level trap and there's no path out of the low level trap and so we need big shock to get out of it.
But I don't think they're ultimately correct about the way in which you can establish the fundamentals. You can't just big jump your way to having reliable enforcement mechanisms and until you get to reliable enforcement mechanisms, the whole Charter City idea is still kind of up in the air. The next podcast I have scheduled to do is with the Charter Cities podcast, so that hopefully…
Tobi;
Oh. Interesting. Last question. We sort of have a tradition on the show where I ask the guest to discuss one new idea they would like to see spread everywhere. But I think more in line with your own brand, like you said earlier, I think I would like to ask for our own exclusive, Ideas Untrapped Exclusive Lant Rant, something you haven't talked about before or rarely. So you can go on for however long you wish. And that's the last question.
Lant;
I think if I had to pick something that if we could just get rid of it, it would be this fantasy that technology is going to solve problems. My basic point I make again and again and again is Moore's Law, which is the doubling of computer capacity every two years, has been chugging along, and it might have slowed down, but has been chugging along since 1965. So computing power has improved by a factor of ten to the 11th. And just as an illustration of just how big ten to the 11th is, the speed you drive on a freeway of 60 miles an hour is only ten to the 7th smaller than the speed of light. So ten to the 11th is an astronomically huge number in the sense that only astronomers have any use for numbers as big as ten to the 11th. Okay. My claim is anything that hasn't been fixed by a ten to the 11th change in computing power isn't going to get fixed by computing power. And I ask people sometimes in audiences, okay, particularly with older people, you look a little young for this question, but I ask them, okay, you older people that have been married for a long time, computing power has gone up ten to the 11th over the course of your marriage, has it made your marriage any better. And they're like, well, a little bit, sometimes when we're abroad, we can communicate over Skype easier, but on the other hand, it's made it worse because there's more distractions and more temptations to not pay attention to your spouse.
So on net, ten to the 11th of computing power hasn't improved average marriage quality. And then I ask them, has it improved your access to pornography? And it's like, of course, night and day, like, more instantaneous access to pornography. And my concluding thing is a huge amount of what is being promoted in the name of tech is the pornography of X rather than the real deal. So people promoting tech in education are promoting the pornography of education rather than real education. People that are promoting tech in government are promoting the pornography of governance rather than true governance. And it's just like, no, these are deeper human issues, and there's all kinds of human issues that they're fundamentally technologically resilient. And expecting technology to solve human problems is just a myth. It enables salespeople to pound down people's doors, to sell government officials some new software that's going to do this or that. But without the purpose, without the commitment, without the fundamental human norms of behaviour, technology isn't going to solve anything and the pretence that it is is distracting a lot of people from getting to the serious work. So if we could just replace the technology of X with the pornography of X, I think we'd be better off in discussions of what its real potentialities are. How's that for [an] original?
Tobi;
Yeah, yeah.
Lant;
You asked for it.
Tobi;
Yeah, that's a lot to think about, yeah. Thank you so much for doing this.
Lant;
Thanks for a great interview, Tobi. That was super fun. We could go back and record this with my asking questions and your questions being the answers. Because you're really sophisticated on all these issues. You're in exactly the right space.
Tobi;
Thank you very much.
Lant;
Great.
This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe -
Welcome to the Ideas Untrapped podcast - and my guest today is Development Economist Lant Pritchett. He is one of the most incisive and insightful scholars in the field, and his influence at the frontier of development research cannot be overstated. His research mostly focuses on economic growth, its contributing factors, and the development implications for peoples and countries. It was a privilege for me to talk to Lant, and I took the chance to ask him questions about some of the big themes of his research like Migration, Education, and State Capability.
This is a two-part conversation. In this episode, we discussed Migration and Education. Lant provides insights into how the demographic transition in many rich countries has now pushed the migration debate to the forefront, as opposed to when he was writing about it two decades ago. How the Solow model might explain the absence of migration on the development agenda, and why he thinks the ‘‘brain drain’’ is ‘‘mostly a myth’’. He also explained to me how we ended up with the wrong dashboard in education policies and the distinction between assessment and examination in measuring learning. I want to thank Lant for talking to me, and thank you all for always listening. I hope you enjoy it.
Transcript
Tobi;
My guest really needs no introduction. There's nowhere in the world of development, global development, and development economics, where Lant Pritchett is not a household name. So I’ll like to say welcome, and it's a pleasure to talk to you.
Lant;
Thanks for inviting me.
Tobi;
On a light note, let's start on a very light note. What have you been working on recently?
Lant;
So recently I've been doing two things. I've been wrapping up a large research project on basic education in the developing world, sort of K to twelve, and that had been an eight year research project that's just wrapping up. But more recently, I'm trying to ramp up my engagement on labour mobility. The world is facing a real demographic transition point, with the rich industrial world, particularly workforce age populations, just in constant decline while their aging population is increasing. And at the same time we have this massive youth bulge in parts of, not all of, but in parts of the developing world. And, you know, I'm an economist, whenever you see huge differences, you think, well, here's an opportunity for exchange. So the world's biggest opportunity for exchange right now is the West, as we call it, desperately needs workers, Africans definitely need the hide productivity income and jobs. And it's a great opportunity for exchange, but it's blocked by laws and policies that just make migration next to impossible. And I'm working to break that gridlock and get some sensible ways in which we can put willing workers into needed jobs.
Tobi;
I think that's a good launchpad to start the conversation on migration, which you've worked quite a lot on. I read your book Let Their People Come a couple of years ago. As a general question, what do you think we have learned from the time you wrote that book and you were compiling that research and now? Because definitely to me, it doesn't feel like much has changed in terms of the debate. And like you said, migration is such a big issue with economic and political consequences on both sides of the Atlantic. So what have we learned? And if nothing, why is that so? Why is there such a resistance to thinking differently about migration?
Lant;
What have we learned is a great question. Let's start with the demography of this. That book was written in 2006. One thing about demography is you can predict it very far into the future, right? Everybody who's going to be a 30 year old worker in 20 years is ten years old today. And so it's really not that hard to know what the future, the 20-, 30-year future of the labour force is going to look like, because everybody gets a year older. So on one level, we've learned nothing. But on another level, I think there's a current ongoing night and day shift in the urgency of the issue, because things were easily forecastable when I wrote the book - what is it, 2006? 2023 - 17 years ago. 17 years ago, I was saying, look, there's going to be this demographic crisis in the West and you're going to need these workers, but it was far away. So when you ask has anything been learned, it's like, no, but all of the projections for what was going to happen 17 years ago are now 17 years closer. And now, all of a sudden, the Prime Minister of Japan, I don't know if you've seen this, but the Prime Minister of Japan gave a speech a couple of days ago saying, “for the demographic future of Japan, it's now or never.” And it's like, no, it's never. The opportunity you might have had to address your labour force crisis through fertility was 30 years ago. It's over now.
Now the only issue is how are you going to get workers to work in the Japanese economy to fill the jobs that you need, given that you have the demographic crisis you have, which you now can't fix? I wish I had a good word for this or a clever way to put it, but it's sort of like when a child touches a hot stove, do you say they learned something? Well, yeah, kind of. They learned that the stove is hot. But people had been telling the kid, the stove was hot, don't touch it for years. So, you know, did they learn something? Well, kind of. They know it in a different, more intense way than they maybe knew it before, but they didn't learn anything new. So my first response is, I was just way premature with Let Their People Come in 2006 because the problem was still too far away for politicians and policymakers really to focus on it. But now it's like, boom, it's in your face. labour shortages in the West aren't like this hypothetical going to come thing. They're here, they're now. They're everything I do, everything I look at, I think it's here now. And now, like I said, the prime ministers of countries are going, “we really need to worry about this demographic thing.” So on one level, nothing learned. On another level, radical change and attention to the issue because what was easily predictable and was predicted is now happening in a way you can't ignore it.
Tobi;
But even with that, you still hear many of the standard objections to more migration, whether it's in the wages of domestic workers in the host countries and things around cultural integration. So, just do a quick recap for me why these objections are false or untenable at best. Because a lot of people are still susceptible to the same arguments even with copious evidence and years of research debunking them, you still hear these things. And in the age of social media, where information travels very very fast, you know, and it's also easy to appeal to people who might be affected by this and politically weaponize their disaffection. So the standard arguments to migration, whether we're talking about the work of Borjas and people who are built on the back of that, why are they untenable?
Lant;
I mean, we can talk about why they're untenable or many of the factual claims are false, but I think we want to start a step before that. I think the biggest problem with conversation about migration is fundamentally, and I'm talking mainly about the rich industrial West, which West includes Australia and West includes Japan, the rich industrial world. Okay. The problem is, since the early 20th century, these countries have forced two questions to have the same answer. And they're radically different questions. One question is, who are we as a sovereign entity that control a border? Who are we going to allow to be physically present on our territory and perform labour services? That's a clear question. It's a policy question. It's a legal question. It's a regulatory question. You can have an answer to that question. Then there's the separate question which is, who is the future of we? Who are we going to allow to come to our country and on the premise that they're going to become a citizen, become a future one of us and determine the future of who is us? Right? And I feel that forcing these two questions to be the same, you get a complete distorted discussion of the first question. So I think nearly everybody who's arguing about the impact of migration or labour mobility, which is by the way, I try and use two different words…
I try and always use the words labour mobility because when I use the word labour mobility it's clear I'm talking about the first question [which is] who are you going to allow under what terms and conditions to be physically present on your territory and what kinds of work are you going to allow them? What kinds of contracts and labour are you going to allow them to engage in? That's a question we can debate and have independently, in my view, of the question - who are the future citizens of the country? Right? But when you force those questions to be the same, I think nearly all the discussion of wage impacts is complete subterfuge b******t. Because the problem is if you say, oh, I don't want people coming to my country because I just don't feel they're going to fit in with us, boy, that sounds racist. That sounds exactly why whites in America had restrictive covenants that wouldn't allow African Americans to move into their neighborhoods because they're not like us. They'll change the nature of our way of life. And so most intellectuals in the West are reluctant to actually deploy cultural-based arguments for migration, but it's much more politically acceptable to say, “oh, well, I'm not saying that I am racist and that I don't want people of different races or ethnicities in my country, but it would be terrible for our workers. And therefore, that's why we're not going to do it.” And I think for the most part that's just b******t. It's just subterfuge. It's just substituting an argument that's politically acceptable but false for an argument that's true but not politically acceptable.
So, I think the reason why these false arguments, quite untenable arguments persist is exactly that. It's that these arguments are factually untenable, but it's easier to justify action in terms of those rather than deal with the concrete issue. And the way in which I'm proposing countries can deal with a concrete issue is start to think about separating these questions. So we have legal mechanisms for people to come and work in the country that perhaps have some path to citizenship, but you don't have to decide the citizenship question immediately when any work authorization is granted.
Tobi;
Of course, there are also people on the other side of these arguments who advocate for more migration and letting more people travel and be able to work. And like you said, they often mix up these two arguments as you have delineated them. So my question then is, is it time for advocates of more migration to maybe swallow some bitter pills, especially on questions of rights? Because I think that is where some of the hot buttons lie. What rights would people have? What are the benefits they are entitled to in their host country? And some of the fiscal implications of that, you know, even though some of you may be a cover to hide larger cultural or behavioral argument. So is it time for advocates of migration to, I dunno, maybe, embrace more pragmatic arrangements, so that we can move this issue forward a bit, you know? What do you think?
Lant;
Absolutely. I think that's a very perceptive question because I feel in the space of people that are debating and talking about migration, refugees and labour mobility, those three kind of different channels, the kind of if we use the word migration just to mean the intent that somebody is going to move permanently from one country to the other country and acquire different citizenship, then there's refugees, and then there's labour mobility. I think there's this tension between more and better. And I'm advocating that the path to better runs through more. Whereas a lot of people in this space want better, but it's not at all obvious that they aren't willing to sacrifice more for better. So I'm an economist, so I believe that if the price price of something is higher, people will do less of it. So I feel if you go to countries and you say every person who you allow into your country to do labour services of any kind automatically has to be entitled to the following long list of entitlements. They'll say, “gee, no, we're not going to do that then, we're going to have robots or we'll do without.” No one really should be talking about abrogating fundamental human rights. I mean, I've never say, oh, people should be expected to in any way, shape or form sacrifice fundamental human rights in order to move to another country. But there's a huge space in between. I like that you use the word entitlements versus rights. I feel a lot of human rights are negative rights. These are things that you can't have done to you. It's just immoral, illegitimate to ask you to sacrifice the privileges against these negative things being done to you. Suppressing your freedom of speech, suppressing your freedom of association, forcing you to change your religion, et cetera. But citizens of the West enjoy this huge amount of entitlements which they're entitled to legally as citizens. But migrants don't necessarily need to become endowed with the full panoply of entitlements that citizens have just because they're in the country. And we accept that for students. If you go to study in the United States, no one says, oh, because he's in the United State as a student, he's entitled to every social program available to any citizen in the United States or a tourist. I guess it’s the lack of imagination here and I love the title of Ideas Untapped. I think there's a lack of imagination here because we're not making the right analogy.
It's like, look, we allow people to be in countries for all kinds o f reasons, like tourism, for students, for passage, to do high level business deals, and we don't expect that to come with this huge array of the complete entitlements of the citizens of the country they happen to be in. And, you know, there's kind of a fetishism about work. Like, if you happen to go to another country and work for three months, that needn't come with the full entitlements of every entitlement every citizen of that country has. And then we just need to have an open and untapped conversation about what is the right line between, for sure protection of rights, for sure limitation of reneging on contracts, of abusing migrants because they're in a difficult legal situation of not being in their home country, but the array of entitlements is a hard question to answer, and countries need to take that on. Okay, if we're going to let people come to our country, what does that entitle them to and in what sequence and how? It’s a hard question that countries need to deal with but I don't think it's impossible question. But it is often made impossible by the insistence of like, no, it has to be perfection immediately. Because if you say that, you act as if you're advocating for better, but I feel you're not advocating for more, and lots and lots of people would love more.
And second, it's not obvious that there is a path to better that doesn't go through more because a lot of the abuse that people suffer is that they're being trafficked to reach these labour opportunities in illegal and informal and undocumented ways, which puts them at even more risk of abuse. So the analogy I use is prohibition in the United States. At one point in the United States, we passed a constitutional amendment, we banned the sale and production and import and everything of alcohol. But then what did we end up with? We ended up with a whole bunch of alcohol being marketed illegally and everybody marketing alcohol was, by definition, breaking the law. And so we ended up with a really, really crappy regulation of alcohol. And the only path to better regulated alcohol was to end prohibition and have it be legal. And I feel we're in this prohibition mode, vis a vis labour mobility, and it just isn't viable.
Tobi;
Sometimes the context within which these debates happen is also ideological, especially in America the right, the left. There's a tiny section of the right that I would like you to respond to their argument, or I should say their sentiments. Maybe I'll fit someone like Tyler Cowen in this category, who are pro immigration but who largely favors high performing technical talent from other countries and not people that can work in the jobs that you argue are actually badly in need of workers in the industrial world, what you call the hard non-tradables. Right? So how would you respond to that? What would you say to them who favour more immigration, but what they want is basically the stem talents of other countries? You know, let them come. Perhaps, they argue, that, productivity is stalling in the United States and to keep pushing the technological frontier, it has to be a large absorption of technological talent from other countries.
Lant;
My first response is that's exactly the inevitable consequence of bundling the two questions. If you bundle the question who are future citizens? And the question, who's going to be allowed to work in our country? It inevitably leads to we should allocate the few scarce slots we're willing to allocate, that inevitably leads to global war for talent kind of migration policies where you're going to attract the best and the brightest out of Nigeria, out of India, out of other places to come to America. And that makes economic sense. My point is there shouldn't be two categories. There should be three categories. Currently the debate happens as if there's two categories. There's migrants and there's refugees. Those are the two kinds of people that move. Whereas my point is we need a third category. In part, we need a third category because as you point out, and as I point out, and this is something that is, I think, completely absent from the debate in the West so far is that the change in occupational demand with respect to some measure of underlying skills in those occupations, it's U-shaped. There's actually been more increase in demand for the low skill, physical, non routine activities and an increase in demand for the super high skill. So if you look at change in wages or change in occupations in Europe, in the US, there's more demand for things that aren't easily amenable to technology and aren't repetitive, like, just to use a prosaic example, like cleaning a hotel room.
Cleaning a hotel room is a very hard, it's not an easily automatable thing because it's different every time, you walk in, things are in different places. And so the result of the technological changes in the West is that everybody's complaining about the falling wages because the middle of the wage distribution has been hit hard by technological changes. But we have a whole bunch of jobs that are needed at the low end that the domestic citizens don't want to fill, and in the US, there's going to be something like a million more needed people in home health care. It’s not a job that any American middle class family is, oh, you need to grow up and be a home health care aid. It's not a super attractive job to the emerging youth, and we just don't have any youth coming into the labour market, so we need to fill those jobs. But if you say to a country, oh, you should determine who you are as a people and who you are as a nation and who your future citizens are, in order to meet your needs for home health care, they're like, no, we want computer scientists, we want data engineers, we want doctors. So what I'm saying is, Tyler's argument is inevitable if you accept the premise that what we're talking about is immediate and expected path to citizenship, labour mobility and the only form of labour mobility is migration.
If you look at what's happened with Canada and Australia, who adopted points systems for their immigration, that's exactly the way it went. You gave points for higher levels of education. You gave points for speaking the language. You gave points for things that were cultural match. Canada has massively benefited from global war for talent kind of recruiting through a points-based system. But there's a whole bunch of other jobs in Canada that you also need to fill. And Canada is dealing with this. It's like, okay, how do we deal with all of these existing [jobs] native born Canadians don't necessarily want and so you're not taking them away from anybody by having more people in here working on those, but on the same type, it's a very difficult political discussion to say, we are going to, in some sense, put the future of who we are as a people at the hostage of the immediate needs of the labour force. So Tyler's arguments make a ton of sense if you accept the premise there's no temporary mobility. Once you allow for rotational or temporary or time limited mobility, which can include path to citizenship, then the whole conversation changes. A fundamental principle of economics that is often ignored is instruments to targets. If you have two different targets, you need two different instruments. And so if we've have multiple needs for immigration, we need multiple pathways. And I think Tyler is right about one pathway. I'm a big advocate of the other pathway. Because I am a development economist, if I say what would really benefit Africa, it's not Tyler Cohen having aggressive American policy to take the best and brightest out of Africa, it's creating multiple pathways for Africans.
Tobi;
On Africa, I don't want to draw into any particular comments on that, but let's move the debate closer. Which is, we also worry about migration in Africa, especially…
Lant;
Oh, within…
Tobi;
Yeah. For example, in Nigeria, there is always a huge debate about the number of Nigerian doctors that leave for the UK every year. Canada is also a big competitor now. Another industry that is causing quite a bit of domestic disruption in Nigeria is software talents, which is a new and burgeoning industry with lots of investments but the talents are moving in droves, which inevitably brings up the issue of the brain drain. Right. I usually cite Sandefur and Clemens work on the Philippines, but I encounter some resistance to that argument that no, no, no, don't tell us about Filipino nurses. So now, is the brain drain, is it a myth or reality? I know that's a bit of a vague question, but…
[Laughs]
Lant;
Well, like, it's mostly a myth, but at the same time, most myths have some grounding in some deep aspect of human reality. Myths that persist are capturing something deep and important. Right. So let's start with the way that it's not a myth. The way that it's not a myth is that if a country is not yet in the position in which there's really rewarding ways for the high talent workers to use their skills, then people are going to leave the country and not come back. And then brain drain is, I think, a significant problem because a lot of the pathway of the the education of the people to become the superstars in software and medicine, capable of moving to Canada, Germany, and the US, was publicly funded. So there is a legitimate concern. The whole premise is we'll educate our people because we'll recoup our investment through taxes when they become more productive people. But if that productivity happens in another place, then, yes, there's a serious problem there. But I think what we've learned from lots of experiences with India, where I live and have been working on and off for over 30 years, eventually there's another rhyming thing that's never going to become as popular as brain drain, and I call it cortex vortex. I think one reason brain drain gets so much attention is the two words rhyme, which is not a good reason for an argument to have credibility. But I'm afraid it's like people [go] “brain drain, oh, yeah. Brain drain, oh, yeah. Rhymes. It must be true.” So I want to contrast that with cortex vortex, your brains moving back and forth. There's a vortex of movement, and I think India undoubtedly has benefited from the fact that the early migration out of India into America was permanent. These people left India. But then, as India changed its economic policies, became a more dynamic place, the rotational mobility that there were trained Indians in both places that you could establish the connections, that you could create essentially huge software firms that were essentially US firms based in India. Meaning. All of the revenue was in the US. All of the work was in the US. But the work was being done in India. That was a consequence of the previous establishment of connections.
So I think, on net, the benefits of vortex cortex, when countries become sensible and viable places to do business, exceed the risks of brain drain. So, not that there can never be a brain drain situation, but the brain drain situation is often a much deeper problem with the country. And when the country changes, you can move from brain drain risks to cortex vortex benefits. And I think that as a country, in Nigeria, I would be saying, well, look, we really should be thinking about why software engineers aren't setting up businesses in Nigeria much more than worry about losing Nigerians to the US. And moreover, the more Nigerians we have going and working in the US, eventually it is going to benefit Nigeria in the long run by creating the possibility of connections. The third issue. I realize I'm giving long answers, but the third issue is an issue that Michael Clemens has raised and has documented is if there were viable, again, time limited pathways, then the net effect of investment in training in these things can far exceed the drain and hence you actually get more skilled people from the possibility of migration. So if you look at the Philippines as an extreme example, like if brain drain were true, Philippines should be desperately short of nurses because there's Filipino nurses all over the world. Exactly the opposite, because Philippine nursing schools train a whole bunch of people with the promise and premise that some of them are going to go work and get jobs as nurses in other places. But the net number of nurses trained versus the net number that actually go abroad is very small. So the opportunities for Filipino nurses to work abroad have dramatically increased the supply. And so there's way more nurses, we need to think of the long-run endogeneity of the number.
So again, people's ability for counterfactual is often very limited. They see a Filipino nurse working in the Gulf and think that nurse could have been working in the Philippines, so therefore it's created less nurses in the Philippines. And they have a very difficult time imagining the more complex counterfactual of well, that nurse actually created five or six additional trained nurses who are in the Philippines because they got trained as nurses and went abroad for a while and then came back and worked in the Philippines. Or never got the opportunity to work abroad. So the net brain creation is a huge driver to the extent that these very high returns to possibility of going abroad increase the total creation of supply often gets completely ignored in the brain drain discussion. So I'm sure a lot of Nigerians are investing in their software skills in the hopes of working abroad. And the net effect of software skills available in Nigeria may well be hugely positive, even though you can point to lots of individuals who leave.
Tobi;
One evidence that you're having a conversation with Lant Pritchett is if his answers always lead you to your next question. Speaking about the cortex vortex now. There are people who argue, and sometimes they toy with a very horrible idea of limiting emigration in African countries, especially emigration of highly educated, highly skilled people because of the fear of brain drain. And one argument that I've heard is that there is less incentive for national development if your brightest and the best leaves. The political incentive is for the ruling class to keep looting. They have no incentive to fix anything. I mean, citizens get educated, they grow up, they leave. Nothing about the political dynamics of the country changes. How would you respond to such people? How would you tell me to respond to such people?
Lant;
I have to say there's two levels to this. First kind of this is getting beyond my pay grade, so to speak. It's like the true dynamics of how countries come to do national development in this fourfold transformation that I talk about, of the politics, the society, the economy, and the administration, it's a huge, complicated historical transformation. And I'm not at all convinced forcing your best and brightest to stay in the country because they'll be really unhappy, and therefore, by being unhappy, they're going to play a positive role in the political dynamics is a plausible story to first order at all? I don't know. Maybe. But it's hard to point to the cases where by not allowing these people to migrate, they instead of becoming a Nigerian doctor working in Canada, they became this path-breaking political transformational figure. And a very striking counterexample is Gandhi in India. Came back to India when he was in his 40s, having spent a significant amount of time in the UK and a significant amount of time in South Africa. You could have said, oh, man, if we had just forced Gandhi to stay in India, things would have been so much better. And there are a number of significant examples of people who went abroad for a period and then came back and made a positive difference, too. So that first one, it's like, kind of on first order sounds plausible, but I don't know of any either historical, or social or political or economic solid evidence that it's true.
Part of my brand is skepticism. Just because it sounds plausible doesn't mean it's true. First of all, yeah, that sounds plausible, but I'm not sure it's true. Had Gandhi not been allowed to go study law in the UK, would India have in the long run historical trajectory, be in a better place? I don't know. The actual historical thing was, and I feel embarrassed as someone who has lived in India for a long time, but I think he was 44 years old before he came back and became a prominent and effective political advocate in India. And who's to know that that experience of living broad didn't radically increase his productivity as a transformational political leader? So that's the first thing I'd say. Second thing I'd say is I have these fundamental liberal tendencies that forcing people, even if it's good for the country, forcing people to do it, makes me nervous.
Tobi;
Yeah.
Lant;
Even if I did accept that it were true, that it would be marginally better for Nigeria if these people didn't go off and work in other countries, putting that burden in a coercive way on the individual makes me nervous. Just makes me nervous. Because how did the burden of Nigeria's national development transformation fall on this person just because they happen to be a good programmer? That's not at all an obvious thing. And then the last point I want to make is, you know, I sometimes want to promote the analogy that human capital is a lot like physical capital, right? And on this, both sides have been completely hypocritical in the sense that when Westerners make this argument, I go, hey, until you guys start refusing to take Nigerians physical capital, when Nigerians want to invest in Swiss banks or British banks and say, no, this physical capital should be forced to remain in Nigeria to promote the national development of Nigeria and so we should ban Nigerians from being able to put money in Switzerland because it would be better used there than in Switzerland. Until you're willing to make that same argument, I'm pretty sceptical that your argument a Nigerian should be forced to remain in Nigeria is really a principled argument. Because analytically, it's exactly the same. And yet the West is like, oh, yeah, yeah, all of the money that wants to roll out of Africa into Swiss, and British and other banks [we’re] super happy to take it, even though exactly the analytically same argument can be made as, oh, this money should be better invested and if we force people to invest their money in Nigeria, they'd be more aggressive about creating a better investment climate. But the West is fully complicit in taking all the money that wants to come out of Africa, and yet when it's people, all of a sudden they acquire principles. And then, secondly, the same thing for the country, it's like, look, if you're losing physical capital, you might want to look at why people don't want to invest in Nigeria and create a better investment climate.
Tobi;
My final question on migration, before we move on to another baby of yours - education. So as a development economist, and also you've written about this, why isn't migration so much on the “development agenda”? I don't know any development organization or any communique or report that is so big on migration as a development policy. Policy that radically increases the welfare and the incomes of the people, like you said. Because sometimes development is usually framed more as a country thing than the people. So why is it missing on the agenda?
Lant;
I think there are lots of reasons. And let me start with the one that is less, I think, discussed and deserves more consideration. And the answer is the Solo model.
Tobi;
Okay.
Lant;
So let's talk economics first, right? The Solo model, which I don't know how many of the listeners are actually into economics, but it was the dominant model of economic growth. And it said that economic growth is a combination of this thing called investable stuff. We'll call it capital. And that includes human capital and infrastructure and all kinds of physical stuff. I'm taking human capital as a physical stuff. So there's capital and then there's the productivity with which capital is used, which we'll call A. And that was kind of the dominant model of economic growth when development organizations in the 1950s and 60s came into being. Now, in the Solo model, and I had the privilege of actually being taught by Bob Solo, so I can speak with some authority about how Bob Solo talked about it. A, was regarded as blueprints. This total factor productivity that interacted with capital was ideas that were in the air. It was regarded as technical. Now, if you think about, therefore, how the dynamics of growth were going to work, is A, this technical blueprints of how to do stuff was going to diffuse very fast, right? Because after all, if I have a blueprint for how to build a power plant or build a dam or build a highway or run a coffee processing plant, that blueprints can transfer across countries really fast. So if you scratch what was the intellectual kind of environment in which the bones and DNA of places like the World Bank were built? They were built on a model that ideas were going to diffuse fast. Well, if ideas diffuse fast, then the productivity of factors in the places that now have high A but have low human capital and low physical capital was going to be super high. And so the whole problem was how do we invest in this super high productivity, physical and human capital in these places with high A and low K? That was the whole model of development. Right? Now, what we have learned and this we really have learned in the sense that we didn't know it and now we know it, is what we have learned from five decades of research on economic growth is that model isn't exactly wrong. Exactly wrong. A, is what hasn't converged. If you ask why hasn't Nigeria had the gross prospects that we would have hoped and anticipated for Nigeria, it's because A stayed low. Not because Nigeria and we'll get to this when we get to education in two minutes, but not because Nigeria has necessarily had radically underinvestment in human capital or radically possibility for investment in physical capital. It's that A didn't diffuse, and it turns out A isn't blueprints. A is much deeper things about how you can make factor productivity in a country which go way beyond do you have the blueprint to build a power plant? Right. So the first reason why development wasn't originally part of the development agenda is that in the Solo model, we should have had human capital flowing to Nigeria because the return to factors should have been super high, because A should have been super high relative to the level of K and HK. So before we get into more cynical, and hence probably more realistic and true positive models of why it's not on the agenda, I think there was an intellectual flaw about economics itself and how it thought about growth that I don't think we've pointed out strongly enough, how completely, totally wrong it is, and how it leads to radically different assumptions with how important migration is going to be. And in the Solo model, there was no need for migration. Like, once A was there, the returns to HK were going to be phenomenally high, not low.
So we really have learned from constructing data sets and just decades and decades of growth research, that A doesn't converge. And that is a huge, huge puzzle. Right. Because if A were, as Bob Solo thought it was, a set of blueprints, it should have diffused very fast, and instead it's been not diffused. So that's an economic-based argument for why it wasn't on the development agenda. And the problem is, like I say, the DNA and bones of the World Bank were built because if you ask, why does the World Bank focus on moving money? Well, again, in this model that A has converged and we need K and HK to catch up, what these countries need is money. Right. Anyway, and it's very hard to change an organization's DNA. Then there are the obvious, and I just want to point out, I'm not being completely silly and naive… it's also the case that most of the development organizations have their intellectual agendas dominated by the rich donors, and the rich donors never really wanted it. Since they never really wanted it, it was always easy to push it off the agenda. Now, on the plus side, the World Development part of the World Bank, which is often a very flagship document, is this year on migration. So for the very first time, the World Bank is going to solidly bring development issues and migration issues side by side. This is another way in which I think the overall environment for discussing migration is going to change radically, I think, in the next ten years. And I think this is a harbinger of that.
Tobi;
I look forward to reading the document.
Lant;
I've seen drafts of it, and it will be good.
Tobi;
Okay, moving to education now. Yeah, so I'll start this way. It's one of those things that is super sexy to talk about politically. We are in [an] election season now in Nigeria, and every candidate is saying, I'm going to invest in education. We need to fix basic education. We need to make our education work. If we make it work, then this and this and X and Y will not happen. There will be no crime. People will no longer kidnap. They can, you know, a lot of things. The benefits of education seems intuitive. But what frustrates me, whether you're talking to policymakers or investors or even my friends who talk about education, is, other than researchers like yourself who are working in the field, almost nobody stops to look at the evidence. Nobody. And then we've ended up with this, to use one of your phrases, we ended up with the wrong dashboard for education, where we are basically measuring schooling and not learning. How did this happen? You can’t talk about human capital without talking about education. So how come we are still measuring the wrong things? How come countries are putting in money, and there’s basically nothing to show for it?
Lant;
Wow, okay, well, that was a long set-up. So I'm writing, like, one of these efforts where a variety of people are getting together, writing about different topics, people are writing about infrastructure and other things, and I'm writing about education. And I start by saying I feel that the field of education is the field in which more false things get set than any other domain. Just completely, totally, obviously false things. Perfect people are perfectly happy to repeat them again and again, year after year, decade after decade. So let me start with the most positive possible spin on it. The most positive spin on what's happened with schooling and education is that if you go back again to the origins of decolonialisation and these newly independent national governments come in and they have control of policies for the first time, it was obvious to everyone and completely accepted that the education level and if now by education we mean mastery of certain capabilities. If we define education in some sense as a vertical axis of, we want them to have skills and capabilities and values and dispositions that are going to contribute to national development, how many years of schooling are going to do, right? There's two ways to increase the stock of, kind of, skills and capabilities. One is more kids in school. One is more learning per year. Well, in the 1960s, it was obvious more kids in school was an easily available, doable, and viable way to do that. You could just push more kids through school, and as long as you push them through at roughly the same level of skills per year, you've got more of it. Right? And every time either national leaders or global leaders or people raised the quality issue, the response is, we'll cross that bridge when we come to it. There was a lot of nervousness that a lot of the early pushback against excessive expansion in the education system was really elitist nonsense, right, that, oh, these people don't really need to be educated and we should reserve education for the elite. And so it was easy to create this debate where the people talking quality were hidebound traditionalists that were anti-egalitarian, and the only acceptable position was [to] expand schooling. And so to some extent, people kept saying, we'll cross that bridge when we come to it. We'll cross that bridge when we come to it. We'll cross that bridge when we come to it.
So the reason for starting with this positive thing is, hey, we're now at the bridge. Like, around the world, nearly every kid goes to school. Like, something like 3% of children don't go to any school ever in their life. And most kids are going to school for a very long time now. And we haven't ever really come back to say, by the way, in the 1960s, it was obvious more kids in school and at constant learning per year was okay. In 1980s, there was still a lot of kids not in school, girls were out of school, et cetera, poor kids were out of school, et cetera. But in 2020, it's like, hey, we're at the bridge. The scope for increasing a country's stock of human capital or the stock of learning and skills and capabilities by expanding the years of school is over. It's just over. It's just over. The additional marginal gain from pushing out on the quantity of schooling access just doesn't hold any promise in most countries of the world. So to some extent, the discourse has to change because the facts have radically changed. Like, I don't want to go back and say people in 1960 were wrong to radically and rapidly expand education or that free primary education in 1970s was a mistake, because there were still lots of kids not with the opportunity or access to school. But that world is gone. That world is gone. And our views and attitudes and discourse hasn't changed nearly as much as the facts on the ground have changed. And so we just have to recognize that, look, the only real viable possibility for substantial, sustained improvements in the level of skills and capabilities of youth is now from more learning per year. We have to radically change that.
Tobi;
So I mean, pivoting to learning, I get that. But I want to talk a bit about testing. Right.
Lant;
About who?
Tobi;
Tests.
Lant;
Oh, okay, let's not talk about tests.
[Laughs]
I'm being quite serious, because there's two radically different things.
Tobi;
Okay.
Lant;
One is assessment and one is examinations.
And then tests, I'm not quite sure what you mean. I'm preempting you here because I was just literally writing about this two days ago.
Tobi;
Okay.
Lant;
Most education systems relied radically too much on high-stakes for-the-student-late-in-the-cycle examinations. But they relied radically too little on assessment of learning. And so when you say testing, I want to be clear, are we talking about grade ten school leaving high stakes for the student examinations, or are we talking about assessments of, in third grade, can kids read and how do we use assessment of learning? Because within the education community there's this huge negative stigma around testing, which then I think leads in radically unproductive directions, because assessment gets thrown into the bundle with high-stakes examinations. And everybody hates high-stakes examinations, particularly because they're often unbelievably crappy examinations, meaning they're examinations of how much can you memorize? And hence we're allocating future opportunities to go to college on the basis of a really crappy assessment of learning. So everybody hates examinations, but I think everybody should love assessment. Sorry, so I've answered a question you haven't asked yet.
This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe -
Hello everyone, and welcome to Ideas Untrapped podcast. My guest for this episode is Decision Scientist, Oliver Beige - who is returning to the podcast for the third time. Oliver is not just a multidisciplinary expert, he is one of my favourite people in the world. In this episode, we talk about scientific expertise, the norms of academia, peer review, and how it all relates to academic claims about finding the truth. Oliver emphasized the importance of understanding the imperfections in academia, and how moral panics can be used to silence skeptics. I began the conversation with a confession about my arrogance about the belief in science - and closed with my gripe about ‘‘lockdown triumphalism’’. I thoroughly enjoyed this conversation, and I am grateful to Oliver for doing it with me. I hope you all find it useful as well. Thank you for always listening. The full transcript is available below.
Transcript
Tobi;
I mean, it's good to talk to you again, Oliver.
Oliver;
Tobi, again.
Tobi;
This conversation is going to be a little bit different from our previous… well, not so much different, but I guess this time around I have a few things I want to get off my chest as well. And where I would start is with a brief story. So about, I dunno, I’ve forgotten precisely when the book came out, that was Thinking Fast and Slow by the Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman. So I had this brief exchange with my partner. She was quite sceptical in her reading of some of the studies that were cited in that book.
And I recall that the attitude was, “I mean, how can a lot of this be possibly true?” And I recall, not like I ever tell her this anyway…but I recall the sort of assured arrogance with which I dismissed some of her arguments and concerns at the time by saying that, oh yeah, these are peer-reviewed academic studies and they are most likely right than you are. So before you question them, you need to come up with something more than this doesn't feel right or it doesn't sound right. And, what do you know? A few years, like two or three years after that particular experience, almost that entire subfield imploded in what is now the reproducibility or the replication crisis, where a lot of these studies didn't replicate, a lot of them were done with very shoddy analysis and methodologies, and Daniel Kahneman himself had to come out to retract parts of the book based on that particular crisis.
So I'm sort of using this to set the background of how I have approached knowledge over my adult life. So as someone who has put a lot of faith naively, I would say, in science, in academia and its norms as something that is optimized for finding the truth. So to my surprise and even sometimes shock - over different stages of my life and recently in my interrogation of the field of development economics, people who work in global development - [at] the amount of politics, partisanship, bias, and even sometimes sheer status games that academics play and how it affects the production of knowledge, it's something that gave me a kind of deep personal crisis. So that's the background to which I'm approaching this conversation with you.
So where I'll start is, from the perspective of simply truth finding, and I know that a lot of people, not just me, think of academia in this way. They are people who are paid to think and research and tell us the truth about the world and about how things work, right? And they are properly incentivized to do that either by the norms in the institutional arrangements that birthed their workflows and, you know, so many other things we have known academia and educational institutions to be. What is wrong with that view - simply academia as a discipline dedicated to truth finding? What is wrong with that view?
Oliver;
There's many things. Starting point is that it was not only Daniel Kahneman, behavioral economics has multiple crises also with Falsified work. Not only with wrong predictions, wrong predictions are bad but acceptable. This is part of doing science, part of knowledge production. But Falsification is, of course, a bigger problem now and they had quite a few scandals in that. The way I approach it always is sort of like a metaphor from baseball. Basically there's something called the Mendoza Line in baseball which is a hitter that has a 200 hitting average. This is like the lowest end of baseball. If you go below 200, then you’re usually dropped off the baseball teams. And on the upper end you have really good hitters that hit an average of like 300 or something. If you have a constant 300 average you usually get like million dollar contracts, right? We can translate this to science in a lot of ways. Of course, there is a lot of effort involved in going from a 200 average to a 300 average to a 20% average of being right to 30% a average of being right. But still if you're at a 300 level, you're still wrong 70% of the time.
And so the conversations I observe, they're people that are not specialists in a field [and] we're trying to figure out who is right in a certain conversation. Talking about conversations in a scientific field we basically try to use simple pointers, right? One of the pointers is of course a paper that has gone through peer review. You see these conversations of like, okay, this paper has not been peer reviewed, this paper has been peer reviewed. But peer review does not create truth. It sort of reduces the likely likelihood of being wrong somewhat but it doesn't give us any indicator of this is true. The underlying mechanism of peer review usually cannot find outright fraud. Cannot detect outright fraud. This happened quite a few times. And also peer review is usually how close is the submitted paper to what the reviewers want to read. There is a quality aspect to it, but ultimately it changes the direction of the paper much more than it changes quality. So academia overall is a very imperfect truth finding mechanism. The goal has to be [that] the money we spend on academic research has to allow us to get a better grasp of so far undiscovered things, undiscovered related relationships, correlations, causal mechanisms, and ultimately, it has to give us a better grasp of future and it has to give us a better grasp of what we should do in order to create better futures. And this all basically comes down to, like, predicting the future or things that were in the past but yet are to be discovered.
Evolution tends to be a science that is focused on the past, looking at things in the past. But there's still things we have to discover, connections we still have to discover. And this is what academia is about. And the money, the social investment we put into academia has to create a social return in the way that we are better off doing the things we need to do to create a better future for everyone. And its [academia] track record in that regard has been quite mixed. That's true.
Tobi;
So let's talk a little bit about incentives here. Someone who has also written quite a lot, who talked so much about some of the issues - I think he's more focused on methods. He's andrew Gelman, the statistician. I read his blog quite a lot, and there's something he consistently allude to and I just want to check with you how much you think that influenced a lot of the things that we see in academia that are not so good, which is the popularity contest - the number of Twitter followers you have; whether you are blue checked or not; bestselling books; Ted Talks that then lead to people making simplistic claims. There's the issue of scientific fraud, right, some of which you alluded to also in behavioral economics, behavioral science generally. There was recently the case of Dan Ariely, who also wrote a very popular book, Predictably Irrational, but who was recently found to have used falsified data. And I recall that you also persistently criticized a lot of people during the pandemic, even till date - a lot of people who made outright wrong predictions with terrible real life consequences because policymakers and politicians were acting under the influence of the “expert” advice of some of these people who will never come out to admit they are wrong and are less likely to even correct their mistakes. So how is the incentive misaligned?
Oliver;
Okay, many questions at once. How does academia work? And like I always like to say that academic truth finding or whatever you want to call it is not too far away from how gossip networks work. The underlying thing is, of course, any kind of communication network is basically sending signals. In this case, snippets of information, claims, hypotheses and the receiver has to make a decision on how credible this information is. You have the two extreme versions, which is basically saying, yeah, I just read this paper and I think this paper makes a good claim and is methodologically sound or I just read this paper and this paper is crap as everything about it is wrong. So you basically start with a factual claim and an evaluation. This happens in science Twitter in the same way a gossip network communicates typically good or bad news about the community. Also, a gossip network communicate hazards within the community, sending warnings, which is what academics have been doing quite a bit over the last two and a half years. And they also have this tendency to, a) exaggerate claims, reduce claims, and [they] also have this tendency to create opposing camps. Because very few middling signals are being retransmitted.
I've been watching the funeral of the Queen, I have no strong opinion about British royalty in either direction so if I post something on Twitter about it, nobody will retweet. And, of course, the two extreme ends will be retweeted. This is how Twitter works, but it's also how science usually works. You’ll see that strong claims in either direction are being transmitted much more frequently than middling moderate claims. So the bifurcation of opinions is inherent in both of them. This element of credibility, that you build credibility, based on how someone else reflects your own beliefs. Your own prior beliefs, really. This is the core mechanism [that if] I read something that confirms my prior beliefs, I'm much more likely to retransmit it with a positive note that "I really like this and I think it's methodologically sound." And if it's something that contradicts my prior beliefs, I'm very much more inclined to question its methodology. And I think we've seen this to an extreme over the two and a half years because we had situations where the discussion was very polarized. And the really bad thing to observe in a scientific discourse in general, but also the amplified scientific discourse on Twitter, is like the absolute lack of quality control when something confirms one's own prior beliefs. So this is usually what a scientist has to do. Like, if I get something that confirms my beliefs, I still have to do a minimum quality control [to check] if it's actually methodologically sound. And this clearly did not happen. People were just passing on anything that confirmed their beliefs and basically expected someone else to do the quality control. The first job any academic has is basically to subject everything, even that confirms your beliefs, and this is also [what] you think is true, you still have to subject it to quality control. And clearly this rarely ever happens. This is why academia is supposed to run on confrontation that, basically, the other camp does it. But if you bring academia together with Twitter, which is [an] amplification network that runs on social engagements, likes and retweets, then you have a very toxic mix. And this is the situation we had over the last two and a half years, how scientific communities can coalesce around things that are just not empirically sustainable.
Tobi;
Now pardon my language, there's a way that academics, whether they are scientists or social scientists (I know economists are particularly notorious in this arena), they completely f**k with your mind when you're a skeptic. So I'll give you an example. Two days ago…I opened with the replication crisis in psychology, so two days ago, I read a SubStack by someone who is presumably a psychologist, who was then basically complaining that, “oh, yeah, after the replication crisis, a lot of them in academia who were doing PhDs, were also having their own crisis of confidence, because then you have to confront a public who thinks they know everything.” So, like, you describe your study or you say you found something and someone says, "oh, but the field didn't replicate." The whole thing just sounded like some weak apologia that just didn't make any sense. I recall that sometimes a little bit after the financial crisis [of] '07-'08, if I recall correctly, Paul Krugman was dismissing something Talib, Nicholas Nassim Talib, wrote by saying that, oh, if you think you found something that a whole community of academic experts… I'm not quoting him verbatim, I'm paraphrasing… If you think you found anything that a whole academic community of experts missed, then you are most likely to be wrong.
So, it brings me to the question of skepticism and how to approach it, because at the other extreme end of this is to say… and certainly there are people like that in the world today who think that no scientific knowledge is true, who question even proven medicine, and there are also conspiracy theorists who say outrightly false things for their own motives, no doubt. So, like, how does one deal with skepticism? Especially if you have conspiracy theorists and outrightly ignorant people on one side, and on the other side you have academic confusion or experts who out of their own biases or some of these institutional and social problems that you have described can also not really come out and admit that, oh, we botched this and this and this is what we are doing to correct our errors. How do you handle skepticism in such a milieu?
Oliver;
The first thing is and it's also the reason why I like the baseball metaphor is if you are [an] academic, you're an expert in a field, you spend far more time studying this field than others, you're communicating with other experts in the field, so you can get this feeling, and probably justified feeling that because you put more effort into it you should get more reward in the form of more recognition and more credibility. But you should also come up with a realization or understanding that any field you're in and that includes economics and all other fields, there are so many things that are still undiscovered, so many things that are undiscoverable that we have to build axiomatic constructs around in order to actually help us move forward. And if you're able as an academic to move from 20% right over many years to 30% right, you're still 70% wrong. So these are not empirical numbers, but I think they get the point across. And if you don't get that, then you're doing something wrong in academics in general, right?
And we've seen this arrogance that was not supported by imperial superiority, like, quite a bit over the last years. Especially Paul Cook when he got some of the things very wrong just recently when he came out, when he admitted that most macroeconomists have been dead wrong about inflation for over a year. And then he claimed that nobody could have foreseen that. This is doubly wrong. You can be arrogant or you can be incompetent, but you cannot be both at the same time. Basically, academia is also a competition for attention. This is an attention industry and exaggerated claims get more attention than moderate claims. So this is not a problem. The problem is, and I see in the discussion is the complete absence of understanding of what the scientific method entails. And that clearly, a lot of academics become specialists in a particular subsection of the scientific method but don't have an understanding of how the whole thing works.
Which is interesting, especially in economics, because economics has this very strong claim that it underwent An Empirical Revolution over the last 20 years, which is certainly true. Econometrics have got a much bigger role over the last 20 years, but they also claimed that because they underwent an empirical revolution, they also underwent a credibility revolution, that their results are much more credible and this is a much bigger claim. And this is not a claim that recent events have validated or recent economic performance has not been up to par to support it. But the key thing [is that] the scientific method is basically starting out from a theory which does not have to be a formal way of expressing, but you have to have an overarching idea of how things are connected, how some things cause other things. And from this, you have to be able to create predictions. Basically, foresee future discoveries. And you do this in a number of steps. The first step is usually formalization. You try to come up with a formal model. There are lots of discussions about like, okay, how formal does a model have to be? Usually, formalization is a self-discipline device. It means that you don't come up with ad hoc predictions, but the predictions are based on a clear mechanism that should be working under a variety of conditions. And then once you have a formal model, which we've seen a lot of people trying to build formal models over the last few years, and a lot of them have gotten more attention than they deserved or that they expected, and then you come up with a hypothesis. Hypothesis usually means are you comparing your own view of the world to competing views of the world. You try to find the positions where they diverge the most or where it becomes visible. And then you do empirical test experiments. Or in economics, you try to do a natural experiment or control trials in order to show that your overarching theory, your model, is closer to the truth than the competition. But the key is also and this is remarkably what a lot of people have just simply missed out on, this is the replicability and the role of moving away from a subjective view of the world to an objective view of the world so this can be refuted or replicated by others.
And this also means that people who are opposed to your viewpoint have to admit that your view of the world was better than others. And this has almost completely broken down. Because in the two scenarios, economics (macroeconomics) in particular has been dead wrong, especially about inflation which is really one of the core predictive elements of macroeconomics and they have been dead wrong for an extended period of time for the very simple reason because they did not want to acknowledge it. And this is a problem, right? So then we start obfuscating about where you went wrong and you're trying to play political games that being wrong was not just unexpected change in economic environment or social environments or something but being dead wrong was basically caused by your model being fundamentally wrong.
Very clearly economics should be in a crisis. The crisis should be clear within the field and the less the field itself owns up to this crisis, the more the outside world [should] pressure the field itself to come clear with its wrong predictions because the cost of getting these things wrong are staggering
Tobi;
True. So I have three questions but I'll ask them differently. You mentioned towards the end of your answer you talked about political games which is something that also gets me really angry and sometimes confused. And a related issue about that I found also is in development economics. But that will take us into the second question. So let's talk about the politics here. For example, take a field like economics which is highly partisan. You have some people that are called neoliberal economists. Some people are socialists, some people are heterodox, some people are capitalists. I know within the field of macroeconomics itself, they have all these other labels - new Keynesian monetarist, you know, whatever.
But what I'm getting at is the role of partisanship, because you always have rival camps accusing themselves of partisanship. One story I related to, which I'm sure you also must have come across is - I saw a story on Twitter a couple of weeks ago before the Chilean constitutional referendum that Mariana Mazukato, Gabriel Zukman and Thomas Piketty, who are all economists, who are all leftists, who mix their research with political preferences and policy advocacy, plan to travel to Chile to celebrate the new draft constitution because it's a win for justice, it's a win for this or that. It's the final rejection of the Pinochet dictatorship and the neoliberal imposition that is. I did not encounter in that particular discourse chain anybody asking what is good for Chile, and Chileans, and even more relevantly how Chileans feel about this.
And, I mean, what do you know? The referendum happened and 60% of the voters rejected the new draft. And I know that partisanship and political games, like you said, play not just in economics, it happens in other fields as well. So I'm curious - is this okay? And how exactly did should I say, scholars, particularly in social science, people that have been able to make extraordinary contributions to our body of knowledge and what we know, how have they managed to keep their politics, their personal politics away from their work? Or is it just that everything just used to be easier before we had Twitter?
Oliver;
Politics and economics have been intermixed long before Twitter. So this is not particularly new, and the mechanism itself is also not new. But your starting point is basically, as I said, like, very simplified that the role of academia is to predict the future and to design strategies to reach good futures. So in that situation, it's not surprising that academics take political positions. The problem comes in, of course, that if the ideological mix in academia and the ideological mix in the overall population and the ideological mix in sort of the ruling elites don't line up. This is a tricky situation, but being close enough to the highest echelons of power for long enough to observe what happens. If you have a change in the administration in Washington DC, then usually the new administration brings in economic experts from favourite schools. And then if the administration loses to the other party, then the other party brings in their favourite economists. So in that regard, if you have this semiconstant exchange of viewpoint, an economic viewpoint gets discredited, it gets replaced via the political process with other people, this is usually how you get closer to the view - I used to call it the drunk unicyclist. You're not really moving forward in a straight path, but you're moving around left and right, and you just try to avoid falling into a ditch. And this is what we observe. No political process is perfect. And as long as the political interests of the academics and the political interests of the elite are aligned with population ones, this is as good as we can get it.
I generally have a problem with ideology in economics, but it's inevitable. And my quality is that I be able to read and appreciate writers from the left end of the spectrum, on the right end of the spectrum. I usually deduct points over ideological bent. But good thinkers can make good points even if they are driven by ideology. The problem also comes in when there is essentially no penalty for being wrong in academia. So basically being wrong and being catastrophically wrong externalizes the damage to others. So the worst scenario you do if you're tenured faculty, sort of what I call the endowed chair blue check, like a tenured faculty with a wide reach in social media, you can be dead wrong,you can be persistently wrong, completely unwilling to own up being wrong, and there's no real penalty to it. This is the major problem we're facing right now.
Tobi;
So that then brings me to the question of niches or what I'll call cottage industries in academic research generally. I know recently I did ask you about what you think about the EA movement. I'm not talking about them, but for descriptive purposes we see the behavior of that group, the adherents, the critics and how much commitment, particularly adherents display to their tribe. I see a lot of that too in academic research. One group I am very familiar with is in economic development (development economics) where everything now is about field experiments and randomized control trials. And one of the fundamental ways it biases research in my opinion and also have negative real life consequences is, if you do a field experiment, a randomized control trial on cash transfer, say in a Kenyan village over a period of time and you measure your results and they are positive and say oh yeah, well, cash transfer works.
But the real question that policymakers, whether local governments or central governments or regional governments really deal with every day are sometimes bigger than that. So, like, for example, if you want to choose between building a power station for that particular village at $1 million versus scaling up your cash transfer program, what you’ll find is that development economists in the current paradigm would most likely go for the cash transfer plan. Let's scale it up. We have tested this. It works. Essentially they are biased to what they can measure - like, we don't know the spillover benefits of electrification, it would be difficult to design a study, there are so many externalities. So basically they reduce real-life situations into the parameters of their methods and its limitations. And such behaviour is very, very similar to what you see with other social groups. Whether it is the Effective Altruism movement… I was briefly involved also with the Charter City people where for every problem that they can see, the solution is to build a charter city.
That movement was actually inspired by your dear friend, Paul Romer. So there is this almost blind commitment and loyalty to their method, to their cottage industry. And sometimes I see it as just drumming up support for their tribe, as opposed to a commitment to the truth and finding what works. So, again, pardon my big question, what's going on here?
Oliver;
Okay, two things on the starting point about tribes within academia is…like, one of my favourite sayings is that tribalism is the shared belief in counterfactuals, counterfactual being everything that is unknown. And the less we know, the more unknowns there are, the more we tend to flock with our own tribes. So this is something you see everywhere in academia. That's what we call thought collectives. Ludwig Fleck, one of the guys who influenced Thomas Kuhn, came up with this term, thought collectives, to describe this idea that people that share the same idea of causal mechanisms tend to come together and confirm each other and create this thought collective. And this is, of course, what we see here, especially in academia. Economics has additional problem. I think it's not nearly as strong in development economics as other fields, but it's also visible there. This is very much the way economists are recruited. Economics, especially US and UK-centric economics, is extremely mathematicized. So, like, mathematical skills are basically number one, two, and three and the priority.
And so you have basically a situation where real-world understanding has almost no role in getting accepted into PhD programs or getting promoted within the system. It used to be theory knowledge, formal theory knowledge. Now it's econometrics knowledge that gets you promoted. And this is very far away from qualification to solve real-world problems. And of course, people are impressed by mathematical skills. So this is something that you can play as a trump card. And this is what happens in the field. And the field is closing itself off from all kinds of outside knowledge because of that, especially in the social sciences. And in my world, I use people with mathematical skills, but only for very, very clearly defined tasks. I have my own mathematical skill set, but I also understand what the limitations are, and I think that's a major problem. And basically, if everyone around you came up in this system that promotes mathematical skills over real-world skills, then you believe that this is the only thing you need. And it's been very clear that basically every ten years, economics has a major crisis about being completely wrong in their predictions. And this intellectual monopoly is a major problem with that.
Tobi;
My third question in that line then pertains to the philosophy of science.
Oliver;
Yes.
Tobi;
So there are people who argue that a lot of these problems are also because modern science or the methodology of science today is divorced from some kind of philosophical foundation. I'm familiar relatively mildly with three philosophical approaches to science and let's just say truth finding.
Thomas Kuhn basically puts everything down to competing paradigms. Like my last question, you know, competing tribes. And it's the tribe that wins at the moment that sort of has the monopoly of truth, not strictly, but socially. Then there's Karl Popper, which is also quite popular, that for anything to be valid as truth, it has to be falsifiable. And we've seen this play out so much in particle physics with things like string theory and things like many-worlds interpretation and so many things where their critics are saying, you guys are basically making claims that are not falsifiable, that cannot be tested and what you are doing is not science. And that has been going on now more or less for about three decades, right? And, of course, there's the Lakatos approach, which sort of fits into your own view, correct me if I'm wrong, which is that science has to make novel claims and it has to be predictive, it has to make predictions about the world. So my question then is academia, science, the truth-finding industry, so to speak, or the knowledge production industry, is it having a philosophical crisis?
Oliver;
I think it has more of a structural crisis. I'm not that deep in the philosophy of science I’m much more interested in the process itself. But one of the things that I think matters to me is Milton Friedman's claim that there are no wrong assumptions but whatever assumptions you make about the world has to generate correct predictions. A theory is being evaluated by its ability to produce non-falsifiable predictions, right? Predictions that turn out to be true even if others don't believe them. This is something you see in the arts as well, you see actually in religion as well, this mechanism of belief propagation that starts with one person believing and over time and over time, can be many decades, of something being accepted as true by everyone.
So everyone starts believing in it. Basically, social contagion mechanism. I've always been interested in this. One scenario where this happens or should be happening is science. Right. This is, of course, a process. A process happens via this academic mechanism of peer-reviewed publications, getting tenure based on publication records and so on. And these are all very very imperfect mechanisms. The two extreme versions of that [are] the American system, which is extremely stratified, and the German version is the opposite, it’s non-stratified, [and] we produce a massive amount of mediocrity. So, like, neither of them are optimal mechanisms to create truth. And we've seen that over the last two and a half years that political posturing took precedence over truth finding.
Is it in a crisis? I think, yes, very clearly. We have two and a half years where very wrong, easily debunkable claims were propagated and were not retracted, even after they've been proven to be wrong. And ultimately, we're in a situation where an economic crisis is very clearly caused by misjudgment from people which we support and pay for being less wrong than the overall population. And that just simply did not work.
Tobi;
One last thing I’ll like to get off my chest and then I'll pass them out to you is, I mean, specifically, if we follow from our last two podcast episodes, I'm a bit frustrated that there is a bit of lockdown triumphalism that the people who vigorously and vehemently used their academic or expert pedigree…
Oliver;
Credentials.
Tobi;
Yeah…to advocate for lockdowns are also taking a sort of victory lap. So the pandemic is over. Everything is back to normal. We did the right thing, even though the whole world was against us. That frustrates me a little. I was still watching a clip on YouTube recently because you get even more sensible take from everyday people, people who are experiencing these things than people who are building models and tweeting. One person somewhere here in southwest Nigeria complaining during the pandemic that the government has decided that it is better for us to die at home of hunger than not die from the pandemic. Because this pandemic, we don't know what it is, we don't know how it spreads, but without giving us any information, you basically confined us to our homes with no means of livelihood and nothing to depend on. That makes me sad because in Nigeria here and in many parts of Africa today, a lot of what we are seeing as, and are calling the food crisis, cost of living crisis, whatever it is you want to call it, did not necessarily start, but were aggravated or exacerbated by that approach to the pandemic. And it makes me sad that the people that are culpable, we can have a situation where they can take a victory lap. So that's me. Over to you. What would you like to get off your chest about everything that we have disclosed today?
Oliver;
Number one is epidemiological modelling was clearly an empirical debacle. The predicted epidemic wave that would take five to six months, that would wipe all large parts of the population never happened. And we have, I don't know, how many thousand waves in our database now, they all go for eight weeks. They start declining, acceleration starts declining very early on. And now we had enough scenarios where simple no measures were taken at any time during the wave. The key moment in that case was, I think, Paul Krugman complained that Denmark was removing all restrictions at the height of the epidemic wave and basically the very next day, the Danish wave dropped. Not a lot of people saw it, but it was extremely embarrassing for him. I've been in very much the same situation because I was living in the United States in the early 2000s and I was very clear from the very beginning of the Iraq war that Saddam Hussein did not have bioweapons. And so the whole invasion was built on Untruth. And the United States and the UK back then also knew that.
Back then there was a strong moral panic, especially in the United States, against anyone who was basically speaking against the rationale for going to war. Now, 20 years later, almost nobody is willing to admit that they were speaking up in favour of the invasion back then. This is like a one-generation thing. And we'll see the same thing about the epidemic. This is very clear. The young people who had to carry most of the restrictions…up till now in Germany they’re still forced to wear masks at school. They will have a very different view about what happened than the politicians in power. These are the things that'll evolve over many, many years. So I expect the same thing to happen. The interesting thing is really sort of back then it was more on the right end of the spectrum that drove this moral panic. Now it's moved over to the left end of the political spectrum. This is something that we’re still to be investigated, why these moral panics unfolded onto the ideological spectrum as we know it. But it might be an interesting topic for the next call.
Tobi;
True.
This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe -
Welcome to Ideas Untrapped. My guest today is Vincent Geloso who is a professor of economics at George Mason University. He studies economic history, political economy, and the measurement of living standards. In today's episode, we discuss the differences between democracies and dictatorships, and their relative performance in socioeconomic development. The allure of authoritarian governance has grown tremendously due to the economic success of countries like China, Korea, and Singapore - which managed to escape crippling national poverty traps. The contestable nature of democracies and the difficulty many democratic countries have to continue on a path of growth seems to many people as evidence that a benevolent dictatorship is what many countries need. Vincent challenges this notion and explains many seemingly high-performing dictatorships are so because their control of state resources allows them direct investments towards singular objectives - (such as winning Olympic medals or reducing infant mortality) but at the same time, come with a flip side of unseen costs due to their lack of rights and economic freedom. He argues that the benefits of dictatorships are not as great as they may seem and that liberal democracies are better able to decentralize decision-making and handle complex multi-variate problems. He concludes that while democracies may not always be successful in achieving certain objectives, the constraints they place on political power and rulers mean that people are better off in terms of economic freedom, rights, and other measures of welfare.
TRANSCRIPT
Tobi;
You made the point that dictatorships usually optimise, not your words, but they optimise for univariate factors as opposed to multiple factors, which you get in democracy. So, a dictatorship can be extremely high performing on some metric because they can use the top-down power to allocate resources for that particular goal. Can you shed a bit more light on that? How does that mechanism work in reality?
Vincent;
Yeah, I think a great image people are used to is the USSR, and they're thinking about two things the USSR did quite well: putting people in space before the United States and winning medals at Olympics. Now, the regime really wanted to do those two things. [That is], win a considerable number of medals in [the] Olympics and win the space race. Both of them were meant to showcase the regime's tremendous ability. It was a propaganda ploy, but since it was a single objective and they had immense means at their disposal, i. e. the means that coercion allows them, they could reach those targets really well. And it's easy to see the Russians putting Sputnik first in space, the Russians putting Laika first in space. We can see them winning medals. It's easy to see. The part that is harder to see, the unseen, is the fact that Russians were not enjoying rapidly rising living standards, they were not enjoying improvements in medical care that was commensurate with their level of income, they were not enjoying high-quality education. You can pile all the unseens of the ability of the USSR as a dictatorship to allocate so much resources to two issues, [which] meant that it came with a flip side, which is that these resources were not available for people to allocate them in ways that they thought was more valuable. So, the virtue of a liberal democracy, unlike a dictatorship, is that a liberal democracy has multiple sets of preferences to deal with. And in a liberal democracy, it's not just the fact that we vote, but also that people have certain rights that are enshrined and which are not the object of political conversation. I cannot seize your property, and it's not okay for people to vote with me to seize your property. And in these societies, the idea is that under a liberal democracy, you are better able to decentralize decision-making, and people can find ways to deal with the multiple trade-offs much better. Whereas a dictatorship can just decide, I care about this. I am king, I am president, I am first secretary of the party, I decide this and we'll do this regardless of how much you value other things that I value less than you do.
Tobi;
Two things that I want you to shed more light on. Depending on who you talk to or what they are criticizing, people usually selectively pick their dictatorships. If someone is criticizing, say, for example, capitalism, they always point to the Cuban health care system in contrast to the American health care system. How the American system is so terrible, and how capitalism makes everything worse because of the profit motive. And how we can do better by being more like Cuba.
On the other end of that particular spectrum, if you're talking about economic development, critics of democracy like to point to China. China is not a democracy. And look at all the economic growth they've had in the last 40 years, one of the largest reductions in human poverty we’ve ever seen in history. I mean, from these two examples, what are the shortcomings of these arguments?
Vincent;
Let's do Cuba first, then we can do China. So, the Cuban example is really good for the case I'm making. Because the case I'm making is essentially that the good comes with the bad and you can't remove them. So, people will generally say with Cuba, “yes, we know they don't have political rights, they don't have economic freedom, but they do have high-quality health care.” And by this they don't mean actually health care, they mean low infant mortality or high life expectancy at birth. My reply is, it's because they don't have all these other rights and all these other options [that] they can have infant mortality that is so low. That's because the regime involves a gigantic amount of resources to the production of healthcare. Cuba spends more than 10% of its GDP on health care. Only countries that are seven or ten times richer than Cuba spend as much as a proportion of GDP on health care. 1% of their population are doctors. In the United States, it is a third of that, 0.3% of the population are doctors. So, it's a gigantic proportion. But then when you scratch a bit behind, doctors are, for example, members of the army. They are part of the military force. The regime employs them as the first line of supervision. So, the doctors are also meant to report back what the population says on the ground. So, they're basically listening posts for the dictatorship. And in the process, yeah, they provide some health care, but they're providing some health care as a byproduct of providing surveillance.
The other part is that they're using health care here to promote the regime abroad. And that has one really important effect. One of those is that doctors have targets they must meet, otherwise they're penalized. And when I mean targets, I mean targets for infant mortality. [If] they don't meet those targets, the result is they get punished. And so what do you think doctors do? They will alter their behaviour to avoid punishment. So in some situations, they will reclassify what we call early neonatal death. So, babies who die immediately after exiting the womb to seven days after birth, they will reclassify many of those as late fetal deaths. And late fetal deaths are in-utero deaths or delivery of a dead baby so that the baby exits the womb dead. Now, if a mortality rate starts with early neonatal death [and] not late fetal ones, so if you can reclassify one into the other, you're going to deflate the number total. And the reason why we can detect this is that the sources of both types of mortality are the same,[they] are very similar, so that when you compare them across countries, you generally find the same ratio of one to the other. Generally, it hovers between four to one and six to one. Cuba has a ratio of twelve to 17 to one, which is a clear sign of data manipulation. And it's not because the regime does it out of, like, direct intent. They're not trying to do it directly. It'd be too easy to detect. But by changing people's incentives, doctors’ incentives, in that case, that's what they end up with.
There are also other things that doctors are allowed to do in Cuba. One of them is that patients do not have the right to refuse treatment. Neither do they have the right to privacy, which means that doctors can use heavy-handed methods to make sure that they meet their targets. So in Cuba, you have stuff like casa de mata nidad, where mothers who have at-risk pregnancies or at-risk behaviour during pregnancy will be forcibly incarcerated during their pregnancy. There are multiple cases of documented, pressured abortions or literally coerced abortions. So not just pressured, but coerced. Like, the level is that the person wants to keep the infant, the doctor forces an abortion to be made. Sometimes, it is made without the mother's knowledge until it is too late to anything being done. So you end up with basically the infant mortality rate, yes, being low, but yes, being low because of data manipulation and changes in behaviour so that the number doesn't mean the same thing as it does in rich countries. And now the part that's really important in all I'm saying is [that] what people call the benefits for Cuba is relatively small. My point is that, yeah, maybe they could be able to do it. But the problem is that the measures that allow this to happen, to have a low infant mortality rate are also the measures that make Cubans immensely poor. The fact that the regime can deploy such force, use doctors in such a way, employ such extreme measures, it's the reason why Cubans also don't have property rights, don't have strong economic freedom, don't have the liberty to trade with others. Which means that on other dimensions, their lives are worse off. That means that, for example, their incomes are lower than they could be. They have higher maternal mortality. So, mothers die to [a] greater proportion in labour than in other countries or post-labour. There are lower rates of access to clean water than in equally poor countries in Latin America. There are lower levels of geographic mobility within the country, there are lower levels of nutrition because, for example, there are still ration services. So that means that, yes, they have certain amount of calories, but they don't have that much diversity in terms of what they're allowed or are able to eat without resorting to the black market. Pile these on. These are all dimensions of life that Cubans get to not enjoy because the regime has so much power to do that one thing relatively well. Let's assume it's relatively well, but the answer is, well, would you want to make that trade-off? And most people would probably, if given the choice, would not make the choice of having this. So, those who are saying, “look at how great it is,” are being fooled by the nature of what dictatorships are. Dictatorships can solve simple problems really well, but complex multivariate problems, they are not able to do it in any meaningful way.
The other part that is going to be of also importance is when you look at Cuba, before we move on to China, the other part about Cuba that's worth pointing out is, I was assuming in my previous answer that the regime was actually doing relatively well. Even without considering all the criticism, it still looks like it has a low infant mortality rate. But when you actually look at the history of Cuba, Cuba was exceptional in terms of low infant mortality. Before the Castros took over, Cuba already had a very low level of infant mortality even for a poor country. And so with a friend of mine, a coauthor, Jamie Bologna Pavlik, we used an econometric method to see if Cuba has an infant mortality rate that is as low as it would have been had it not been for the revolution. So, ergo, we're trying to find what is the effect of the revolution on infant mortality and we're trying to use other Latin American countries to predict Cuba's health performance. And what we find is that in the first year of the regime's, infant mortality actually went up, so it increased relative to other Latin American countries, but it gradually reverted back to what would be the long-run trend. So that Cuba is no more exceptional today in terms of infant mortality than it was in 1959. That is actually a very depressing statement because it's saying that the regime wasn't even able to make the country more exceptional. So even if it's able to achieve that mission quite well, it's not clear how well they've done it. At the very least, they haven't made things worse in the very long run, they only made things worse in the short run. So when you're doing, like, kind of, a ledger of goods and bads of the regime, all the bad trade-offs I mentioned: lower incomes, higher mortality rates for mothers and maternity, lower rates of access to clean water, lower rates of access to diverse food sources, lower rates of geographic mobility - pile these on, keep piling them on, that's the cost. What I'm saying is what they call the benefits, they're not even as big as it's disclaimed. The benefits are relatively small.
And now with regards to China…
Tobi;
Yeah.
Vincent;
The Chinese case is even worse for people because they have a similar story with GDP. So, in China, a regional bureaucrats have to meet certain targets of economic growth. Now, these same bureaucrats are in charge of producing the data that says whether or not there is economic growth. You can see why there is a who guards the guardian's problem here? The person who guards the guardian is apparently one of the guardians. So you could expect some kind of bad behaviour. And there is an economist, Luis Martinez, out of the University of Chicago. What he did is he say, well, we have one measure that we know is a good reflector of economic growth and it is artificial light intensity at night. Largely because the richer a country is, the more light there will be at night time. And so if you have like 1% growth in income, in real numbers, you should have some form of commensurate increase in light intensity during night time. If the two deviates, it's a sign that the GDP numbers are false, that they're misleading. Because if they deviate, the true number, the always true number will be the light intensity at nighttime. So, when Martinez used the nighttime light to compare GDP in Chinese regions overall and the actual GDP, he found that you can cut the growth rate of China by, maybe, two-fifths, so it is 40% slower than it actually is. So, China is not even as impressive as it is. And the thing is now think about the pandemic, think about how extreme the measures that China deployed to restrain this has been, no liberal democracy would have been able to do that, no free society would have tolerated forcibly walling people into their houses. And there are massive downsides to the communist regime in China. Like, yes, the regime is free to do whatever it wants, but it also means that it can put Uyghur Muslims into concentration camps. It also means that it can wall people into their houses when they do not comply with public health order. It also means that people are under the social credit system where they are being largely surveilled on a daily basis. It also means that the government can allocate massive resources to the act of conquering Taiwan or flexing muscles towards Japan. All things that when you think about it, is that really an improvement in welfare? Obviously, you can say that, oh yeah, they're doing X or Y things really well but here are all the bad things that come with this. And those bad things are on net much worse than the good things.
Tobi;
Now, you keep emphasizing liberal democracy and I want to get at the nuance here because I've seen several results. Either it is from Chile and other countries that say unequivocally that democracies are better for growth than dictatorships, even in the case of Chile, despite all the reforms of Pinochet regime. But what I want to get at is, what exactly about democracies make them better? Because, for example, we can think of Nigeria and Nigeria as a democracy. We've had uninterrupted election cycles for over two decades now, but there's still very weak rule of law. Successive governments still rely on extracting oil rents, basically. And, the degree to which people enjoy rights vary depending on who is in power or their mood on any particular day. And, of course, Nigeria is a democracy. So is it liberal democracy? Is that the key factor?
Vincent;
So, think about it this way.
Tobi;
Yeah.
Vincent;
Think about it this way. Inside the big box of liberal democracy, there is for sure democracy. But the part that makes the box liberal democracy is not only the smaller babushkadal inside that box which is a democracy one, it is the other constraints that we put on the exercise of political power. The true definition of a liberal democracy, at least in my opinion, is that not only are people allowed to vote, but they are restraints on what we can vote on. So, for example, if it's not legitimate for me to steal from you, it is no more legitimate for me to vote with two other people to steal from you. The act of democracy should warrant some acts that are outside the realm of political decision-making. There are also constraints that exist on rulers, so it's not just that there are some rights that are not subject to conversation. There could be also incentives that prevent rulers from abusing the powers they have. That would mean, for example, checks and balances, where there are different chambers that will compete with each other, different regional powers of government that will compete with each other for jurisdiction, and so they will keep each other in balance. It could also be some form of external constraint, because a liberal democracy can also rely on external constraints upon political actors. It could be the fact that people can leave the country, the fact that taxpayers can migrate to another country, puts pressure on politicians to not abuse them. People can move their capital out of the country, [this] creates a pressure on politicians to not try to steal from them, because people will just remove all the productive capital and the ruler will be left with very little to exploit as a result, regardless of whether or not the ruler is elected or not. So the way to think about this is liberal democracy is, you want to have a system where there are rules, incentives, constraints that make it so that we are not betting on a man or a woman, for that matter, being the correct man and woman for the moment. We care about a set of incentives, constraints, and rules that will make sure that even the worst human being possible will feel compelled or compulsed [sic] to do the right thing. So, that's like the old Milton Friedman thing, it’s like “I don't want the right man. I want to have a system that makes sure that even the most horrible person on earth is forced to do the right thing.” That's what a liberal democracy is.
Now, it is a broad definition that I've provided. It is not narrow in any way. It is not specific, largely because I don't think it can be what works. It’s not everywhere the same. The general family to which this belongs is universal. But the way it can work is not the same everywhere. A homogeneous, small, Sweden probably doesn't need as much level of, say, breakdown of provincial versus federal powers. Whereas, from what I understand, Nigeria is a somewhat multinational country, multiethnic country with multiple groups east and west from what I understand the divide is in Nigeria. There, it might be good to have a division inside the country where things that are most homogeneous, you leave to the federal government, to the highest level of power. Then the things that you can delegate to the local level, [it is] better to do it that way. Countries that are incredibly heterogeneous maybe need even more federalism. What is optimal for one place won't work elsewhere. So I couldn't take Belgian institutions and then just dump them in Nigeria. Same as I couldn't just say, well, let's take Swedish institutions and dump them into Canada. But what makes generally Sweden work better in terms of institutions than Nigeria, for example, is the fact that Sweden does fit in that general box of liberal democracy. There are clear constraints, there are restrictions, there are constitutions that are well respected, there's a strong rule of law, and politicians are compelled to not fall prey to their own baser instincts.
Tobi;
A couple of months ago, I had Mark Koyama on the show.
Vincent;
Great guy. He's a colleague of mine.
Tobi;
Yeah. So, we were talking about state capacity. We're talking about his book with Noel Johnson. So I did bring up your paper on state capacity, [in] which, basically, one description that stuck with me is that you never really find a poor, but highly capable state in history…
Vincent;
You mean backwards. A rich society with an incapable state?
Tobi;
Yes, a rich society with an incapable state. Thanks for that. So, I've been trying to disentangle this state capacity thing, I know Bryan Caplan basically dismissed it as a sleight of hand. Right. So, like, how does it work and how is it a necessary ingredient for economic development, so to speak?
Vincent;
I am actually quite respectful of the state capacity literature in one way. So let me do like kind of a quick thing. State capacity says that you want the state to be able to do certain missions. Right, so we're not making judgments as to whether the mission is good. State capacity is about the abilities of the state. The reason why that literature has emerged since the 2000… here's a story of economic thought really briefly: in the 1950s, Samuelson and others show, ‘oh, well, there are market failures’ and then a few years later there are the public choice rebuttals, where the public choice economists say, ‘well, you're kind of wrong. There are also government failures.’ And the state capacity crowd tries to come in between these two and say, ‘yeah, there are market failures and there are government failures. How do we get a state to solve the market failures but not fall into government failures?’ Okay, straightforward, good argument. The part that I'm sceptical of is that the argument of the state capacity crowd is that you will have a lot of rich societies that will have strong states, you will have much fewer societies that have strong states but are very poor (the USSR would be a good example of that), [and] you will have a lot of societies that are poor and have weak state. The thing is that they can't seem to explain why it is under their theory that there are no societies that are relatively weak state but rich. Even though in history we do have many examples of these and they collapse all the time.
The argument that I make with my colleague, Alexander Salter, is that societies that have weak states will fall prey to predation because their neighbours with stronger state will try to capture their wealth by conquest. If they are conquered, they grow immensely poor, they are made poor. Basically, it's a terrible event for them. Or they resist, and if they resist ably, the result from resistance is that they have to build a strong state themselves to resist predation by other rulers. And so in the argument me and Alex build, it boils down to: the state is not necessary for development, but it is inevitable as an outcome. So, the task of political science, of political economy, is understanding if we are going to be stuck with one of them, how do we make it that we get the least terrible one? If it's not necessary, but it is inevitable, then how do we get to one that will maybe do some benefit, or at least, we can get the best kind possible? Well, that's where the liberal democratic answer gets into. [It] is [that] we need to find sets of constraints, rules, incentives that force the politicians to make it too costly for them to engage in predatory behaviour, in redistributive behaviour, and that they concentrate on what you could call productive behaviour. That would be like solving externalities. Like dealing with pollution or producing public goods stuff that markets have a harder time to produce. Getting into that category is the task of what liberal democracies are trying to do. That is a much harder proposition. Daron Acemoglu in his somewhat awful book, The Narrow Corridor, calls it a narrow corridor. (I don't like that book that much. I think it's a horrible piece of literature. He should have kept it at Why Nations Fail, we had everything we needed with Buchanan, and it was much better in the other version. He was a much worse version of that.) So, Parenthesis over on Daron Acemoglu, but his point is still relatively okay. There is a narrow corridor on which we evolve. That is a very narrow equilibrium that we want to stay on to, to avoid veering either into more territorial forms of government or into different types of authoritarian[ism], in a certain way. So the corridor for a liberal democracy is very, very, very, very narrow.
Tobi;
I like that description. The state is not necessary but inevitable. Whereas with the traditional state capacity crowd, the state is often assumed and never justified.
Vincent;
Actually, that's a bit unfair to them. The state capacity crowd, a lot of them are interested in state capacity as a story of the origins of states. That, I think, is a much-valued contribution. However, the issue of whether or not state capacity is linked to growth, I think this is where there's overstretching. My point is “no, there's very little reason to believe that state capacity is related to growth.” State capacity is more the direct or indirect result of growth in the past. So, either you are getting state capacity because you get conquered and you get imposed it by somebody else, or you get state capacity because you want to protect your wealth from other predators.
Tobi;
For the record, I'm not talking about your colleagues. There's this industrial policy school in development economics who are also big on state capacity, who think the state has to do this heavy lifting. They sort of assume the state and not justify it. But I won't let you go without asking you this final question. You recently published a paper - talking about the work of Thomas Piketty, the French economist - with Phillip Magness, I should say. What is your critique of his work? Because so far as I can tell, yes, I read the op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, [but] everybody else is sort of pretending that a critique of Piketty does not exist. And the political coalition around their research, along with [Emmanuel] Saez and [Gabriel] Zucman is moving rapidly apace, whether it is in taxation or other forms of agenda. So, what is your critique? I know there have been others in the past Matthew Rognlie, I'm not sure how to pronounce his last name.
Vincent;
Yeah. Our argument is actually very simple. And to be honest, I don't really care about the political conversation where, [for] the political people who are using Piketty's work, I ignore them. There may be a motivation for doing this work because it tells you the importance of his work, but the person I'm trying to talk to is Piketty himself. And the point we make in the paper is that he [not only] massively overestimates inequality in terms of levels, but he also misses times a lot of changes. In the article that me, Phil, another Phil, and John Moore published together in the Economic Journal, we find that there is a very different timeline of inequality in the United States. The most important part is that unlike Piketty and Saez, who can assign most of, and later Zucman… who can assign most of the changes in inequality to tax policy, we find that actually half the decline in inequality that happens between, say, 1917 and 1960, half of it is because of the Great Depression. And just as good economists, we should not be happy that, okay, the rich are growing poor faster than the poor, but the poor are also growing poor. That is not a decent outcome. So we're minimizing the role of fiscal policy and tax policy in doing inequality, but also the other changes that we find give a very different story of what matters in changing policy rather than being taxes, it has more to do with labour mobility within the United States. With capital mobility within the United States. So poor workers from the south, mostly black Americans, move to richer northern cities where wages are higher. Capital moves from the rich north to the poor south where workers are made more productive. So, the levelling has to do with a very standard force in economics - it's a Solow growth model - capital goes to where the returns are greatest, labour goes where the wages are greatest. Most of the convergence is explained by this, not by tax policy changes. So that's the critique we make of them. And there's a lot of other people who are joining in, Gerald Holtham, David Splinter, a lot of people are actually finding that their numbers don't make much sense and they're actually in violation of a lot of other facts of economic history, even though they're correct in the general idea that inequality fell; fell to 1960 and rose since the 1980. The problem is that all they got right is the shape, but they got wrong the timing, the levels, the extent of the changes. They got most of it wrong. They just got the general shape right. And that's no great feat.
Tobi;
Thank you so much for joining me.
Vincent;
It was a pleasure.
This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe -
Welcome to another episode of Ideas Untrapped. My guest today is Charlie Robertson, who is the chief economist of Renaissance Capital - a global investment bank - and in this episode we talked about the subject of Charlie’s new book, "The Time-Travelling Economist''. The book explores the connection between education, electricity, and fertility to economic development. The thrust of the book's argument is that no poor country can escape poverty without education, and that electricity is an important factor for investors looking to build businesses. It also explains that a low fertility rate helps to increase household savings. Charlie argues, with a lot of data and historical parallels, that countries need at least a 70-80% adult literacy rate (defined as being able to read and write four sentences in any language) and cheap electricity (an average of 300 - 500 kWh per capita) in order to industrialize and grow their economies rapidly. Small(er) families (3 children per woman) mean households are able to save more money, which can improve domestic investments by lowering interest rates - otherwise countries may repeatedly stumble into debt crises. We also discussed how increasing education can lead to higher domestic wages, but that this is usually offset by a large increase in the working-age population - and other interesting implications of Charlie's argument.
TRANSCRIPT
Tobi;
The usual place I would start with is what inspired you to write it. You mentioned in the book that it was an IMF paper that sort of started your curiosity about the relationship between education, electricity, fertility, and economic development. Generally. So, what was the Eureka moment?
Charlie;
Yeah, the eureka moment actually came in Kenya, um, because I'd already done a lot of work showing how important education was. It's the most important, no country escapes poverty without education. So I'd already made that clear and there wasn't much debate about that. Perhaps there was a debate about why some countries have gone faster than others, but there wasn't much debate about that. The second thing I was very clear on was electricity, which kept on coming up in meetings across Sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan, [at] a number of countries, people kept on talking about the importance of electricity. But the eureka moment came when somebody pointed out to me that Kenya, where I was at the time, couldn't afford to build huge excess capacity of electricity, which I was arguing you need to have. You need to have too much electricity, so that it's cheap and it's reliable.
And then investors come in and say, "great! I've got cheap educated labour, and I've got cheap reliable electricity. I've got the human capital and the power I need, that then enables me to invest and build a business here." And the question then was, well, why was it so expensive in Kenya but so cheap in China? Why was the cost of borrowing so high in Nigeria but so cheap in Morocco or Mauritius? And when I was trying to work out where did the savings come from in China, uh, well I was looking globally, but China's the best example of economic success and development success we've seen in the last 50 years. Over half the answer came from this IMF paper saying, actually it came from their low fertility rate. That's over half of the rise in household savings, which are massive in China, came about because the fertility rate had fallen so dramatically.
And I then thought, could this possibly be true for other countries as well? Could this help explain why interest rates are so high in Nigeria or Kenya and so low elsewhere? And the answer is yes. So this book, The Time Travelling Economist is bringing all of these three things together - the fertility rate, the education rate, and electricity - to say not just how countries develop, cause I think I've answered that, but when they develop. Because once we know those three factors are key, we can then work out the when. Not just in the past [of] countries, but also in the future. Um, so that's where this came from.
Tobi;
I mean, we're going to be talking about each of those factors over the course of this conversation, but another question...some would say boring question, but I know how development economists and economists generally always try to defend their turf, you know, around issues like these. So, has anybody like taking you to task on the causal link between these three factors and development? And how would you defend yourself against that were it to be asked?
Charlie;
I haven't found anyone yet who's argued successfully against these points. Um, the closest criticism I get, and just to say, you know, this book came about off the back of three key reports I did in 2017 on education, 2018 on electricity, and 2019 on fertility and savings. So I've now been talking about these ideas for three to five years. The book only came out in July, 2022, bringing them all together. But in five years I haven't had pushback other than people ask, "is it not correlated?" You know, "is it not perhaps economic growth leads fertility declines or boosts savings?" And I think I show really clearly in the data that "no." Um, the fertility declines give us the growth. You don't get growth without adult literacy of at least 40%, you certainly don't get industrialization until literacy is at 70 to 80.
So, you know, I'm looking at the data and I think it's pretty crystal clear that you've gotta get these other things right first before your economy can take off. And I can't find any counter-examples. Except, I mean there's the inevitable few, those countries like Qatar or Kuwait with huge amounts of energy exports per capita or diamonds in Botswana's case. And there you don't have to get everything right before you get wealthier because you just happen to be lucky to have huge amounts of energy exports per person and a very small population. But they are a bit of an exception. I think you could probably argue that they do grow first before they get everything else right. But for the vast majority of the planet and all countries in history, it's the other way around. You gotta get education, power, fertility rates in the right place to take off.
Tobi;
So I mean, getting into the weeds, let's look at education first. Before your book, personally for me, and I should say what I really like about your book is, it's well written, it's an interesting read. It comes across as a bit less analytical, which is what you get from the standard development literature, you know, and I think that's partly because you are writing about a lot of the countries that you have also worked in and interacted with a lot of these factors. So it really gives it a first-hand experience kind of narrative. So I like that very much. So prior to your book, if someone were to ask me about the relationship between education and economic development or catch-up growth, generally, the reference usually goes to Studwell's big claim, Joe Studwell, that: Yeah. You don't really need a super high level of education metrics for a country to industrialize because the standard explanation is that how a relatively poor country starts industrializing is from the low-skill, uh, labour-intensive, low-skill manufacturing jobs, that you don't need a high level of education and skill for you to be able to do that.
So what I wanna work out here is what is the transmission mechanism between adult literacy and industrialization the way you've, like, clearly analyzed in your book?
Charlie;
Well, thank you very much for saying it was nicely written, I appreciate that. I wanted to try and make it as accessible as possible. Yeah, I think Joe Studwell's books are really good and I think he's right that you don't need a high level of education to do that first step out of rural poverty, subsistence farming into a textile mill. I think what's interesting is how many people writing about development forget how important just adult literacy actually is, because we've taken [it] so much for granted. So Adam Smith, who wrote The Wealth of Nations, the father of economics back in the 18th century in Scotland, he didn't make a big deal about adult literacy driving growth. And more recently, you know, people like Dani Rodrik have echoed exactly that saying you don't need any great education to work in a textile mill. You just need to be dextrous with your fingers. Which is almost exactly actually what Adam Smith said 250 years ago. And I was sympathetic to that, but I then kept on seeing in the data, well, first of all, I found this theory written in the sixties that said that no country has industrialized even to that first basic level of textiles without adult literacy being about 70 to 80% of the population. Which means basically all adults, all men, plus well over half the female population as well. And this was the theory written in the sixties and when I looked at the data, it was proven right and I couldn't quite understand why - if you just need dextrous fingers to work in a textile mill, why would there be that link? And I ended up talking to a guy who ran Levi's factories in Asia in the 1980s and he said, “Charlie, just think about it.”
You've got this box of Levi's jeans coming down the conveyor belt. Do you put that box onto the truck labelled United States or that truck labelled Europe for export? And if you can't read and write, you won't even get that right. So the adult literacy thing I think is overlooked. People are focusing on secondary school, high school education, how much [many] university graduates a country needs and they do need graduates too. But until you get to that 70 to 80% adult literacy, textile mills don't go to a country. And we can see that they did go to China in the nineties when they got to adult literacy of 70%. They are in Southeast Asia. They're in Bangladesh since education hit about 70 to 80% in the last 10 to 15 years. But they're not big in sub-Saharan Africa, or at least in parts of Nigeria or the Sahel or West Africa because the education levels still aren't there yet. So, you know, I looked as far back as I could go to the 19th century and even the first non-European country to take off, Japan, had an adult literacy rate of about 70% by 1900 and 20 years later, they had a thriving textile industry. The education always comes first. And Korea copied that Japan model in the 1950s and sixties, Taiwan, Hong Kong, all the rest [of] Southeast Asia's followed. Now, South Asia's doing it and luckily it's spreading across Africa too. But the adult literacy is the first essential step.
Tobi;
One possible objection. And I haven't seen this anywhere, but I couldn't really get it out of my mind while I was reading that part of the book is that some will argue that increasing education also increases domestic wages and that is really a problem for industrializing. And, if I recall, one particular point that the anonymous economic historian on Twitter, Pseudoerasmus, made particularly about Asia, is they were able to combine a very high adult literacy rate - a measure which you use is completion of secondary education…
Charlie;
Yeah.
Tobi;
With very unusually low domestic wages. What role do wages play in your analysis?
Charlie;
I think that's the norm actually. It connects to the fertility thing. And I'm not sure if you want to jump there just yet, but what tends to happen when you've educated your population is that the fertility rate drops a lot. And when that happens, the number of people who have to stay at home looking after 5, 6, 7 children goes down a lot too. Women can go into the workforce and of course cause you've got the education, right? Those women are educated so they can join the industrial workforce as well. So very roughly, if we say there's a hundred people in Nigeria, 50 kids and 50 adults, let's say 25 of the adults have to be staying at home to look after 50 kids, you're talking 25% of the population can go out and work of the overall population. You go to Asia today and it's more like 70% adults, say 30% of kids.
So you need maybe 15% of adults to stay at home. And you end up with something like 85% of the whole population can go out to work instead of 25%. Now, the consequence of that is a massive rise in the working-age population. And I think that that keeps industrial wages low for a few generations, in fact. Or at least three decades. Probably 40 years, where the education's come through, the fertility rates come down, you've got this huge excess supply of labour, which is then joining the industrial workforce and getting jobs. But because there keeps on being more people joining that workforce, it keeps wages relatively low. Now, what eventually happens then after a few decades is that that big increase in the workforce stops increasing as fast. We've seen this in China in the last 20 years. So, 20 years ago China's per capita GDP was about fifteen hundred dollars, $1,500.
Whereas now, now the population has stopped growing. Working age population's shrinking. It's gone up to over $11,500. It's gone up tenfold. So the big reward for industrialization comes later. And we had this in Europe of course in the 19th century, you know, wages were pretty awful and industrial working was pretty awful experience in the 19th century. I mean it paid slightly better than rural subsistence farming, which is why people came to the cities. But London was a horrible place for the vast majority of people. And the industrial workhouses were terrible places as well. And that lasted for generations. It's only when that big population, kind of, boom stories started to shift that labour eventually got any bargaining power. Cause when there was too much labour coming into the market, they had no bargaining power with the factory owners. It wasn't until the 1870s that the trade unions became legal in, say, the United States. Because up till then, you know, "you join a union, I fire you," you know, could be what the factory owner would say in the United States, cause there's always gonna be another person I can employ. But once the workforce starts to gain a bit of bargaining power, cause it's not expanding quite so fast, then finally wages start to pick up. So I think what's happened in Asia is pretty normal and will probably be the experience that we've seen across Africa as well.
Tobi;
Inevitably this will take us into what it means to be educated, really. Because a lot of countries, I mean it's pretty much standard - they say, Oh yeah, we want invest in education. Um, we know it is important for human capital. We know how important it is to have an educated population and all that. You talked about some data challenges also for some countries in your book. So what I wanna ask here is what exactly does it mean to be educated in the sense that you are talking about in the book?
Charlie;
Yeah, this is a really fair question. Why am I talking about adult literacy? The definition is can you read and write four sentences in any language? Sentences like "farming is hard work." So it's not a very high threshold and I wouldn't argue, I don't think you would, that it's highly educated. It's just educated enough to put that box of jeans onto the right truck when it's going to America or Europe. But all that's doing then is taking your country's per capita GDP from your per person kind of wealth from say $500 a year, a thousand dollars a year to the kind of two, $3,000 a year level. It doesn't mean you've got the education levels you need to get to the $10,000 per capita GDP level growth or 20 or 50 or even a hundred. Um, to get to the 10,000 level, I think you probably need very good secondary school education as well.
And to get to the $20,000 per capital GDP level, you're talking a lot of graduates coming out of university and you need to have that education then spreading throughout the population, both broadening and deeper education as well. And that is a process that takes decades. I mean I focused quite a bit on Korea because it was one of the most successful models and then China came along and did it even faster. But what Korea prioritized in the 1950s was getting that adult literacy rate from 35% or so, too low even to grow sustainably, to about 90% they said by 1960. So in about 10 or 15 years they got it from 35 to 90 and that was enough then to have textile mills do really well in the 1960s and they became a manufacturing country, an industrialized country by the early 1970s.
But already then the government said, right, we need more engineers, we need graduates coming out of university to do heavy industry, to do cars, shipbuilding. But Korea had no cars or shipbuilding at the time, nothing significant. So they were changing the university focus from, kind of, the arts or law towards engineering and the sciences before they had the economic sectors that they were trying to promote. And then about 10 to 20 years later, all these graduates were then in the economy and ready to start up companies like Deawoo, Hyundai, Kia, Samsung. And they started small obviously in the 1980s and early nineties. But this kind of sequential thinking about it meant that Korea kept on having the right human capital at every stage of development. So my book's trying to focus on, you know, why hasn't Pakistan got all the textile factories?
Why does Bangladesh have them? Why doesn't Nigeria have them? Why does Vietnam have them? And this is saying first you've gotta get that sequencing right of everybody ideally being literate, everybody having had school up to 11 years old and come out with a good standard of education. On the quality issue you just raised, the problem here is a couple of things. So I mean firstly people sometimes just make up the data and say, yes, my population is literate when it's not. But secondly, when you try and kind of shoehorn a hundred kids into one class to say, you know, they're all going to school now, but you've only got one teacher, you are not coming out with a good education at all. You might not even be coming out literate at all. So that, you know, I'm also trying to warn that governments can't do this on the cheap. Or not completely. They have to take it seriously and say, look, we actually need to make sure everyone really is coming out able to read and write. It's not just trying to tick a box to say everyone's at school.
Tobi;
Hopefully, we'll circle back to policy questions around this later. Let's talk briefly about electricity, which as you say, once you start investigating these factors, then you start teasing out what's what for each country. And the way you introduce that is [that] there are some countries with very high adult literacy rates but still weren't getting the benefits - like [the] Philippines, which was your example in the book. And it turns out what was missing in that particular case was electricity generation. But first I want you to make one distinction for me quite quickly. Cause it's funny, I was reading David Pilling's brief coverage of your book in the FT and he talked about the fertility part being controversial and I wonder that people miss the obvious controversy in electricity, but we'll get to that. So, now, is it really about investment in electricity that is often missing in countries that can't quite manage to get it right or the way their electricity market is structured? I know you are quite familiar with Nigeria and it's really a big, big, big debate that we've been having for, I don't know, like 20 years. So, some people will say you need very large upfront investment, possibly by the government, in generating capacity transmission, machinery and co. We argue, oh no, you really need to restructure the electricity market first. People have to pay for what they use. You need to restructure the tariff system, blah blah blah, blah, blah. What are your thoughts?
Charlie;
Um, big issues. And there is a debate. There're so many debates about this actually. There's the debate about whether you need a big national grid, big national generation and distribution companies or whether you can have localized electricity. Um, you are getting a couple of points though that I think it's easier to say some answers to. And one of them was to do with getting people to actually pay their bills. Certainly a problem in Nigeria, apparently, you know, discos will say that because there hasn't been good metering and despite privatization that those meters have not been rolled out. I know the government's promising to roll it out to all 10 million account holders now, but because there hasn't been metering, you can't charge necessarily the fair price for the amount of electricity people have used. So then people don't wanna pay. So then the discos are losing money, then they can't pay the generators and this then becomes a problem.
And I think there is a case to say that if the generators can sell some power directly to some big companies, that could be one way around part of the problem. So in a place like Lagos, very similar to the Philippines in the 20th century, good educated population just held back by a lack of cheap reliable power. You know, I think if Lagos could have its own electricity story, it would be a phenomenally successful economy. It should be over the next three or four decades. So there is a case about how you structure this. But I found two or three things interesting when I was looking into this issue in 2018. And the first was just clarifying that it really is electricity that people need more than say transport infrastructure. You know, this is a survey the world bank had done and the only countries where they've said transport infrastructure was the bigger problem was countries where there wasn't an electricity problem because there's so much of it.
So countries, where there's a load of electricity, say yes we need more transport infrastructure, but everybody else says we have to have the electricity first. So then it's a question of how do you roll that out in a way that makes money and supports development? And there is a... I think, a problem at the moment with well-meaning policies from people like the United Nations or the African Development Bank saying everybody should have access to electricity. But my point in the book is, and Adam Smith said the same thing in the 18th century, you want your infrastructure to be making money not losing money. You need to make sure that if you're going to supply people with a road or a bridge or electricity, that they can pay for it. And if you start building stuff that loses you money because people can't pay their bills, then you'll end up with an uneconomic electricity system which can't function properly and can't give industry what it needs.
And what I try to emphasize in this is that every country from America and France in the 1920s to Turkey in the 1960s or seventies to Korea in the 1970s, every country has said, okay, let's make sure we've got electricity for industry first. Profitable, makes money, and then households over time? Yeah, okay, we'll connect them over time, but only when they can start affording to pay for electricity. It's not another subsidy that governments can't afford, we just can't do that. [This] is what every other country's done. But at the moment I do see this pressure for electricity systems to try and roll out universal access and so, in places like Kenya that's putting the whole electricity system under financial pressure because it's hurting their profits. And if you're trying to roll out cheap electricity to households, well how do you pay for that?
Well, government subsidies partly, but the other way to pay for it is to make industry pay a high price. But if you're making industry pay a high price industry won't come. They'll go to Asia; where they get a low price for electricity. They're not going to go to somewhere that's got a high price. Cause no company's gonna say, I just wanna subsidize households getting electricity. Companies are coming to build stuff in countries because they'll make a good profit from doing so. So I think you've raised a number of issues there, you know, is localized electricity good, and so on? You know, what should you be prioritizing first - industry or households? And there's a whole host of issues. But I hope I've answered that.
Tobi;
Actually, that's the controversy I was referring to at the beginning of that question because the background that is, it'll be a very, very tough sell in the current political climate, for example in Nigeria, for any person aspiring to public office to make this argument that you have to power industry first. What it's going to sound like is: you are just trying to prioritize the rich and trying to exclude some people from what, like you said, has come to be framed as a universal basic right. You talk to a lot of small businesses, even individuals, like you mentioned with the World Bank Survey, the importance of electricity is so paramount on everybody's mind that if there's stable electricity, I can start X and Y businesses. I could make money and, I mean, no one needs the government for anything else. Just give us electricity.
Charlie;
Yeah.
Tobi;
So my point is practically… thinking about this practically, how do you think a sensible government that is not trying to bankrupt itself prematurely can manage this situation?
Charlie;
Well, I think it's hard work. Um, how did the Koreans do it in the sixties or the seventies or the eighties? They gave you no right to protest - military government. How did the communists do so well at getting this industry first, households later? How did they get it right in China or Russia? Same thing. You've got no rights to protest. "Your interests don't matter, we're thinking 10 to 20 years ahead how to make our country better off and how to make everyone better off. So you suffer now because we are gonna prioritize business." So that is one model. I'm not recommending it, I'm just saying it is a model that can be done. The other way is to allow it to be done by the private sector. And if you let the private sector roll out electricity, they will not supply electricity to people who won't pay their bills.
And that is the story that you saw in western Europe, it's the story you saw in the States, and to some extent you're seeing actually in Kenya. There's quite an interesting company there called M-KOPA. And M-KOPA will sell you, well, they'll lend you, they'll lease you, a solar panel, a little one that you can put on your - actually, a friend of mine was showing it to me the other day in Uganda...they put it on the straw roof of the mud hut and that solar panel, you pay a monthly fee and after about 18 months you've paid for the panel, you've also got energy during that time enough to supply a mobile phone and so on, lights a little bit, and then it's yours and that's effectively privatizing that rural distribution story. But I think the difficulty is that politicians find it really hard to do this.
And part of what I'm writing about in the book is how really hard it is for governments in a country with no savings, big population growth, to constantly meet all of the different demands. With huge population growth you're having to build new schools all the time, you have to hire even more teachers all the time. You've got population pressure, maybe, causing clashes over agricultural land like the Fulani herdsman in Central Nigeria, Northern Nigeria as well. And all of these pressures are on you all of the time. And there's constant demand to spend more on bridges, on hospitals, on education, on security. And what you can't afford to be doing is making a loss. And so I think what politicians need to do is say, we've gotta sequence this right. The same thing as with education. It's no good having a million university graduates if a country isn't literate enough to have an industrial base, you've gotta have the literacy first.
And equally, it's no good having electricity rolled out to every household when there are no factories for people to go and get the jobs they need to be able to pay the electricity bill. And it's not easy. I, I totally understand it's not an easy situation for anyone to be in. The difficulty is [that] because it's not easy, too many political leaders will take what appears to be the easy option of saying, "I tell you what, let's just go and borrow a load of dollars offshore. Nigeria's going to go and issue a lot of dollar debt and we'll use that to try and sort these problems out." Kenya's done the same, Ghana's done the same, Pakistan's done the same. And the risk then is that you end up in default situations. So that feeds into one of the other chapters in the book as well.
But I think it's very difficult. I think realistically governments need to say, what can we do here? And this is how long it's going to take. And it's going to be not a five-year story, it's going be a 20-year story, a 30-year story to get it right. And people, sadly, need to be patient, which is hard; when for generations people have been waiting for things to get much, much better and little progress has been made, relatively little progress has been made compared to Asia and that causes a lot of political frustration. I think.
Tobi;
I mean, speaking about Asia and I mean your point about taking away the right to protest, I think Africa and Nigeria sort of missed that window when we had military governments everywhere. So, uh, let me give you one experience I've had in trying to discuss your book with friends. So I get two reactions to the fertility section.
It's almost automatic, you know, when you discuss fertility being at a certain level and I try to, you know, successfully argue your point, you get two strands of reactions in my experience, one goes immediately to the China issue - the one-child policy; that, "oh, so are you trying to say we should do what China did?" The other slightly more technical objection I get goes to the relationship between population growth and economic growth that is quite pervasive in the growth literature. Did you also experience that while writing the book and debating with colleagues?
Charlie;
Now I'll take each point in turn. Um, the China one-child policy story helps explain this massive rise in Chinese savings and then their very strong growth. What I'm trying to show in the book, of course, is that every rich country has seen a fertility decline. And what I'm arguing is probably the right sort of level for countries to aim for is about two to three kids on average. I don't care if people have five kids or one kid, it's just as a country the average of two to three kids is consistent with a very high, well, a big jump in the level of sayings. And with those savings, you can then industrialize and grow, and grow fast. Um, China I think actually made a mistake. I think China got it wrong by going for the one-child policy because they kind of turbocharged that story, that story that every rich country has got, of lower fertility, it took a really long time in Europe. I mean it took a really, really long time in Europe and that's why Europe had the slowest growth of any industrial revolution. It was done faster by the communism [they had] in Russia and they did faster growth and we've done even faster in China. But the consequence of this one-child policy and what the Chinese have discovered is it's bloody hard to get the fertility rate back up again once you've had one kid. I was talking to a Chinese professor on a plane back from Asia once and she was saying all of her friends, they can't get married, they can't stay married. They get married and they can't stay married because they're all used to being a one-child kind of princess or prince in the family who gets everything they want and then they try married life and they discover as you might well know, that you never get everything you want in a marriage, and you have to compromise.
And it's certainly created a problem now that China can't get the kids, they can't raise the fertility level and it's not just China that's discovered that once you've got a low fertility rate, too low, I think of one, you have a problem raising it. Again, Italy's had the same problem, Iran, uh, Russia. So I think China did it too fast. And you certainly don't need to do it and loads of other countries show you that just aiming for that two to three kids figure really helps your economy and gets you onto the path to being middle-income and then a rich country. So I don't think you need to do the China one child. No. Um, the second issue, the population growth versus economic growth. What I show, what we did in this was we looked back at every country's growth rate since 1960 and I compared the per capita GDP growth, the per personal growth of an economy, it's the best way to measure how well an economy itself is really doing. And I compared that growth rate against the share of adults to kids that I was talking to you about a little earlier.
Tobi;
Yeah.
Charlie;
And where it's 50-50 roughly, between adults and kids, per capita GDP grows at 1% and that was the story of Asia in the sixties and seventies. It's still the story for a good number of countries including Nigeria today. So per capita GDP growth is about 1% when half your population can't work because they're kids. But once you get two-thirds of the population being adults, your average per capita growth in lower-income countries by half of America's wealth level, so not even lower-income, lower or middle-income countries, your per capita growth, and it averages three to 5% a year. So the structure of your population tells you what your per capita GDP growth is. So it's just... I can't see that there's any other way to explain this than you've gotta get that fertility rate down first before you can start to get the high per capita GDP growth. Um, and it's connected to the savings, of course; cause once you've got two kids instead of six, you're saving money in the bank, the bank starts to have more cash to lend out. There's more money for lending for investment. The government can borrow more cheaply so it can build infrastructure, roads and rail, electricity and cheap electricity cause interest rates are low cause the savings are high because most families are able to put some money aside at the end of the week. But that doesn't happen when 50% of the population are kids. They're not earning any money, they're not saving anything and the poor parents are trying to manage to feed five, six kids on average. You know, they've got nothing left at the end of the week to put into a bank.
So the bank's got no cash. So interest rates are really high cause there's no money in the bank. Um, so money's really expensive. So the government can't afford to invest in infrastructure and if it does build electricity it has to charge a lot of money cause it's having to pay a lot of interest on the debt it's taken on. So to me, I've yet to find someone demolish the argument and uh, you know, it could happen.
Tobi;
Yeah.
Charlie;
But so far it seems you've got to get the fertility rate down first if you want to get fast growth. Now if you don't want to grow at three, four, 5% a year, you could do it really slowly like Europe did and you grow at say, one and a half, two, eventually, you get from European farming in 1800 to factories that are producing not great stuff by 1900, a hundred years later. But when I'm looking at Nigeria today, I don't want Nigeria to be waiting a hundred years to be doing what Europe took a hundred years to do. I also don't think the Chinese model of it taking 30 years, 20, 30 years but then having a population problem of being too old, I don't think that's the right solution either. But there's somewhere in between. At the moment though, Nigeria's on that long growth story, it's not yet ready for the faster growth story
Tobi;
On the China question, um, thinking about your answer there, is extremely low fertility or what they say "fertility below the replacement rate" a feature of the kind of explosive growth 30, 35, 40-year trajectory that we've seen in Asia. Because if you look at Korea, Korea even have worse demographic numbers than China and there was no draconian population policy, but it's kind of gone through this explosive growth phase that is even faster and bigger than China's.
Charlie;
Well, it's been going on for longer. So what the Koreans got right was they raised their adult literacy rate to, you know, they said about 90% by 1960. China, despite being communist and communists tend to say they really appreciate education, didn't get to over 70% literacy until 1990, sometime in the early 1990s, which is 25, 35 years later than Korea. Uh, so Korea was already booming in 1970 at a time when China was having the catastrophic mistakes of the cultural revolution and really bad growth and people feared mass famine. Well many, many did die in China in the sixties. So what I would argue is that Korea had a slower fertility decline and the growth rates were not as fast as China's but they've been growing for 50, 60 years already. So Korea's two to three times richer than China is today. But as you say, they're so ageing that they're gonna be the oldest country in the world by 2030.
And what's gonna get interesting then, and I can't really answer this in the book cause we haven't seen it yet, but what's interesting about Korea and we're going to have to watch it carefully, is that you are going to end up with, not 70% adults and 30% kids, it'll be less and less working-age adults, maybe 60%, I dunno maybe eventually 50% and it'll be 50% kids and old age pensioners who can't work. And my guess is that Korean growth is going to slow back to about the 1% per capita growth that Nigeria's got at the moment because Korea's going to be too old. You know, and that's not something that I think people should be thinking about or worrying about. [People should be thinking about] Pakistan, East Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa at the moment. It's [Korea is] just not a...you know, that's a problem to worry about in 50, 60 years. But it is going to be interesting to watch what does happen to growth in really old countries. Um, can pensioners actually still do work? You know, maybe they end up retiring at 70 or 75 or 80, I dunno. It's gonna be quite interesting to see.
Tobi;
So I mean the question then is, uh, for countries that have fertility rates that are higher than what you described in the book.
Charlie;
Yeah.
Tobi;
It then becomes how do we get it to the point where domestic savings start going up, interest rate for the domestic investment environment then benefits from that virtuous cycle. You talked about access to uh, reproductive interventions like contraception, also education, which takes us to where we started this conversation from, especially the education of women and girls, generally. I was taking a look at David Le Bris recently where he was talking about equality between siblings and inequality between siblings and how it affects the overall capital formation, whether it's physical capital or human capital in the society. So my question then is, do you see individual sort of personalized household decision-making affecting this more or it is sort of a national policy thing?
Charlie;
When it's something as important as family, you know, the individual decisions matter a huge amount. And as I said earlier, I've got no issues with anyone doing what they choose to do. But that big family story, I was just talking to a former minister, actually, of a... former finance minister of a country and he's got five kids, he's saying that he's been able to help fund them go to university, but he can't afford to help them buy a house cause he just hasn't got the cash. And I thought that was a really interesting example of even in a wealthier country, you know, it still matters how big that family is. You know, when I looked into this on how do you get the fertility rate down and there's been quite a lot written about it. I don't have a magic or a single answer, but the theories are first: girls if they're staying at school until they're 18, versus girls who leave school at 13. If you leave school at 13, perhaps you have your first kid at 14, maybe a second kid at 17, third kid at 20. But if you stay at school until you're 18, perhaps the first kid's at 20. So already you've reduced the fertility rate by two just by keeping girls at school. And the key figure, but just kind of remind, well tell people is the key figure is at about three to four kids per woman on average, the banking system has got deposits cash in it of about 35% of GDP, at four to five kids, it's around 30, 25 to 30. At five to six kids, which is where Nigeria is, it's about 20% of GDP. Um, so 20, 30, you know, these sort of levels. If you get to two to three kids though, if you get it below three kids, it more than doubles to about 60% of GDP.
That's when banks suddenly have loads of cash. When banks have got loads of cash, there's loads of lending, suddenly access to finance isn't a problem anymore. So how do you get it below three kids? So you educate girls, there's an incentive when women are educated for them to work cause they can start to make decent money in a textile factory that you can't do unless you've got that literacy. Um, the government just telling people that low fertility is a good thing is shown to have some success. From Indonesia to India, these kinds of government campaigns suggesting lower fertility rates have made a difference. The third thing, which really surprised me cause it's such a strong correlation, is [to] stop kids [from] dying. And I was pretty upset, actually, to see the numbers where, for Nigeria, you've got a 10% chance, just over a 10% chance of dying before the age of five because you're born in Nigeria. And when I was comparing that to Covid - which the world spent, what, trillions trying to fight - with a fatality rate of about one or 2%, you think of those with more than a 10% chance of dying just before the age of five in Nigeria. Anyway, it's kind of shockingly high, but when you have such a high chance of losing a child, you tend to have more children and the correlation is really quite strong. So, if you can try and address infant, [and] young child mortality rates, which doesn't cost that much, you can see countries with Nigeria's wealth level that have a mortality rate of not over 10%, but five or even 3%. And usually, countries with such a low mortality rate then have a much lower fertility rate as well. So, people tend to have less kids when they are more confident that all their kids are going to survive childhood. So, some investment in basic healthcare for children, education of girls, contraception availability, yes it does help, and government information campaigns. You put those things together and then you get a country like Bangladesh. Bangladesh which had the same population as Nigeria about 15 years ago. But today Nigeria's got tens of millions more. But Bangladesh is growing as fast as India. Bangladesh's per capita GDP is over $2,000. And it keeps on growing at six, seven, 8% every year. Because they have on average two kids per woman, they've got savings, they don't have much foreign debt because they don't need to borrow dollars from abroad to fund their growth, because they've got their own savings, because the fertility rate is low. Muslim Bangladesh: tremendous success story over the last two or three decades.
Tobi;
You sort of made allowances for countries that can't quite get their savings right up to the levels where they can get the desired domestic savings and really positively affect their investment environment in a big way. And you talked about debt in the book, which would be familiar to anybody that's been in the new cycle about Nigeria currently, which is that government revenue has collapsed. Debt servicing is rapidly approaching a hundred percent of what the government can collect. And it's only a matter of time before we are talking about a debt crisis. But, like you said, a debt crisis is, like, unavoidable if you're trying to grow and you don't have to requisite domestic savings to sort of mitigate that. But this inevitably brings in the question of debt restructuring which, again, some would also argue does not help you grow. So, in terms of just the sheer macroeconomics management of this, how do you go about it?
Charlie;
It's tough. The book's arguing, obviously, that a whole chunk of this stuff is really long term. You got to get the education right. So, you've got to have enough teachers and that takes, well, at best Korea did it in 15, 20 years. But even if you've got the education, then you've got to get the fertility rate down. And that takes at best 10 years to get it down by about two kids per woman. Nigeria's at 5.3 kids or so at the moment. It needs to be below three to have the local savings. So, we're talking at least 15 years, even if every priority was made today to try and improve education, do all this reproductive education and so on. So, the governments then have the choice of what do you do? I mean, if you're going to wait 15 years, you can grow at 1% a year per person. But you'll find the population is getting pretty cross because you've got all these other countries in the world growing at three, four, 5% per person every year. You know, why is my country growing at one [percent]? So, the politicians then...[it] becomes so attractive to go out and borrow and, you know, every country, not every single one, but the vast majority of debt defaults in the second half of the 20th century were in high fertility countries. The fertility rate I think was around, on average, five - five kids per woman was the average fertility rate in countries that defaulted in the second half of the 20th century. Wherever they were in the world. A lot of them were in Latin America in the debt crisis of 1980s. So firstly, debt crises are really common in high fertility countries because governments say I want to speed up my growth and they borrow when the markets let them.
And we've certainly seen that in Africa in the last 10 years too. And then they borrow too much and then they go into default and then they can lose maybe a decade. And that is what happened in Latin America in the 1980s. But the alternative is to only grow at 1% a year. And yeah, you can avoid debt default. I'm not saying every high fertility country defaults. I'm saying almost all the countries that have defaulted are high fertility. So, you can settle for the low growth but if you don't want to settle for the low growth, the debt becomes a very attractive way to try and get faster growth. But it causes a problem. I end up finding roughly two other ways that you can try.
Tobi;
Okay.
Charlie;
And grow faster. Is it okay to jump on to those?
Tobi;
Yeah, go ahead please.
Charlie;
Yeah. First is to try and bring in as much foreign investment as you can. Cause you haven't got enough local savings, you don't want to take on too much debt cause eventually you'll default. So, you can try and make yourself very attractive for foreign investors. Foreign direct investors. The only problem with that model is that those foreign direct investors do also want their cheap electricity and the good infrastructure that unfortunately high fertility countries haven't got the money to pay for. So, it's difficult to get in a lot of foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment in China, I was just reading a really good book by David Lubin, who's the chief economist of Citi for Emerging Markets and he did a book called Dance of the Trillions. Highly recommend, it's brilliant on emerging markets. And he says FDI suddenly started in China in the 1990s. Now, I know why. My book is explaining why I think, which is you finally had a literate population, 70% literacy and you also had the low fertility rate. So, you had the high savings, you had the good infrastructure. But the FDI didn't come 10 years before into China. It only really picked up in the 1990s. So, the point of then is, I mean yeah, try and get some [FDI] if you can, but the last option that I can see other than to just, perhaps, try to go full Stalinist, kind of communist, take control of every part of the economy. But even that still education and low fertility really helps... Um, the last option which any country can do is to run a current account surplus, I think. Have a currency level that's so cheap that you are running a trade surplus. A current account surplus, which is obviously trade plus services and remittances and so on.
If you've got a surplus on that current account, you are bringing dollars into the economy and those dollars help reduce interest rates. And Nigeria saw that actually in 2005, six, seven and eight when the oil price was booming. Nigeria had that flood of dollars coming into the economy. Interest rates were really low below inflation and investment was relatively cheap and easy to finance. Now it's a problem to manage when it's a commodity-driven boom because commodities then bust. So, all that flood of money that came in suddenly disappeared again, you know, once the oil price collapsed there wasn't that current account surplus anymore. But if you run a cheap currency policy to make sure you always run a current account surplus, then that helps give you that supply of savings that you can then use to start investing. So that seems to me one of the few ways that a low-income country that's got not enough local savings, doesn't want to wait forever until its fertility rate's down [and] low enough to build the domestic savings, this is one way that looks sustainable that can bring in some foreign cash to help support growth.
Tobi;
But one minor aside on FDI and you can really correct me here if I'm wrong, wouldn't that really be a bit unstable? Because if you have loads of FDI, if other indicators are really working in your favour and at the slightest hint of a crisis, all that money then flows out.
Charlie;
Yeah. Well, I'll just differentiate between foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment. And, again, David Lubin's book is very good on this because the Washington consensus, which is this set of policies that were drawn up by policy makers around 1989, 1990, it said countries should welcome foreign direct investment. Building factories that it's pretty hard to move out of the country, that that should be welcomed. But when the original guys who drew up the Washington Consensus wrote down the kind of 10 principles, they weren't that keen on foreign portfolio investment. This is the hot money that will include a lot of my investors who will come in and buy shares in companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange and might come in and buy bonds. And I think it's fair to say that that money can leave in times of trouble and doesn't really support...isn't necessarily as supportive [of growth] and that money we count on the capital account because it is foreign capital.
What I was talking about on the current account surplus was obviously the trade surplus, the remittances, the services and so on. So, I think it's more debatable. I think a number of countries have restricted foreign portfolio flows into equity market or the bond market. And if they've got other things going for them, like a low fertility rate, they can kind of get away with that. Um, what I'm highlighting is that for some countries they just don't have that choice. And when America was short of capital in the 19th century, it was British capital that went over and built their railways, that bought all the shares in their infrastructure companies. The Brits owned America for much of the 19th century and then the French actually owned most of Russia. Uh, the railways and the ports and some of the industry, the coal mines [were] very significantly owned by French investors, portfolio funds, and portfolio guys are there to make money as well. You know, they're there to make profit and if you're making good profit, five, 10% a year or whatever sitting in Nigerian equity market, people will stay, and it won't leave. They'll be happy to stay there for many, many years as people are and have been doing in India, actually, since India's education fertility and electricity numbers have all come together in the last 10 years in a really good way. Foreign portfolio guys are saying, "Hey, we wanna put our money into the Indian stock market too." And Indian shares are pretty expensive right now because of that. But the money doesn't want to leave. It'll leave when policy mistakes are made but fundamentally doesn't want to leave. However, I don't deny that there is a reasonable argument you can make to say we're going to choose foreign direct investment, we're going to be more restrictive on foreign portfolio investment. Because that can be more volatile. It can leave quicker. And I wouldn't argue with that. Well, I mean we could debate it, but I think it's harder to prove that you must have foreign portfolio investments to thrive. I think the current account surplus is a better policy choice because it's in your control. Foreign portfolio investors and what they do, that's not in your control.
Tobi;
One question that stayed with me throughout your book, which is a bit silent in the book itself, maybe it's implied, you can tell me, is that it's really difficult to find a country at any particular point where all these three factors align at the same time. Where you have the requisite adult literacy rate, electricity and fertility, they rarely align at the same point in time in the history of any one country. Because your book did not really distinguish between any particular political preference or institutional arrangements, which I like that, but what institutional arrangement favours the consistency for all these factors to sort of come together, uh, in the economic history basically of a country. Because we know that political leaders tend to favour what benefits their ambition at any particular point in time, you know? And a lot of these things are investments that do pay off in the long run, you know? Like we talked about on savings, a lot of political leaders would want to borrow a lot of money and then leave the debt crisis to the next administration.
Charlie;
Yeah. Yeah. Happens a lot.
Tobi;
Yeah. You know, and so many other things, whether you are investing in electricity or education or whatever, they don't really want to do the hard work. They want to do the easy stuff and just leave it to the next guy.
So, what institutional arrangements have you found in your observation and study of this that favours the patient consistent build-up to the alignment of these three factors?
Charlie;
I think it's really, um, it's kind of interesting actually because in each chapter I try and say which countries are at the right place for industrialization, education, which countries are at the right place for electricity, and which countries are at the right place for fertility. Perhaps I didn't properly bring that together in one chapter at the end to say, "so, who's the fast growth story?" But right now, the countries that have brought them together are Vietnam, India, Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and I think those five countries, Morocco actually six, um, those six countries should be the countries that will show the really good growth for the next 30 to 40 years. Um it's going to be great. And I'm then trying to highlight who's closest to joining them on a 10 year view. Um, Pakistan and Egypt both got big debt problems right now, but five to 10 years they could be joining that group as well and Ghana and actually Kenya and I would argue southern Nigeria could be, could be there in the 2030s.
Um, so I am trying to say when they come together. The question you are asking, though, about institutions or perhaps leadership and so on, I think is a really important one because I guess this book in lots of ways is an argument against Why Nations Fail, which was a really interesting book; and [it] said it is all about institutions and the right institutions and that's why if you walk a kilometre across the US border into Mexico, things are run so very differently. It's got to be the institutions, that book argues, that makes the difference between a country succeeding or not. And what I'm arguing is that I don't think that's true. I think you appear to have the good institutions when everything else is running well and you appear to have the terrible institutions when you don't have the education or you don't have the electricity or you don't have the low fertility or worst of all, you haven't got any of them.
So, a country that hasn't got any of them, like Niger, Chad, Somalia, you know, these are countries in a terrible place. But I'm saying that they can't have good institutions cause there's no money in the economy, there are not enough educated people in the economy. There's just no way that you're going to get a good setup in those countries. And actually, even at the beginning when, at the first 10 years or so, when you've got these things all coming together, you still don't think the institutions are good. You know, you go to India today, people don't think, "wow, this is a brilliantly run civil service. It's so uncorrupt[ed]." Such wonderful institutions everywhere. They don't say that. They don't say that about Philippines' Duterte, the president who's been just recently retired, by people who were worried the institutions found it difficult to control his populism. And yet Philippines boomed under Duterte, and India's boomed under Modi and countries like Korea boomed even with a level of corruption that means in the last 10 years we've seen four presidents go to jail for corruption.
Um, so I argue that the better institutions come afterwards and that's why four presidents have gone to jail in Korea because they're now getting the institutions better. And I read a really good book about why democracies die by some American academics about three or four years ago now. I recommend it. And they pointed out that Latin America, across Latin America, they just copied the American institutions. They said, look, what's working in the Americas is North America. It's United States, they've got it right. Let's copy their institutions, we'll put them into my country, be it Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, whoever. And then they discovered that actually if the human capital is not as advanced, people will undermine the institutions. And you arguably saw Trump try it in the United States itself, but the human capital and the rest of the place was good enough to stop him from going too far.
This is all debatable stuff, but you know, this is... So, I think the institutions do work when everything else has been working for some time and before then it's very hard to argue that the institutions work or can make a huge difference. I think the fundamental economic reality of are you growing at 1% a year or three to 5% a year per capita? That isn't about the institutions. Having said all of that? I think there's no doubt that you can have, if you're lucky, very lucky, really good leadership. A leader like Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, who has got vision, understands or is lucky, but he prioritized education and all the rest, who gets it right and takes the country onto a new path. When I think of some of the most obvious successes, a lot of them are small Singapore, Hong Kong, even Taiwan really.
And maybe it's just tougher to do it in a country the size of Nigeria with over 200 million people or, or uh, India with over a billion, which is why it took India so long or Brazil. But I remember even the French president, Charles de Gaulle, I think in the sixties or seventies said, "how is it possible to govern a country with 350 types of cheese?"
.
Um, and in India you'd say, "how can you govern a country of over a billion people with that many different dialects, different customs, different local cultures?" Um, and it is hard, but once you get these fundamentals of education, electricity and fertility right, suddenly, it looks like you can govern well. So, I want to think there is a role for good leadership, um, and it can make a difference and it does help. I just think history's telling us over the last 300 years that we can't count on luck and that lucky guy who happens to be the right leader to come in, sometimes woman who can come in, and push reform in the right way. What we can count on is that if you get the education, electricity and fertility numbers right, you will get out of poverty, you will get better off and your kids will have a much, much better future and your grandchildren even more so.
So, I think that's probably one area [where] my book differs from many in the last 10, 15 years is saying, "I don't think it is so much about the things that we all like to pay attention to [like] who's going to win the next election and what are their different policies going to be?" And you know, most of the time I'm arguing it doesn't really make as much difference as we'd like to think.
Tobi;
Now, another point that came in the later chapters in the book, which I found interesting, and which is quite also a bit of a political issue right now, surrounds migration. Uh, a lot of Nigerians are leaving, I mean it's become even a social media trend and meme - "who is...
Charlie;
The Japa trend.
Tobi;
Who is leaving next, uh, yeah, yeah, Japa. So, like, who is leaving next, you know? Right. But you argued in the book that as countries grow richer, there will be more migration not less because what you often hear is that the reason why people are living is because the country is so bad and they're looking for a way to make better lives for themselves, which is true anyway. So, and that the way to really stop this migration wave is if you can improve the domestic economy and then suddenly you see a drop, but you are saying no, um, we are actually going to see more migration as countries grow richer. Now, how do you suppose that this can be resolved with the current, should I say, political environment in Europe and to some extent in America that is increasingly seeing migration from poorer countries as a problem, right? Is it a case of as countries grow richer, then the migration demographic just, sort of, changes to more educated people leaving and less tension and political rancour about migration?
Charlie;
Um, I doubt, I mean, I doubt that these political problems about immigration in Europe and The States are going to disappear. Cause we've seen election results just in the last two, three weeks in Italy with the far right becoming dominant, in Sweden as well. Where they took in a huge amount of, I think, it was Syrian refugees and before that Somalian refugees. Um, and you're trying to integrate people coming from a country with very low adult literacy into, particularly in Somalia's case, into a country like Sweden, which had a hundred percent, nearly a hundred percent adult literacy already by 1900. That's an integration process that takes generations. As America's still struggling 150 years after civil war, still struggling to manage integration. So, I think that political problem is going to carry on, but it is going to get more acute for Europe, um, and eventually United States because Europe is this aging old continent that hasn't got enough people.
I was in Germany two weeks ago and there, there was a surprising number of industrialists saying "we must have a much more open border situation." I said, well, you know, that'll be really interesting to see if you do that because the backlash that we're seeing elsewhere says there is a limit to what countries politics seem ready to accept. And, I think, I even think the Brexit vote was about that. It was about the East European migration into the UK, which had the most open approach to east European countries from Poland and Hungary and Czech coming to the UK. Every other country in Europe kept in a border, well, restrictions, but the UK didn't. And I think that backfired on the UK when it had a Brexit vote that said, "oh, we have too many Polish people eating sausage in our supermarkets. And I, I, yeah, I mean really people cared.
I don't understand it. I love the variety obviously, but while I don't understand, while I don't feel the same, [some] people do. So, I think that's the political problem. And even educated people who are needed by the economy might find it hard to integrate, say, beyond the bigger urban centres. I was really shocked when I was writing the book and I was looking at what happens when you've got an educated population but a high fertility rate. What happens across history is people leave. Cause there aren't enough jobs at home. Cause the fertility rate's so high, there's thousands, millions of people coming into the workforce. The savings aren't there to help create the jobs. So, they leave and it's the Philippines, you know, in the 20th century, it's Pakistanis now, where a number of people are well educated, not everyone sadly. But 150 years ago, it was Ireland, and it was Norway, and they were sending their excess population to America, and it caused huge controversy.
There was, you know, rioting between, kind of, the Italian immigrants and the Irish immigrants in New York. There was legislation in parts of America deliberately aimed at Norwegians.
.
I've never heard of anyone discriminating against Norwegians before, but you go back a hundred years ago in the United States, and they really didn't like people speaking foreign languages on trains, they were banned from doing so, they had to speak English. So, I think, first, it's inevitable people will want to move, and I think we're going to see quite a lot of this struggle to manage immigration by countries that really do need it. The problem for a Nigeria, say, is you're going to be educating more and more people to a better and better quality. You know, it's been happening already for more and more people getting access to education for 50, 60 years. That gives them the skills they need to immigrate.
But Nigeria also would benefit from those skills staying at home. So, it's, uh, I don't think there's much you can do about it other than go full communist and not let people leave the country.
But, it’s going to be a challenge. And the numbers do get worse, it’s quite interesting. So, [at] a $1,000 per capita GDP, low-income countries don't see much immigration cause people haven't got the skills on average to be able to leave. But it peaks at about eight, $9,000, quite high levels, kind of where Mexico is, its like the peak. That's when people are really saying, “I've really got the skills to go and work anywhere and I’m gonna go off to America and make my fortune.” And then it [immigration] drops. So, once you get to about $15,000 per capita GDP, people say, “you know what, my standard of living is actually pretty high.” And what we've seen in Poland is that 10, 20 years ago they came to England, they've probably got a better standard of living today, in Poland now, than they do in the UK. Housing's expensive and, you know, everything's expensive in the UK and in Poland you get a better quality of life. So it looks like people finally do start moving back, but only when you get up to that quite, quite wealthy level.
Tobi;
So, I've got two final questions for you. One is hypothetical in a way. As you know, Nigeria has elections next year - February. And, of course, campaign season has started. Now, suppose that whoever of these guys in the election, whether you are at Tinubu or Peter Obi or Atiku and, like, gives you a ring and say, "uh, Charlie, I've won the election. I really want to do good in Nigeria. What and what should I prioritise?" Against the background of this book and your research, what would your answers be?
Charlie;
The first challenge for Nigeria in the long run and the most important is the educational divide in the country. The fact that well under half of adult women in the north, many northern states, cannot read or write in any language, nor has learn anything else. And I just think this is going to ensure that per capita GDP growth in the north will be low until that changes. While in the south, because the education levels are that much higher, the per capita GDP growth can be higher. So, the divide between north and south is just going to get bigger and bigger until every effort is made to get universal basic primary education for all girls in the north, but actually an adult literacy campaign as well. Castro did it in Cuba in the early sixties, Korea did it in the 1950s. You get literate students, and you send them out to the villages, and you get them to teach everybody to read and write.
Even the people who say I don't need to read and write, I've lived my whole life without being able to read and write. Everyone needs to get this. And that would be, I would argue the most important thing for Nigeria in the long term. Second issue is that in itself will then encourage that lower fertility rate and eventually improve Nigeria's savings, um, which will come, but uh, I'd be very tempted to say what's going on with infant mortality and child mortality and why is Nigeria's ratio so much worse than other countries of the same income level like Ghana or Cote d'ivoire. Let's bring in as much support - Medicine San Frontier, whoever it might be, private charity. I don't know. And it doesn't matter who. Anyone who can come in and try and address that, I think that that, again, is one of those very long-term policy choices. But should be a huge focus.
I mean, unfortunately, the state of security in Nigeria means that while I don't like to see a government have to spend money trying to just maintain security because that's not really investment, but unless there's security, you're not going to get that education. So, unfortunately, something has to be done about the security issue too. And I say unfortunately because it just means spending is being spent on that rather than the long-term growth drivers. And then the question comes of what can we do about the lack of savings now? Now, these are all great long-term policies, Charlie, this is fine, but you know, it's not going to sort me out in four years. What can I do now? And I would argue, try the cheap currency policy that will run a current account surplus and help bring dollars into this economy. Because Nigerian needs savings and if the currency's cheap enough, the current account surplus should happen and then there's some savings to be able to invest in some of the infrastructure that's needed to get the economy going.
And at a more micro level, I wonder whether that, for electricity, trying to get Lagos right. Let's try and see if we can get a city with good education and actually relatively low fertility rate compared to the rest of the country, potentially more savings within Lagos state. Is there a way of sorting out electricity here so that this place can show how it can be done? Because the success stories in China, it all began on the coast. It wasn't inland, it was the coast and for 20 years it was the coast that led growth in China. It was only when the coast had done incredibly well - Shenzhen and , all of these cities up and down the coast had done really well. It was only then that money started getting invested in a big way inland and rural, bringing up the rest of the country too. So, if Nigeria can create some positive success stories in [the] Southern states that act as a kind of symbol of what can be done that's, you know, I don't know if it can be done in four years, but on a four to eight year view and one to two terms in office, I think you could start to make a noticeable difference to the growth rates in some of the southern states and that can help be an example for everyone.
Tobi;
My last question for you is, uh, and of course this is a bit of a tradition on the show. What's the one idea - you're not allowed to take from your book, by the way...
What's the one idea? It may be current, it may be past, it may be global or specific, that really gets you excited, and you like to see it become more widely accepted and popular. What's that one idea? Just one idea?
Charlie;
Yeah, that's a difficult one. I mean the book that interested me in terms of the future, over the last two or three years, was Homo Deus and this is the guy who wrote Sapiens as well. But if you read the last third of Homo Deus and he's talking about robotics and genetics and AI and how much they're going to change everything, eventually, for all of us. Um, that, that interested me. I'm not sure that he came out with one specific idea about it, but I would recommend people to take a look at that last part three of Homo Deus and have a read cause it got my mind thinking, not working out the answers either, but it was just something about "this is going to be big. Um, and I don't know quite how it's going to be big." But, anyway, I recommend reading it. I don't know if that's quite the answer you were looking for, but that's totally caught, caught my attention anyway.
Tobi;
Okay, Charlie Robertson, it's been fantastic to have you on the show. Thank you very much.
Charlie;
It's been an absolute pleasure. Thank you for so many thoughtful questions. It's really, um, it's great to discuss it.
This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe -
Bangladesh has transformed tremendously in the last twenty-five years. Average incomes have more than quadrupled, and many of its human development indicators have improved alongside. It has also become an export powerhouse with its garment industry, and generally a shining example of development - though things are far from perfect. Five decades ago, when Bangladesh became an independent country, many were not hopeful about its chances of development. So how did Bangladesh turn its story around? Well, it turns out the history of its transformation is longer than credited - and the process is more complex than what is cleanly presented.
I could not think of a better person to help me unpack the Bangladeshi miracle than Dr. Akhtar Mahmood. He is an economist and was a lead private sector specialist for the World Bank Group - where he worked in various parts of the world for three decades on privatization, state enterprise reforms, investment climate, competitiveness, and more broadly private sector development. He has written some excellent books (see embedded links), and his column for the Dhaka Tribune is one of my wisest sources of economic development commentary.
Transcript
Tobi;
Welcome to the show Akhtar Mahmood. It's a pleasure talking to you. I am very fascinated and curious about Bangladesh, and you are my number one option for such a journey. It’s a pleasure, personally, for me to be having these conversations. I've been reading your column for about a year now with the Dhaka Tribune, and I've learned so much. They are very perceptive, and I'm going to be putting up links to some of my favourites in the show notes for this episode. Welcome once again, and thank you so much for doing this.
Akhtar;
Thank you very much for having me. Thanks, Tobi.
Tobi;
There's so much that I want to talk to you about, as you'd imagine, but let me start right at the end, which is now. There has been a lot of attention on Bangladesh, recently, at least in my own orbit, there have been two quite detailed and interesting columns in the Financial Times about Bangladesh. There is also Stefan Dercon’s book, which used Bangladesh as a positive case for what he was describing about the development process. But also, there's the issue of what's going on right now with the global economy. First, it started with COVID and how the economy suddenly stopped, and all the reverberation that comes with that - the supply chain, and now, a lot of countries are going through a sort of sovereign debt crisis and Bangladesh, again, is in the spotlight.
So, I just want you to give me an overview, and how this, sort of, blends with countries that put so much into development…you know, in terms of policy, in terms of the things they are doing right, in terms of investment and attracting investment, and the exposure to these sorts of global economic risks and volatility. [This is] because, usually, what you get in Western discourse is that a lot of countries are victims of some of these risks because of some of the wrong policy decisions they make. But in the case of Bangladesh, at least to my knowledge, nothing like that is going on. And yet, it is usually talked about as a very exposed country in that regard. I know you wrote a column recently about this. So I just want you to give me a brief [insight]—is there anything to worry about? How do countries that are trying to get rich, that are trying to do things right, how do they usually manage these sorts of global risks?
Akhtar;
Right? I think, inevitably, we'll have to go a bit into the history of how we came here. But since you started with the current situation, let me briefly comment on that, and then maybe I'll go to the history. Right now, yes, like most other countries, we are facing challenges, but I think there has been a bit of hype about how serious the challenge is, in terms of the risk of a debt default, the risk of foreign exchange reserves going down very sharply. And I think there is a bit of the Sri Lanka effect, and then also the Pakistan effect, as people are trying to put Bangladesh in the same bracket, which I think is very, very misplaced. I think the IMF has made it clear, [not only] in its latest country report, which came out in March 2022 but also in many recent statements, that Bangladesh has both a solvency situation and a liquidity situation. As you know [that] the solvency is typically measured by the external debt to GDP ratio, one of the ratios is external debt by GDP and the liquidity is measured by debt service requirements - the external debt service requirements by the export earnings ratio. And there are these certain thresholds, and if you go beyond that, it's considered a bit risky.
Bangladesh on both these accounts is much below the threshold. So there's already a lot of headroom in the sense that even if things get worse over the next few months and maybe a year or two, Bangladesh would still be able to manage the situation. So I just wanted to make that clear at the beginning. Now, that doesn't mean that there aren't other issues in Bangladesh, issues which have been brewing for quite some time. For example, many of us are concerned with the efficiency of public expenditures. We know of projects where there have been cost overruns. Some of it may be for genuine reasons, some of it may be related to corruption, which sadly still remains a serious problem in Bangladesh. I feel that I've written about it, and you may have read some of these articles about the spectre of rising cronyism, which, again, is not surprising; when an economy grows as fast as Bangladesh's has, there are certain people who become economically powerful. And at some stage they acquire political power as well, and then you start seeing the problem of cronyism. So we have that, we have a serious problem in the banking sector with a lot of non-performing loans. I'm not suggesting that we don't have serious problems, we do. But there is a disconnect between the typical headlines and where the real problems lie in Bangladesh.
Now, this may be a good moment to bring up a little bit of history, and I can go deeper into it. The Bangladesh economy has certain resilience. And I just want to comment on that. One which is not discussed much, because the story often is about garments and remittances, is the transformation that has happened in the rural areas. It started with agriculture, it actually started with rice production, which is the most important crop in Bangladesh. And then it expanded into other crops, and then even non-farm activities in the rural areas, we can go into the details of this later. But agriculture provides a certain resilience. And we saw that again during COVID. Because the agricultural activities in Bangladesh were not affected that much by COVID, and that was a big benefit.
The other is the unleashing of an entrepreneurial spirit in Bangladesh. And this spirit has been unleashed across the board, so it's not just some large conglomerates or some large government manufacturers who have become entrepreneurial. This is something which has happened across the board, from small farmers to large conglomerates. And that, I think, is a big asset for the country. Because we don't have natural resources; unlike Nigeria, we don't have natural resources. In some ways, it's actually a good thing. Because then we are forced to use other assets and latent entrepreneurship… you know, Albert Hirschman, the famous economist, wrote a book in 1956, which is a classic, on the strategy of economic development, and he made a very interesting comment. He said, in developing countries, you have a lot of latent resources. In developed countries, the task is how to allocate the resources you have; how to best allocate them. In developing countries, it is about bringing out the latent resources you have; and entrepreneurship is one of the latent resources developing countries have, but many countries have not been able to bring that out and make use of it. Bangladesh has, and that gives a certain resilience to the economy. So yes, the shocks are going to affect us, especially because our major industry, in fact, is export-oriented, which is garments. So that is affected by the shocks, but unlike commodity prices, export earnings don't fluctuate that much. And the industry has proven to be resilient over the years.
Tobi;
Yeah, I'm glad you touched on history because, really, that's where I wanted to start. But I just want to get the pulse of the moment and how to make sense of all the headlines that we're seeing around. So usually, and I’ll refer to the two pieces I've read in the FT [Financial Times] recently that I referenced in my first question. The development trajectory of Bangladesh is usually dated as something that started around 1990. But Bangladesh became an independent country two decades before that. So my question then is: that intervening period before that sort of consensus about the takeoff point, what were the things that were brewing in the background that culminated in that takeoff? I know a lot of things went down, and just to mention that one of the reasons I’m very interested in Bangladesh is that it sort of defies some of the seductive examples of development and progress - the Asian tigers, you know, so to speak - where things seem to be very clear, the prescriptions are very precise, you need to do this and do this.
Bangladesh seems like a regular country - like Nigeria, with its history, its complexities, its problems like every other country in the world, but that has also managed, despite a situation that has seemed hopeless, at first, to people who look at these things in terms of hard boundaries - that has emerged as this fantastic example of economic growth and development. So what were the major things that happened before 1990 that sort of made this takeoff possible?
Akhtar;
Now, one may debate on whether 1990 is the point of the takeoff. In any case, it's very difficult to pinpoint. But anyway, it's good. So 1990, twenty years after independence and also a transition to democratic rule after fifteen years or so of military or quasi military rule. So that's another reason people take that as a counterpoint. But it's a good counterpoint to start discussing these things. Professor Stefan Dercon, whom I think you had on your show recently, who wrote this book Gambling on Development; he has been saying that actually, in some ways, it's a Bangladesh experience which may be more relevant for many developing countries than the East Asian [experience]. And one of the reasons he mentions is, I think, what you just alluded to - that there is a certain messiness, and yet Bangladesh developed. So countries which think that they are also in a somewhat messy situation, or whatever dimensions, say in governance or other dimensions - whether it's possible for them to develop. And that's why the Bangladesh example may be more relevant and encouraging than the East Asian, where one common characteristic has been the strong capabilities of the state. In China, it has been there for hundreds or more, thousands of years. In East Asia, yes, I'm sure they also have that but they certainly acquired that quite fast. So how do you develop in a country context where the state capacity, the governance quality are not that great, and then you have many other problems as well. So you're right. In that sense, Bangladesh may be very relevant.
I think I'd like to first start with, um, even deeper history, because if you look at the region which now constitutes Bangladesh, it used to be part of a province in British India. So it was East Bengal, and then you had West Bengal and then together it was Bengal. Now there was a time in history when Bengal including East Bengal was supposed to be reasonably rich, perhaps the richest province in [the] whole of India before the British came. But if we go back to the beginning of the twentieth century, East Bengal was actually quite backward economically and in many other ways. And if you look at the political discourse in the first half of the twentieth century, before the British left, the political and intellectual discourse in what is now Bangladesh, you’ll see there's a lot of talk about peasants being exploited. We were a very peasant dominated economy and society. In many ways we still are, although there has been a lot of urbanisation and industrial activity. At that time it was very much peasant dominated, and the theme which dominated the discourse was exploitation of the peasants. And the aspiration that the leaders whether political or intellectual had is how can we improve the conditions of the poor people. And that sort of got ingrained in the minds of the leaders, and that continued during the time when we were a part of Pakistan. Because you may have heard that there was a lot of disparity and there was a lot of discriminatory treatment by the Pakistani establishment.
So that theme was there. When we became independent in ‘71, you could think of the political leadership, you could think of the professional leadership, the bureaucracy, the intellectuals, the media, this theme of doing something for the poor, was actually very strong. So right at the beginning, and, I heard somewhere that our first prime minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was asked by a foreign journalist: what is the number one problem of your country? And he said, I actually have two number one problems. One is food security, and one is population. And we need to take care of that. So right from the beginning, even in the midst of all the turmoil in the first few years, and all the challenges of relief and rehabilitation, work had started on ensuring agricultural growth and food security. And we were fortunate that the HYV rice, the high yielding variety of rice, had been introduced just before independence, so we had something to work with. So that was very important. And there was a strong program to bring down the rate of growth of [the] population and we succeeded on both counts. So by the time we come to 1990, agriculture is taking off. Rice production had taken off significantly, farmers were diversifying into other crops. And we had started to see the beginnings of a rural non farm sector. So agriculture and non agriculture together. And, Bangladeshis had been going out as migrants, and they're sending back remittances, most of it going into the rural areas. So there was a vibrancy in the rural area by the time you come to 1990.
Secondly, sometime in the late 70s, the government decided that not only should we move away from the early talk about socialism, [but] towards a more private sector-oriented or market-oriented economy. They also understood that industry has to grow to absorb the surplus labour in agriculture, and export orientation has to grow, because the market in Bangladesh is simply not large enough. So there was an early emphasis on exports. And of course, fortuitously, you know, the South Koreans were running out of their garment quota, so they wanted to relocate some of the production to Bangladesh, but we were ready to take advantage because by then the government and let's say the elite of the class had decided that we need to industrialise and the major driver of industrialization is going to be exports. And then throughout the 80s, we saw the takeoff of the garment industry. The third thing which happened was the liberalisation of policies, mostly in the 80s. So, privatisation was done, the banking sector was open to the private sector. The agricultural input market, which was previously dominated by the government, was gradually liberalised and towards the late 80s, there was a significant liberalisation of that. And finally, as remittances started coming in, our foreign exchange constraint was relaxed. So that also gave government some comfort that we can decontrol certain things. And we can allow industry to move ahead without too many controls. So all these things coming together sort of created the context in which we entered the 1990s. So a lot of the preconditions - the population growth rate had fallen significantly by the time it came to the 1990s, agricultural growth had taken off, industry was taking off, especially the labour intensive garments, which is export-oriented, that industry was taking off.
Tobi;
That was such a loaded answer, which has preempted some of my further questions. But let me quickly make one digression on agriculture, because over the past seven years or so, in Nigeria, there's been this debate. There's been a huge debate about agriculture, the current administration sort of prioritised agriculture and a lot of resources (capital) was allocated to that sector. And there's been challenges and there's been critics, sometimes I've found myself on the critic’s side of things. Now, what I want to know from you is that,the link between agriculture, especially investment and the agricultural productivity that is necessary for the vibrance of that particular sector, how was the Bangladeshi experience? How did Bangladesh achieve food security, especially in terms of improving yield and productivity?
Akhtar;
Right, so a few things. Firstly, as I said, the high yielding variety of rice had been introduced in the late 60s, and then just after independence, government continued, but more vigorously with a model of… it was more [of a] public sector driven model, where the public sector would import the major inputs. One is irrigation equipment, because this rice needed irrigation, and the other was fertiliser. So, they're imported by the public sector, then they're distributed by the public sector going all the way to the farmers. Maybe at the last mile, there were some private traders who act as dealers on behalf of the government. So, the government took that responsibility. Later on, as I said, in the 80s, they started liberalising it. We'll come to that later. Second is, there's been quite a bit of investment in agricultural research. Now the HYV rice came from abroad, but as it was being applied in Bangladeshi farms, in many cases, we realised that there was some adaptation needed, because the conditions were not always well suited for this variety. The crop conditions varied even within Bangladesh, even though it's a small country, lots of variation. Later on, for example, salinity became a problem, because a lot of water was coming from the Bay of Bengal into Bangladesh. So there are all kinds of problems - there's flooding also. There were many areas where after floods, the waters don't recede that fast, so they remain underwater for a long time.
So the agricultural scientists in Bangladesh, and they were all in the public sector, they came up with innovations to come up with rice varieties and later other varieties like maize varieties or vegetables, which are better suited to the conditions in Bangladesh. And then the public sector effort was also complemented, supplemented by NGO efforts. You may have heard about BRAC [Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee], which is the largest NGO in the world, and we often talk about their activities in the health sector, in education, in microfinance. They were actually doing a lot of work in the economic sphere as well. R&D in agriculture was one of the things that we're doing, in collaboration with the government often, so there was R&D. Another thing happened, which I forgot to mention, when I mentioned sort of the run up to the 90s. In the 80s, the government started a massive program to build rural roads, connecting the rural areas to the small towns and the small towns to the bigger towns. So,a huge rural road network was built starting from the late 80s. And it continued into the 90s, which broadened the markets of the farmers. So in all of this, the core player was the small farmer. As I said, Bangladesh is a peasant, small farmer dominated economy, so it is remarkable that these farmers were willing to innovate, they were willing to move away from what their parents and grandparents had done for many, many years, and adopt these new varieties. So the combination of the government with some NGOs and the farmers, I think that created the basis for productivity improvements in agriculture. And that was sustained because the market was sustained. There were lots of public policies. And at some point, when the government thought the public sector delivery model was not working that well, they allowed the private sector to come in.
Tobi;
I don't want to infer anything, but from your answer, I can tell what Nigeria is doing wrong, but maybe we'll get to that later. So let's talk about the conditions, which you've also sort of answered for me but I want to know if there is more. Dercon in his book, I'm talking about Professor Stefan Dercon, talked about elite consensus that sort of becomes the bedrock of deciding to pursue economic development. So this broad consensus amongst the Bangladeshi political elites to improve the conditions of the poor, and, which, I'm speculating sort of enabled an ecosystem of policy consistency, even if there are deviations at the margins, how did it emerge? And how was it sustained?
Akhtar;
Okay, as I had mentioned to Professor Dercon ‘cause I also had a conversation with him for our Bangladeshi group. And I said that – and, he agreed that, it's really difficult to define if there was an elite consensus because it's not that the elite are sitting in a room discussing and bargaining and one day they come out and say, okay, here is an agreement, we have agreed on these three things, it doesn't happen. And there is a bit of tautology in his book as well. And he agreed with that, that in his country chapters, he says, these countries had an elite bargain. And then he says, Okay, this is how the countries grew. And if they have grown, therefore, they must have had a bargain. So there's a bit of tautology there. But coming back to this, I think, I started giving you a flavour of that when I brought in history, even before the British left and how in East Bengal, there was this deeply ingrained feeling that something has to be done for the poor people. And then just after independence in ‘74, we had a big famine. And that sort of strengthened this feeling amongst Bangladeshis. And you know, you mentioned the word elite and it's a bit difficult to define the elite. I would say that it's a broader… I'm talking about people who can influence policy, both the formulation and the quality of implementation.
There are a lot of people in the bureaucracy who may not, in that sense, be called part of the elite, but they do have some authority. Now, most of these people, they actually are not too far away from the poor people of Bangladesh. Many of them still have very strong connections with their villages. They go back regularly. They know what the conditions are there. And in a densely populated country like Bangladesh, you see poverty all around you. So all these things, I think, have ingrained in the minds of the elite, however you define it, this commitment to doing something to safeguard the interests of the poor, but that is the security side - food security, [to] address the vulnerability. But somewhere down the line, people started recognizing that Bangladeshis also have an entrepreneurial potential. And there was a feeling that we should try and help unleash that potential. So, as I said, it's difficult to pinpoint a particular period where there has been a consensus but in a subtle way, there has been this consensus that to achieve food security, to help take advantage of the latent entrepreneurship of Bangladeshis, we should be focusing a lot on growth and more generally on development. And that has survived the transitions in administrations, from one government to another, that common element has been there.
Tobi;
It's not exactly a push back, and I should note that there is a lot more; there's vastly a lot more to Bangladesh than Dercon’s book. So, and I don't want to be caught in debating his book. But, why I find that particular line of thought relevant is that, from what you have described, it's amazing to me, so maybe you can help me understand the difference. Now, how a country can set out to do some of these things; invest in agriculture, agricultural R&D, and all these other support programs with big macro effects. Whereas a Nigeria can set out to do those same things and then you find divergent outcomes in their implementation, particularly the inability to execute. You know? There's always a plan. We want to improve the lot of the poor. We want to invest in agriculture. We want to improve productivity. We want to build infrastructure, you know, this, that, they are always so nice and interesting. But the difference is always at the end of the day, countries often don't do these things, right, they never stay true to these things. And of course, we can talk about various reasons why it fell astray - corruption, state capacity, and all that. But what I… which you mentioned in your last sentence [is] how policies survive, even though there are political transitions, election cycles come and go, the particular direction that policy goes, survives this transition, I think that's really what I'm trying to get at.
Akhtar;
Okay, so I don't know that much about Nigeria. Now, people say that the fact that you have natural resources may have been in some ways a curse, I don't know if it's true or not, but certainly, that sometimes gives governments a sense of complacency and therefore, even if they start on a certain course, they may not have the discipline to stay that course. Now Bangladesh, we never had the advantage of having natural resources. Nowadays, certain things have improved, you know, foreign exchange reserves have been at comfortable levels for several years. So, that may induce a certain degree of complacency, but for a long time, the government knew that we were operating with very narrow degrees of freedom. So that was the context in which Bangladesh had to operate. Which also meant that we were somewhat dependent on donors and that certainly imposed an additional set of disciplines on Bangladesh. But later on, I may come and comment on exactly the kind of relationships I think existed between donors and Bangladesh. But maybe the best way to answer your question would be to say a little bit about the way in which policies have evolved in Bangladesh. And in a sense, it's a bit of a “muddling through” process. And I wrote a blog for the Brookings Institute a year ago, where I said that Bangladesh did it, alluding to that famous song of Frank Sinatra - “I did it my way.” So what was that “my way?”
We all know that the Bangladeshi Government has never been tremendously competent, there's always been corruption problems as well. So the way it has happened is the following. Things happened in the economy, let's say agricultural productivity is improving. But then it hits certain constraints, and the economic actors, or people acting on behalf of the actors; like academics, donors, journalists, will bring up those issues. And they will probably say that, “here are ten things which need to be done.” Now what the governments in Bangladesh have done, successive governments, [is] they have responded to that, not by doing all the ten things. No. They may have picked up two or three things. And they may have done a little bit. Why a little bit? Because they were risk averse. They wanted to test out what would happen in the market, how the market players respond. [As the government], if I do just three or four things and not everything, and then see the response…and here comes the entrepreneurial side - the response was usually quite good, and when the response was good, the government felt encouraged. And then the government said “okay, let's do a few more of the things that were demanded.” The other thing which happened was, as the response came, newer constraints were revealed, or constraints which were not binding before became binding.
For example, initially when the agricultural growth was not that great, when production wasn't that huge, the fact that we did not have a good rural road network connecting the rural areas to broader markets wasn't that big a constraint, because you're not producing enough to go out in a big market. When you started producing a lot of marketable surplus, you needed a broader market. And that's when you started feeling the constraint. And people started talking about the need to build up the rural road network. And to the credit of the government, they responded. So, this is what I call the sort of back and forth, policy dynamics - things happen in the economy, government notices it or it is brought to their notice, they react not in a grand way, just doing a little bit here and there;nd then the market responds, may be much more than in many other countries, because of the entrepreneurial spirit, and then the government responds. And that process has gone on uninterrupted throughout the last fifty years. And so, once you accumulate, even if these are modest steps, once you accumulate all of that, you'll see a tremendous result. And that's what we're seeing here. So, what it means is countries – the governments don't have to be very competent, they just have to pick the signals. So, you know, you have this phrase called “picking the winners” and a lot of people say, no, governments should not be in the business of picking winners. I say, in Bangladesh, that what the government just does is pick signals. They’ve picked signals from the private sector, from the farmers, and they have acted accordingly. And I think the accumulation of all these, the synergies created by all these is, I think, what has made the difference.
Tobi;
That's interesting. So, generally, the usual story with development is structural transformation. That is, for you to grow rich, the economy has to transform from a largely agrarian, low productivity economy to preferably an industrial high productivity economy. And, I mean, to an extent, we've seen the same process also in Bangladesh. Manufacturing, particularly the garment industry, is eighty or so percent of exports and employment is largely created also in that industry. Now, what I want to ask you is, the role of foreign direct investments in that cannot be understated. You talked about South Korea earlier, and how it played a role in that. For South Korea, so many other scholars would cite the role of Japan in kickstarting the South Korean garment industry; garment and textile industry itself. So, my question then is, is there a link here? I mean, also in your columns, I've read about the role of Samsung, and the electronics industry in Vietnam. Right. So the role of FDI in development, and especially getting industrialization started, what are the favourable conditions? To what degree is it external and internal? I guess that would be my question.
Akhtar;
Okay. Well, you use the term kickstarting, because in Bangladesh, in the garment industry, a foreign investor helped kickstart that industry, but didn't do much beyond that. So, Bangladesh’s Government has been largely domestic…[it is] a case of domestic entrepreneurship leading the sector to the heights that it has achieved now. Yes, we have some Export Processing Zones where we have a number of foreign invested garment factories, but the bulk of it is domestic entrepreneurship. But you're right. The initial thrust came from this partnership with Daewoothe IU. It was a five year partnership. Daewoo trained Bangladeshis, (they) took them to their plants in Korea, trained them. They obviously had the market connections and market knowledge, all that was very useful. But what many people don't know is that the Bangladeshi partner actually quit that agreement just one year into that five year period. So after one year, he thought that he had learned everything that needed to be learned. Now, if he hadn't done that, I believe Daewoo had other plans of coming into other sectors, which we may have lost. But then we did end up with this vibrant mostly domestic-owned garment industry. But foreign investment had a role in jumpstarting that. If you go a little beyond industry, think about sectors which facilitate industry. The entire mobile phone development in Bangladesh, which is also remarkable, was foreign investment led. So, foreign investment played a major role there.
So, I agree that foreign investment can play an important role in kickstarting industries, and that is something very important now that we want to diversify our exports, make them more sophisticated, we can come to that subject later. Now, you asked me about what are the conditions which are conducive for foreign investment. And this is where I would say that in Bangladesh, the conditions are still not that conducive. In the case of garments in the late 70s, it was the exhaustion of the South Korean quota of garments, which was the major inducement for them to come in. But also, as I said, the new government, which came into power in ‘75 was talking a lot about export promotion. So, that was there. But the most important constraint that Bangladesh faces, and it's true of many other countries, is policy and regulatory uncertainty. So, Bangladesh often says that we have got a policy regime which is very friendly to foreign investors. And that may well be true. But the execution has problems. And there are a lot of case by case decisions which are taken, which affect the foreign investors adversely. And that creates uncertainty. And those stories are told to other prospective investors. And when they hear those stories, they get discouraged. And the World Bank where I used to work, in fact, the last unit that I worked on, they did a survey of CEOs of multinational corporations just a few years ago, asking them about what are the factors which are very important for you when you decide to invest or not invest in a country, and policy and regulatory uncertainty was top of the list. So that is where Bangladesh still has got a lot of work to do. It is attractive in many other ways - very large domestic market, relatively cheap labour, the labour is quite fast at learning, a lot of good things there. But I think the policy environment, particularly the implementation, the certainty, that has to be ensured.
Tobi;
I have a further question, particularly on that point, and referencing another one of your columns, I think I'll just stick to your columns today for all my questions. For example, in Nigeria, I'll give you an example. In Nigeria, recently, foreign airlines are threatening to quit. Over the past three, four years, foreign investment (FDI) has plummeted. It's barely a billion dollars, currently, one of the lowest even in Africa. And of course, a lot of these things you mentioned are the problems that investors and business people talk about - policy uncertainty, especially around the control of the exchange rates and inability of companies to repatriate their capital, and to fund their operating expenses, and so forth.
So, I mean, that's one constraint. But one distinction you made is like the types of FDI. There are different categories of FDI; market-seeking FDI, natural resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking [FDI]. And the reason I'm asking this is that there seems to be one problem, which, to my mind, Bangladesh has solved, it's not perfect, that Nigeria is struggling with, which is this inertia to get things started, you know, once you start on a journey, you can muddle through, but the inertia to get that process going is still something that Nigeria struggles with, in my opinion. So, now talking about FDI, if I were a policymaker today talking to you; advise me, what kind of FDI should I prioritise in trying to lure investors into my country, for them to create jobs and [create] a nest of high productivity manufacturing industry? So is it market seeking? Is it natural resources seeking? Is it efficiency seeking? Which one is the best in terms of the necessary incentives for sustainability?
Akhtar;
Okay, so one of the articles, not as part of the regular column, I think, but I wrote for the same newspaper a few years ago, was titled “investment for what?” So that's a question the governments have to ask. Because everyone talks about attracting FDI. It's a mantra all over the developing world. But governments need to ask why exactly do we want FDI? How is it aligned with our development aspirations and development programs? I wanted to just emphasise that because often governments just go blindly trying to attract foreign investors. And whoever comes in, we welcome that. That's not necessarily a good strategy always. For example, in Bangladesh, if we now have a lot of foreign investors coming in, to make jeans and T-shirts, using the same technology as before, we don't really need that, we can't afford to give our scarce land and utility and other things to do things which our domestic entrepreneurs have become reasonably good at doing. So it has to be something new that comes in. Now, at the same time, we also have to recognize that the foreign investors also have their own interest and their own calculations. So we have to come to a balance between the two as well. Now, it's difficult to say a priori that we prefer market-seeking or efficiency-seeking. On a natural resource, it's a slightly different issue if you have natural resources, and if you don't have the capacity to develop them yourself, you may need foreign investors. And obviously, we all know why foreign investors are often very attracted to that. But let me confine my answer to the choice between market-seeking and efficiency-seeking.
Now, let's take the case of Bangladesh. We are now talking about diversifying our exports. And we are talking about going into more sophisticated products like electronics. If that is our objective, we may want to target some people who come and make electronics. Now they may come for two reasons. Bangladesh has a huge market, our per capita income may not be that high, but our total economy size is actually pretty large. We are amongst the top 40 economies in the world. And if you look at the size in the purchasing power parity terms, we're actually in the top 30. That's a very large economy. So, naturally foreign investors would come in looking at the market as well. But if our objective in this sector is to make a breakthrough in the global value chains, and not just serve the domestic market, then we'd like to have foreign investors come in with an efficiency-seeking objective that, in Bangladesh, we can make these things more efficiently, at lower cost, than in other places. So that Bangladesh then can ride on the backs of the foreign investors, who know the markets, who have the brand recognition and show the world that things can be made efficiently in Bangladesh. And, then once we have shown that with the help of foreign investors, maybe Bangladeshi entrepreneurs can also start doing it. So here you see I give you an example, where you have a strategic objective, and you attract foreign investors of a particular type.
Now, there are also many needs in the domestic market. Bangladesh needs to develop a very good logistics system. And we may need foreign investors to come in and invest there, but will be more market-seeking. I mentioned the case of mobile telephones, that was not an export-oriented industry, although it may have facilitated exports, that was domestic market-oriented. And we encouraged foreign investors to come in, who were obviously coming in as market-seeking investors. So the answer would vary depending on the sector or the activity. But that brings me back to my first point, the government should have a clearer idea of what is the role of foreign investment in implementing the various dimensions of your development strategy. And accordingly, you're going to target efficiency-seeking investors in some cases, and market-oriented investors in other cases.
Tobi;
So, now, from a policy perspective, because really, that's what's sort of dominating this conversation. One thing that keeps coming up is the role of government, the strategy it pursues, you know, this, that. But inevitably, that leads to the question of what… in terms of economic development, what role does the government play by itself? Now, China, and, of course, other East Asian economies are very, very popular in the development discourse and these are largely autocratic governance. Right. And, to an extent the gospel of state-led development has travelled far and wide, sometimes in contrast to what is generally called the neoliberal or the Washington Consensus-type policies. But at the same time, at the nexus of all this is the role of markets, how the economy is regulated, liberalisation. How does a government approach regulation and policymaking generally, with the right incentives for the government to take the lead in areas where, maybe because of access to market or not seeing the prospect of returns, private actors are reluctant? And also at the other end, this sort of control, excessive control, that you see in so many developing countries, like Nigeria, and so many others in Africa, where government sees itself as the primary player in the economy, right? What is the balance? What is the heuristic generally, in trying to, [or] should I say, make policy and regulations to encourage economic development, and, of course, your Bangladeshi experience of that?
Akhtar;
Okay. So, when you say state-led, there are many ways you can define that. One is the direct participation of the state in productive activities. And in China, that is still pronounced, there are different models of state-owned enterprises, including public private partnerships, but the state plays a dominant, or at least an important direct role in the production of activities. That's one thing. The other is playing a direct role, not in production, but in things that facilitate production. So I had mentioned the case of research and development in the agricultural sector of Bangladesh, which was there right from the beginning. It was largely a private sector activity, but that was meant to facilitate productive activities by the private sector, in this case, thousands and thousands of farmers. So, the whole spectrum of things that the government does and, of course, there is the whole regulatory function of the government. And I think in choosing the balance, and the balance itself may shift over time as the economy develops. And I give an example of that, again, from the agricultural sector of Bangladesh, how the government moved away from the direct import and distribution of agricultural inputs, giving more and more space to the private sector over time. So initially, in the 70s, maybe that was the right thing to do. And then later on, the right thing to do was to withdraw and create space for the private sector. So the balance, (a) has to be thought of carefully, in terms of the capacity of the government, that's very important. And, again, if I [could] mention Stefan Dercon, he talks about the self awareness of [the] government. Are governments aware of what they can do and what they cannot do? And that answer would vary by country. Often governments make the mistake of thinking that they can do a lot of things, and therefore they; (a) go into productive activities themselves directly, and (b) also controlling too much the activities of the private sector. Controlling is not that easy. It requires a lot of skills, and many governments actually don't have the skills of doing that.
The thing that may have happened in Bangladesh is the government has been more or less self aware, not always, but more or less self aware of what they can do and what they cannot do. And that has led to a certain division of labour between the government and the private sector, and the NGOs. With that division of labour also changing over time. That's very important. So the government needs to be aware of where its capacities are, and they need to also have some faith that the private sector, if given the opportunity, can come and do certain things. Because governments often say, okay, but if we don't intervene, the private sector is not going to come in. Or we have a big factory, if we close it down, then a lot of people will lose their jobs, and the private sector will not be forthcoming to create jobs for them. If you want, I can give you a good example of that kind of thinking. In Bangladesh, we had the world's largest jute mill called the Adamjee Jute Mill, and it was bleeding like hell, and every year the government had to subsidise. So there was lots of debate on whether the factory should be (a) privatised, and there was no taker, then the question is whether it should be closed down. Then, about 20 years ago, exactly 20 years ago, a very bold decision was taken to actually close down the factory. It was a controversial decision. About 26,000 workers lost their jobs. Some of them were ghost workers, maybe 20,000. Now the story of what happened after that is very interesting. That land was converted into an export processing zone. And now the latest figures are that about 65 to 70,000 jobs have been created there. So you had lost about 20 [thousand jobs] and you have created so many. These are all private sector firms, they're all export oriented firms, the government doesn't need to subsidise them. So you can see once given the opportunity what the private sector can come and do. So you don't have to hold on to a loss making enterprise just because you're worried about job losses.
Tobi;
Let me sort of ask you a big picture question on this particular point, which is the role of democracy in development, generally. Democracies have been taking a beating recently, so maybe you can speak up for it, somewhat. Do you think democracy has some kind of unique weakness in terms of trying to engineer economic development, particularly because of elections? I mean, to cite the example of the jute mill you mentioned, some regime that is sensitive, maybe in an election year, or maybe that wants to appeal to a particular constituency, or, maybe workers Union or something might actually kick the can down the road. An example is (fuel) petrol subsidy in Nigeria, which the bill keeps increasing, but I mean, each government promises to remove it or reduce it, and then kicks it to the next government because nobody wants to annoy the workers union, nobody wants to lose votes, the party wants to remain in power, you know, and these incentives that are common in democracies. So, do you think this makes democracies weak in a way, in trying to develop the national economy? Because a lot of people will say that's why China has developed much faster than India, for example. What's your take?
Akhtar;
Okay, let me start by giving you an anecdote. So this is from about I think it was 2008 or so, 2007 maybe. Bangladesh then had a quasi military government, it was called a caretaker government, whose major responsibility was to conduct free and fair elections. So they were in power for about two years. And I was actually working in Bangladesh at that time. And we had, I think we had a natural disaster, or maybe we had floods. So conditions were pretty bad. And one of the… well, they were called advisors, but they were de facto ministers, who was having to deal with this problem of getting food to poor people, dealing with rising prices [and] all that; he said to me, “I can feel a certain handicap being part of this kind of government.” What is the handicap? Right now what I need a lot is information from the grassroots, I need to know what is happening in different parts of the country, and I need that information very fast. I need it right now, about what's happening earlier today, or what has happened yesterday. Fortunately, I have some connections in the NGO world, this gentleman was an academic. I'm getting some information. But if this was a political campaign, I would rely on my political network, my workers, my small town leaders, and within a few hours, I'll be getting information from all over the country on what the conditions are. Now, why do I mention this anecdote? Because in a democratic system, your feedback mechanisms may work very well. Yes, there can also be a lot of noise. But otherwise, the feedback which is very, very important for government, they need to know what's going on throughout the country with different groups of people, with different localities etc. That is something that autocratic governments lack. Yes, information flows, flows from lower level bureaucrats, but I'm sure they are modified on their way. Because, the boss often doesn't want to hear certain things. It may happen in political democratic setups, but generally, the flow of information is much better for politicians. Now, how they act upon that information is another issue, but that's very important. Secondly, politicians operating within a democratic setup, (a) they develop a lot of empathy, because of their interactions with people, [b] they also get a good idea of what the trade-offs can be. And these are very, very important in decision making. So those are the good sides of democracy. Now, yes, in democracy, you also need to cater to your political constituencies, and that may lead to certain decisions, which technocrats may feel are sub optimal. But that is the price you pay for democracy. Compared to the gains for having a democratic system, that is sometimes a small price to pay, although sometimes that can get out of hand. But if it gets out of hand, it’s usually where you may in name have a democracy system, but in practice, you don't. So the kinds of disciplines that democracy imposes on the government are lacking there. So that is my answer. Now, as you can see, implicit in my answer was some definition of democracy. It's not just about electoral politics. It's not just about having regular elections and free and fair elections. It is the monitoring mechanism. Are governments picking the signals, are they getting the information? How wide is the information that they're getting? That's a very important characteristic of development.
Tobi;
So another one of my sort of big picture questions to you, and in this case, using the Bangladeshi experience and example, is, in the last couple of years, there has been this big debate in development over, oh, do you prioritise the big things or the small things you can measure? You were with the World Bank, I'm sure you have some familiarity with the so-called empirical revolution and how it has sort of taken over the field of development economics where, yeah, there is a lot more preference in terms of international aid funding for interventions, things that you can measure. So, the RCTs, or, whether it is conditional cash transfers, and all these things – and the atmosphere with which this debate happens sometimes, personally, I find it frustrating because it makes it seem like a zero-sum kind of thing. Like, you can either have one or the other. You either pursue growth, or you forego that and choose to do all these small scale, local and domestic interventions. But Bangladesh, like you mentioned, the issue of BRAC and also people like Naomi and co. have written about – Naomi Hussein [that] Bangladesh managed both. There was a sort of productive combination of both frameworks, that is, the role of non governmental organisations who were able to provide some support for the rural communities. And of course, there was the big macro policies that were explicitly designed to pursue economic growth, get businesses going, create jobs, you know, and all the other things that happen in the private sector.
So, my question would be, how did that sort of synergy happen in Bangladesh? How was that cooperation, so to speak… I mean, you talked about the role of BRAC in R&D and agriculture, you know, how did that happen? How did, perhaps, it wasn't intended, but in practice, how does it work?
Akhtar;
Okay. Let me start by recounting something I heard Abhijit Banerjee, the Nobel laureate, who got a Nobel prize for his work on RCTs, said something about the rationale for going into RCTs. And he's saying that the kinds of interventions that we talk about in the context of RCTs, they're not the only interventions that bring about development. In fact, the most profound development impact may come from other kinds of interventions and policies, and other factors. But his point was that, let's say, as a development practitioner, we are not able to influence these big things. So I'm going to focus on the things that we can influence. So I'm doing a project here, a project there, and we can change the parameters of the project in certain ways that we achieve the most significant impact. And how do we change the parameters or what parameters we choose or how do we design the project? That's where randomised control trials can give us very useful insights. And we can get more bang for the buck from the development expenditures in those kinds of projects. Now, he never said that that's all about development. There are many other things that need to be done. And governments, in their collective wisdom, may have a better idea of what those things can be. And that's different from a particular project team trying to do a project. They won't have all that knowledge, which can lead them to think about much bigger things, but governments can; not perfectly, but governments can. Or large organisations like BRAC can within certain spheres of operation. So, yes, I agree with you that this is a false dichotomy, that you either completely forget about RCTs or you get completely immersed into RCTs. So, one has to find the right places where the randomised control trials, which are after all an instrument, one of the tools in your toolbox… which is the best time and place to deploy it.
I would say in Bangladesh, yes, the scope for applying them is more than the actual application so far, which means that we have a scope to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending by using these techniques judiciously in certain areas. Now, coming back to, I think you mentioned the question of BRAC in the context of R&D, but also BRAC has played an important role in market development through their social enterprise world. So, as I said before that the part of BRAC’s work which is not discussed much is the work on the economic sphere. So what happened there? I’ll just give one or two examples. I think giving concrete examples is the best way to illustrate this. So, they got into, let's say, they got into dairy [farming]. Actually, the way BRAC started most of these activities was from a livelihood concern. They wanted to create livelihood opportunities for the poor people in the rural areas of Bangladesh. So they said, okay, we have dairy farmers whose incomes are limited, we want to do something to help enhance their inputs [output]. So they came up with certain small interventions, which helped improve the productivity of their dairy farming, and they ended up with more production, then they had a problem. Now, milk is not something that you can preserve for a long time, you need to have some cold storage facilities, some refrigeration facilities, and that was lacking. So a lot of these increased output was actually being wasted. That led BRAC to start thinking about what else it needs to do. So then it went into refrigeration plants. So, they set up refrigeration plants, where the dairy farmers would come from adjoining villages and store their milk. And that led to other things also down the road. So there are many examples of BRAC where they went into a certain activity, they went into poultry, for example, and then discovered that there isn't a good supply of day old chicks, which is an important ingredient in poultry. So they went into that. And the interesting thing is, in many cases, BRAC was the first one to go into that, later the private sector came in and came in in a big way. And when they did, BRAC withdrew. Because BRAC thought, okay, we have played the role of a pioneer, we have catalysed the entry of private enterprises, we can now withdraw and attend to certain other things.
So what's going on here? What's going on here is, you have value chains, which are underdeveloped - there are gaps in the value chain. And one aspect of development is to make the value chains more complete. And here you have an actor, BRAC, which has entered the market… [enters] one part of the market, trying to do something, discovering that there is not much it can do unless it intervenes in other parts of the value chain. Well, it can do something but the impact will not be that great, so then it intervenes. But at one point, it realises that other players who are better at scaling this up have entered the field so let me withdraw. So judicious entry, and judicious withdrawal. And that is also true of the government. It's also true of BRAC. I think that's the kind of dynamics of development which is very important. And somewhere there, yes, you may have some trials, which may be randomised control trials, it may be just informally observing from your own experience of what is working, what is not working, but this idea of learning by doing, learning by doing, the government has done it in Bangladesh, BRAC and other BRAC-type institutions have done it. The private sector is also doing it.
Tobi;
The last of my big-picture questions to you is– Another dichotomy that I have observed is the business cycle concerns of an economy and policy and these sorts of other long-run development growth policies. For example, in Nigeria, it's a common refrain that we had growth in some years, but we never really had development. Income didn't grow as fast as GDP, and growth has been cyclical, it's not sustained. And some of the issues that really plague governments and policymakers is that even in trying to make policies that are tolerant and favourable to long-run growth, there are short term issues that you have to deal with [like] foreign exchange policy, inflation, and sometimes I've heard people say that, Oh, as a developing country, you have a lot more tolerance for inflation than developed economies. I think you’ll have to tell me whether that's true or not. Because inflation does not happen in a vacuum, it affects the purchasing power of people, poor people even more so. Right. So how do policymakers in growing countries manage these tensions in terms of – and, I'm working my way through your book with Gustav Ranis on this – how policymakers mine through these everyday concerns of the economy, versus the long-term prospects and the projects you are trying to put forth as a government?
Akhtar;
Okay. Well, since you alluded to that book, I will first briefly mention the main theme of the book, and then come to this specific [question]. The main theme of the book, which we illustrated through a comparative study of East Asian countries and Latin American countries, [was that] we talked about the East Asian pattern of government behaviour and the Latin American pattern of government behaviour. And the period covered was from the mid 60s to the mid 80s so things may have changed after that. And in any case, it's difficult to talk about (a) East Asian pattern, and (b) Latin American pattern. But what we were talking about is that during the course of a business cycle, or terms of trade cycle, as your terms of trade improve, your foreign exchange reserves go on increasing, obviously, growth accelerates. The question is what does a government do when things are good? Do they let growth accelerate according to some normal – “normal trajectory”, or they get excited, and they try to push growth beyond the “normal trajectory”-- making it higher than what the good times normally would make it? So, in the “Latin American” scenario, when things were good, growth was happening, government wanted to have more of it. So they went for expansionary fiscal policies, expansionary monetary policies to push growth beyond what the natural trajectory is. And then inevitably, because we are talking of cycles, inevitably a time came, where things started going down. And conditions were not as conducive as before. At that time, what the East Asian countries did– but first– they never tried to artificially push growth above the natural level. When the downturn came, they allowed the growth to fall. So they went for contractionary policies, they allowed the growth to fall. But in the Latin American scenario, having pushed growth beyond the natural path, it's almost like being intoxicated, you could not get rid of that habit. So, you try to artificially maintain growth even though the signs were all pointing downwards. And then the time came when things just crashed. And you fell into a deep crisis. Whereas the East Asians, they had their ups and downs, but they didn't have a serious crisis at that time. They had later, but not at that time. So that was the main thing about how you conduct your policies during the upturn, and then also during the downturn.
Now, coming back to the specific situation like the one we observe now, when there are many economic challenges facing countries, and what can governments do to ensure that the course on which they had been before the crisis started, or the challenges started, and hopefully it was a course of development, how can they stay on that course as best as they can? First is, governments should look for existing inefficiencies. For example, in your public expenditures, there may be a lot of inefficiencies, and if you can identify those and get rid of those [inefficiencies], then you can bring things under control in the context of the challenges without sacrificing growth. Most developing countries, including Bangladesh, do have inefficiencies in their public expenditures. So the question is, do you target those inefficiencies and curtail them? Or, do you target those parts of expenditures which are actually very useful? So that's number one. And that's why we often have this phrase, “don't let a crisis go to waste.” Because a crisis can often focus attention better than good times can. And a crisis can also create the political and social consensus to take some tough decisions. So that's one thing. Second is the importance of social protection. And we must remember that for people at the margin, and in our kind of countries, Nigeria, Bangladesh, a lot of people are still at the margin. Even a small shock which takes them below the threshold is not a temporary damage that after some time they can come back [from], often it's a permanent damage. They have to sell off their productive assets, which means even when things start improving, their conditions won’t improve. So that's why it's very, very important to have good social protection systems in place.
Third, coming back to a point I made earlier, it's very important to have good monitoring systems. ‘Cause we really want to know what's going on, how the lives of different people across the country is being affected by the tough conditions in which you are, without that your policies will be suboptimal. So that monitoring is very, very important. And it's very important to engage different stakeholders in society. And for two reasons. One is part of the monitoring, because economists, business people, journalists, and others, would know a lot beyond what the government knows and it's important to tap into that knowledge, but also to build consensus about some of the tough decisions that need to be taken. So, at the end of the day, it is a lot about governance. It's a governance challenge that countries face when they're facing an economic challenge.
Tobi;
My final question to you, I have a couple of other questions, but… from a policy-making perspective, how do you then make knowledge count? Because from everything you have talked about, the role of knowledge… which takes me back to where we started, you know, talking about agriculture. The role of knowledge is actually very important. But you have situations where you can have knowledgeable people in government, world class economists, and the government itself might be making policies that are clearly wrong, which means there's a disconnect somewhere. And I mean, in Bangladesh, it's often talked about how there is a policy knowledge ecosystem that informs the public and shapes their accountability and expectations, and also informs policymakers at the other end of that spectrum. How does a country build and nurture that? Especially, how does knowledge of, whether it is knowledge of economics, whether it is knowledge of society and other programs, how it transmits to the key decision makers, and influence some of the actions or policies, or regulations, that are taken? How does that happen?
Akhtar;
Okay, so you mentioned the sort of the ecosystem linking policy and knowledge in Bangladesh. We have an ecosystem, I wouldn't say it always functions very well. And we do have many instances where people in government feel that they know the answers to all the problems. They know the problems, the issues, and they know the answers to the problems. The question is whether they will do something with that or not. That depends on various calculations. So that happens, we have that problem. And some would say that problem may have become a bit serious in recent years, especially because the economy is doing well, and when the economies do well, governments often suffer from a certain degree of complacency. But it is true that we do have a good system. We have some good research institutes [and] think tanks who work on economic issues, and they have a very good tradition of doing surveys where they go and get information from rural areas as well. We have had that tradition for a long, long time. And that has informed the policy debates.
Now, how do those insights enter the arena of policymakers? This is where the role of policy intermediaries is very important. So the researchers themselves may sometimes be able to play that role. Or if they're part of an institute, there may be some people in the Institute, who are particularly good at taking the findings of their researchers, their colleagues, and taking it to the government. So you need to have that kind of capacity. There can also be specialised institutions. In Bangladesh, we have an institution called the Center for Policy Dialogue, which is created with that objective - that they will pick up the research being done by other think tanks, and they will create platforms where policymakers, politicians, journalists, and researchers can come together, donors as well and discuss these issues. And that has been going on for more than 20 years. They get a lot of publicity in the media, so the role of the media is extremely important, and the quality of the reporting in the media - is it data based? Is it logic based? - that's also very, very important. But one important thing for people outside the government to understand is that politicians will seek out advice from experts when they have a strong need to do so. If they don't have a felt need, you can still try and create that need, but that requires a lot of creativity. Otherwise, you can invite them to seminars, they will come out of politeness, they will say the nice things, they will listen to you, but then they will go back and forget that. So the first thing to do is to identify what is keeping the politicians awake at night? What is the need that they feel? They may not have articulated that very well, but once you understand that, then see, what do you have in your knowledge base, which will be useful for the politician? (b) What is the best way to transmit it? So what is the language that you're going to use? Because the language of the politicians is different from your language. And third, you have to understand, in fact, let me mention an anecdote here.
Many years ago, Sheikh Hasina, who is now the prime minister, but was the opposition leader came to Washington and there was a meeting with a group of Bangladesh economists. And there was a World Bank macro economist who started talking about the importance of trade liberalisation - the usual World Bank mantra of trade liberalisation. She stopped him midway and said, look here, there was a time when I was living with my husband, who is a physicist, in a border town, the border of Yugoslavia in Italy. Three days a week, the borders were opened up. And I saw people from this part going to the other part, and the other part coming to this part, exchanging goods. So I saw firsthand the benefits of trade liberalisation. But if today we liberalise trade, some industries may go down under, what will happen to their workers? The workers are going to come to me, they're not going to come to you in the World Bank, but they will come to me, whether I'm in government or opposition, and say, what do you do about us? Right? So the interesting thing is that the politician had reached the same conclusion, like the technocrats, that trade liberalisation is good, but she has come from a different route, and she had different concerns. And technocrats need to understand the concerns that the politicians have. They need to understand the world views of the politicians. They need to understand that there is a method in the madness of politicians, and only then you can communicate well, and only then your knowledge will be taken seriously by politicians.
Tobi;
On that note, and this is a bit of a tradition on the show. What's the one idea that you feel most passionate about, it may be recent, it may be in the past, it may be from your work, or any other field that you would like to see spread everywhere?
Akhtar;
I think the idea of, as I said, the notion of picking signals. If I'm talking about the government, so if I'm in the government, the idea of picking signals from the people, and then acting upon it, and then seeing the reaction of the people and then acting upon it again. So this idea of synergy of interaction between the government and the marketplace, and continuing that over time, is an important idea. I don't know exactly what you meant by an idea, or what kind of idea you're talking about…
Tobi;
It could be anything.
Akhtar;
I don't know if this satisfies it. But for my own study of the history of policymaking in Bangladesh and economic transformation in Bangladesh. This is, I think, [an idea] I have found to be at the core of the success of Bangladesh. Which is this kind of interaction between policymakers and economic actors, and the repeated playing out of this interaction. And that is, I think, one idea that I'd like to leave behind.
Tobi;
That's a fantastic idea. In your experience. I mean, Bangladesh gets talked about a lot. What are the common misconceptions about your country?
Akhtar;
Okay, so I often see notes on Bangladesh. And we saw a lot last year when we had the 50th anniversary of Bangladesh's independence. So people talk about the good things that have happened in the economy. And they will often say, despite the government, and I know The Economist had an article about two or three years ago, “Bangladesh has done well, despite the politicians.” And I think I've made it abundantly clear in the conversation, Tobi, with you today, that the government had a role. And I've given you many examples of what the government did, including the withdrawal. Now, withdrawal also is important because it's not easy to withdraw. We may think it's easy to withdraw. But when you have had a system for many, many years, withdrawing is not that easy. So, the government has done so. And in many, many ways the government has played an important role in Bangladesh's development. So, the development has not happened despite government, that's a big misperception. And that's why we need to know what exactly was the role the government played? And that's why, as I said at the beginning, maybe, that has more relevance than the East Asian experience for many developing countries, because the government in Bangladesh, the initial conditions, were probably similar to that in many developing countries. So if Bangladesh can do it, others can do it. So that's one thing. The other misperception is that it was all about garments and remittances. But as I said, agricultural transformation in Bangladesh has played a very important role. And the third could be a smaller misperception that NGOs like BRAC, their contribution is limited to the social sectors - of course, [a] very, very profound contribution, but limited to the social sectors. As I've said, I've given examples of how they had also operated in the economic sphere, and how that has also had profound implications.
Tobi;
What are you most proud of when you think about Bangladesh’s journey in the last 50 years? What are the things that you're most – I visited Dhaka about 10 years ago, I love the food, but the traffic congestion reminds me far too much of my own city, Lagos.
Akhtar;
I went to Lagos about 20 years ago, and Lagos reminded me of Dhaka. I think the thing to be proud of is the thing I mentioned earlier, the fact that Bangladesh’s in general have become entrepreneurial. And in some ways, there’s an audacity, which I'll say it's a sweet audacity. The audacity that yes, we can do it. We can do this. Whether in Bangladesh or abroad. You know, the writer Amitav Ghosh, he said in an interview that Bangladeshis are probably the most globalised nation in the world, because anywhere in the world you go, maybe with the exception of that in America but that may also change, you will see Bangladeshis there. So there is a certain degree of audacity that yes, we can do it. I think that's what we should be proud of as Bangladeshis - that we have shown that we can do it against tremendous odds. So that confidence, that audacity, which I think is very sweet, is what we can be proud of.
Tobi;
Fantastic. Thank you so much, Akhtar, for this conversation. I enjoyed it so much.
Akhtar;
Thank you so much for inviting me. It was a pleasure talking to you.
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Bangladesh has transformed tremendously in the last twenty-five years. Average incomes have more than quadrupled, and many of its human development indicators have improved alongside. It has also become an export powerhouse with its garment industry, and generally a shining example of development - though things are far from perfect. Five decades ago, w…
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We often speak of economic development as a phenomenon of sovereign national countries, but the process by which that happens is through what happens at individual firms in the economy. The decisions by firms to upgrade their products (services), export, and adopt new technology are the most important determinants of economic development. The incentives and conditions that shape these decisions are the subjects of my conversation with my guest on this episode. Eric Verhoogen is a professor of economics at Columbia University school of international and public affairs. He is one of the leading thinkers and researchers on industrial development.
TRANSCRIPT (edited slightly for context and clarity)
Tobi;
Usually, in the development literature, I know things have changed quite a bit in the last few years. But there is a lot of emphasis on cross-country comparisons and looking at aggregate data, and a lot less focus, at least as represented in the popular media on firms. And we know that, really, the drivers of growth and employment and the source of prosperity usually are the firms. The firms in an economy, firms are the ones creating jobs, they are the ones investing in technology, and doing innovation. So firms are really important.
One of the things you often hear a lot is that one of the reasons poor countries are poor is that the firms are not productive enough. So that's sort of my first question to you, how exactly do we define and also measure productivity, you know, for us to be able to distinguish why firms in the developed countries are more productive than the lower income countries?
Eric;
Yeah, this is a big important question. So I agree, in principle, that firm productivity is very key. So countries that are going to be doing well are countries that are populated by firms that are being very innovative, and their productivity is rising, they're learning how to do new stuff, they're producing new products, etc. And so there's a reason why people are very focused on this conversation about firm productivity. The sort of, I would say, dirty secret of economics is that it's very hard to measure productivity well, right? And so the productivity measures we have, I think, are very noisy, and most likely fairly biased. But basically, the way you estimate productivity is you run a regression of like sales on inputs, okay, so on how much you're spending on labour and how much you're spending on materials, and then the part that's left over, we call that productivity. So it's like unexplained sales, you know, sales that can't be explained by the fact that you're just purchasing inputs and purchasing workers.
But that is actually a very noisy measure of productivity. And so I've been working on a review paper, and a separate research paper kind of pointing out some of the issues with productivity estimation. So in principle, it's exactly what we want to know; in practice, it's very hard to measure. So one argument I was making in that paper is we should go to things that we can actually directly observe. Okay, so sometimes like technology adoption, we can often directly observe whether the firm has adopted this particular new technology, or if they're producing new products, we can directly observe that. Sometimes we can observe the quality of products that can be measured. Now, the standard datasets that we have typically don't have those things. It is possible now, in many countries, to follow manufacturing firms or even other sorts of firms, [to] follow them over time, which is great, at a micro level. But those that have the technology, they don't have quality, they do it now increasingly have like what products they're producing, often they don't have the product people are producing and so it's harder, you have to go out and you have to talk to people, you have to access new sorts of data, there's a lot more work, a lot more shoe leather - we'd say you wear out your shoe is going to talk to people trying to get access to other datasets in order to have these measures that you can observe directly.
But I think there's a big advantage to that. Just in terms of measurement. Like, can we measure these things, and record that technology quality and product innovation together? I'm not sure that's answering your question. But, you know, I mean, I totally agree that what firms are doing, that's crucial, right? So the big macro question is, why are some countries rich and some countries poor and how can we make poor ones richer? That's the big question. I think that's kind of too big to be able to say much about. The much more concrete thing, which we need to be focusing on is how can you make firms in countries more innovative and productive. That's the absolutely right question. But that's just hard. There are challenges and research about, you know, how you actually analyze that, and it has to do with these issues of measurement.
Tobi;
I understand the measurement problem, and of course, TFP, the residual, and so many things like that. But practically, I want to ask you, what can you say, maybe if you have a handy checklist or something? what distinguishes firms in rich countries from firms in poorer nations?
Eric;
Yeah. So let me say what I don't think first, and then I'll say what I think. So it's become increasingly common to say that firms in poor countries are just poorly managed. The firms in rich countries have better management, and the firms in poor countries have poor management, right? And partly that's coming from the influential paper by Nicholas - Nick Bloom - and others, and David McKenzie and John Roberts. You know, they had consultants go to some factories in India. In some they camped out for four months, some they were there for only one month, and the ones where they camped out for four months ended up doing better, right? And they say that that's because these consultants improve the management of the firms and management matters. And I do agree that sometimes these management practices matter, but I don't think... sort of, one kind of implication of that line of work is somehow, like, the firms in a developing country are just making mistakes. They haven't gone to business school in the United States, and so, therefore, they don't know what they're doing. And I think that's incorrect. I think that's incorrect. I think the problem is, firms in developing countries face many, many constraints that firms in rich countries don't face. Right. So often, for instance, gaining access to high-quality inputs can be very difficult, right? That you just don't have the supply chains domestically producing high-quality inputs. Often skilled workers are very expensive relative to unskilled workers, and even relative to the price that you might pay in rich countries. Having skilled workers, including skilled managers, is very expensive. In addition, you have all these frictions on trying to get your goods to market or trying to, you know, trying to access export markets, often there are, you know, their costs involved in that.
In addition, being productive requires know-how and often firms lack that know-how, right and so the question is, how do you get that know-how, you know, like, the distinction I'm trying to make is, it's not that they're making mistakes, it's just that they're doing the best they can given know-how they have, and given the constraints that they face. And so in that sense, I would sort of point to those constraints, right, those constraints both in know-how and both in the input and output markets, rather than just failure of management. So now, one of the constraints I should say, actually, so is often, you know, legal and regulatory institutions are much weaker in many countries. It is true in Nigeria, and it's true in many places, right? And so then that does create a complicating factor also when you're trying to do business with somebody, but you don't have the legal recourse of going to court to enforce whatever contract you write down. And so that creates friction. So then you have to do things differently in part because of that. And so you're likely to be much more based on, like, networks of various types. It might be ethnic networks, or it might be people that you know or that you have long-term relationships with. But then that means you can't necessarily just find the best supplier of something, you actually have to find someone that you trust, and that can complicate your life, basically, if you're trying to do business and develop.
Tobi;
So one thing I want us to discuss is the issue of firm upgrading. I mean, one of the things that have helped me in reading your work and taking this firm-level view of development is that, okay, on the one hand, if you look at a country like Korea, we can say the average income, the income per capita for Korea 40 years ago versus now and compare with say Nigeria, but also we can look at Korean firms 40 years ago versus where they are today. Today, Korea have global firms that are at the very frontier of technology. Companies like Samsung are innovating and making chips and making electronics and making smartphones and you compare with firms in Nigeria who have not been able to upgrade their products over that same period. And now what I want to ask you is how important is a firm's ability to upgrade productivity. I take your point on the measurement but controlling for that, how important is a firm's ability to upgrade its output? Its products on its productivity?
Eric;
No, no, I think upgrading is crucial. And upgrading in various ways, you know, more specifically technology, producing higher quality products, producing new products, new innovative products, you know, you might be reducing costs, right, all those things. I do think that's crucial. I think that's crucial to the development process. I mean, much of the conversation in development economics has often been not about firms. It's about, you know, social policy, or it's about education. It's about human capital accumulation. But I'm with you on that, the firm-level upgrading is totally crucial. You know, the question of like, why isn't it happening? Or how could you promote upgrading? That's a very difficult question. There are lots of papers that are sort of speaking to that subject. And this review article I was trying to write was basically all about that. So Alexander Gerschenkron way back in 1962, is a historian writing about late industrialization had this phrase, not very politically correct phrase, but basically, advantages of backwardness. So in principle, if you're a developing country, you should benefit from the fact that technologies have been developed in rich countries, and you should be able to go and adopt them off the shelf. But for some reason, that's difficult, right? It's hard to do. Partly, it's difficult because of, you know, know-how reasons. So I'd say that often, much of the knowledge that you need in order to implement these technologies is not written down anywhere, it's not really in the manual, right? You have to kind of talk to people who know it, rather than just downloading the instruction sheet. That's one reason.
It's also true that many times, machines or processes, actually, may be context specific. So like the picker machine, in a very humid environment, they operate differently than in a non-humid environment. And so, you know, there are things that you need to learn. So I'd say that kind of like gaining the know-how is an important kind of constraint on upgrading. And partly that happens through networks or through... there's a ... Juan Carlos Hallak, who's in Buenos Aires (who would be a good person for you to have on your show, actually, I think that he'd be an interesting person to interview) as a very interesting paper. It's basically on like Argentina, looking at industries that have done well, they've been able to upgrade essentially and looking at what was it about them that made it possible, and especially the leading firms, what were the leading firms doing? And what we're basically finding is that often the key person in the firm, like, had been embedded in markets in rich countries, maybe in the US or in Europe or someplace. So they understood very much how those markets work and what consumers want. So one was like making boats, sailboats, or motorboats right, that was one of the interesting things he focused on. But knowing sort of what the people who are buying those boats really want to see in their boats ended up being important for what they're doing. And so that's an important part of the know-how. It's like, yeah, understanding the customer understanding also how if there are firms that are producing there, understand what the competition is. And so that's know-how that often has to be sort of gained in person rather than, you know, just reading a book or talking to somebody on the phone. And so when I think about... I don't know Nigeria very well, but when I imagine, you know, Nigerian producers, I think, partly what might be holding back is, sort of, maybe not having the understanding of what are the requirements, what are the expectations of consumers in the export markets, right, in the rich countries that they may be selling to?
We've talked about the barrier, we can talk about the driver of upgrading. So then, like, gaining know-how would be a driver. So that's one. I think, and part of a lot of my work has been about quality upgrading, you know, producing higher quality. And I think that's in part driven by who you're selling to, right? So Mexican firms, you know, if they're selling to Mexican consumers, they produce different products than if they're selling to us consumers, which is their main export market, right? And so, you know, and if you're selling to Mexican consumers who have a certain willingness to pay for quality, we would say, right, they have a certain level of, you know, demand for certain characteristics, the optimal thing to do is keep producing that kind of lower quality stuff, right, rather than producing the higher quality. So I had this famous example of a big Volkswagen factory in Puebla, Mexico, which for a long time, it stopped in 2003, but for a long time been producing the old beetle. The old beetle that had first been produced in 1940, or certainly the 1950s. But for a long time, in the Mexican market, that was the main car that people were buying, and they were happy with that because it was cheaper. It was like, you know, it's very reliable. But that same factory started producing the New Beetle, basically, for the US market, right, for the US and European market, which is much more sophisticated, but also much more expensive. So it depends a little bit on which market you're selling into and whether you're going to upgrade or not. And so accessing export market can, in some sense, like pull the upgrading process, you know, once they access these export markets, they'll start producing higher quality stuff for these consumers. And that I think, actually, generates some learning, and I can talk about one paper that shows that a bit. But it seems to be that by gaining access to markets and producing high quality, then firms learn how to do stuff better. And so that can be an important driver of upgrading.
And conversely, not having access to export markets or having a hard time breaking into export [markets] can be a reason why firms failed to upgrade. Let me tell you about one paper that, you know, demand effects can drive learning.
Tobi;
Yeah. Go ahead.
Eric;
Okay. It's a paper by David Atkin, Amit Khandelwal and Adam Osman. It's in Egypt. Okay, it's an RCT experiment, a randomized controlled trial. And it's among rug producers, producing rugs. What they did is they randomly allocated initial export contracts, right? So if they work with an intermediary, like a buyer of rugs, you know, among several hundred rug producers, they say, Okay, some guys are gonna get an initial contract, and some guys not. And so that was a way, this is a way of investigating basically what's the effect of exporting on the decisions and in a very clean way, and they found a couple of things. So one is those guys who had the export contracts and started producing higher quality stuff. So that's sort of consistent with my Volkswagen story, too, right? So increasingly, export markets produce higher quality and they did lots of measures of, you know, how thickly packed the rugs were and how straight the edges were - the very dimensions of quality of rugs. That was one thing. And then the other thing that they found which is very interesting is that you know, these weavers of rugs got to be better at producing rugs, basically. So then, when they took them into a laboratory, and they say, okay, produce this identical rug to a whole bunch of producers, both in their treatment group, and in their control group to produce this identical rug, and they found that the guys who had gotten the export contracts were better at producing that rug, they produce sort of higher quality rugs than the other guys. This suggests that demand can drive upgrading, right, in the sense that it induces firms to produce higher quality, but there's also learning involved in that process. These Egyptian rug producers became more productive as a result of having access to these export countries.
Tobi;
Yeah, I mean, listening to you, I can think of a few things that click in place. When I look at, say, a country like Nigeria, I think about the way the central bank has been running the exchange rate policy, which is messing seriously with the way firms actually source inputs. Some firms actually don't have access to the foreign exchange quota to actually source quality inputs. I mean, from manufacturing firms to agribusinesses who want to buy high-quality seeds overseas, I see how that can be a constraint. But two things I want to get at. Also, if you look at Nigeria whose industrial policy is really about domestic self-sufficiency, you could see that there isn't really an incentive for upgrading, and therein lies my question. If we talk about upgrading and how important it is, even though it's not really discussed as it should, what role do you think industrial or state-directed policies can play in this? Why because industrial policy is back in fashion, you know, it's being discussed everywhere... but usually, at least in my experience and in my opinion, what most scholars and advocates are focused on are [things like] state investments, you know, how the state can put money in one sector or the other. There really isn't so much focus on this sort of micro-level detail and what happens at firms, which your work is about. So for practical purposes, do you see industrial policy as something that can really, really, play a role and incentivize domestic firms to upgrade? For example, something like export quotas, you know, for firms?
Eric;
I mean, in terms of your question, do I think industrial policy can be helpful? I do. I do think that industrial policy can be helpful. Basically, I think that learning generates spillovers that firms themselves can't fully capture. And so I think there is a role for government to promote learning, basically, in a way. To subsidise learning such that - the socially optimal, or - the best sort of amount of investment in learning for society is more than individual firms to do on their own. And so there's a role for industrial policy. But I agree that it's got to be smart industrial policy, it's not just any old industrial policy. And so many countries have this idea...it's a little bit of nostalgia for import substitute industrialization, or it's very much like inwardly focused industrial policy. We're going to try and guarantee a domestic market for our producers, something like that, right? I'm not a fan. I'm not a fan of imports substitute industrialization or these very inward-focused strategies because then you get to the point where there's just not a lot of pressure on domestic firms to be more productive. They become kind of in a comfortable situation where they have kind of protected markets, not very competitive, they have a lot of market power in that market, and so that is a recipe for stagnation over the long term.
So I think the crucial thing is that the targets for industrial policy be export-oriented, you know, outwardly oriented. You want your firms to be successful in world markets, right? I think that should be the key, rather than domestic self-sufficiency. Or rather than just the government investing in well, okay, so I don't have a problem with the government investing in infrastructure, investing in things as long as the aim is always ''what's going to facilitate our firms being successful in world markets'', right, I think that's a good target. Because those world markets are competitive [and] for firms to be able to be successful there, they're going to have to up their game and be more productive and be more innovative, subject to the measurement constraints we talked about, right and to upgrade. And so I think that the smart industrial policies are going to be things that sort of push firms to learn and to be more innovative and to be successful as exporters.
Now, the other thing we have to keep in mind in thinking about industrial policy, is that [for] the governments, it's just very hard to [know] in the future what are the sectors that are going to be successful. What are the activities that are likely to have a future? It's just very hard, it's very hard for people who are, you know, private equity firms embedded in the sector... it's very hard to know, it's gonna be even harder for a government official or someone making government policy to do that. So I think we need to think about policies that have this effect of promoting learning or subsidizing innovative activities, but that, you know, don't require too much knowledge and understanding of the future on the part of the people setting the policy. Right. So things like collaborations between universities and firms for, you know, how to train workers to have the skills that the higher tech firms in your country need. That's something that seems like a good idea that's probably going to promote upgrading without having to pick and say, I think this product or this sector is the future of the Nigerian economy and therefore we're going to subsidize that thing. And you also want policies that are somewhat flexible, right, so that if something happens... so I'm working on a project in Tunisia, where the Tunisian Government was trying to promote exports. But the issue that they've had, and it's a matching grant program where sort of half of the costs of exporting of a certain category of costs of exporting will be paid by the government. The problem with that program, though, has been that it was somewhat inflexible. So basically, if something happened, you know, there's a big shock, and in fact, COVID shock, you know, and that changes what firms want to do. And it's very hard for them to switch gears and say, now I want to spend money on something else, can you please subsidize this other thing, and there were a lot of frictions in the program. And so that's often the case for government programs. The government sets a policy and then the world changes, firms want to do something else, but the policy is still stuck, you know, in the old world. So we need to think about how to build in, you know, flexibility into the programs so that if firms decide, actually, the market is moving in this direction, rather than this direction that we were expecting, that the support that they receive could move in the same direction.
Tobi;
Yeah, I agree. And I don't mean export quotas as hard targets. So I'll give you an example. Nigeria has this policy that we've been running for about six to seven years now, where there are multiple exchange rate windows for different parts of the economy or sectors that the government deems should have priority, you know, to import. And I recall a paper where Korea had a similar arrangement, but it was focused on firms that export. Firms that export to world markets sort of get priorities so that they can source inputs at a very low cost and seamlessly, you know, but it's not just something that we really think about in Nigeria, because we are so focused on the domestic market and how large the population is not minding, you know, how much of that population is poor.
Eric;
Yes, no, absolutely. So, certainly, Korea did this. But the Korean model, a key part of it, and they definitely picked sectors in a way that, you know, it's, there's a little bit of tension with what I just said about, you know, the government officials are not going to be very knowledgeable, there they seem to have done a good job of picking sectors to advance. But the key part was it really was oriented towards success in export markets. And the industries that were not successful on the export markets, they pulled the plug, they removed the, you know, they removed the support, which is politically hard to do, you need a fairly insulated, like, secure government in order to be able to do that. Because, otherwise, you start providing support, and then the industry lobbies a lot to maintain that support, you know, and so then it becomes politically very difficult to remove it. But I think if the government is committed to ''if these industries are not successful, we're gonna pull the plug on the support'', then this can work. Right. But you're absolutely right, in the Korean model, the key thing is the export orientation rather than the import orientation. And what you mentioned about exchange rates, I didn't comment on that. But I think it is an issue, you know, especially for a resource-rich economy, that the exchange rate can be, you know, highly valued, arguably overvalued, which makes it hard to develop the domestic industry. And so I think that's a real issue that, you know, some countries seem to be able to handle that, you know, ''what do we do with the natural resource wealth a little better than others'', if you just let it accumulate and people are going to spend and that leads to devalues your currency to increase that's going to make it harder to achieve export success in export markets for manufacturing goods or other exporting services. And so that is something that needs to be a focus of thinking about how to upgrade.
Tobi;
Yeah, I want to talk about technology for a bit. You had this very, very, an interesting paper on the soccer ball, we call it football, the soccer ball producers in Pakistan. And in a bit, you're going to tell me some of the interesting things you learned about that study. But first, Dani Rodrik and Margaret McMillan had this interesting paper about industrialization in Africa, and how domestic manufacturing firms are now shifting more towards capital-intensive technology. So hence, manufacturing firms are not creating jobs as much as historical patterns should suggest, do you see this as sort of a problem? I know so many other people have this worry about automation and how this technology can be exported everywhere, which is really a concern for maybe a continent like Africa with a large, jobless, and young population. So do you see this as a trend that we should worry about, you know, more capital-intensive technologies, or are there opportunities?
Eric;
Yeah. So I do see it as a trend. I do think it is something to be worried about. You know, Dani Rodrik recently organized a panel with the International Economics Association I participated in, along with Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti and Francis Stewart from Oxford. And I sort of had two points there. One point was, yes, I think this diagnosis is correct. Basically, economists refer to it as appropriate technology. But the idea is that many technologies are developed in rich countries, you know, given factor proportions, we would say in those rich countries, so basically, skilled workers are more abundant, unskilled workers are less abundant, and so people develop machines that kind of conserve on unskilled workers. That's, in part, the background to the story that Dani Rodrik and Margaret McMillan are saying that in Africa, many firms are using this technology that's been developed in rich countries, that's very skill intensive, but it's not generating a lot of them. Right. So I think the diagnosis there is correct that that happens, right? And so the technology often is inappropriate for poor countries given, you know, their supply of unskilled labour, given how many workers they have that could use employment. On the other hand, the other question, though, was, what do you do about it? And so I was less convinced. So my worry about that. There are two versions of that concern about what you do about it. One is, given the set of existing technologies, you could try to encourage firms to use more labour-intensive technologies. Okay. But the problem is that you may encourage them to be less productive. Maybe they might generate more employment, but they'll be less productive, right? There was an interesting paper that I cited in Brazil by Gustavo D'Souza, which was sort of saying the Brazilian government basically put a tax on international technology licensing. And he shows that sure enough, firms were less likely to use International Technology. They're more like to use domestic technology. They actually generated employment, but they were less productive. Right, and they overall did worse. So there's a worry that you're gonna make firms less productive in an immediate sense. The other worry is that, like, if the Nigerian government starts encouraging Nigerian firms to develop new technologies, which are more labour intensitive, you know, then they'll generate more employment, the worries that you're gonna get sort of fall behind the world technology trajectory, I'll call it that. Like, you can think about the world frontiers moving in whatever, pick an industry, and the world frontier is moving at a particular place, and then, you know, firms are competing with each other and they're, you know, someone gets a patent, someone comes up with a new idea and sort of technology moves in a certain direction. And then Nigeria says, no, no, we want to be on a different trajectory that generates more employment, right? The problem is, you're going to be permanently behind where the technology curve is, right? Where the world frontier is. And I feel like that's worrisome, right, you're likely to have less learning, right, there's gonna be a gap between where the Nigerian firms are and where, you know, the world frontier is that it's gonna be hard for them to catch up afterwards. So in the short term, you might generate more employment, but you're gonna have a less dynamic industry as a result. And so I think, my own view, and this is, it's a feeling rather than something that's very research based at this point. But my own view is, even though it means that firms are not going to generate that much employment, they have to try and stick as close to the technology frontier as possible, or, you know, catch up as quickly as possible to where the world technology frontier is.
Tobi;
And so talk to me a bit about lessons from your walk with the Pakistani soccer ball manufacturers. What did you learn from that particular experiment, especially on the role of appropriate technology and technology use and the incentives that surround it for firms and investors?
Eric;
Yeah, so it was a study of technology adoption, what are the factors that encourage technology adoption? And what made it possible was that the football producers, I'll use that word football instead of the soccer ball, these football producers, there are a lot of producers using the same simple technology, right? And this football design is, you know, 85 or 90% are just these hexagons and pentagons. If you can imagine a, you know, a football, it's got hexagons and pentagons. And so the simple technology involves cutting out hexagons and pentagons and then stitching them together. And there were a lot of those and what made the project possible is we came up with a new improved technology, which is basically a way of cutting pentagons from these sheets. The main costs, you know, 50% of the cost are the sheets, they call it rexine. It's like artificial leather, that's the exterior of the ball. But they were cutting pentagons in a way that was wasting some material. Wasting more than they need to and so the new technology is a way of cutting these pentagons so that you can fit more into a given sheet so that you can get basically 8% more pentagons which ended up being about a 1% reduction in total costs. Which wasn't enormous but on the other hand, it's a pretty competitive industry, profit margins are about 8% so we felt like they shouldn't have been paying the 1%. And actually, when we started out, we thought we were gonna be studying technology diffusion, right, which is, you know, one person adopts, then is that their neighbours who adopt or is it their cousins? Or is it the, you know, people who share suppliers, and what are the channels of diffusion, right, and we're trying to keep everything secret, and we thought, okay, when we let it out, it's obviously the people we give it to who are gonna adopt right away, and then it's gonna spread. And so then we gave out this technology, for free, we gave it to 135 firms.
And then, you know, we had a few firms adopt, and they started using it, and including one big firm that was producing - I can tell you the name later, but basically had like 2000 employees and is producing for Nike, and as a big producer adopted this technology, and, you know, is basically cutting all of its pentagons using our design and our die for cutting rather than the old one. So after, you know, 15 months, there were six total firms that had adopted. And that was puzzling and thought, you know, why is that? So then we started asking firms, we started talking to people and basically, it was revealed that the reason was that the guys doing the cutting... so the cutters are basically paid piece rates, they're paid per pentagon or per hexagon, or essentially per ball like, which is, you know, 20 hexagons and 12 pentagons they're paid. That was what their salaries were based on. And they didn't have the incentive to reduce waste, like, they weren't penalized if they wasted the material, right? And so they just wanted to go fast. And our die was slowing them down, right, made them go more slowly because they had to be more careful how they placed it and also, it was a different design, it was the design that they were used to. Now, it turns out that within about a month, they could get back up to speed, to the speed they were at before but they didn't know that, and in any case, for that month, their salaries would be way down, they'd just be slower and knowing that if the firm didn't change the contracts, their salaries would be lower. And the workers were figuring this out, the cutters are figuring this out, they said, this is not good for me, right, that my salary is gonna go down if I use this thing, I have no incentive to use this new technology. And so then they started telling their firms, you know, this is bad, bad technology, it doesn't work, it's dangerous, it has all these issues.
Okay, so then we realized that this was happening and we said that we were going to do a second experiment. So, you know, half of the people we originally gave the technology to who hadn't yet adopted, we did a second experiment where we said to workers, we're gonna give you a month's bonus, which is not very much it is about $150 US dollar. So these guys are not paid very much we said ''a month's bonus if you can demonstrate to us and the owner of the factory that the technology works.'' And actually, that was enough. The workers were excited about that, you know, they got paid for doing this. Everybody who did it then subsequently passed the tests. So they demonstrated that the technology is working, and then a statistically significant share of the firms that they worked at ended up adopting the technology as a result. So those were the two experiments, those were the facts. What are we learning from that? I think we're learning that, basically, the lack of information flow from workers to their owners, to their managers, was what was getting in the way of technology adoption in this case. Like, the workers knew that the technology was working, but the owners didn't know because they sort of delegated the process of cutting the pentagons to the workers, and given the contracts, the workers didn't have the incentive to share the information. Right. So I think those sorts of, like, information flows or barriers to information flows are actually very important in the learning process. And kind of what our second experiment did when we did this bonus of a month's pay, which induced the workers to share the information and that was sufficient to make the technology be adopted. And so I think the punch line or the one-sentence version of this is, workers need to see that they're going to benefit from the adoption of new technology or from upgrading generally in order for the process to work well. They have to buy into the process. And they have to see that they have the incentive to do so. One recommendation coming out of that would be some sort of profit sharing, or some sort of gain sharing between workers and firms would actually be very useful. And will it help there be more innovation?
Tobi;
It brings me in a way to another very interesting paper of yours which [they] also had a summary essay about, I think, in VOX or something, which is about wages in poor countries. And I mean, thinking about the soccer ball story and the lesson. One issue and this has generated quite a number of debates between I think Rodrik and a bunch of other scholars who are thinking about Africa, is that the reason Africa is not really industrializing, or firms are not creating jobs is because wages are too high relative to the level of income. But what I learned from your paper, and you can correct me if I'm wrong, is that paying higher wages in poorer countries is not really a disincentive to creating employment and even generating productivity and profit. Tell me a little bit about how that works. Because, usually, we've gotten familiar with this logic that for you to be able to industrialize, if you think about China, and so many other countries, you need to have access to low-wage workers, you know, you need to be able to do very cheaply, and labour is where you can really cut a lot of your costs. And then it becomes a problem if your domestic wages are too high for the level of your income or what firms and investors are willing to pay. So tell me this high-wage, low-wage dynamics, especially... I remember the famous Paul Krugman was it article defending sweatshops in Bangladesh, where if you force firms who are outsourcing to pay higher wages or impose certain conditions, poor people in those countries will lose jobs, and they will lose their livelihoods. And so you should not mess with that process. What are your thoughts on these [issues]?
Eric;
Yeah, very interesting. So I think the article you were thinking of, it's related to the specific case of the football producers and seal coats. In Pakistan.
Tobi;
Yeah.
Eric;
There was a very interesting thing that happened. I mentioned that one firm adopted this new technology. And you know, one very large firm and it was producing for Nike, it's called Silver Star. The interesting thing about that firm is that because they're producing for Nike, which had had sweatshop scandals in the past, Nike required them to do a bunch of things, basically, so that Nike wouldn't be vulnerable to a further scandal, right? And among the things that they had to do was make sure they were paying the minimum wage in Pakistan. And the only way this firm could guarantee that they were paying the minimum wage in Pakistan, which many firms were violating basically, the only way they could is to say, we're not going to pay a piece rate, we're going to pay a fixed wage. Right. So this firm was paying a fixed wage rather than a piece rate. And actually, we talked to them about when they first won the Nike contract. They said their labour costs went up 20 to 30%. So they did a bunch of things. They had this fixed wage, there was a medical clinic on the factory grounds. They had sickness pay, they had some retirement benefits. So a bunch of things, they did raise wages. But the advantage of that was that the workers were much less likely to block the adoption of this new technology. Because in a specific way, they did not have a disincentive, you know, their wage was going to be their wage no matter what happened, rather than in other firms [where] what was happening is that the worker can see if they adopt this technology, their wage would go down. And so we believe, and I wrote this in an article that you saw in the Harvard Business Review, I think that's where it was, that those wages, you know, higher wage payments and fixed wage payments, which were imposed by Nike actually contributed to the process of innovation. The title of the article is how labour standards can be good for growth, and also in the process of upgrading. So that's an example of how having higher wages can actually be good for this upgrading process.
Now, there are factors going in both directions, right? On the one hand, you know, the 20 or 30% higher labour costs, I think they did contribute to innovation. On the other hand, 20 or 30% higher labour costs may mean that firms will hire fewer workers or that the industry will be less competitive. So it's not that, you know, this innovation effect is all powerful and it's going to overwhelm anything that's about labour costs. But I think it is something that we need to take into account. And so, you know, labour market institutions that, you know, maybe promote profit sharing with workers, that promote longer-term employment so you have people who are around for longer, that have some job security, the sorts of things that often labour unions want to negotiate, can actually be good for this innovation process. And that's one factor that should be weighed against this issue of, you know, how higher labour costs and how competitive is the sector going to be. You often hear, like, the World Bank or the USAID, the development agencies will often say, you just have to be cheap. Like, you know, the competitive advantage of Nigeria is cheap labour and therefore, you should be focusing on having low wages and producing, you know, garments and textiles and toys and low-end manufacturing. But I think that's kind of a low-road model. You know, and I think that there are viable high road models, which would involve somewhat higher wages, some sort of gain sharing or profit sharing, and being more innovative at the same time. I can't tell you I have it all worked out exactly what that model would look like, I think it's going to vary by country. But I think we need to try to think about and push in that direction of where you can have, it may not be high wage, but it's gonna be higher wage than the market by itself maybe would bring about. So I am optimistic that that can happen. But again, the devil's in the details, you know. So Nigeria needs to think about what are we relatively good at doing right now and let's think about how can we be more innovative and move up to the quality ladder, the technology ladder in those industries. And then how can we get our workers on board to the process of moving up that ladder? And that will probably involve paying those workers more, rather than just trying to cut wages to the extent possible.
Tobi;
Before I let you go, let me... I know you're a relatively quiet person so let me draw you in a little bit... yeah, I know you're not active on Twitter or anything like that. Let me draw you into a little bit of professional controversy. And one of the things that I admire most about your work, I should confess, is that it's methodologically diverse. You know, you do structural econometrics, you do RCT, you do regular modelling and so many things. So there's this huge debate currently that I think, a lot of my colleagues may not think so but I think has important consequences for the policymaking process on development, which is that - is development research right now focused on the right things? You know, RCTs are like the standard tool for the investigation of development questions. Empirics have sort of taken over the field.
But on the other hand, you have folks like Lant Pritchett who are constantly pushing back that this is encouraging researchers to think too small, they are researching cash transfers, and so many other key interventions, whereas we really should be focused on the big questions. And in my experience, these have real-life implications, especially in poor countries where they have budgetary constraints. We might say this is due to corruption, and that will be true, but sometimes they have a real balance of payment crisis, because a lot of these countries are resource-dependent, and it's often cyclical. So a policymaker may really want to know where to spend the most resources to have the maximum benefit for the citizen. So I find these questions very important. What do you think about this debate? As someone who transverses the field very often in your work, how have you been able to navigate this debate? And what do you think is the, maybe right is not the right word here...what do you think is the useful approach going forward?
Eric;
Yeah, good question. Yeah, in my own work, I've been very question driven rather than methods driven. Right. So I've always thought, you know, I'm interested in this question of from upgrading, what are the barriers to upgrading? What drives upgrading? How can we, you know, learn about that, and if we can learn about that using an experiment, that's great. If we're in about that using other methods, that's great, too. So I, sort of, don't have a dog in the hunt, as Bill Clinton would say about, you know, the methodology. And I'm kind of in the middle of the road, I think, in terms of this debate between, you know, J-PAL and Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee and Lant Pritchett or others on the other side. I think, you know, in situations where you can run an experiment, I think that is the most credible source of information. Okay, so I'd rather have a randomized experiment than do a correlation and put some causal interpretation on a correlation. At the same time, I do think that there are many questions, either that can't be answered with an experiment, or that are just very, very costly to answer with an experiment, right? And so it's very hard to run, you know, it's running experiments on firms. I've tried to do it, but it takes a long time. It can be very costly. You have to give much bigger shocks to firms to get them to react, etc. And so, I've heard Abhijit Banerjee articulate that, like, we should never do a policy that hasn't first been evaluated by random experiment, I think that's too strong. Because we're gonna be waiting years and years and years to get the experiments and with a huge investment of resources in order to get the experiments that would then inform the policy. So we're going to have to make policy and, you know, make decisions based on other sorts of information. And so there, I do think we need to be like small ''c'' Catholic, allow for lots of different types of methods, quasi-experimental methods, you know, even structural methods, and then also experiments. There's this famous joke about the drunk guy with a streetlight, you know, he's looking for his keys, and he's looking under the streetlight, because that's where the light is, maybe not where the keys have been lost. And so I take that point, like, maybe we really care about these big questions about, you know, what's going to drive growth, then in that sense, I'm sympathetic to the sort of the Lant Pritchett view. On the other hand, under the lamppost, we actually are learning stuff, right, I feel like we're more confident that we're making progress by looking under the lamppost. And so I think the, you know, the trick, the art here is to sort of stay near the edge of the lights and we're getting closer to the big questions, but in a way that's still credible, and that we're still, you know, we can believe the answers that we're actually given.
To sort of counter the Lant Pritchett view, you can post these big questions, and you can, you know, think big thoughts. But at the end of the day, you have to be able to convince, you know, you have to show us the data, right, you have to show that this is really correct. And that's just very hard to do for many of these big questions. So we need to incrementally build up based on this work. That's why I kind of like this work on firms, we're getting towards these big questions about growth, but in a way that you can actually have some confidence that you understand what's going on.
Tobi;
In your experience doing this work, what are misconceptions that you have encountered in the field that either the professional development industry, so I'm talking about aid and the think-tank and all the other folks, or it may even be your academic colleagues, what are the common misconceptions that you have encountered?
Eric;
Yeah. I mean, so one big thought [is] I think that the of field development agencies, right, it's like, how are we going to spend aid dollars in a way that's going to have a positive effect? And I think there's value to that. All right. I'm all in favour of spending, you know, aid dollars, in the most effective way. But I think that you know, a set of questions does limit to some extent the impact of the field of development on the development process. So I actually think we could spend every aid dollar in an optimal way, and would it have a meaningful effect on the material standard of living of people in poor countries? I'm not sure. I mean, maybe a little bit, maybe marginal, right? I think what's really going to matter is, do these countries start getting industrialization happening? Are they getting upgrading? Are they growing? And so in that sense, I sometimes get a little bit frustrated with the development discussions, it's all about this, you know, how do we spend aid dollars, and let's do RCTs to figure out how to spend the aid dollars, rather than these bigger questions, which are going to have a longer-term effect on people's living standards. You know, that's changing a little bit. I'm encouraged. There are more and more people talking about firms, there are more and more people taking sort of industrial policy ideas seriously. They're talking about bigger-picture questions in a kind of micro-founded way. So there are some encouraging signs. But I think a lot of development is still about that issue of like, what's the right way to do social policy? What's the right way to do, you know, aid spending, rather than trying to understand deeply why is it that Korea was able to make this transition from a poor country to a rich country, essentially, in a generation? And why is it that many countries in Africa are not? What is it that's actually getting in the way? And for that, that's not really like how to spend aid dollars question that's more about how firms behave. What are the factors that constrain them? And those sorts of things.
Tobi;
This is a show about ideas. So I want to ask you, what's the one idea? Just one. One idea that you think everybody should think about and adopt, that you would like to see spread everywhere. What's that idea? It may be from your work, or it may be from other things that inspire you. What's that one idea?
Eric;
I think the one idea I would choose is, uh, workers have a brain. This goes back to the soccer ball study, that there's knowledge and information that, like, workers have or people who are lower down in the hierarchy have, which is not being taken advantage of. Right, the soccer ball thing was an example. The workers were understanding the technology, but because of the way they were paid, and because of the, you know, institutional arrangements, they didn't have the incentive to share that. And I think the world, including the economics profession, tends to undervalue the intelligence that people have. Even the people who are actually, you know, on the frontlines doing the work. And if we can figure out ways to harness that knowledge and give people incentives to share it and give people incentives to develop their own intellectual thinking about whatever it is they're doing, I think that'll have a big payoff. And so I'm interested in sort of investigating what are the sorts of arrangements, what are the sorts of policies that can lead that to happen more?
Tobi;
Yeah. Thank you so much, Eric. I mean, tell me a little bit about what you're working on right now.
Eric;
What am I working on right now? I mean, so one thing related to what we've been talking about that I'm excited about is, again, a paper on technology adoption. This is in Bangladesh, with an energy-efficient motor like sewing machines. They're different sorts of motors that the traditional ones they're kind of spinning all the time. And then people have the foot pedal they like to press the foot pedal and then the needle comes down and stitches right but they're actually wasting a lot of energy because these motors are spinning all the time. And so there's a new type of motor called a servo motor which spins Only when the needle is moving, right, so it's energy efficient, energy efficient motor, but it can just replace the old motor, you don't have to change anything else about the machine, you just put this new servo motor to replace the old clutch motor. And we're studying when new managers or when new owners, when do they make those decisions. And so we're trying to track we're giving them information in different intensities, like including installing the machines in their factory one is just showing a video when it's just providing information, but one is actually installing their machines. And we're seeing how they react to that information. So I think that's a big topic. It's like what's getting in the way of the adoption of energy-efficient technology? These are the people who are making mistakes, or they just don't have good information. Or that basically, maybe if they have the right information, they actually will adapt very quickly. So that's one thing I'm thinking about.
Tobi;
It's been fascinating talking to you, Eric. I enjoyed it so much.
Eric;
Thank you, Tobi. Good questions.
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My guest on this episode is Stefan Dercon - author of the recently published and most excellent book ‘Gambling on Development: Why Some Countries Win and Others Lose’. Development scholars have produced many explanations for why some countries did better than others after the Second World War. Factors like geography, quality or type of institutions, foreign aid, and protective trade policies, have been argued as what explains this divergence in national prosperity between countries. Dercon's contribution will no doubt be plugged into this long-running debate - and in my opinion, he comes closest to having a ‘‘first principles’’ explanation than anyone I have read on the subject. Other theories leave you with nagging questions - Where do good institutions come from? Are countries condemned by their histories? Why do some countries use foreign aid better? Why are some countries with rich geographic endowments doing worse? Why does protective trade lead some countries toward becoming industrial exporting giants, and some others into a macroeconomic crisis?
Dercon argues that countries that have done better do so by working out a ‘development bargain’. This comes about when the people with power and influence (elites) in a country find a cooperative agreement (bargain) to consciously pursue economic development and national enrichment. Development bargains are not simple, they are often messy. And elites are not a bunch of altruistic do-gooders. Rather, through many complicated networks of intra-elite competitions and cooperation, they decide to gamble on the future by betting that economic development will deliver the biggest win. Dercon does not claim to have found the holy grail of development - and there are still many questions to be answered. But his argument does lead to one inevitable conclusion. Countries and their people will have to figure out what works for them and how that delivers prosperity.
Stefan Dercon is Professor of Economic Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. He was the Chief Economist of the UK’s Department of International Development (DFID).
Transcript
Tobi;
Was your experience really what inspired you to write the book?
Stefan;
Well, you know, what inspired me definitely is just the contrast that I've had in terms of things I do. Because I've been an academic for a long time, I have more than 30 years writing and studying and, you know, I was one of these academics who like to, as one sometimes puts it, you know, like, likes to get mud on their feet, you know, mud on their boots. I used to work mostly on rural households and in most countries, these are amongst the poorest people, and you just get to know what's going on there. I have a policy interest, and I was just lucky 10 years ago, a bit more than that, I got a job as a Chief Economist in the UK aid agency, and it's just that contrast of having had the chance and the opportunity to get involved on the policy side, on meeting all the more senior people...and it's just that contrast between still enjoying being surrounded by people and what they do and understands livelihoods of poorer people, combined with being in the policy space, I felt like, you know, I have a unique perspective that I wanted to communicate. And it was just a quest to communicate, actually. If anything, I wanted just to tell more of these stories because I think, from all sides, we tend to misunderstand a lot of what's going on and how things work in practice. And that's definitely the case on the academic side. We're so far sometimes from reality that I wanted to tell that story a bit more.
Tobi;
And I mean, after you wrote the book, and after publication, I presume from some of the feedback that your book is actually quite successful. I gave so many copies away, right, I can't even count. I think at some point, I temporarily bought out Roving Heights' entire stock. So how has the reception been generally?
Stefan;
I mean, look, what you just told me makes it much more worthwhile than if white kids in Oxford are buying the book. So what I'm really pleased with is that it appealed to a much broader group of people. And actually, you know, if I'm really honest, I hadn't expected that people like you or I was in Bangladesh last week that young people there would actually appreciate the book, you know, that you would actually get people that think about these problems in these countries are actually interested in it. And I'm very pleased that people find it both worthwhile to read and quite interesting. Of course, I get some academics. One story last week in Bangladesh, I had a question, you know, how Lenin fitted in my book. Now, I had to struggle with the answer of how Vladimir Lenin would actually fit into the book and thinking, you know, that's an academic typically responding to, you know... I don't know, I'm not a deep theoretician but it was written out of a kind of pragmatic sense of what can I learn from economics and politics that actually is worthwhile communicating.
So it's well received. And if I'm really honest, I don't mind that there are pdf copies circulating as well and things like that. Actually, as long as it's read, you know, you write a book, not because you want the highest sales, but you actually want it to be read, and that actually makes it really interesting that people seem to be able to relate to it. Another group that, actually, I found really interesting that can relate to it is people that are either civil servants working in governments like - in yours, as well as maybe aid officials and International World Bank officials, IMF officials, who actually find it helpful as well. You know, and there's usually a huge bridge between them, there's a huge gap between how in Washington when we think about these things, or in London or in Abuja, and so that's pleasing as well. You know, I don't give a solution to the things but I think I touched on something of where a big part of the problem of development lies is that actually, we are, unfortunately, in quite a few countries, still with governments that fundamentally are backed by elites that don't really want to make the progress and do the hard work. And that's an unfortunate message. But at the same time, you have other countries that are surprising countries that make the progress. And so clearly, there is a lesson there that it's not simply like the problem is simple. Actually, the problem is to some extent, simple. It's about, fundamentally, do you want to actually make it work, make this progress work? And I think that echoes with quite a lot of people - the frustration that many of us have, that some countries seem to be stuck and not making enough progress and we need to be willing to call it out for what it is that it's not entirely the fault of those people who are in control, but they could do far more for the better than they actually do.
Tobi;
For the purpose of making the conversation practical and accessible, in the spirit of the book itself, I'm going to be asking you some very simple... and what I consider to be fundamental questions for the benefit of the audience and people that probably have not read the book. So there have been so many other books on development that have also been quite as popular as yours, Why Nations Fail comes to mind, and so many others, The End of Poverty by Jeffrey Sachs, some of which you actually reviewed in the opening chapters of the book. And at the heart of most of them is some kind of fundamental concept that then defines how the body of work itself or the central idea itself works, whether it's institutions, or culture, or industrial policy, or whatever. For your book, you talked a lot about the development bargain, what is the development bargain? And how does it work?
Stefan;
So the way I look at any country in the world, and I mean, any country, rich or poor country is that one way or another, there is a group of people, which I call for convenience, ''the elite.'' It's not like a pejorative title or a title to applaud them, but simply as a descriptive title. The group of people, in politics, civil service, in business definitely, maybe the military, maybe even civil society, key universities, public intellectuals, I talk about the group that I refer to as the elite, these are the people that have power, or they have influenced one way or another, that can be quite broad. Now in every society, I think it's that group that tends to determine what politics and the economy will look like, what the direction of a country will look like, in any society. And I call that underlying idea [as] they have essentially a form of an elite bargain, a bargain between the different people, they don't have to agree on everything, but to have some kind of an agreement that this is the principle by which, you know, my country will be run in politics and in the economy. Now we could have lots of these elite bargains. We could have an elite bargain that, for example, is based on: if I happen to have power, then everything that I'll do is to reward the people that brought me to power. I'll give them jobs in government. I'll give them maybe contracts, I'll do something, you know, technically, we call this Clientelist. You could have another one where he's saying, Look, no, we're going to run this country, totally, where everybody gets an equal right or equal opportunity, and in a particular way. And so you could have political systems that are around this. Now you could have all these things coming together. You could have also regimes that basically say, Well, the main purpose for us is to keep us as a small group in power, you know, he could have a particular way of doing it. Or indeed, to make sure we use it entirely to steal anything we can get and we'll actually put it in our own pockets, you could have a kleptocracy. You could have lots of these different things, you know, you could have different societies.
Now, what I mean by development bargain, is actually fundamentally where that underlying elite bargain values, the underlying idea is that we want to grow our economy, and we want to do this in quite an inclusive way. We want to have developmental outcomes as well. And we make this a key part of the elite bargain. So basically, I define a development bargain as an elite bargain - the deals that we have in running our economy and our politics, that fundamentally, one big way we will judge it is that when we make progress in the growth of the economy, and also in development for the broader population, and I call that the development bargain. And I want to actually go a step further and say if you don't have this, you will never see growth and development in your country. You could have leaders talk about it. They could make big development plans, but if underlying all this there is not a fundamental commitment by all these key players that actually it's worthwhile doing, we're not going to achieve it. And maybe I'll make a quick difference here with say, how does that difference...(now, you mentioned Why Nations Fail.) Now, that underlying elite bargain, of course, the nature of your rule of law, your property rights, all these things, they clearly will matter to some extent, but Why Nations Fail puts this entirely into kind of some historical process. And a lot of people that talk about getting institutions right, they say, Well, you need to get institutions right before you can develop, and they seem to come from a long historical process. In my concept of elite bargain, I would actually emphasize [that] even if your country is not perfect in these institutions, even if there's still some corruption left, even if there are still some issues with the political system, even with the legal system, we actually have countries that can make progress if, fundamentally, that commitment is there amongst the elite. So you don't have to wait until perfection starts before you can start to develop. And that actually [means that] I want to put much more power into the hands... sorry, agency is the better word, I put much more agency in those who at the moment are in control of the state. History may not be favourable for you, there may be a history of colonialism, there may be other histories, factors that clearly will affect the nature of your country at a particular moment in time. But actually agency from the key actors today, they can overcome it. And in fact, in the book, I have plenty of examples of countries that start from imperfection, and actually start doing quite interesting things in terms of growth and development, while other countries are very much more stagnant and staying behind.
Tobi;
You sort of preempted my next question. I mean, since say, 1990, or thereabout, when the results of some of the ''Asia Tigers'' started coming in, maybe also through the works of people like Wade, Hamsden and co., countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, have become like the standard for economic development, and subsequent analysis around issues of development always look at those countries and also their neighbours who have actually made some progress, maybe not as much as those specific countries. But what I want to ask you about in your book is, you talk about some of the works on development trying to reach for some kind of long history or some kind of historical...I don't want to say dependency or determinism, but you get my point. So my point is, if we go outside of these Asian Tigers, if we go back to say, Japan, or even the second industrial revolution, America, Germany, the Netherlands, can we observe the development bargain as you have described it? Is it also consistent through history?
Stefan;
I would say Absolutely. I mean, one of the things with when we look at these countries with longer-term success, you mentioned correctly, you know, the Koreas and also Japan, or going back in time to the Industrial Revolution, the second industrial revolution and so on, actually, we take for granted that actually they really wanted to succeed. And it's actually one of these things, and especially in recent history, [South] Korea came out of deep conflict, of course, it was also called War so they got certain support as well. But it was really important for both Japan and Korea after the Second World War, for Japan to re-emerge and for Korea to emerge. It was a form of also getting legitimacy towards their own population. So it was a real underlying deep commitment by that elite in these countries to try to make a success of it. We take it for granted, if we go back in history, take England in the 19th century...I mean, it was a very strong thing, it's like, you know, we wanted to show that actually, we are ruling the world on commerce and all the kinds of things, there was a deep motivation. And of course, also the pressures, you know, remember, the society was being very fractured, and we can't call growth in the 19th century in Britain very inclusive. [There was] a lot of change happening, and indeed, you know, very poor people I think actually initially didn't manage to take up. But especially if we come to the early 20th century became this kind of thing surely [where] development in the form of growth was also when it's a little bit broader shared, became quite part of it. And it's one of these things that when you look at politics, whether it's in the 1930s or 40s or 50s or now, whether it's in England or in America, actually growth and development, I won't take it for granted. People are voted out of office because they are not managing the economy well. There is a lot of political pressure in Europe now. And it's really political because ''oh you're not dealing with the cost of living crisis right or you're undermining the real income increases.'' You know, the US election, we ended up interpreting Trump as an election that actually [served] people [who] had stayed behind in the process of growth and development. Actually, in the politics of most richer countries, it's so much taken for granted that that's a big part of the narrative.
So it's an interesting one (maybe, if I may) just to [use] China, I find it a really interesting one. Because, you know, the historical determinism is problematic there. And of course, some people would say, China should never have grown because it has the wrong institutions. But of course, it is growing fast. But if you think of a bit of what would be historical institutions that are relevant? China has had centralized taxation for 2000 years, a centralized bureaucracy for 2000 years, a meritocratic bureaucracy for 2000 years, you know, it actually had a history that actually acquired strong institutions. But funnily enough, when did it start? Just at the moment of deep weakness in the 1970s. When the Cultural Revolution had destabilised the legitimacy of the state, ideology was totally dominating, Mao died in the early 1970s and mid 1970s the Gang of Four came up, which was his widow, it was all turbulence. And actually lots of people thought China would disappear. It's at that moment, it picked up that kind of thing, you know, and actually, fundamentally, if you read all the statements of that periods, they became fundamentally committed, ''we need to make progress in our economy, that's our source of legitimacy.'' So even there there, that's where you see that actually really emerges and this became something that they needed to achieve - a fundamental commitment to growth and development as a form of getting legitimacy to the population. So in a very different way, as some of the other countries, but it's the same principle. Legitimacy of a lot of countries is equated with progress and growth and development, which is essentially a feature of a development bargain.
Tobi;
Obviously, all societies have some form of elite bargain. Not all elite bargains are development bargains. That's the gist of your book, basically. Now, what I'm trying to get at here is elite bargains that are not for development, that do not benefit the rapid progress of a society, how do they emerge? You talk about the agency of the people that are running the country at a particular point in time. To take Nigeria as an example, a lot of people will blame Nigeria's problems on colonialism. And I'm also quite intolerant of such arguments, at least up to a point. But what I'm trying to get at is that how do elite bargains that are not for development, how do they emerge? Is it via, also, the agency of the elites of those societies? Or are there features of a particular society that kind of determine the elite bargain that emerges? For example, sticking with Nigeria, a lot of people will argue that our elites and our institutions will think and look differently if we don't have oil.
Stefan;
Yes.
Tobi;
Right. The state will be less extractive in its thinking, the bureaucracy will be less predatory, right? A lot of people would argue that. So are there other underlying factors or features in a society that shape the kind of elite bargain that emerges, or this is just down to the agency of the people who find themselves with power and influence? They are just the wrong type of people.
Stefan;
So, Tobi, you make an excellent point here, and, so let's take this a little bit in turn. Leonard Wantchekon, the economic historian at Princeton, from Benin… he gave a nice lecture not so long ago, at Yale, it's on YouTube. And he made this very helpful statement, and he said, you know, if it's between history and agency, I would put 50% history 50% agency, okay. And I will actually add to it [which] is that depending on where you are, history is a little bit more or a little bit less. And so clearly, and he was talking about Africa in general, colonialism will matter. It has shaped your institutions and, you know, the way countries have emerged and the way they decolonized, all these things will have mattered, and they make it harder and easier and so on. But you alluded to it as well [that] at some level, it's already a long time ago now. Of course, it's still there, but it's a long time ago. So over time agency should become much more important. The point though, that you raise about oil makes a lot of sense.
So the problem with a development bargain is that actually for a political elite, and for a business elite, dare I say for a military elite, the status quo is, of course, very convenient. Status quo is something that is very convenient because it involves very few risks. So the problem with growth typically is that, actually, new elites may emerge, a new type of business elites may emerge, they may question the economic elite that exists. As a result, it may change the politics. And in fact, if you go back to history, as we were saying, of course, that's the history of Britain where all the time, you know, there has been a shift of who is the elite, there's always a new elite, but it's shifting. So growth is actually a tricky thing. Because it actually, in that sense, changes relative positions in society. Now, that's obviously the case in every society. But it will even more so if the status quo is actually quite of relative affluence, if the status quo is actually quite a comfortable position to be.
Now if you have natural resources, you don't need growth, to be able to steal. You can just basically control the resources that come out of the ground. And so your supply chain for stealing money can be very short, you don't have to do a very complicated game. If you need to get it from growth in the economy, it's much more complicated, and it's much more risky. Okay. And so it's not for nothing, that actually clearly, more countries that didn't have natural resources in recent times, over short periods of time, managed to actually get development bargains and basically leads gambling on it. Because actually, the status quo was not as lucrative as the status quo can be if you have a lot of oil or other minerals. And so you're right, and it makes it just really hard...and it actually means in fact [that] even well-meaning parts of the business elite in Nigeria will find it very hard to shift the model entirely. Because you know, you are a business elite, because you benefit from the system one way or another. I'm not saying that you steal, but it's just [how] the economy is based in Nigeria on a lot of non-tradables, is helped with the fact that you have so much to export from oil and so you end up importing a lot, but you can also keep your borders closed or anything you feel like keeping the borders closed for. And that helps for a lot of domestic industries, because protectionism, you know, you do all the things. So the system self sustains it. And with oil, there is not that much incentives to change it. So yes, it is actually harder if you have natural resources to actually reengineer the system to actually go for growth and development. So yes, it is the case. But it hasn't stopped certain countries from not going that route.
You know, Malaysia has oil? Yes, it's not a perfect development bargain. But it has done remarkably well. Indonesia, in its early stages, also had oil in the 1970s as an important part, it managed this kind of relationship, and then maybe come the agency in it, you know, do we get enough actors that actually have the collective ability to shift these incentives enough to start promoting more outward orientation, try to export some new things from your country, all that kinds of stuff? And that is indeed what happened in Indonesia. There in the early 1970s, they had oil, but they also learned to export shoes and garments early on, they took advantage of good global situations. And Nigeria didn't, you know, and then agency comes into it, you know, the managers of both the politics and the relationship between politics and business, including from the military, they went in a particular route, and they had choices and they didn't take them. I'm pretty sure if you go back and, you know, there will be moments of choice and we went for another - as people call it - political settlement... another equilibrium that actually didn't involve development and growth as the key part. So yes, it makes it harder. But the agency still, still matters.
Tobi;
From that point, my next question then would be, what shifts an elite bargain more? That's kind of like do question, right? What shifts an elite bargain? These questions do sound simple. And I'm sorry, but I know they are incredibly difficult to answer. Otherwise, you wouldn't have written an entire book about it. Right. So what shifts an elite bargain more towards development? I mean, you talked about China, we've seen it also in so many other countries where the country was going in a particular direction that's not really pro growth, pro-development, and then there's this moment where things sort of shifts. So it may be through the actions of particular actors or events that inform those. So what... in your experience as a development practitioner and looking at all these places...What are the factors that have the most influence in shifting the elite bargain? Is it just luck? I mean, when I think about China, what if Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues had actually lost that particular power struggle after the death of Mao? So did they get lucky? Is it luck? What's going on?
Stefan;
You know, I wouldn't use title of gambling but there has to be a little bit of luck involved as well, you know, the circumstances have to play in your direction. But it's not just luck. Okay. So it's an interesting thing when you look at a couple of the countries, what were the moments that people within the elite managed to shift it in another direction? So. China is interesting because it was going through conflict, not deep conflict or violent conflict, but there was a lot of instability in China at the time, at the end of the Cultural Revolution in that period. Other countries like Bangladesh came out of conflict. And so conflict, definitely, or coming out of conflict creates a moment. But of course, there are lots of countries that come out of conflict that make a mess of it. It's a window of opportunity. And it probably is linked with something related to it, which is legitimacy. When you come out of conflict, most of the time, leaders need to reestablish legitimacy. This is clearly something that happened to Rwanda coming out of the genocide, Kagame clearly had to establish legitimacy, you know, he represented a very small group of people within the country and he needed to get legitimacy overall and he chose growth and development to doing that. I think Ethiopia is similar, that actually Meles Zenawi coming from Tigray, he needed, you know, post 2000, coming out of the Eritrean war at a time, and all kinds of other crisis that he was facing in his own party even, he needed to get legitimacy, and they thought he could get legitimacy for his regime through growth and development.
So legitimacy-seeking behavior can be quite important. Now it has another side to it. If there's a crisis of legitimacy, that's the moment when the leader can actually take advantage of it. A crisis of legitimacy is actually saying, ''Well, look, we better go to something that begins to deliver to people.'' And why I'm actually suggesting it is that actually, there are in certain countries, a bit of pressure from below also seems to be quite useful. But there is a role there and I find it very hard to define exactly because I'm always scared of autocrats and so on. But the point of leadership is there. So I don't mean it as the strong leader, but more to do with the kind of group of people that manages to take other people along and convince them that is the kind of thing that they need to do. So if you go to Indonesia, I don't think it was Suharto personally, who was the great thinker there that did it. But he clearly surrounded himself with a group of people that included technocrats and also other people from politics, that actually managed to push this in a particular direction in doing it. So how do we get it? While it is actually people taking advantage of windows of opportunity to actually nudge towards it? Okay. But it's hard. We’re talking Nigeria, other people have asked me questions about Brazil, about India, you know, large countries like yours with very complicated elite bargains that have national and state level things and so on... it's really complicated. Rwanda in that sense is well defined, you know, we have one well-defined problem and, you know, we could go for a particular model. It can be quite complicated to have some ideas on that on Nigeria, but maybe we can come to that a bit later.
Tobi;
So, I'm curious. I know you didn't cover this in your book. So let me let you speculate a bit on the psychology of elite bargains or development bargains specifically now. Given that I've also tried to look at some of the societies that you described, and even some others that you probably didn't mention, I don't think there's been a society yet where this is a gamble true, but where the elites have sort of lost out by gambling on development. So why don't we see a lot more gambles than we are seeing currently?
Stefan;
Actually, unfortunately, we see gambles that go wrong. I mean, for me, and I've worked a lot on Ethiopia, Ethiopia as a gamble that went wrong at the moment. And Ethiopia... you know, just think a little bit of what happened and maybe typify a little bit in a very simplistic way the nature of the gamble. You know, you had a leader under Meles Zenawi, under the TPLF - the Tigray and rebel group - where in the end the dominant force in the military force that actually took power in 1991. And they stayed dominant, even though they only represent, you know, five 6% of the population, they remain dominant in that political deal. Though other groups joined, but militarily, it was the TPLF that was the most powerful. So it also meant that the political deal was always fragile because in various periods of time, you know, my very first job was teaching in Addis Ababa University so I was teaching there 1992 93... you know, we have violence on the streets of students that were being actually repressed by the state, they were demonstrating against the government. You know, over time, we have various instances where this kind of legitimacy, the political legitimacy of that regime was also being questioned.
Now, one of the gambles that Meles Zenawi took was to actually say, look, there's a very fragile political deal, but I'm actually going to get legitimacy through growth and development. So he used development as a way of getting legitimacy for something that politically and you know, just as Nigeria is complicated, Ethiopia is complicated with different nationalities, different balances between the regions, that he actually wasn't quite giving the space for these different nationalities to have a role, but he was gambling on doing it through growth and development. How did this go wrong? You know, I kept on spending a lot of time, but in the 2010s after Meles Zenawi died, very young from illness, the government still tried to pursue this. But actually, increasingly, they couldn't keep the politics together anymore. They were almost a different nationality, they were always on the streets, there was lots of violence and so on. And then in the end, you know, the Tigrayans lost power in the central government, and then, of course, we know how it escalated further after Abiy. But in some sense, the underlying political deal was fragile and the hope was that through economic progress, we could strengthen that political deal to legitimacy. That gamble is fine. Now it's a very fractured state and unfortunately, all the news we get from the country is that it's increasingly fractured. And I don't know how we'll put it together again. So that's a gamble that failed. Now, we know more about it. And it was very visible because it lasted quite a long time. Many of these gambles may actually misfire if they don't pick the right political moments. You know, if you don't do it at the right moment, and if you're a little bit unlucky with global circumstances, you fairly quickly could get into a bit of trouble politically, and whatever. For example, with the high inflation we have in virtually every country in the world now, it is clearly not the moment to gamble. It's extremely risky, [and] fragile, and your opponents will use it against you. So it's another thing like, you know, we don't see them gambling, you know, there are relatively few windows of opportunities at which you can gamble. And there are some that will go wrong. And even some that I described as successes, you know, we don't know whether they will last, whether they will become the new Koreas. I'm cautious about that. So, we need to just see it a little bit. Although I don't see Nigeria taking that gamble. So that's another matter.
Tobi;
No, no. I mean, that's where I was going next. Let me talk to you a bit about the role of outsiders here. We're going to get the aid discussion later. So currently in Nigeria, obviously, the economy has been through a lot in the last several years, a lot of people will put that firmly into the hands of the current administration. Rightly so. There were some very terrible policy choices that were made. But one point that I've quite often made to friends is that, to borrow your terminology, I don't think Nigeria was under the influence of a development bargain that suddenly went astray seven years ago. We've always been heading in this direction, some periods were just pretty good. And one of those periods was in the mid to late 2000s, when the economy seemed to be doing quite well, with high oil prices and also, the government actually really took a stab at macro-economic reforms. But if also you look carefully at the micro-history of that period, you'll see the influence of, should I say, outside legitimacy, you know, trying to get the debt forgiveness deal over the line and, you know, so many other moves that the government was making to increase its credibility internationally was highly influential in some of those decisions and the people that were brought into the government and some of the reform too. And my proof for that when I talk to people is to look at the other things that we should have done, which, we didn't do.
We had the opportunity to actually reform either through privatization, a more sustainable model of our energy policy - the energy industry, generally. Electricity? People like to talk about telecommunications and the GSM revolution, but we didn't do anything about electricity, we didn't do anything about transportation. Infrastructure was still highly deficient and investment was not really serious, you know. So it was not... for me, personally, it was not a development bargain. Now, my question then would be, could it have been different if some of the outside influences that are sometimes exerted on countries can be a bit more focused on long-term development, as opposed to short-term macro-economic reforms on stability? You know, institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, I know they have their defined mandates, but is it time for a change? I think they actually have a lot more influence than they are using currently.
Stefan;
You make extremely valid points. And I think I will broadly agree with you with what you just implied. And I'll take a stance on it now. So the first thing, of course, and you correctly saw that something very misleading in Nigeria's growth figures is that periods of high growth are not at all linked to much action by economic policymakers. But it's still largely linked to oil prices. And we have this unfortunate cyclical behaviour in policymaking. Where the behaviour when prices are really good, is just always missing taking advantage of the opportunity. While when things are bad, we're talking about all kinds of things one ought to be doing but then saying, ''we can't do it because the prices are low.'' And so there is this kind of strange, asymmetric thing about policymaking that we always have the best ideas when we can't do them, and then we don't have the ideas we should have when the going is good. And this is in a way what you're alluding to. Of course, the role of outsiders that gets very interesting is what these outsiders were focusing on, actually, I think it was in the interest of the, call them, semi-outsider inside government...some of these technocrats that were brought in. And I can understand it entirely, you know, there were some really sensible finance ministers at various moments and so on. They were focused on actually things that were relatively easy in that period. So they were actually relatively easy, because the going was quite good. And so actually you created that strange impression, and it's a little bit like together with the outsiders, with World Bank, IMF, but actually, we're dealing with something really dramatic but, actually, we were not at all setting a precedent because it was actually, relatively... relatively politically low cost to do these things at that moment. Okay.
So it was progress of sorts, you know, getting the debt relief, and so on. But arguably, you know, it's not a bad thing. But this actually was quite a low-hanging fruit and many of these organizations like these ideas of low-hanging fruits, because actually, politically, it played well, it increased the stature internationally of Nigeria...but, actually, it didn't really cost the elite much. It wasn't really hard for the elite to do these things. [If they did] the difficult things, they would really have started to change Nigeria. And so there is something there that I'm struck by the last sentence you said that some of these outsiders may be focusing on the wrong things. I think it has to be the insiders wanting to focus on these things, on these more difficult things. And then I do agree with you, the outsider should be smarter, and better able to respond to this. There's a problem with the outsiders here as well, take something that clearly you still struggle with and struggled forever with - electricity reform, the electricity sector. It's so complicated, and it's set up so complicated in all kinds of ways and whatever. So much inefficiency, so much waste that then it doesn't function and everybody, you know, complains about it. But it becomes politically very sensitive because there are definitely vested interests linked to it now and it becomes very hard to unravel it.
Now the problem is if you ask typically a World Bank or an IMF for advice, they will make it very simple and say, Oh, just privatize the whole thing and do the whole thing. Now. You know that in a politically sensitive environment, you just can't privatize everything, so you privatize a little bit, but anything that's really with vested interests you won't touch. But these are the inefficient bits. So the easy prey, you privatize, and that's someone else making even more money off it because it's actually the efficient part of those systems that gets privatized, and then the inefficient part is still there and costs even more money. And so what I think these outsiders could do better is to have a better understanding of Nigeria's political economy, which is complicated at the best of times, but really understand, where can we start actually touching on something that we are beginning to touch on something vested interests that we begin to unravel a little bit some of the kind of underlying problem of, you know, politically connected business, you know, all the way to party financing or whatever...that you need to start unraveling somehow, where actually the underlying causes of inefficiency lie. Because the underlying causes of inefficiency are not just technical, they're actually not just economic. The underlying causes are these kinds of things. So I think why the outsiders did what they did at that time, it actually suited the government at the time, the technocratic ministers, that's the best they could do because that was the only mandate they had. Together with the outsider, they'd say, Well, that's certainly something we could do. But actually, fundamentally, you didn't really change that much. You don't still have then wherever it goes a bit bad, I'll get six or whatever exchange rates, and I'll get all kinds of other macroeconomic poor management, and, of course, nothing can happen when there's a crisis. There's no way we can do these more micro sector-specific reforms than doing it. So yeah, you're absolutely right. But let's not underestimate how hard it is. But starting to do the things that you refer to is where we need to get to to doing some of these difficult things.
Tobi;
The way I also read your book is that the two classic problems of political economy are still present, which is, the incentive and the knowledge problem. So I want to talk about the role of knowledge and ideas here. Let's even suppose that a particular group of elites at a particular time are properly incentivized to pursue a development bargain. Right? Sometimes the kind of ideas you still find floating around in the corridors of power can be quite counterproductive. A very revealing part of your book for me was when you were talking about the role of China. Also, I have no problem with China. The anecdote about Justin meme stood out to me quite well, because I could relate to it personally because I've also been opportuned to be at conferences where Justin Lin spoke, and I was slightly uneasy at how much simplification happens. I mean, just to digress a little bit, there was a particular presidential candidate in the just concluded primaries of the ruling party, I'm not going to mention the name, who is quite under the heavy influence of the China model. Right? Always consults with China, always meeting with Chinese economists and technocrats. And my reaction when he lost the primaries was ''thank god,'' right? Because what I see mostly in development thinking locally, I don't mean in academic circles, a lot of debates are going on in academics... is that the success of China and Asia more broadly has brought the State primarily into the front and centre.
If you look at this current government, they will tell you seven years ago that they meant well. You know, judging by the Abba Kyari anecdotes where government should own the means of production. He may not believe that, like you said, truthfully, but you can see the influence of what has been called ''state-led development.'' In a state where there is no capable bureaucracy. The government itself is not even optimized to know the problem to solve or even how to solve that particular problem. Right. So broadly, my question is, if an elite chooses to pursue a development bargain, how does it then ensure that the right ideas, which lead to the right kind of policies, and maybe there might not even be the right policies - one of the things you mentioned is changing your mind quickly, it's an experimental process - but, you know, this process needs people who are open to ideas, who change their minds, who can also bring other people in with different ideas, you know, so this idea generation process in a development bargain, how can it be stable even if you have an elite consensus is that chooses to pursue development?
Stefan;
Look, it's an excellent question. And last week, or 10 days ago, when it was in Bangladesh, I was very struck that, you know, as a country I think that has the development bargain, there was a lot of openness. And you know, I was in the Ministry of Finance, and people had a variety of ideas, but they were all openly debated, there was not a kind of fixed mindset. And it is something that I've always found a bit unfortunate dealing with both politicians and senior technocrats in Nigeria. Nigeria is quickly seen as the centre of the world, there's nothing to learn from the rest of the world, we'll just pick an idea, and then we'll run with it and there's nothing that needs to be checked. And, you know, I love the self-confidence, but for thinking and for pursuit of ideas, you know, looking around and questioning what you hear whether you hear it from Justin Lin, who by the way, I don't think he's malign and he means well, he just has a particular way of communicating but it is, of course, a simplified story that you can simply get, and then you'll pick it up. And of course, if you ask the UK Government, the official line from London, they will also tell you there is only one model when they're purely official, but privately they will be a bit more open-minded, and maybe Chinese officials don't feel they have that freedom to privately encourage you to think a bit broader and so you have maybe a stricter line. So how do we do that? I think we can learn something here from India in the 1970s and 1980s. So when India after independence, it had a very strict set of ideas. In that sense, India was as a child of its time as a state, you know, state control, state-led development, there were strong views around it and India ended up doing a lot of regulation. They used to refer to India as the License Raj. Like a whole system based around licensing and everything was regulated by the state. So the state had far too much say in terms of the activity, despite the fact that the underlying economy was meant to be very entrepreneurship and commerce-led, but you had a lot of licensing rules, and so on. And of course, its growth stayed very low in the 1970s and 80s, it was actually very stagnant. It changed in the 1990s. Partly came with a crisis - in fact, a balance of payments crisis - it needs to reform and Manmohan Singh was the finance minister, then, later on, he became maybe a less successful Prime Minister. But as a finance minister in the early 90s, he did quite amazing things. And then during the 90s, gradually, every party started adopting a much more growth-oriented, more outward-oriented type of mindset.
Now, why do I say this? Because actually, during the 1970s, and 80s, you had think-tanks, all the time pushing for these broader ideas. It took them 20 years. But there were really well-known think-tanks that kept on trying to convince people in the planning commission, economists in the universities and so on. And to critically think, look, there must be other ways. So actually, funnily enough, in India, it has a lot to do with the thinking and the public debates, that initially the politicians didn't take up, but actually found the right people to influence... you know, you actually have still in the civil service some decent technocrats there, they don't get a chance. But there are decent people, I know some of them and so on. But there needs to be a feeding of these ideas. And actually, this is where I would almost say there's a bit of a failing here, in the way the public discourse is done [in Nigeria] and maybe voices like you, but also more systematically from universities from think tanks and so on to actually feed and keep on feeding these ideas. There is a suggestion [by] Lant Pritchett - you know he's a former Harvard economist, he is now in the UK - [who] wrote this very interesting paper and he said, some of these think tanks who are actually getting a little bit of aid money here and there and he said, that's probably the best spent aid money in India ever. Because the rate of return and he calculates this number is like 1,000,000%, or something. Because he basically says the power of ideas is there. And I do think there is something there that I'm always surprised by that there are some very smart Nigerians outside the country, they don't really get much of a hearing inside the country, then there are some that are actually inside the country, the quality of debate is maybe not stimulated to be thinking beyond. It has to do probably with how complicated your country is, and of course, the Federal status plays a role. I just wonder whether maybe this is something that needs to start in particular states. You know, there are some governors that are a little bit more progressive than others. Maybe it is actually increasing and focusing attention over this on a few states to get the debate up to a high level and to actually see what they can do and maybe it's where the entry point is, but you need ideas I agree with you and I do worry at times about the kind of critical quality... there are some great thinkers in Nigeria, don't get me wrong, but the critical quality of ideas around alternative ways of doing the economy and so on, and that they get so easily captured by simple narrative, simple national narratives that are really just too simple to actually pursue. I mean...yeah.
Tobi;
That's quite deep. That's quite deep. I mean, just captures my life's mission right there. It's interesting you talked about Lant Pritchett and the question of aid, which is like my next line of question to you. There was this brief exchange on Twitter that I caught about the review of your book in the guardian, and the question of aid came up. I saw responses from Martin Ravallion, from Rachel Glennerster, I'm not sure I'm pronouncing her name right. So it's sort of then brings me to the whole question of development assistance, aid, and the way intervention has now been captured by what works. One fantastic example I got from your book is on Bangladesh, and how both systems work. You know, there's a broad development bargain, it's not perfect, nothing is, no society is. And there's the pursuit of economic growth. And also, it's a country where aid money and all forms of development assistance is quite active, and is quite huge, and it's actually quite effective. Now, my question is that basic insight from your book, which is for aid spending to be a little bit more biased, not your word... a little bit more bias to countries that have development bargains broadly? Why is that insight so difficult for, I should say, the international NGO industry to grasp? Why is it elusive? Because the status quo, which I would say, I don't mean to offend anybody, but which I will say is also aided by development economists and academics who have sort of put methodology and evidence above prosperity, in my view... because what you see is that, regardless of how dysfunctional the country is, broadly, the aid industry just carves out a nice niche where they do all sorts of interventions, cash transfers, chickens and, of course, you can always do randomized control trials and you say you have evidence for what works. But meanwhile you don't see the broad influence of some of these so-called assistants in the country as a whole. And these are institutions who proclaim that they are committed to fighting extreme poverty and we know what has vastly reduced poverty through history has always been economic growth and prosperity. So why is this elusive? Have those agencies and international development thinking itself been captured?
Stefan;
Look, I think I should make you do my interviews in the future. Yeah. So I've got to hire you to give...Because, look, I've been inside the aid industry and, in fact, the two people that you mentioned, you know, I would call them my friends, although one of them clearly is very cross at me at the moment. But you know, these are people I've worked with, and so on. And I am worried that there is such an obsession within the aid industry to prove their effectiveness. And I know I've been under pressure, you know, I've worked in it and sitting in London and getting your newspapers to say you're wasting all this money. It's really affecting a lot of people. And it was really hardwork for these 10 years that I sat inside it. But it's about just the humility that you just described, you know, and I want to make this distinction between...I'm about to make two distinctions. So the first one is - you made it well, even Bangladesh, something is going on. And you know, with all the imperfections, the government is trying to do something, and largely by staying to some extent out of the way. And there's some good stuff happening. So there's growth picking up and so on. So you can do all kinds of things. And I think aid in Bangladesh has been great at trying to make sure that the growth that was taking place in that country was a bit more inclusive than it probably would have been. I think it's great. And I think the aid industry should be proud of it. There is a great book that I quote as well also by Naomi Hossein and she calls it The Aid Lab and this is a bit like in praise of it. You know, if we do it carefully with some community and complement what's going on in a country that is deeply poor, you know, you can actually do really good things. Because in the book, I also mentioned Ghana that, actually, aid has been pretty effective because something had begun to change in the 90s, and so on. And we can question that to some extent and, of course, it's none of this perfection.
But if you then come to a country where, you know... probably the two of us agree [that] there is some form of stagnation in that kind of [country], there's no development bargain, the elite bargain doesn't really push everything forward. Just be humble to say, look, I have a little niche, and there will be some chicken farmers that are happier, we'll do some good things in health... in health, actually, it's quite straightforward to do good things. But they are to call these good things, don't classify this as if you are leading the fight against extreme poverty, leading the fight against the change in these countries. Because, actually, if the local elite is not leading their change, and those people who have the power and influence not leading their change, the best you can do is doing good things. So I'm happy for us to be able to say we do good things. And it led me in the context of an interview to say like in India, as doing a lot of good things means that aid was actually in itself quite irrelevant, because the real change came, as I described in the 90s, actually, there was a real shift in gear, and suddenly their own development spending became gradually more effective. And of course, you can help them then to make it more effective. But, you know, I was a bit sad, and Martin Ravallion now took issue with it and wanted to emphasize... you know, and I don't want us to ever say, look, we did it. I mean, it's such a lack of humility I'll say this. At some point, we may have been supportive of doing it, but it's always the countries that did it. And the people there that did it. And other times just be humble and say, well, we may be doing something reasonably good, we may improve health outcomes, education outcomes, but not necessarily the whole country may do it in the schools that we work in, or whatever. And it's, that's good, you know, that's just as there are Nigerians that do good things via their own organizations and so on, they do good things. And it's probably teachers in the country, within the state schools that do some of these good things in the best practice stuff. And so yeah, they improve things, but overall, have the humility to say you're not changing Nigeria, because unfortunately, Nigeria is not being changed at the moment.
Tobi;
So my question then would be, is it reflective of the current intellectual climate in development economics where randomized control trials, they pursue...I know Lant Pritchett has really come down quite heavily on this particular movement, though, sometimes he seems to be the only one standing, maybe not quite literally true and I'll give you two examples from Nigeria, right? In 2012, when the anti subsidy-removal protests broke out, when the government on the first day of January removed fuel subsidy and prices suddenly went up. And the labour movement, the student movement, opposition politicians mobilized the population against that particular move. Some form of resolution that the current president at that time reached was to do what they call a partial removal of subsidy, you know, prices will go up a little bit and the government then did a scheme - an entrepreneurship scheme - where you submit a business plan and you're paid to get $50,000 to do a business.
And I read a particular study by David Evans of the World Bank of how fantastically successful this particular scheme was, and of course, no doubt, it was successful. I mean, if you get $50,000 to do business in Nigeria, that's a lot of money. I don't need econometric analysis to know that, but maybe some people do. But the truth is, if you look today, I can bet you that a lot of those businesses are probably dead now due to how the economy as sort of evolved after that.
Secondly, at the time we were having these debates and protests in 2012, the subsidy figure there was $8 billion annually, today it is $15 billion. So if you say you have evidence that something works, what exactly is your time horizon for measuring what works? And if you say something works, works in whose benefit, really? The most recent example was in 2018, 2019, where the government was given a small amount of money to small retailers, they call it Trader Moni. I'm sure there were World Bank officials and economists (I have a lot of respect for them) who are measuring the effectiveness of this thing. But you could see clearly that what was politically going on was the government doing vote buying. Right? So if you say something work, works for whom? Right? That was my response to Rachel on Twitter, but she didn't reply me. My question then to you... Sorry, I'm talking too much... Is this reflective of the current intellectual climate in development economics?
Stefan;
So yes and no? Okay. So, well, i'm going to have to be very careful. Of course, Rachel...I know her very well. And, actually, I have not that many gripes with her. She comes out of, indeed, the whole school of RCTs. By the way, I also actually do RCTs. I like it as a tool to actually study things. And I'll explain in a moment a bit more. So I do these randomized control trials as well. But I am very, very sympathetic. And I actually totally agree with your frustration around this idea to creating that impression about what works. You know, I have it in the book, I even mentioned it, there was a particular minister that at some point announced we're only going to spend our money on what works, you know, like a great slogan, as if you have all the answers, you know what to do. And of course, there is a technical meaning to it. Technical meaning would mean, if I do something and if you haven't done it, what would have been the outcome? And the paper that you refer on the entrepreneurship, this entrepreneurship for the $50,000... I know actually the research very well, the original was from David McKenzie and then other people commenting on it. Yes, relative to a counterfactual, yes, it was actually much bigger than an alternative scheme, you know, then that's something. So you could say, well, you know, as a research question, as a researcher, I find it interesting. From a policy point of view, I'm so much more cautious. And I'm totally with you. You know, first of all, in the bigger scheme of things, how tiny maybe it be... now there are some people who would say, well, we don't know anything, really, what to do in this whole messy environment so at least [to] have something that does a bit better than other things is maybe a useful thing to know.
I think it comes back to that humility. As a research tool, it's great at getting exact answers. As a policy tool, I think we need to have much more humility. Because are these ideas tha totally transforms everything, that is actually makes a huge difference? Not really. It probably means that we can identify a little bit and I think even Pritchard wouldn't disagree with [that] sometimes a few things are a little bit better than other things. And if we want to do good, maybe it's helpful in medicine whether we know whether we should spend a bit more money on X or on Y, that it actually does a little bit better in the functioning of a health facility or not, if we spent a bit more money on that practice or on that practice, same in teaching in the school, if we do a little bit more of that in a very constrained environment than something else, that's useful, it doesn't change dramatically. And I categorize it with doing good. With humility, if we do good, it's helpful to know which things are a bit better than other things...when we try to do good. It's an interesting thing, even in Rachel's thread, she actually used it, we can still do quite a lot of good with aid. Actually, funnily enough, I don't disagree that deeply with her and say, Yeah, we may be able to do it good, but don't present it as if we, in the bigger scheme of things, which is where you're getting that, make any difference. And this is where I'm also sympathetic with Lant in saying, Look, sometimes we seem to be focusing on the small trivial things and yeah, it's useful to know but meanwhile the big picture is what you were describing, there's so much going on and, actually, nothing changes there.
And so I categorize it in a bit of the same thing. Because I'll now give you an account, which is then go to Bangladesh again. Look, I think it was extremely useful in Bangladesh at some point to really have ... an RCT - a randomized control trial. So really careful evidence to show that a particular program that BRAC, the biggest NGO in the world, the local NGO, was actually what it was actually doing to the ultra-poor. In fact, two weeks ago, I was visiting the program again. And I find it really interesting because it's really helpful for BRAC to know that that program, when I do it in a careful evaluation relative to other things, that actually this program is really effective. And that, actually, we know for BRAC that they can have so much choices to spend their money on poverty alleviation, the things that we can dream up, to actually know this is actually a really good thing. And why of course does it work? Well, it works relative to doing nothing, but of course, it helps in Bangladesh {that] growth is taking place and it actually can get people to become [a big] part of it. In fact, I was visiting people that, whether we use a Nigerian or Bangladeshi definition of extreme poverty, they wouldn't have been in that state 10 years ago and so this is their being six, seven years in that program, and it was really interesting that I was sitting into some interviews they were doing, and I looked over my shoulder, and they now had a TV and a fridge. And I say, okay, an extremely poor person in Bangladesh would not have had this. So there's clearly something happening. Now, that's not simply because of the program. It's also because the whole country is improving. But I'm pretty sure and what the data showed is that those who actually had a program would have found it a bit easier to take part in that progress. And I'm pretty sure that the TV, and the fridge, probably was helped, to some extent, by the programme. In fact, we have very good evidence in the kind of evidence that Rachel Glennerster talks about.
So again, I think it's all about a bit of humility, and understanding better what we mean by it. And to be honest, I think there are lots of people who work in that field that are careful with it. And that actually will do it, use it well. It gets just really worrying that people, often more junior people than Rachel, they've never really been in the field properly and then they make massive statements. So they work in big organizations, and they use that evidence, overuse it and overstate it. I think Rachel is actually careful, even her thread was very careful, although your question is a very good one. But it's very careful. But it still allows other people to overinterpret this whole thing. And then I get really worried. I'm actually going to put out a thread on Twitter in the coming days where I'm going to talk about tribalism in development economics... where I'm good to deal with your question as well because I think the way the profession has evolved is that you need to be in one tribe or another, otherwise, you're not allowed to function. I think, you know, you need to be eclectic, you know, no one has this single answer. And there's too much tribalism going on, much more than I've ever known before. You know, you need to be Oh, a fan of that, or you need to be the historical approach, or the Political Economy approach, and the whole... we should learn from all these bits. That's the idea of knowledge that you learn from... as much as possible from the progress in different parts of a discipline, or in thinking.
Tobi;
I'm glad to have caught you on a free day because having a lot more time to have this conversation has made it quite rich for me personally, and I'm sure for the audience as well. So I just have a couple more questions before I let you get back to your day. The first of those would be...um, when I first became aware of your book on Twitter, it was via a Chris Blattman thread. And he mentioned something that I have also struggled with, both personally in my thought and, in my conversation with people. And something you have alluded to earlier is pressure from the bottom. So the question that I'm sure an average Nigerian right now is grappling with is what can they do? What can they do to affect the system? The sad reality in a certain context is that a few people run the country and they sort of decide the direction with which the country go. Bureaucrats in Abuja can decide what happens to your business in Lagos or in Onitsha or in Katsina or wherever. So the question then becomes, what can you do as someone who is not a member of that select few to affect the system? And I want to put that question to you that the generic common man, what can they do?
Stefan;
I think there are several things that we can still do, of which the first one is that we keep on debating, and we keep on talking. I mean, the example I gave from India, you know, there is a power of ideas. And there is a power of both convincing young people who, in Nigeria, are increasingly dominating the electorate. So I think people can still do quite a lot. So the first thing I would say is that conversations we're having, they matter. When I referred to earlier, also, what was happening in India during the 1980s - the debating, the discussing, the kind of thinking about alternative options. We're not talking about fundamentally, you know, political upheaval, or you know, this is not about coups, this is not about revolution, this is actually about persuading key people in powerful positions to open themselves for ideas that are more developmental, that are more growth-oriented. And I would say It has to be about, for example, getting to a situation where we're buying more from Nigeria than just oil. That we are willing to start asking ourselves, is the nature of the link between politics and the economy the right one? How politics is financed and so on. But you begin bit by bit, because you'll need to have key people in whose interest it, also, is seen to be that there is this change. So I think in Nigeria, it's definitely going to be about a changing political class or an evolving political class, you know, lots of people would say, look, the current two candidates, the last time of that generation will probably fight it out. You know, there's a new generation coming, hopefully, it will be a bit younger than just a few years, and so on. And so you start getting bits of this renewal, but it's making sure there is enough ideas and about openness and not making it too simple. You know, none of this is going to be easy. None of this is going to be quick, because it's going to be choices. And basically, I think what we should be doing is that, because we are at a moment going through very high oil prices, so central bank is laughing all the way and it's easy for the macroeconomy. But every time when it's this wave of high prices, or the next one of high oil prices, of course, this one is combined with other issues as well, in global prices, and other things...but whenever the macro economy has a bit of that space to actually prepare ourselves to do a little bit more sensible things with it, things that are not driven by ideology, but by pragmatism. Things that are willing to start taking on some of the difficult things than not. So these ideas need to be planted now even if we only start doing them, maybe not during the next presidency but the one afterwards. And that's also what I think really could work in Nigeria is having some governors that actually within the space they have, and they have some space and have a bit more space than they sometimes dig, but actually doing sensible things. And you know, trying to, for example, do another type of politics, a politics of legitimacy, where they want to be reelected based on a platform of delivery rather than reelected on a platform of vote banks or party finance, and so on.
So you'll begin to work on that. So it's basically a mixture of realism, but making sure the power of ideas, with bits of accountability. Because we talked earlier about learning and ideas. But learning actually is a form of accountability, being willing to say, I'm actually wrong, and I need to change my mind. And so it's a form of building up a little bit better the way these debates, maybe, the way civil society works, and so on. I really think that actually organizing also among civil servants, I thought one of the very interesting things that was in Bangladesh is that actually civil servants in their own private time connected themselves with young people in other sectors, and so on. And they debated. They're not breaking any rules or regulations. But they were trying to get themselves organized. I was the guest of Youth Policy Forum that in a couple of years now has 30,000 members on Facebook. And they were actively debating what a new economy could look like, what actually an upgrading of their economy could look like, what sectors it would look like, and so on, and actually having quite in-depth discussions on industrial policy and so on, in ways that I was very surprised by. So it's basically finding ways of connecting and talking. And then, you know, young people in Nigeria are the power in the end, you know, they increasingly are the voters as well, and to try to see whether one can get a little bit forward. So I think it's to do with where you sit, the quality of debate, but it's also probably about the quality of organization, and not just debate for the sake of debating which I think happens a lot in Nigeria, but actually organizing and actually thinking: where do we find areas of consensus and organizing yourselves, and this is not in a revolutionary sense but just in an influencing sense. I was struck in Bangladesh that with a one week notice they organized the discussion about my book with this Youth Policy Forum, but they managed to get the chief economic adviser of the President to be there, and six MPs, all with a week's notice. You know, I thought that's actually quite powerful. And the reason they turned up was not because of me, but because this group of 30,000 people had organized it and they have so much Facebook coverage and so on, and they do high-quality debates. So it's things like that, that actually people can do and I think there is more future to that. And I don't see it enough coming from Nigeria, or maybe I'm missing it. Maybe it is there. But I think that's influential.
Tobi;
Final question before I let you go. What's your one big idea for... I know the big idea from your book is the development bargain. Trust me, you may not know it yet, but that's quite a powerful idea that will be quite influential in the years to come. But what are all the big ideas on how countries, particularly from a policy perspective... if you want to pursue a development bargain, what are the first set of things as a rough sketch that you should get right, in terms of policy?
Stefan;
So the one big lesson is, and that would be for Nigeria and also for some of the other countries is that... it sounds maybe like an old lesson, but it gets a different meaning in this context, and this is about every economy needs to find its growth engines. The whole power of encouraging a growth engine that involves the world as the market rather than your own economy as the market is, in my view, still more powerful than we may have understood for a long time. For a long time, people said, Oh, you need to export because you probably need to have foreign exchange, and you need to do something in the economy. What I see very powerful in Bangladesh, in an economy, in a society where politics is very messy, which is not as strongly ruled as Korea was during its time of progress or Taiwan was - but actually have this weak, relatively tricky politics, not a very functional state, not a very strong state, and a lot of corruption around as well - by having to sell to the world and making that a really big part of what you do, proved an incredibly powerful disciplining device for the elite, [and] for actually keeping the course going. So Bangladesh got itself locked in almost into selling garments to the world, you know, 95% of its exports are readymade garments, they're a massive success. But it also means now, they really can't allow the exchange rates to become overvalued. Which actually means you'll see very few Mercedes and BMWs on the streets of Bangladesh. You'll see very few Bangladeshi elites that can send their children to school in London, or to Eton or to Harrow. You basically have the strong incentives to keep a competitive exchange rate which means imports are expensive. And so it gives that incentives for its domestic economy to actually start doing things. So it's this power of actually being export-oriented, therefore needing to keep a competitive exchange rate so you need to sell abroad, that now has a further influence on your domestic economy that you have actually an extra incentive to actually start producing things for your local markets because imports are expensive.
So it's an old idea of export orientation. But actually, it's a brilliant disciplining device for your elites. And I do think it matters for Nigeria. Because that's where it all the time goes on. Every time the old price goes up. you allow your exchange rate to become cheaper, you basically overvalue so imports become cheaper. And every time that the price goes down, you have no way of correcting it. And so actually, we all the time do things in the interest of the elite. But actually, you know, I think my big idea in terms of policy is to really become much stricter on that. And the only way to do it is to really... if you do industrial policy, do it focused on some export products, trying to sell something else from Nigeria. I look forward to the day that I go and walk in a shop here and I see ''Made in Nigeria.'' I will be a very happy person because it's a sign for me that actually you're getting closer to a development bargain in Nigeria.
Tobi;
That's a good answer. We are trying our best here to make sure the right people understand that message because policy right now is captured by this idea of self-sufficiency. You see central bank governors, and even industrialists, saying we have this 200 million population, a large internal market, we really don't need to sell anything to the world.
Stefan;
I think Bangladesh has 165 million people.
Tobi;
Yeah, China has 1.3 [billion people].
Stefan;
It's obsessed with trying to sell to the world and it's looking for the next thing. It's looking all the time for the next thing it can sell to the world.
Tobi;
So thank you so much, Stefan, for doing this with me. It has been a thoroughly enjoyable experience for me personally.
Stefan;
It's been very enjoyable for me too.
This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe -
I was thrilled to get a chance to talk about cities with Alain Bertaud - he has been one of the most important thinkers in urban planning for the past fifty years. His book Order Without Design is a must-read and an excellent summary of his research (conducted in collaboration with his wife Marie-Agnes, an urban planning scholar in her own right) project with aim of bridging the gap between urban planning and urban economics. Alain is a brilliant and generous teacher who has greatly influenced me - I hope my questions have done their bit to honour him.
Transcript
Tobi;
Welcome to Ideas Untrapped podcast and my guest today is legendary urban planner, Alain Bertaud, welcome to the show, sir, it's an honour to speak to you.
Alain;
Thank you very much for inviting me, I'm quite honoured.
Tobi;
You are aware that some of the biggest cities into the future are going to be in the so-called low-income countries, because urbanization is exploding in cities like Lagos, Kinshasa, and these cities are a bit different from some of the cities in other places around the world, especially in the West, you know, in that they are lower-income, they are a bit congested, they don't have much density, and, it's a challenge for such cities having to host that many people. Now, if I may ask you, what would you say the problem has been in making some of these cities work? Are we seeing a failure of markets or planning or a bit of both?
Alain;
I think that there are sometimes market failures. But I think that there has been a neglect of infrastructure. For me, a city, and that's something common to all the cities of the world, whether they are, you know, in Europe, in America, in Africa, or Asia, the main things for cities are labour markets, that's why people go to cities to find a job. And that is why a big firm will go to Lagos. They will go to Lagos, rather than a small town somewhere. They will go to Lagos because they will find in Lagos people who are competent in whatever they want to do. They will find a large labour force, you will have a lot of choices. And so if I am a migrant living in a small village somewhere in Africa, and not necessarily Nigeria, I may want to go to Lagos because I know there are a lot of jobs there. So if we accept that a city is a labour market, the most important things are two things.
First is transport. You should be able to move in this large city. Within an hour, you should be able, ideally, to go from one side to another side, in order to find the job you want and change jobs. You know, changing job also is very important. That's why company town, you know… sometimes you have a mining town or a town developed around a steel mill or something, and then everybody there is working for one employer - the mine or the steel mill, this is not very good, because you have no chance of changing jobs. I think the advantage of very large cities like Lagos or Abidjan or Dakar, is that there are so many employers that you can fill your way, you know, you can change jobs and learn things from other people, that's what's a city.
Now, what should the planning be? Planning should be transport, you know, there should be a system of transport. And when I say transport, I don't mean necessarily a subway, I mean, subway sometimes is necessary, but not always. It could be informal transport, you know, the different minibuses, for instance, so things like that which are private. But the planners often consider them as a nuisance, you know, that they are a little messy, they stop everywhere. Sometimes they don't follow the rules very much. But if they are there, it's because there are people who prefer to take this informal thing rather than a regular bus. So we have to take them into account. And we have to make them more efficient, you know, by having specific stops where they can stop which is wide enough and things like that rather than eliminating them.
So the first thing is transport. The goal is to allow people to move from one part of the city to another in less than one hour. Now, in a very large city like Lagos, I suppose it's a bit like Mexico City, you will find that this is impossible right now [to move] from one side of the city to [the other], you know, let's say you go from north to south, it may take you three hours to go there. The goal is to decrease this time, you know, [and] how do you decrease this time so that you can have access? Any individual should have access to the maximum number of jobs. And it's the same for the employer. You know, the employer, when they look for employees, if they move to Lagos, suddenly they need somebody with specialized, I don't know, a welder, for instance, somebody who is very specialized in something. They want to have a choice between competent people. If the transport system works well, they will have a choice between 100 welders and they will select what is best for their company. So transport is the most important thing and you have to take into account informal transport, you know, this is very important. You cannot just say the best will be to have a subway or... you know, it's possible that the subways might be necessary but it's only one part of the transport system. You cannot pretend that one day everybody will move by subway, or municipal buses, or even ferries or things like that.
All these modes of transport have to be combined and thought together, including cars, by the way. Many of my colleagues now are dreaming of cities without cars, I don't think it can work because first you have freight, and you have certain jobs which cannot be done without a car, you know, if you are a plumber, or if you are an electrician, you have to move around with your material, you cannot take a subway… if you are a plumber, you know, with your bathtub or something like that. So a large city has acquired a lot of freight, you know, you have restaurants, you have bars, you need to bring food to those restaurants, to [bring] bottles of beers, something like that. So you need a transport system which accommodates all modes of transport. Some of my colleagues have a preferred means of transport that they love, you know, say light train, tramway, or bicycle, or scooters, or whatever, or subway, or monorail. And I think that it's possible that a monorail is a good thing, but it will be only a small component, you know.
So the job of the planner is to accommodate all these different modes of transport. And if people prefer to take even a taxi motorcycle for instance, which I think in many countries of Africa, I'm sure in Lagos it exists too, you have to accept that this is the best way for some people, not everybody, but for some people. So you have to also accommodate that and say, Well, what do we do for them to reduce, for instance, reduce the pollution they cause but also reduce accident, make them more convenient, because those means of transport are serving certain groups of people who have no choice, who cannot afford it, or who live in a part of the city which is not served by the normal transport.
So transport is very important and transport has to be multimodal, and you have to look at it. The other thing which is very important in every city is housing. People move to the city from the countryside or from another city, and they look for a job, but they have to find housing. And very often, I think [for] many of the cities in Africa, but also in Asia, or even in Europe, they didn't welcome the migrants, they considered that the migrants are a nuisance, you know, because usually, they are relatively poor. Some of them are coming from the countryside, so they do not have the skills. You know, they have skills, but they are raw skills, which are not necessarily very useful in the city. So they have to learn skills. The city has to welcome those people because they are the labour force of the future. They are the ones who are going to pay taxes in the future. You cannot import only people who have PhDs or things like that, I mean, those are very useful, too.
But we have seen that during the pandemic. During the pandemic suddenly I remember in New York, but everywhere else, people were saying indispensable people, who are the indispensable people? And we found that the indispensable people were not professors like me, they were people who were delivering food in grocery stores, they were indispensable. They are indispensable for the life of the city. So that's why they have to be welcome too, you know, and for that they need housing. So they need housing, they need land. I think that the big mistake that many cities have done, again, everywhere in Europe, as well as in Asia, or in South Africa, by the way, is to concentrate too much on housing, and not enough on infrastructure.
I think what planners need to do is to let people build whatever they want even if it's a shack, but provide clean water supply, provide sewers, and some services like health [centres] and schools, and let people build whatever they want on the lot, even on the very small lot. In my book, I have an example in Indonesia what they call the Kampung development which were villages which were absorbed by the city, and you know, if they were very poor, they will have a lot which is only 15 square meters, and they will build a house of 10 square meters with corrugated iron and bamboo and then that's it. This is okay, providing they have clean water supply and that the dirty water is evacuated. What is terrible is to live in an area where the garbage accumulates, children play in dirty water and there are no health facilities at all or schools.
So, to me, the criterion of a successful city is how long do they take to absorb a migrant, a migrant who is coming from the rural area, who has no skills, he has only his arms or her arms. And how long does it take to absorb them so that they can get an urban job where they are very productive for the city and then contribute to the welfare of the city. So some cities have tried to measure it a bit informally and some cities take one or two generations. You have one or two generations of migrants living in extreme poverty, very often being sick because they live in very unhealthy neighbourhoods, and it takes two generations to be absorbed. In other cities, in some cities of Asia that I know, in half a generation, those people are absorbed. So for me, how quickly you can absorb these people in the city life is a sign of success that you can measure. Now, the attitude very often of the housing board or people in government involved in housing, is to say, well, these are poor people, let us be nice to them and build really nice houses for them. So they build kind of a walk-up apartment, or five, six-storey or something like that. And the problem with that is sometimes they are well designed, most of the time badly designed. But when they are well designed, they are too expensive. So the government, instead of delivering one million lot a year to absorb those migrants, they deliver 500 houses. So the houses are nice, you know, they have electricity, they have plumbing, but 500 houses do not solve any problem at all for all the others.
So I think that you have to give up the idea of building houses. And this is not very popular, by the way. Politicians like to say, we are going to have one... usually, they say 1 million houses, and then they end up building on the 5000. And they call the press, they build a simple building and they say, you see everybody in the city now is going to be entitled to a house like that, and then never get built. And then we are back to square one. So I think we have to be very realistic, we have to accept poverty, we have to accept that there is a lot of difference in income in a city and we have to concentrate the resources of the government on the few things which are important, like water supply, sewer and things like that. Not, you know, not having an ideal city.
And poverty is something which is temporary. For instance, I used to work in Korea, a long time ago, you know, Korea, in 1968-70 I think had about the GDP of Mali, you know, it has about the same and then what happened? And suddenly now it's an industrialized country. They absorbed migrants very intelligently, I think the absorbed migrants and the area which were slums are well developed, you know, you still have neighbourhoods which were former slums which have been developed. So you see, poverty is a temporary phenomenon. It's not a permanent one. And you have to accept it when it happens. But then slowly make the people employed, so slowly, they will emerge from poverty. You don't address the problem of poverty by giving say somebody who has an income of, let's say, $300 a year to give this person a house, which costs you know, $50,000 is not going to solve poverty because you will not give very many houses like that to them. And probably those houses are going to go to people of much higher income very soon. So you see where infrastructure is always useful for everybody. So that's my attitude, those two things. First, the people who live in the city are the ones who are going to make this city so the infrastructure has to serve this. And the infrastructure, in particular the roads, has to give access to a lot of land even if the cities sprawl, so that everybody has access to a piece of land where they can build something. If originally they build a shack which is not very nice,[it] doesn't matter providing they have an infrastructure which allows them to stay healthy, and to have access to jobs eventually. So then they will themselves either move to another neighbourhood or build something which is better. Again, I think my chapter on the Kampung in Indonesia in my book illustrates this very well.
Tobi;
I'm going to come back to cities as labour markets later, which is one of the most powerful insights I got from your book. So we're talking about housing. For example, in Nigeria, it is popularly reported that we have a housing deficit of 17 million households, there are many independent estimates that put the number higher than that. So how do we, especially, in the face of rapidly increasing urbanization… how do we increase urban housing at a big enough scale? Do we have to democratize land markets in some of these cities? For example, in Nigeria, we have a Land Use Act that places the ownership of land solely in the hands of government, though there is an informal land market but it's, of course, largely informal. So do we have to democratize ownership? And would you say the ideas of Hernando de Soto will be useful here, like, we need to absorb more people into the formal land registry?
Alain;
Right, yeah, I like your idea of democratizing the land market. That's exactly what you have to do. Now how do you do that? I will give you an example. In Indonesia where I worked again, when the government started investing in the Kampungs, which were slums at the time, you know, pretty bad slumps, actually, but providing the infrastructure in those slums, you know, I was working for the World Bank at the time. And we insisted that they should survey this informal area, and give tenure to everybody, even people who had only say 10 square meters of land. And then the Indonesian told us, that will cost a lot of money, it will be very, very long to do because, you know, all the streets are crooked and things like that it's very difficult to survey. And they say, why don't we just accept the informal market. And it took a long time for us to accept, and then we accepted it. And then we realized that after people were giving water, you know, clean running water in those slums, they had a bill to pay for water. And the bill was a substitute for tenure because they have an address. You have an informal market which becomes formal, because it was legal, because people could do it. So you have to legalize. It doesn't mean necessarily that we have to have a registry in the cadastral, in the formal cadastral, because that may take 20 years.
In a way, the Kampung in Indonesia, you could consider an entire neighbourhood as a condominium. So it's a condominium and within this condominium, you establish the rules which are specific to the condominium. And then let people trade. They know what is the boundary of their lot, usually, they're very small. And everybody knows that and says, if you have three or four witnesses, you will have a piece of paper. And little by little, then you could formalize it. But I think that recognizing the informal trading of land, making it legal, and including, by the way, we found then in the Kampung that even banks now accept as a title, just the water bill. you know, there is a water bill, Mr So and so during last five years had paid this water bill at this address, and you know, you don't have the former survey, but you know, the lot is, say 50 square meter, and a bank will accept that as collateral, because it's recognized by the government, it's not going to be bulldozed.
The problem with informal settlements is that sometimes the government will just go through and bulldoze that area, or put a highway through, and do not compensate people because they do not recognize the legitimacy of their claim. And so if you do that, then, of course, you create an enormous uncertainty on tenure. You do not encourage people to invest in their own neighbourhood. And of course, banks will never touch it, because you know, if they learn something, and then a highway goes through and there is no compensation. So I think that integrating the informal sector, not necessarily making it formal in the sense that they have to follow the same rule as the formal, but have special role for the informal sector to make it legal. And then look at land use regulation. That's been my problem all over the world. And that's true, by the way, in New York or Paris, that there are standards for housing which are not really reflective of what people want.
For instance, in New York, the government imposed by regulation, larger apartments than what people want. You know, there are a lot of people now in New York who are living alone who are a small couple with only one child or no child and the regulation do not reflect that, that those people will be very happy to live in a studio and they are not allowed to build a studio. So I think it's the same in developing countries. If you are poor, you can live with your family in 10 square meters, but if that 10 square meters is close to jobs and have, again, access to clean water, and if there is a school nearby, this is what is important. And you should be able to live there legally, you know, legally without the threat of being exploited or things like that.
And again, you know, you were mentioning at the beginning housing deficits, right. I don't believe in housing deficit. Deficit is only, what is your minimum standard for a house? Have you measured all the houses in Lagos to know which ones are below the standard? And what are your minimum standards? You know, is it 10 square meters? Is it 100 square meters? Do you need two bathrooms? For instance, the UN have this thing, I think you have to have, I think it's one room per person or one-half person per room or something like that. And if it's below that, it's a slum, and it's informal. It's a deficit in the housing, I don't think it is. By definition, all the people who live in Lagos live in something they can afford. The problem with housing is that they can afford very, very little, and there's no water and no electricity, maybe, I don't know. And so you have to increase the consumption of housing of the people who are already living there, it is not a question of saying this is not housing, we need to build a new house somewhere to compensate for this house.
So I think that the idea of deficit, you know, doesn't lead you to good policy. It's too abstract. You could say, you know, in Lagos, for instance, we can produce only, I don't know, 20 litres of clean water per capita, per day. And so we want, of course, to increase it to, for instance, 60 or 80 or 100. And then you will need to bring more clean water or use more clean water in Lagos, that's legitimate. Let's say you have a deficit of water in the sense that you want to increase the consumption of water. Now, when you do that, you will have to look at the income distribution curve within the city, you know, but in my book, I have several of those curves, and you will have to see if you increase the supply of water in Lagos, you have to make sure that the ones who increase their consumption are the ones now who consume very little. And so you increase their consumption. So you have to measure the consumption of these different groups. Clearly to increase consumption is not to build more houses. And people will build [for] themselves more houses if there is enough land with infrastructure. So the goal of the city is to develop more land with infrastructure.
Tobi;
So urban planners are by nature very practical people, but I'm going to ask you a bit of an abstract question. Do you think part of the problem with this housing thing is that on some level we do not really respect or extend that abstract idea of property rights to poor people? Is that part of the problem?
Alain;
Absolutely. Absolutely. I think there is a paternalism, let's say, of the elite, who consider that poor people will always be dependent on a social program. And in a way, you have a society that largely lives on markets. But then you try to condemn the poor into a kind of non-market things, you know, like putting them in public housing or saying well, wait for public housing, we are going to provide you with public housing, you know, don't worry about it. So they are in a socialist system with no property rights. You know, their property rights is going to be given to them by the government, it's not something they will acquire by themselves. So you have these two societies, and then it creates a poverty trap for the poor, you know, they cannot escape because they never accumulate capital. They cannot invest in their own house because their house belongs to the government, [it] doesn't belong to them. So I think that, yes, it's a problem of poverty right. And very often also, many cities have colonized poverty right only if you have a lot developed very formally of a certain size, you know, they will not allow people to own land if the parcel is not at least 200 square meter or 500 square meters, I don't know. And this is not correct. You know, if somebody owns 100 square meters, you should recognize that this ownership is 100 square meters because if not, if you put this minimum threshold of ownership, that means you exclude from ownership half of the population of your city, and you make them live in a non-market economy while the rest of the economy is working on the markets.
Tobi;
Let's talk a bit about density. So when I travel to New York City, I enjoyed the fact that from my hotel, I can access a cafe, I can access the cinema, I can go to my appointments, possibly all within a walking distance of 15 to 20 minutes.
Alain;
Yes.
Tobi;
That is something that I don't have in my city. Sometimes if I want to see a movie from my house, I have to drive two, sometimes two and a half hours. So how can cities in... I don't like that phrase developing world, but that's what I'll use for now. I don't like it. So how can our cities, and by us I mean cities like Lagos and co., better optimize for density or [as] I'm also seeing, ideas by some other planners or thinkers in that space saying that perhaps some of these cities have to give up on the idea of density altogether? So?
Alain;
Controlling densities, yeah, you see, every land use regulation, control density, tend to put density down, always. You have a minimum lot size. So some people would like to have a small lot, but they are obliged to have a bigger lot because that's the regulation. And then you have the floor ratio or maximum height of buildings. I think that the height of buildings should be removed. So planners say ah, ah but if we do that, we will not have the infrastructure to serve higher densities. Infrastructure is much cheaper than land, always. Much cheaper than land. So what engineers are doing, they are saying, Hey, you have now a water pipe, which is only that big. Therefore, the density cannot be more than that, because we will not have enough water if the density increases. But they are making a trade-off between land and the price of your pipe. And land is more expensive, and more useful. So I think that if they let the density increase, of course, they have to have a system of taxation on land. But again, if they recognize the ownership of land to a lot of people, they can have a type of property tax or something like that which will allow them to have the resource to pay for the infrastructure. And it's always cheaper to increase the level of infrastructure in [an] existing area, to increase the capacity than to expand further away.
So if your regulation restricts densities, it means that people will have to build somewhere else, you know, further away. And they're not going to leave the city because the planners say the density here is restricted to that, they are going to stay there but they are going to live further away and at lower densities. So many of those regulations should be audited. I'm not saying that all regulations are bad, not at all, I think the markets need regulation. But the regulation which regulates consumption, that the people themselves can see... you know, if I go into a studio which is 20 square meter, I know it's 20 square meters, if I want to rent it to buy it, this is my business, the government do not have to tell me, No, no, a studio has to be certain square meter, or at least you cannot buy 20 square meters, this is absurd. Let the consumer decide what is best for them. Because then they can... you know, the problem you were mentioning, they can make a trade-off between living in a smaller house but closer to amenities, or a large house far away from everything, you know, some people may prefer that. So regulation restricts the choice. And of course, regulation, because they have this minimum consumption standards, if you look at the income distribution curve, those minimum construction housing standards have a cost. So they eliminate automatically, maybe 50% of the population from anything formal. You know, informality is really created by regulation. It's not created by anything else.
Tobi;
I want to talk about, perhaps, maybe, there is a kind of market failure in trying to deliver density. Devon Zuegel, I'm sure you're aware [because] she is your friend, wrote...
Alain;
She's my friend, yes.
Tobi;
She wrote a blog post a couple of days ago...
Alain;
I read it, yes.
Tobi;
Very interesting. I found it very interesting. And while read in that I, because i liked it...
Alain;
Yeah, Devon, in the last line of her thing [blog], she says, I have not discussed regulation. And my experience is that most of the inconsistencies or contradictions of densities in cities are due to regulations. And I will argue with her about that. You know, that she has to do a blog on regulation.
Tobi;
I would love to read that because while internalizing the idea she was putting forward, I thought about my street. So I live on a beautiful street. There is access to a major road and so many other amenities. it's gated well secured and all that. But we have just nine houses. Landlords built these huge compound houses. And I can't help but think, every time I go back and forth, that this is an area that can actually house a lot more people. So would you say that's a failure of markets because I think that equilibrium came to be because the first settlers on my streets prefer building for space as opposed to access?
Alain;
Yeah, but that's not a failure of markets. The market is a mechanism. It's not a god, it's not a religion, it's a mechanism. So here you have people in your compound who live there because they enjoy having low density. And I hope that they paid for it, they didn't steal the lot. So they paid for it? And so that reflects the market. At a certain point, if there is demand for higher density there, a developer will come to your compound and say, I'm making a deal with you, you know, I will give you that much money, and we are going to build more houses here. Unless. Unless there is a regulation which says you cannot have more houses there, or unless the water company tell you, we will never provide enough water in this area for higher density. You know, there are market failures, by the way, but I don't think that density is part of market failures. I think the market predicts rational densities if they are free to [build].
So let us talk about market failure. For instance, pollution is a market failure, you know, there is no way to decrease pollution directly through markets. I mean, you can do it by taxing polluting cars more than non-polluting cars, you know, this you can do, but you have to address it through market mechanism. But the market itself is not going to create a non-polluting thing. The same with global warming, you know, you have to price carbon. The government has to put a price on carbon because the market will not go into putting a price on carbon. That's clear. And then for major infrastructure, for instance, say, if a large city like Lagos needs more water, you know, enough water, clean water for everybody, you need major work to get the water somewhere - from a river, from a deep well, I don't know. And this major work is not going to be created by markets. The government could use a private company to do it. But the initiative has to come from the government, to say we need that many millions of cubic meters of water in the next 10 years. And our engineers say that to do that, we need to have, say, deep well, or whatever water plants, and that will cost that many million dollars. And that will be recovered from taxation. So it could be tax on land, it could be tax on income tax, I don't know. And then we have to do this major work somewhere in the city or in the suburb of the city where you will have the water plant. So all this is not done by markets, the total amount of water which will be brought to [households] has to be done by government, it has to be planned. And after, you will allow the land market to work. If you are allowed to put a network of pipes with water everywhere, including in areas which are not yet developed, including areas which have very low density but could not densify without more water.
Tobi;
Finally on housing before I move on, do you think that some of [the] newer propositions or technologies like blockchain, for example, hold any promise in terms of land registration, and generally democratizing property rights in cities?
Alain;
It's quite possible. I am not knowledgeable about [blockchain]. I'm very interested and intrigued by blockchain but I have not seen an example yet. But it's quite possible that yes, this could do it. Yes. You know, at the beginning I was talking about the problem of formal cadastral you know, the traditional property rights [that is] given the cadastral way [where] you have a surveyor from the government who starts taking [measuring] things, and this is very slow, it's very costly to do. It's possible that there are better ways of doing it. And it's possible that blockchain will be [it] but I've not seen an example yet, but it's possible and it might be a good way to start in a city like Lagos, just to try it, see [if it works].
Tobi;
Interesting. So let's talk about charter cities. I know you're very good friends with Paul Romer. I became intrigued by the idea when I first saw his presentation. And I've sort of followed how that idea developed. But first of all, why do you think some of these projects failed? The one in Honduras and Madagascar? Yeah. What do you think were the pitfalls?
Alain;
Because government were not ready to allow a [...] charter city, they saw that as just a new real estate development, and they thought that they could control it. And if the existing government control it, it means it's going to be a traditional city, it's not going to be a charter city. I think that in Honduras it was very clear. In Madagascar, I'm less aware of the details. But in Honduras, I follow the [development]. By the way, there are several new charter cities in Honduras now, I'm curious to see if they will succeed or not. Actually, Devon is involved in one of them. And I'm curious... sometimes I'm a little uneasy when I see that one of the first things that the promoter of a new charter city [does] is asking a big architect to put the design first. To me, a charter city is, again, developed land, and the possibility that you were talking about the beginning, democratising land ownership. That means that if you move to a charter city, and you want to open a small restaurant where you will sell sandwiches to workers, you should be able to either rent or buy a little piece of land where you will build your restaurant. You should not go through the government and say I want to open a restaurant, please give me a permit.
So for me, a charter city is first a layout of streets, not building, you know, it's a layout of streets where you can buy very small pieces of land. And you can buy some big one, you know, maybe a department store or an office building so they want a big lot, that's fine. But there should be small lots available to people who move there. Because, again, the indispensable people are not only bankers and architects and lawyers. Indispensable people are the people making sandwiches. And so I think that one of the problems is that they have to start with the layout, and making land available to all sorts of people, including very small lots. And I think that will work.
Now, my argument was Paul for the first part of your question, but when we first discuss it, you know, when we started working together, and he told me, well, we think that we could do 50 charter cities, you know. My first reaction is, cities are dictated by location and there are no more locations for 50 cities. The good locations are all taken. So if you want to start from scratch, you go to the countryside, and, you know, you have some farmers there even and you say, Oh, the land is very cheap there because there is nothing, why don't we do a charter city? In Lagos land is so expensive. Don't forget that a city is people, it's not the sewers. You're not going to move to a city because it has a nice sewer system, you are going to move to a city because there are jobs, because there are other people you want to work with or be friends with. So the problem with any new city is, who is the first one? Would you leave Lagos for, let's take NEOM in Saudi Arabia (the city that the Saudis want to build)
Tobi;
Yeah.
Alain;
So if I told you, okay, in NEOM we could give you a house for $50,000 and it has this fantastic infrastructure. Would you leave Lagos to go there? Unless you know how many people are already there? Are you going to move by yourself or with your family? And you don't know if the schools are working? You don't know if there are restaurants or bars there, you know, [finding] bars in Saudi Arabia is always a problem. [laughs]
And so you see, that's the problem. I have an example to explain the problem of a new city. In South Korea, they thought that Seoul was too large, and they thought that they would build a satellite town which will be self-sufficient. So they calculate how many jobs they will need, how much housing and the Koreans are very good at that, they really planned it extremely well, it was financed very well too. They matched exactly the number of jobs and they use the demographic, everything. And they're very good at logistics too. So they built the school, the sewer, the transport, the buses, all at the same time and well done. And it was nice architecture. So the idea was it will be self-sufficient [and] that the people who live there will work there. When the city is fully built and inhabited, they found that 90% of the people who live there commute to Seoul. They work in Seoul, but they live in the New City; and the people who have jobs there, they come from Seoul, they live in Seoul but they work in the New City. Why that? Why didn't they manage to match the thing? It's a question of the first inhabitants. When the plan is finished and the thing is ready to be sold, they told firms in Korea, well, you know, if you want to establish yourself here, you could have a factory of this and it will cost that much and you will pay that much more for electricity, So very attractive. So the firms say, Hey, we are in Seoul right now, but we want to expand, and in Seoul, we cannot expand because land is too expensive, so let's move to this new city where we'll something more modern.
Now, these firms, if they have the money to move to the new city, completely new, it means that they already have employees, they have [an existing] business. So they are not going to fire their employees and say we are going to recruit entirely new employees. So the employees which are already in Seoul, working in the old site are going to commute to this. Now, why don't they say oh, we have this new job there and we are going to move into an apartment in the new city? Because where they are now, maybe they have their mother-in-law who is babysitting their kid and they cannot move. Or maybe they have a school that they like a lot for their children. And they don't want to move their children to a new school which has no record. You know, there are a lot of reasons why people don't want to move, or maybe because there are a couple and one of them is working in the neighbourhood and do not want to commute. So the new firms are attracting existing employees from outside and the people who take housing there... you know, if you are a young couple in Seoul, you are desperately looking for a new apartment, but it's too expensive and suddenly, they propose you a nice apartment in the new city... Now, you will need an hour 20-minute commute but you think well, this is a really nice apartment, there will be a nice school so you move there with your family. But your job is in Seoul, you know, because if you can afford an apartment in the new city it's because you already have a job. So you're not going to quit your job and say, Well, I've moved to the new city, I'm going to look for a job in the New City. Maybe after 20 years, you will do that. But initially, you won't.
So you see this is a problem of new cities and that will include charter cities unless the charter city becomes so attractive in terms of, again, the democratization of land use, and of property rights. But again, you have the problem of the first mover, you see. So that's why cities like maybe Abuja or Brasilia are successful because they are civil servants so they are obliged to go there. And the government pays for it and all the taxpayers, by the way, all the taxpayers of Nigeria are paying for Abuja.
Tobi;
Yeah, that much is true.
Alain;
Yeah. And this is true also for Brasilia, you know, the people who live in Brasilia are not paying for their infrastructure, it's the Brazilians who live in Recife or Rio de Janeiro who are paying for that. So, you see, those examples are not very good examples - the new capitals. The other thing which is very difficult, and I saw that when I was working in China in a new economic zone which usually piggybacks on a city is the cash flow. You know, when you build a new city, there are certain things that are discrete, you know, for instance, you cannot build a sewer plant for 500 people, you are obliged to build a sewer plant for at least 10,000 people or 20,000 people and when you build that you have to spend for 10,000 people but you will not get 10,000 people before five or six years. So you pay interest on this capital for five or 10 years. So you have a negative cash flow for a long time and that is [for] the sewer plant but that's true for schools, that's true for roads, that's true for the water system, that's true for garbage removal, you know. You need right away to bring trucks to remove the garbage to treat it and before you have [enough] inhabitants. So you have to pay a lot of interest. My experience in developing a new economic zone in China was that the cost of interest during construction (that means the cost of interest before the lots were sold to the private sector) represents sometimes 40% of the entire expenditure.
So this negative cash flow, if it's a private city, by the way, you have bankers, so the banker, let's say, trusts you. And they say, all right, you have planned to have, say 1000 people, the second year at 10,000 people, the fifth year... and then 100,000 people in 15 years. So they trust your business plan, but then imagine that it's a little slow at coming. So you are borrowing more and more money, and at the same time the bankers get cold feet, and they say, we are not going to go roll over your loan, because you know, your thing… it's too risky, you are accumulating a negative cash flow much longer than we thought. And then they will cut your finance, and then you will go bankrupt. And that's why the most successful new cities are capitals because the entire country is paying the bill, you know, money was no object.
Tobi;
Does this mean you're bearish on private cities generally? So I'll give you some examples. And I'll try to be brief. For example, in Lagos, there was this project called the Eko Atlantic project. This was a land that was basically reclaimed from the Atlantic Ocean, it raised $6 billion, right. And at the end of the day, they ended up building office buildings for oil companies, banks and skyscraper apartments that cost $2 million. Almost nobody goes there to work, which fails the labour market condition in my view, right. There was also the story of Gurgaon, I'm not sure I'm pronouncing that right. In India...
Alain;
A suburb of Delhi. Yes, yes.
Tobi;
Yeah. So, where, maybe it was partly driven by the labour market, the tech workers and private firms. But we saw that they could not deliver on things like the sewer system... public goods investments failed woefully. But the common thread in some of these narratives and initiatives, and of course, you know that private cities are very, very hot right now in Silicon Valley...
Alain;
Yes. Sure
Tobi;
Is to look at Shenzhen and say, oh, yeah, this was a fishing village of 30,000 people...
Alain;
Yes, yes. Right. Yeah.
Tobi;
And it's now the manufacturing capital of the world, the centre of technology with 50 million people. So are you bearish on private cities generally, that was one? Secondly, what are we missing from the Shenzhen story?
Alain;
You know, Shenzhen by the way, I know it well, because when it was a little more than a fishing village, I was working for the World Bank… the Chinese invited me there with the team. We were five or six planners and economists. So at the time, it was about 300,000 people, but dispersed, it was not really a big city. And they say we want to build the city of, at the time they say, 4 million people and we want the World Bank to finance it. And this is one skeleton in my closet. I told them you are too ambitious. If you want to build a city of two million, up to 2 million, you know, I made a back of an envelope calculation, I say look 2 million is a city is so large, so fast [and] would be impossible because of logistics. You will not have enough trucks, it will be impossible and I was wrong. So after that, I followed because I was spectacularly wrong. I followed what happened in Shenzhen I went there regularly and you know what created Shenzhen? First, location.
You know I was telling you at the beginning [about] location. They have a deep port. A natural deep port in Shenzhen and you know the rocks are going there. And it's next to Hong Kong. Hong Kong port is already saturated. They are at a coveting distance from Hong Kong. So when they want somebody very specialized - an architect, an engineer - at the time when they built it, that was in '83, you know, when I was there, '83-'84, the needed manpower will commute from Hong Kong. They will spend maybe the night in Shenzhen and go back. And then you have the Pearl River Delta on the other side of Hong Kong, you had Guangzhou, you know, which is a very important city too. So, they are in between.
Now. The major thing which did the success of Shenzhen was Deng Xiaoping [who] for the first time in the history of China, put a line around Shenzhen and say within this area, the firms are going to pay the workers according to [the] market, and people who come to Shenzhen will negotiate their salary with their employers, depending on their skill. In China before that, if you were, say, a geologist, at 30 years old, the government will say your pay is this per month, period. If you are a welder, the government will say, for entire China, this is your pay, and the government will decide where you will be employed. You have no labour market, there was no labour market in China, you know, people were unemployed, but the government tells them where to [work]. Even the kid coming out of high school, the government will say you're going to work in this factory for the rest of your life. Now, in Shenzen, for the first time, you had the labour market, and a lot of Chinese coming from the north, from all over China (the ones who were the most courageous, you know, [it's] a bit like migrants coming to Lagos are the most courageous in a way that, you know, it's a selection of people) they decided that they were trusting their own skill, they say, we'd rather work and negotiate our salary and change employment when we want rather than stay with it.
So you had an influx of people, of talent, from all over China. And that's why, you know, Shenzhen is in an area where everybody speaks Cantonese, normally, you know, in the south of China, like Hong Kong or Guangzhou, but you will find that, in Shenzen, most people speak Mandarin, because they came from all over China. They didn't [all] come from there, [the southern part]...some people from Guangzhou, obviously, from the Pearl River Delta, but say the language that you hear the most is Mandarin because they came from all over. So, you see, what created the enormous success of Shenzhen was the market. It was the labour market. It was the first time you had the labour market in China. And then after that, they used experiment, and you had that, you know. And by the way, housing, also… it was the first housing on the market that people will be paid at the market price, but then with their salary, they will have to pay for housing. Where before in China, housing was provided by your employer entirely. That means that you have no mobility and you have no capital either, by the way. You cannot leave your job because if you leave your job, you have no savings, and you have no house.
So that's the story of Shenzhen, and do not forget the location. Look at the container port of Shenzhen, it is one of the best in the world and it's because location, you know, it's even better than Hong Kong. It's larger than Hong Kong's. In Hong Kong, they have to do a lot of land reclamation, whereas [in Shenzhen], it's natural. They don't need to dredge it or anything, you know, it's a natural beauty. So that's the story. So I am not bearish. You know, I like the idea of trying new cities and private cities, I think that's a good thing. But let's say, you know, just to think that if you have a good infrastructure, you know, [when] building [a] new city, they say, Oh, we will have this fantastic system for removing garbage by vacuum and things like that, this is good and well. If the city is reasonably clean, that's good enough, you know, and you don't move to a city because the garbage is vacuumed. You move to a city because there is a good job, the city's attractive, you have bars, cinemas, and you know, whatever, if you'd like to go jogging or things like that, you have nice parks. But you move to a city mostly because of the people who live there. So the question of new cities, how do you attract a lot of people right away in the beginning? Who will be the guinea pig to live in this new city? And then there is the financial aspect, you know, this cash flow, you need to have a lot of money in advance to finance it because bankers will get cold feet. Maybe I've been talking too much and not [...] enough questions. I enjoy it. That was very interesting. I hope maybe we can do it again sometime.
Tobi;
Okay. Thank you very much.
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It is difficult to overstate China's rise in terms of economic development in the four decades - growing from one of the poorest countries to becoming the world's second-largest economy. China has also become an important geopolitical partner to many developing countries, and it is quite common to encounter talk of the ‘‘China model’’ of development as being more suitable for many African countries that have struggled with economic transformation. Joining me on today's episode is political scientist Yuen Yuen Ang to unpack what China did during the reform years and the many ways that process is misunderstood. She has two excellent books (linked here) on China, and she is one of the most careful, thoughtful, and perceptive scholars I have read.
Transcript
Tobi;
Welcome to Ideas Untrapped, and my guest today is Yuen Yuen Ang who is a professor of political science at the University of Michigan. She has written two very important books on China. And I want to talk to her today about the first book, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap. Welcome, Yuen.
Yuen;
Well, thank you very much, Tobi, thank you for having me. And I very much appreciate your support.
Tobi;
In global development today, it's almost impossible not to talk about China. China has become so important both economically and geopolitically, and we know that the picture or the situation was quite different 40 years ago. Another thing with what China has done in the last four decades, I mean, two-thirds of the global reduction in poverty is in China and so many other amazing things, is that there's a lot of, should I say, content on China and in my experience, it feels a bit like quantum physics and that Feynman quote, which is the more you read on China, the less we understand.
But, reading your book for me as being quite illuminating. Again, I want to thank you for writing it. So the first question I'll ask you is, very early in your first book you made what I think was an important distinction, which is the difference between market-creating institutions and market-preserving institutions. Can you elaborate more on that? And how China was able to take advantage of the former?
Yuen;
Sure. Well, first of all, I really love the quote that you used. And before I jump into the question that you just asked, I think it's useful to respond to your comments, which I think it's very insightful, which is that everyone is very interested in China. There's a lot of talk about it, but it feels confusing.
And so at the outset, when I write my books, I think one of the things that I wanted to set out to do was to provide an integrative account of China's development since its market opening in 1978. And I stress the word integrative, because I think one of the sources of confusion that you alluded to comes from the fact that there are many, many accounts about China's development, but they tend to focus on only one aspect.
So some will talk about trade, others might talk about economic policy, so there are so many different topics about China. But what people need is an integrative account that puts all of these different elements and variables together.
I really put them on a timeline to help people to understand, sort of, the different factors that were salient at different points in time. And this is important for correcting the misconception that there is one China model, like some kind of blueprint that was created at the outset and designed to help China take off.
So that was the kind of broader backdrop that motivated the way that I write my book, in particular, the first one. Let me now come back to your original question, which is the concept of market-building and market-preserving institutions.
And the important thing to understand about institutions is that economists have all agreed that good institutions, such as rule of law, such as formal accountability, such as modern courts, that all of these good institutions are essential for growth. And you have famous books like Why Nations Fail pretty much making similar arguments. And that then translated into the good governance agenda that was advanced by International Development Agencies, such as the World Bank.
So for about, I would say, 1990s to the present day or so, there was a great deal of attention and hope that if poor countries could get institutions, right, if they could have first-world institutions, then they will be able to have economic growth and become developed.
And when I look at the China case, that obviously does not follow that formula, because if you look at the early parts of China's growth, and even until today, there are so many dimensions of China's institutional design - everything from the ownership of companies, to the property rights, to the design of bureaucracies that just don't conform with what we think first-world good institutions should look like. So why is it that China has been able to grow its economy without those first-world institutions that economists say are the preconditions for growth, and this has been a long-standing puzzle in political economy?
So from my investigation, what I find is that the fallacy with the conventional wisdom is that it thinks that there is just one universal set of institutions that are necessary for growth, namely, the first-world rich country institutions. But in fact, what really happens in the course of development is that countries actually have to develop qualitatively different institutions for early and late stages of growth.
And those institutions at early stages of growth, that can support the growth process can actually look very, very different from the first-world norms. They can look in ways that conventionally we would dismiss as dysfunctional or corrupt. But those institutions can actually work very well at early growth stages. And subsequently, however, when the economy takes off, and it enters into a more mature stage of development, and then you begin to see that, yes, you do need institutions that are more like fist-world institutions, such as formal regulations, private property rights, and so forth.
So that is why I make a distinction between market-building institutions and market-preserving institutions.
Tobi;
I mean, one important thing that I also learnt from your first book, and you can please correct me if I'm getting this wrong, is that (it's interesting you alluded to economics accounts of China's rise) ever since the works of people like [Robert] Wade and [Alice] Amsden talking about the East Asian miracle, there has always been this importance for the role of the states. And then the discussion then polarizes into, do you use the State? Or do you use the markets? And policymakers in different developing countries choose what they see, you know, and some stressed the importance of state capitalism.
But what I learned from your book was that it really doesn't matter the kind of political system you run. Every political system in history that has gone through that stage has used market-building institutions. One thing you also talked about quite early in the book is this concept of directed improvisation. What is that? And how did China use that?
Yuen;
Yes. The conventional wisdom when people look at China's case is to assume that the recipe for its economic growth must be centralized political control because it is an authoritarian regime. So when people talk about the China model today, it's reduced or dumbed down into, basically, authoritarianism, plus some elements of capitalism.
And I question that conventional wisdom in my book. If the answer was simply authoritarianism and centralized control, then China would have prospered long ago, under the reign of Mao, where you had absolute centralized power under one leader, even more centralized back then than it was today.
So it couldn't be that centralized political control or authoritarianism is the answer to China's development. Instead, what really happened is that the central government under Deng Xiaoping was the reformist leader who took over thus helping change the role of the central government from that of a dictator to a director.
And what the director does is that it focuses its job on setting up conducive conditions for bottom-up innovation and bottom-up adaptation, primarily among local governments. So China is politically centralized, but it's economically and administratively decentralized.
But in encouraging local governments to adapt and to find local solutions to local problems. The central government still plays a crucial role in terms of providing direction, setting up the rules of the game, defining what the goals and targets should be. So these were the ways in which the central government “directed” the process of adaptation. So directed improvisation simply means you have the merger of direction from above, with bottom-up adaptation among local governments. So in the first 30 years of reform, which most people call the reform period, which is up to 2012, what you can see in China is actually a diverse range of regional economic models, and not just one. And if you take even any county or city in China, and you trace the history of development over those 30 years, you'll find that the role of the government and the development strategies that that particular city undertook kept changing over time.
So I think it is this highly adaptive element of the Chinese experience that is often neglected, or not understood in the global discourse about China because people are overly distracted by stereotypes about authoritarian control.
But the point that I think is most valuable, and that China should talk about more is the adaptive element under the reformist Deng government and the amount of diversity that they were able to create despite being a formerly authoritarian state.
Tobi;
One distinction I'll also like you to elaborate [on] is control versus influence, which was something I also got from your book and found interesting. I remember reading Robert Bates, writing about the political economy of Africa. He talked about the importance of control regimes, you know, having a closed economy, price distortion, regulation of industrial outputs, regulation of markets, these were things that were also part of China's economy and policymaking during the Mao era, you know. But we also observed that during the reform years after 1978 policymaking also was not thrown into chaos, you know, like the opposite of control. So how did China manage that balance, particularly substituting influence for direct administrative control of policy?
Yuen;
I'm really glad that you raised this subtle point, but an important point. So let me give some theoretical background before I elaborate on the China case. If you look at the conventional thinking about politics and economics, it is really a literature that is obsessed with control. Right? So it's always about someone controlling someone, it's like the state controlling civil society, or politicians controlling bureaucracy, central governments controlling local governments.
And this fixation with control is, I think, an extension of a mechanical intellectual paradigm. So if you look at the beginning of my book, I talked about how and why I use a complexity paradigm to interpret the Chinese development process.
The conventional paradigm is a mechanical one. So things about how things work as if it functions as a machine. And indeed, the top economists do explicitly say that they think in machine mode. So when you think in machine mode, everything looks like a control problem. And so that's why you see the literature and Political Economy being so fixated on control.
But what we don't talk about enough, or sometimes not at all, is the other element of human activity, which is, apart from trying to control we also adapt all the time, including in Nigeria, and we have very little understanding in the political economy context of how do people adapt? Why do they adapt? What are the conditions that make adaptation possible? What are the products of adaptation? These are the various questions that we don't ask in political economy.
So once you move to the Chinese context, and you apply the lens of adaptation, it immediately opens up a very different story from the traditional one that was entirely about control. One of the things that is important to know when we think about China is that control is always an element present in the Chinese political context. And it’s present in a big way because it is a top-down political system. So I'm not saying that there is no control in China. Of course, there is; such as censorship.
But what I'm saying is that as the reformed leadership under Deng took over from Mao, it dramatically change the role of government as well as the mixture of control and adaptation. So on under Deng, of course, there were still policies of repression and control. The family planning policy, for instance, required a great deal of forceful implementation. But it also dramatically increase the amount of adaptive activity that the government carried out.
So the distinction I make is that when you are fixated on control, what we conceptualize is that politicians want to control the outcome. So they already have a predetermined outcome or solution, and they're just trying to control everyone so that they can get there. Right? When I use the term influence, however, the assumption is that oftentimes, the leaders actually do not know what the best outcome should be. They don't have the solutions to the problems that they face.
And this was absolutely evident in China's market transition process, because that was something that China had never tried before, it had never tried to move from communism to a market economy.
So oftentimes, these leaders themselves do not actually know what is the best solution that they should create. And so what they did is instead of trying to control outcomes, which presumes that you have a lot of knowledge and know exactly what's best for you, they instead try to influence the process of coming up with solutions by, for example, encouraging local governments to come up with solutions that are tailored to local conditions, but at the same time setting up some guardrails in this process of experimentation.
So that is what I mean by the difference between trying to control an outcome versus influencing the process of problem-solving.
Tobi;
One thing I so love about your first book, which you've also alluded to in your answer is appreciating that a society and the economy is a complex system. And you said that an alternative to control in complex systems is to influence the process of adaptation and change. So I want you to talk briefly about how these influence the design of the reform packages themselves in the China reform experience, particularly the three key mechanisms you talked about in the book, which were variation, selection, and niche creation. How did that work?
Yuen;
Yes, I'm happy to do that. Let me focus on the first two parts because of time, which are variation and selection. And these terms come from the well-established scientific literature about how adaptation happens.
So adaptation begins with generating a variety of possible solutions. So that's why the first mechanism is variation. And this is followed by selection. So from the possible pool of solutions, you pick one, and you test it out, collect feedback and decide "do you want to continue with this solution? Do you want to share this solution with others, or perhaps you find out the solution I picked didn't actually work so well, so let's select another one."
And niche creation is about creating differences among members of the units so that these members can coexist, instead of competing head-on with one another. So I use these mechanisms to organize different parts of the book in explicating what were the mechanisms that the central government designed in order to structure the process of adaptive governance in China.
And on variation, I look specifically at the system of political communication in China. China is a top-down political system. So the way the top government sends commands - written directives to the local governments - is the primary and most important mechanism by which it commands, instructs, and guides the whole bureaucracy.
And normally, this is a system that, frankly, almost nobody studies because it doesn't really seem interesting. It's a command system. So you think that, you know, whatever, if Beijing wants to send a command. But what I argue and actually show in the book is that the command system in China actually functions in ways much more interesting way can imagine. And specifically, what I show is that in the Chinese political system, the central government would send out three different types of signals.
The first signal is what I call black signals. These are written directives, where the language is explicitly clear, saying, "yes, you can do this. Yes, the local governments all over China, you can do this." And the second type of directive is what I call red signals, which explicitly says, "no, you cannot do this." So, for example, "no, you cannot exceed the amount of water use by this amount."
And then the most interesting one is the third category, which is the grey directives. So commands that are deliberately ambiguous. And there are a lot of ambiguous commands and instructions that occur in the Chinese political system. And they still do today.
And I argue that what these ambiguous commands do is that they actually provide room for experimentation. Because from the perspective of the local officials when the command is vague and ambiguous, and broadly stated, it means that they are free to interpret how to implement that particular instruction.
And when they experiment and try things out, it produces, generates a variety of possible solutions. And from these possible solutions, the regulators in Beijing can then take a look at these options, many of which they had never thought about before and then decide, "among these possible solutions, are there some really good ones that we should scale up to regional or national levels," or sometimes they might also realize, oh, some local experiments turn out to be not good. And we are going to change our commands from grey to red and say, No, I don't want you guys to try this anymore.
So through this varied and dynamic system of commands, is one example of a mechanism by which the central government in China is able to calibrate the amount of discretion that it gives local officials, allowing them to experiment when the central government wants to experiment, and then also providing a mechanism for the central government to collect feedback to scale things up if they want to. And also to scale things down, if they decide that that is the right thing to do.
Tobi;
So it's really hard to talk about China, at least the way China is being written about generally, without talking about state capacity. Like you talked about in the early part of the discussion that analysts and scholars usually take one thing and focus on that when discussing China, and there is always this talk about state capacity being the be-all of how China was able to reform itself and become rich. You know.
Some say it's the bureaucracy that was inherited from the communist regime, some talk about the 5000-year history of civilization, and so many other theories. But you've discussed this often on your Twitter feed, and in other appearances, that when we talk about the bureaucracy, we usually have the Weberian Western-type democracy in mind, and that the way scholars and people discuss this is like, it's the only way to achieve bureaucratic coordination.
But you've also challenged the idea that there are other forms of bureaucracy. So I want to ask you, how did China achieve that bureaucratic coordination without feeding into the Weberian archetype? You know, so to speak, because the challenge with most developing countries like Nigeria, which I am familiar with, is that you often have pockets of effectiveness in different arms of the government, but it's usually difficult for one vision to be projected, you know, and be implemented. So how did China achieve this through its bureaucracy, what were the design elements?
Yuen;
I am very glad that you brought up this important point. It is a point that I keep making in my books and in other forms of speaking. It is also a point that many people find hard to accept. The reason for this is that for a very long time, the conventional wisdom has always subscribed to the view that there is only one standard for good institutions, for stake capacity, for good governance and that is to look like rich Western nations.
Now, the conventional wisdom doesn't put it this way, but if you look at all of the global metrics that are created, regardless of the names that are coined for them, it's always the same countries that are ranked in the top 10. And it's always the same group of countries, including Nigeria, and sometimes China that's ranked at the bottom, right?
And so this is very deeply entrenched in both academic and popular thinking that there is only one standard in this world for good governance and good institutions. And that we should only use that benchmark. And when we look at developing countries, their situation is only accessed in terms of their distance from this ideal type.
So things in developing countries are not perceived as being qualitatively different, they are instead perceived as deficient because they don't comply with the standard expectation of how things should function. And so including in the discussion about state capacity, one of the core elements of state capacity is bureaucratic capacity. And so as you alluded to, everyone subscribes to the legal-rational model that Max Weber had portrayed 100 years ago. And it is assumed that the only kind of effective bureaucracies are the ones that have these Weberian qualities, and everything else must be corrupt or dysfunctional.
And the reason that I questioned this conventional wisdom is that I think it is... first of all, it reflects a first-world bias that people are either unaware of or unwilling to admit. And second of all, it is limiting and distorting. Because when you assume that there is only one standard, you cannot see qualitative or categorical differences. Meaning that perhaps in this world, we are actually comparing apples, oranges, bananas and guavas. But when you say only the Apple is the legitimate fruit, and then you look at the banana, and you think, "Oh no, the banana is deficient, because it doesn't look like an apple," right? So that is why it becomes this very narrowing logic.
And what I find from both my historical research and my field research, in the case of China, as a very good example is that the qualities of an effective bureaucracy were actually very different at the early and late growth stages. So the given example, I show that in the early 1980s, 1990s, when markets first opened in China, the country actually relied on bureaucracies that had non-Weberian characteristics. So they were not specialized. Local governments would mobilize every agency to go and recruit investors. And this defies Weber's rule of specialization and technocracy. They also create a mechanism where these bureaucrats were basically taking a cut from the investments they could bring in which in economics, we say high-powered incentives. And in Weberian bureaucracy, you're not supposed to provide high-powered incentives, you're supposed to have these very modest rule-abiding and somewhat boring bureaucrats in office.
And the reason why these non-Weberian qualities work very well, in the beginning, is because they made the best use of what China had in the beginning, which is it had a communist apparatus and a communist apparatus [that] is good at mobilization.
It made use of the personal connections of local government officials and these personal connections substituted for formal property rights, and so forth. And so even though these individual characteristics would appear to be wrong from the first-world perspective, they were actually functionally a good fit with the objectives of early development.
However, as the process goes on, income rises, the markets become more complex, businesses grow and so forth, the society and the economy had different objectives, had different priorities about growth. They no longer wanted just any type of growth they wanted, instead, quality growth in states-selected priority sectors. And that's when you begin to see an evolution in the bureaucracy towards the more specialized and technocratic forms that we see in first-world countries today.
So to sum it all up, there are two takeaways. The first takeaway is [that] the good institutions that are often touted as universally ideal institutions are actually good institutions suitable for advanced stages of growth. But early stages of growth may actually require functionally and qualitatively different institutions that make the best use of what low-income societies have.
So that is the first takeaway. And the second takeaway is that we should drop this assumption that there is only one standard because that prevents us from seeing potentially creative solutions throughout the developing world.
Tobi;
So your second book, "China's Gilded Age: the paradox of economic boom and vast corruption," I would say, also slayed another dragon for me personally, only that the dragon is not China.
So from my experience in Nigeria, when you talk about corruption, the almost - I should say, self-interested response you get from politicians is that there is corruption in other places. And from somebody coming from a civil society background or even an average citizen, that answer is unpalatable, because the way we have been made to think about corruption is usually about the overall level of corruption, the quantitative level of corruption.
But in your book, you made it important that the qualitative aspect of corruption is also important. So can you please briefly explain the difference? How did you come about this insight of unbundling corruption, so to speak?
Yuen;
Yes. So the second book is called China's Gilded Age. And it is a sequel to my first where I zoom in on the relationship between corruption and capitalism. And the core argument of the second book is actually quite simple. What I argue is that corruption comes in different types. And different types of corruption have different forms of harm. And I focus on one particular type of corruption that I call access money: elite exchanges of power and wealth.
And I show that in many contexts, not just in China, access money can actually encourage businesses to do more business; because politicians provide them with conducive conditions. But that this form of corruption results in indirect risk and harm that is nearly impossible to quantify. And so once we, in particular, zoom in on access money, we can understand why there are many economies that are prosperous, on the one hand, but on the other hand, have many structural distortions and risks.
And in addition to China, the other country that fits this model is actually the United States. So whether you look at the United States in the late 19th century, the original Gilded Age, or whether you look at the United States during the 2008 financial crisis and today, you'll find that these are wealthy capitalist economies that produce rapid growth, but also [produce] inequality - a great deal of inequality and a great deal of policy distortions and systemic risk.
And that is the kind of corruption that is neglected that people don't look at. The reason for this is that most people, when they think about corruption, they immediately think about the forms of illegal corruption that they encounter in their daily lives. So when a policeman stops you and extracts a bribe from you. Now that is obviously corrupt. It is an act of bribery, it is illegal, it is extortion. And so the focus is on this type of corruption. Whereas a lot of the popular discourse neglects the other type of corruption - access money - which has always been actually central to the history of capitalism.
Tobi;
I find that book very insightful. I'll give you a brief anecdote. The former president during one of his media appearances went on television and made, I would say, the error at the time of saying that corruption is different from stealing. And it happened to be one of the things that became a public relations nightmare for him.
So I just want to ask you, for countries that are dominated by the destructive types of corruption, can they transition to access money types of corruption, and can they also avoid the inequalities that come with it? And I should say that you stressed in the book that corruption is not good, which is another wrong message that a lot of people take from the book.
Yuen;
So my book, China's Gilded Age, unfortunately, as you pointed out, is widely misunderstood. As soon as people see the story of corruption coexisting with growth, they take that argument out of context, and start screaming that, "oh, my god, she's saying corruption is good for growth, and she's saying we should do more corruption."
And so there have been quite a lot of nonsensical reactions to the argument. So at the outset, let me stress that actually, I made clear throughout the book, and over and over again in my speaking that all corruption is bad. This is not an argument about corruption being good in any way.
All corruption is bad, but the harm is expressed in different ways. And so that is why I use the analogy of drugs. I used the analogy of toxic drugs to refer to extortion and embezzlement. These types of corruption have absolutely no benefit, you immediately see the harm, and it immediately destroys the economy. And Nigeria is a good example of this type of highly destructive corruption.
And the second type of corruption I call speed money, I refer to that as painkillers. So you can think about a business that pays a small bribe so that it can get a business license faster. And that corruption is a painkiller in the sense that it allows the business to buy some conveniences, gets rid of some headaches, but that doesn't actually help the business to make more money. Ultimately, for the business owner, it is a hassle. And it is a cost. So that's not good, either.
And the last type of corruption, access money, I call it steroids. So steroids, as we know, is a kind of drug that dishonoured athletes use to help them grow muscles and perform superhuman feats. But if you keep using steroids, then ultimately it's really going to have a whole range of serious side effects that accumulate over time. And access money is a type of corruption that you find in high growth or wealthy, crony capitalist economies, right? So what people should take away from this book is not that corruption is good, or that countries should do more corruption, which obviously would be nonsensical. Instead, they should really think about the following issues.
First of all, countries should take a look at what is the dominant type of corruption that exists in their country, and think about the appropriate methods to fight the dominant type of corruption.
For instance, in the United States, extortion, petty bribery, these sometimes happen, but it's not common in the United States. But over there, the dominant type of corruption is legalized access money. So lobbying has become a gigantic industry. And so the United States would have to come up with very different ways of fighting the kind of corruption that dominates in their society.
Conversely, when you look at Nigeria, it has all four types of corruption that I talk about and so in a country like Nigeria, there has to be a focus on fighting all of these four types of corruption, but particularly the toxic ones. So embezzlement, extortion, imposing petty bribes, and thuggery on people. These types of corruption have no benefits at all. They drain the economy and the burden falls most heavily on the poor.
So countries have to think about what are the measures they can take to bring down this overtly, growth-dampening corruption. And if you look at the Chinese experience, what happens as it developed over time is that the structure of corruption changed, and it invested at least 20 years of efforts to really bring down extortion and embezzlement.
And although I had an entire chapter devoted to that topic, a lot of people just ignore it. And instead, they run with the misleading conclusion that oh, we should do more corruption. They ignore my discussion about the 20 years of effort that China put into bringing down extortion and embezzlement.
So for readers in Nigeria, start with the obvious things, things like extortion, embezzlement… of course, they're wrong; of course, they're terrible; of course, they're damaging, so do something about that first before you even attempt to think about how can we transition to more advanced forms of crony capitalism like we might see in some advanced economies.
The other takeaway I would add... the third takeaway that I would emphasize is that the part about access money, it’s not about how do we encourage more access money corruption… the way to think about that takeaway is how do countries like Nigeria, create incentives for government officials to have a personal stake in economic outcomes? Right.
And so what happened in the Chinese case is the system that I call profit sharing. Meaning local officials have a stake in economic growth, which comes both in terms of their career, as well as in their financial payoffs. And that shows up as access money.
It doesn't mean that other countries should have more of that kind of corruption. Instead, the real lesson is, if not this type of corruption, are there other less damaging ways in which we can create incentives for government officials to actually have a personal stake in economic development?
Tobi;
One final question, I know our time is gone. I know scholars usually, sometimes, shy away from making policy proposals but for countries that are also interested or ambitious about escaping the poverty trap, what… maybe theoretically speaking, or practically, what are the three things that you would recommend from your research on the China experience? Not necessarily copying China, we know that has pitfalls, so what would you recommend?
Yuen;
It's a good final question to wrap up. Um, I would sum up with three takeaways. The first takeaway is, really work hard on fighting the overtly growth damaging types of corruption. It is a simple takeaway, but a lot of people actually forget about it. So things like embezzlement, things like extortion.
If Nigeria could bring down the level of these damaging types of corruption, of course, immediately, you will see the economic and social benefits. So work hard on that.
And then the second takeaway is, how is it possible for government officials in Nigeria to have a personal stake in collective outcomes? I don't have the answer. But I think it is a question that Nigerians have to sit down and think about.
One of the things that are often missing in developing countries is a discussion about incentives and also about a sense of personal ownership in shared outcomes. People prefer to invest their energies in criticizing politicians and so forth. But if you think about it from an institutional perspective, why should that particular politician care about the collective outcome? Right.
So how can we create those incentives, which doesn't necessarily have to be monetary. It could also be non-monetary, it could be reputational, how do we make them care? Right? So that's the second thing to think about.
The third thing I would emphasize is a principle that I call using what you have, and China illustrates that principle, richly. Using what you have means that every society, even one that is a low-income society has a lot of indigenous resources, they have human capital, they have creativity.
So the first step of development is not to go and copy rich countries, it is also not to sell your oil resources, but to really make the best use of these indigenous resources. And so for those who know my first book, actually, in the conclusion, I have a chapter about Nollywood. And that's an excellent example whereby under desperate circumstances, the people in Nigeria actually created an industry from the bottom up using what Nigeria had at that particular time.
And so there are so many instances throughout the developing world where there are actually a lot of indigenous resources, they are untapped, or they are ignored or they're dismissed. Because we are so used to thinking that the only right solution is to look like rich countries. And we have to drop that mindset.
I think it's part of an extension of a colonial mindset as well. And developing countries have to develop a certain sense of intellectual independence, as well as confidence in seeing the potential that is already existent in every society, and make the best use of those resources to kickstart entrepreneurship and new industries.
Tobi;
Thank you very much, Yuen Yuen Ang, it's been fantastic talking to you.
Yuen;
Thank you very much. It's a real pleasure to speak with you.
This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe -
Innovation is the key ingredient to human material prosperity and an essential factor in economic development. But the importance of innovation is often misunderstood because of the common belief that poorer nations need not invent anything new and can always copy existing technologies from the richer nations - hence innovation policies are often missing from the development agenda of most developing countries. My guest today is social scientist and innovation policy expert Dan Breznitz - and he has made many significant contributions to changing the conversation and policy around innovation. We talked about the distinctions between innovation and invention, why the Silicon Valley model of innovation does not fit all contexts, and how innovation policies can be set in the long term.
TRANSCRIPT
Tobi;
Where I will start, basically, is innovation as the engine of economic growth is a view that has been pretty much validated through economic history. But when we think of innovation, we still think of new things, invention, which is kinda like a distinction you made in the book. So briefly, just tell me what is the difference between innovation and inventing new things, which most people understand innovation to be.
Dan;
So there's a big difference between innovation (and that's what we should care about) and invention. We should also care about it but it does not necessarily lead to economic growth, especially not where it happens. So if you and I would go back to my lab or your lab in the university, or just a lab in the back room, and we come up with a new idea for a new product or service. Even if we move it to a level of a prototype or have a patent on it, that's great, that's invention but that's not innovation.
Innovation is taking ideas and actualizing them in the real world. So taking the idea that we develop and actually make it into a product (if we talk about economic innovation) or service and sell it to people. It can be novel ideas, but it's across all the arrays of activities from coming up with novel ideas, to improving them, to recombining them with others, to innovation in their production, to even innovation in their assembly and after-sale. And innovation is important and creates welfare, not in the moment of invention but because it's continuous. So let me give you two examples that are very prominent because of Covid.
The one which is the most simple, since I know you love new cars, right, Tobi, and you ordered at least three in the last year, right. And you can't get even one of them. And the reason you can get one of them is not because people cannot produce cars, but because there are not enough semiconductors. And the reason there are not enough semiconductors in the world is Silicon Valley, which is called Silicon Valley because it was in semiconductors [but now] no longer knows how to innovate in the production of semiconductors. There are actually only very few companies. two be exact, and they both come from Taiwan, that knows how to create semiconductors, and how to actually innovate in their production.
But a much better example is COVID itself. I mean, it's great that we came up with new vaccines. But that was not enough, right, with the molecule. We had to innovate in their production, we had to innovate in material science creating a new glass vial, so we can move them around. We have to innovate in their distribution. But it's now very, very clear that that's not enough. True welfare for humanity and the ability to live with Corona would happen when we innovate to a level, which is now very clear, of producing billions of units of said vaccines and distributing them to every human on earth. Okay. That will probably allow us to put Corona behind us.
So it's not the moment of invention. I mean, the moment of invention is great. But innovation is the actualization of ideas all across the [value chain], if you want to call it the supply or the production, network, and stages, in order to constantly come up with better and improved products and services, and its impact, real impact start to happen when either all or most people on earth actually have access to it. And that happens because it's continuous.
So you and I talk on Zoom, which is a very old invention, right? Telemedia. However, you and I can talk - you're in Nigeria, I'm in Toronto - and not even think about the cost of this because hundreds of millions... not because somebody invented it, but because after somebody invented it, hundreds of millions of engineering hours, if not days, went into improvement in fiber optics, improvement in software algorithm, improvement in memory, improvement in CPU and speed to the level that now you and I can do zoom as if this is costless. And that's the real impact of innovation.
Tobi;
There's so much to unpack in that answer. But now today, like you said in the introduction, when people talk about innovation what usually comes to mind is Silicon Valley, and that's the model that you've critiqued quite a lot, rightfully so, in my opinion on many points, but just give me a brief. What are the limitations of the Silicon Valley model of innovation today and why is it an inappropriate example of what innovation should be?
Dan;
So let's understand what has changed in the world. And what has changed in the world in the last 20 to 30 years is before, when somebody came up with an invention and a novel innovation, it was then produced, it was transformed into industries, in production around that area. So let's think about HP, or Apple computers, as it was known there.
It used to be that when they came up with new products, they will produce that product very close to their headquarters. So Apple and HP employed 1000s, if not 10s of 1000s of engineers around Silicon Valley or in places like Colorado, around it. And those people will have great jobs in what you and I will now call advanced manufacturing, and all boats will be right. What we now have is a global system of fragmented production.
So let's talk about semiconductors. Okay. In semiconductors, now, we look at Tel Aviv, Silicon Valley, Taipei, Shinshu Park, Taiwan, Seoul, Korea, Shenzhen, in China, all of those places have unbelievably successful semiconductors industries. And if you look at those places, you'll also see that many of the same companies work in all of those places. So you think great, but then if you look at what the companies in those places do, it's completely different.
So in Silicon Valley and Tel Aviv, it's the first stage, we think about new ideas to put on silicon. In Taiwan, as you now know because you can get your car, it's the only place where they can take those ideas and actually make them into silicon. And Seoul, in Korea, Samsung and LG control very critical niches. So for every smartphone that you buy, the second-highest profits go to Samsung and LG because of memory and the controller of the screen, the touch screen. And in Shenzhen, it's the only place where we can work with different materials, constantly changing components [that] actually produce a product that works, for example, this iPhone and all the rest and sell it.
So all those places are extremely innovative, but they do different activities. And in order to succeed in each one of them, you need therefore different innovational capacities, but also different finance, different institutional system, different education system. And there are real, for two reasons, those options of where you work. One is because once you develop those capabilities and systems, you can excel in one or two of those stages but not in others. And the second is because they also define who is enjoying the fruits of the success, who is being employed, and how we're being compensated for that employment.
[What] happened in Silicon Valley and in Tel Aviv is that when move, we move to fragmented production, and we have a new model of venture capital. We moved [away] from actually having an industry which is really about innovation. So if you want to be completely cynical about it, the industry is about creating companies for cheap and selling them for a financial exit within five to seven years for the highest bidders, preferably 1000s of percent, right? It's not really for most of those people about changing the world. And in this system, the only people you employ are the engineers of the top universities (so not the people we should really care about or worry about). They are getting wages that are at the top wages of the US and Silicon Valley, or Tel Aviv, it's the same wages. So they're on their way to becoming a millionaire and they're getting stock options, right, basically lottery tickets to become billionaires.
But who are the people that enjoy this system, it's only the GEEK ELITE, their financiers, maybe a few celebrity chefs and that's it. No one else is really employed in that level. And as soon as they finish with their work, all the rest of innovation goes somewhere else to be done. So what happened in both Tel Aviv and Silicon Valley is suddenly from a system that created a lot of good employment and jobs for everybody in that society, you're employing only the top 15 percent who are already basically extremely well off, the rest of it 85% are on a treadmill to nowhere.
We all heard about what happened in San Francisco and Silicon Valley. But let's talk about Israel. Israel moved from being the second most equal society in western democracies in the 70s when it started that process, to now moving into a position where one of every five families in Israel is under the poverty line, which means they don't have enough money to buy food at the end of the month. And that's the fruit of a success they enjoy from this tremendous, maybe the most amazing innovation miracle in the second half of the 20th century. 20% of Israelis, including children, don't have enough money to buy food at the end of the month. So I wonder why people, even if they can imitate Silicon Valley, why do we think this is a good model for our community?
Tobi;
Now, you touched on something that I want to sort of press on, which is the finance of innovation and how it has come to be dominated today by venture capital finance model. Now, we all know how even Silicon Valley itself got started with a lot of public funding, either in Defense Research, which created lots of companies from IBM, Oracle, even Microsoft… how DARPA funded Google initially. So my question then would be why did the public, in this case, governments (whether at the city level or at the federal level) stop funding [research]? How did venture capital come to dominate the finance of innovation, and public financing just kept dwindling and dwindling, is it because we stopped believing in innovation as a source of growth, and policy sort of shifted to things like redistribution and things like that?
Dan;
So I will say that it really depends. There are some countries, multiple countries that still have a lot of public support for innovation. Canada, for example, is one. However, the problem with some of them is that they don't know how to transport that investment in basic invention into real innovation. And then all that great wealth, intellectual wealth, if you will, and all those inventions are then being taken away, and becomes great innovation somewhere else with what you say private money. So I wouldn't be as harsh on that. What I think has happened is that we have developed together with what people will call the neoliberal worldview. A firm belief with Silicon Valley is the only model. And then a very thin understanding of how Silicon Valley really works. And that's a belief that actually helps a lot of government if they so wish because then they don't have to be responsible and the only thing we need to do is to allow venture capital, whatever that is to come into the play, instead of actually looking cases of success, real success, from China, to Taiwan, to Korea to Finland, to actually all the Nordic countries.
Whereas a significant role for public money and very interesting division of labor between public funding, public money and what it's trying to do, and where and how, and I think that's the most important thing, how private money and private investment in innovation are done, regulated, and most importantly institutionalized. And the way to think about it remember those stages we talked about?
Tobi;
Yes.
Dan;
Each one of them necessitates a completely different financial system in order to excel in it, right. If your aim is to supposedly create a new Alphabet, Google, or Facebook, you need maybe a system that resembles venture capitalist [...]. I have to say venture capital work only in ICT in biotech so far. So if you are in any other industry, maybe you should look for other ways of financing it. But if you're, for example, in the business of Taiwan where in order to excel as TSMC, you need to build new fabrication facilities, basically, factories at the tune of several billions, if not 10 or above billions a year, Venture Capital, Private Equity and even the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ are just not the way you can find this type of behavior.
There is no venture capital on earth that would allow you to spend hundreds of millions or billions every year on basically capital equipment. You need to figure out the different financial systems that allow you to do that and judge you. The metrics of your success are different than the metrics of the success that your VCs and NASDAQ uses. From return on assets, to a margin of profitability, all those things need to be changed for you and your financiers to actually be able to make money.
Tobi;
So not to defend Silicon Valley, I'm not in any position to do that. But I'm just thinking from the perspective of say an African startup founder, for example. And we are talking about the proliferation of this model. So my question is, don't you think this model, the Silicon Valley model, venture financing startup as an approach to innovation spread the way it did because it is permissionless? So for example, I can start a startup right here in my room, in Lagos, Nigeria, whereas the current political economy might not let me be able to build a factory, because then I'll have to go through all kinds of regulatory red tape, I have to know someone at government ministries, I'll have to navigate a whole bunch of things. So an African found out my hear your argument and think, Well, the only way I have this opportunity to rise is because of the Silicon Valley model. So what would you say to them?
Dan;
So I will say that A, you're right. And, and I'm not against the Silicon Valley model. The two things that you have to take into the equation, and again, as a community leader is A, it's very, very hard to innovate with the Silicon Valley model, which is fine. But the second, if you are successful, really successful, one of the results will be growing inequality if you really imitate it. So you might as well think about it in advance and figure out ways how to at least limit this inequality, or, you know, the growth much more positive and wide, instead of, you know, like Israel, who understand that they have a problem, but now for at least a decade now have programs after programs trying to diffuse the miracle with mixed success because they're already stuck in that model.
So from a point of what you just said, yeah, all power to you. The question is, how can we then widen the, in Lagos, or in Nigeria.... the impact of your startups? One thing is what I call in the book, play [...] is, you say, Yeah, that's a model, that's a financial system and it works. And that's one problem. Once you put venture capital into your firm, Tobi, you will need to supply them with a financial exit, right? That's how they make their money. But what I want as the mayor of Lagos is for your company to grow as big as possible, preferably in Lagos.
So we need to then figure out how to do two things. A, how to allow you to grow as big as possible in Lagos for as long as possible before a financial exit. Because then two things happen, A, if you're big enough and successful enough in life your venture capitalist wouldn't want to move, they would like you to be in Lagos. Not only that, then is the biggest you are and the most successful you are the chances are that your financial exit will be an IPO, which means that you will stay as an independent company. And then when we do an IPO, should you go to a NASDAQ IPO or should you go to a local IPO or should you go to an [...] IPO there are several options, right? Each one of them has consequences on your growth. The second if you grow big enough and successful enough, even if the financial exit is somebody is buying you, Tobi, because you by then have already 300, 400 employees in Lagos and you have customers all over Africa, the foreign company that will buy you will probably keep you maybe even grow you to become their main division in Nigeria.
So it's not that the only thing that Lagos will get is you, your co-founders and some of your employees becoming millionaires and then the employment disappearing. But not only you as some of your employees grow and become bigger and employ more people. And as we do that, we also need to think about what will be the financial incentives I'll have you if you're big enough, so you can employ people who are not just r&d engineers. So I would call it, you know, playful delay. So the Nigerian startups or any African startups that now happen, grow as big as they can, for as long as they can before they're being bought by someone else.
Tobi;
So now, if I am the governor of Lagos, the Mayor of Lagos and I'm trying... So my first question before I get that would be, are there geographic? So I'm thinking along the lines of things like new trade theory, economic geography, and specializations. So are there geographic determinants of innovation? Or can innovation be deliberately nurtured and directed in any location? So I had a conversation recently about the supply chain, which you also touched on on semiconductors. And it took the pandemic for me to know that probably two-thirds of the global supply of hand gloves come from Malaysia. But I didn't think, unless you tell me I'm wrong, that Malaysia did set out to become the global supplier of hand gloves. So are some of these innovative niches and economic dominance based on innovation, are they serendipitous or can they be deliberately nurtured in a particular location?
Dan;
So let's talk reality. Okay.
Tobi;
Yeah.
Dan;
And I'm going to use Israel and Taiwan as an example, just because both of them are famous enough that people at least heard about them. So both of them started at the same time, okay. And since I interviewed the people who were responsible, if I tell you that they really knew how the end outcome would look, I'll be lying, and they would be lying as well. But they made particular choices that really define their success. So Israel, even before Silicon Valley became famous and all the rest says, Look, we have no natural resources, we don't have a lot of money, what we have is brains. And we actually have no clue in what industrial sector those brains will transform things into to growth. So we are going to create an innovation policy, which is a horizontal technology policy. Back then just so you understand how limited knowledge was, they called it science-based industries because the term high tech was not yet created. And they said, in order to do that, we will focus all our attention on coming up with new ideas and making them into products. Okay, and we'll derisk will help private [companies] and private companies need to do that. And we will create policy, after policy, after policy to make it happen.
And then those companies started to be created. Then very early on like a year after the NASDAQ was established, there was already an Israeli IPO on NASDAQ. So the state co-evolved its policies to slowly but surely worked down this model. So it's not a surprise that Israel ended up basically as an engine of startups. It's not a surprise because it was horizontal. So it was whatever was successful in the market, it followed very closely in the footsteps of the US in new industries, first hardware, and then software. But the Israelis had no clue that this is what was going to happen. They also invested a lot in Agri-tech companies and in geothermal energy and then all the rest. Okay. But their model of how do we know that we are successful is, we will have a lot of new companies with new products that are exportable and we'll build the financial system to allow that to happen. Taiwan was almost the opposite.
Taiwan says for both political reasons other is we do not want to have very big corporations like Japan and Korea, which is a model we see to our left. And because we are isolated, we can take that risk. We also don't think that we can be successful completely imitating Silicon Valley. So where we can be successful is in new industries working with the US. It's not just Silicon Valley back then, it's the US as a whole. So we will put bets on this new industry called semiconductors. But unlike Japan or Korea, we will not put bets on a specific niche. But we will create two capabilities that will allow Taiwan to excel in what we want to excel, which is basically the sub-suppliers for American companies, maybe Japanese. Remember, there was nothing else in the world back then. So they spent resources on innovation in the production of semiconductors. So all those companies that we talk about TSMC, UMC, Taiwan Mask Company, all of them came from a public research institution, which created projects that basically took the technology from abroad, brought it to Taiwan, created the company that then allow the ability to, you know, produce semiconductors in Taiwan, that was one.
And the second, [is] a huge amount of attention to design. So you want to do something with silicon, you need to do two things. Actually produce the silicon but also design what it is that this chip does. And again, through the same public research institute that was diffused. But the aim was not an industry like Silicon Valley that comes up with new ideas, but the aim was you need much more simple semiconductors, for example, in toys. So we will figure out where there are niches where you already have a need for semiconductors and we'll make those semiconductors more reliable and cheaper. We're not going to invent new ones.
And we will be able to do that because we just created those factories so we can do those two things and be these great sub-suppliers for very big multinationals. So without even understanding how the global system is getting fragmented, they opted for one industry and in one part of that industry. When they created TSMC they didn't know that they were going to completely change the global semiconductor industry. But they had a very specific strategy of thinking, what would success look like to Taiwan? So the ability to do over design and supply for big American, European and Japanese companies, the ability to innovate in the production, and the ability to innovate in second-generation innovation and semiconductors and multiple companies that will grow big but most of them are SMEs, and that was the vision. And then as industry changed, right, they co-evolved.
In both places, there was nothing, really nothing before the government started. So in Israel, there were 860 Something people with any kind of academic education doing any kind of r&d in the whole business sector. So probably less than in one lecture hall in your university. And in Taiwan, not only that the private industry did not want to do semiconductors but even after a few very successful spinoffs from ITRI, (that public research institute I'm talking about) when they wanted to spin off TSMC (maybe one of the world's most successful companies), private investors in Taiwan refuse to participate, and it ended up in a small Dutch company called Philips [which] became the biggest investors in TSMC. So again, did they know how they were going to change the global industry? No. But did they have a very specific vision of what is success and what would it do to Taiwan and Israel? Yes.
Tobi;
Excellent. That brings me to my next question, which is kind of broad. Like I mentioned earlier, if I was the governor of Lagos, or the mayor of a city, or even maybe the President, and I want to design innovation policy, I really want to exploit innovation for real inclusive, widespread, broad-based growth that tries to avoid some of these problems that you have mentioned, both in the book and even in our conversation on Israel, Silicon Valley and all that. What should I do? What should I be funding? What complimentary public institutions do I need? And how should innovation policies be designed generally?
Dan;
So I think you're missing the most important step. The most important step is what, as I just said, Israel and Taiwan have done, maybe even unknowingly. What I will tell you as the governor of Lagos is that, Okay, let's assume you're successful as a first step. 15 years from now, what does Lagos look like? What kind of companies do you have? What kind of people do they employ, what kind of things do they sell to the global system and what kind of things do they buy from the global system? Okay, now that we have this vision, let's do reverse engineering, and figure out how we get into that vision knowing that we, I mean, the world is constantly changing, we might have to, you know, change course, but we have a vision of what success is. And that vision is not the one that too many cases are now [that] when they talk about innovation, they talk, oh, I want to go to VCs and I did a lot of patents. No.
What does your society look like? Once you do that, A) we can reverse engineer and figure out exactly what financial system you need, how you develop it, what changes you need for your education system, how you also tie yourself into those global networks so you get the outputs you need, which are not just physical outputs but the constant knowledge and ideas, and how do you move it back? And as you do that, you also need to look at several things: what are your current strengths and limitations? what you can build upon? And what are gaps that you have that [you think] is reasonable for you to assume you can fix? And then we can start to be much more targeted. Not necessarily in industries, but the way I think about it is in capabilities, where do you want to operate in those four stages? And then we can maybe talk about industries, maybe just talk about core activities of what you need in order to excel in that and build all those institutions and programs. But without that vision, you're basically going into a very rough ocean with no map and the no goal. So the only thing that will happen is, at best, you'll be drowned.
Tobi;
That's powerful and poignant. Final question, Dan. And this is a bit of a tradition on show. What's the one idea, it may be from your work, it may be something you admire, it may be something that is probably even old and the world has forgotten about, what's the one idea that you would like to see spread everywhere, you'd like to see people discuss more, you'd like to see people think about a lot more? What's that idea?
Dan;
That idea is that: believe in human agency, or believe in the ability of humans to do things and to make things better. Right? So if you think about what makes us human, it's really to innovate is to take ideas and make them part of the world. Right? That's what we do. And for too long, everybody has been taught that there's only one way to success. And I think that that's the main problem of modern economics and modern social science. We look too much at structure, and not enough at the human agency. And we need to believe in the ability of societies, humans working together, figuring out new ways to make our communities better. But in order to do it, they have to understand how the world works and how they work. And doing that I think we now have more options than ever before to make communities both richer and more inclusive. But it has to come from the communities itself. Lagos and a lot of places in Africa need to dream their own dreams and stop dreaming the European or American dreams. The other successful countries that have done that manage at least to tailor the American dream and make it into their, I don't know, flavour [of] dreams - from Japan and Korea to Taiwan, Israel, Finland, all of those places that have moved from being poor to successful after World War Two.
Tobi;
Terrific. Thank you so much, Dan, for doing this with me. It's been educating, it's been enjoyable. Thank you so much.
Dan;
You are very, very welcome. I hope that one of those days, maybe after, we will finally innovate our way out of COVID...
Tobi;
Yeah
Dan;
Then I can meet face to face.
Tobi;
Yeah, I would I would love nothing more.
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If you ask any Nigerian today what the number one problem that they think political leadership should tackle - I am fairly certain security will be the overwhelming answer. In the last week alone there have been two deadly attacks in the Ondo state and Kaduna state with scores of people murdered in their homes and places of worship. Go back a week further, and the number of such murderous attacks would have risen to six. What many Nigerians depressing is that the problem is worsening and spreading to all parts of the country without any sign that it might abate anytime soon. Politicians seeking elective positions in next year's elections are making promises to end the crisis, but given how much it has gotten worse under the current administration despite similar promises leaves very little room for optimism. It is in the light of this that I speak to my guests on the podcast today James Barnett and Dr. Muritala Rufai. Our conversation is about what is now known as banditry in the Northwest of Nigeria. We talked about the origins of banditry, the nuances of the many factors at play, corruption, and the failure of local governance. Dr. Murtala Rufai is a professor of history at Usman Danfodiyo University in Sokoto.
TRANSCRIPT
Tobi;
So I'll start right at the end, which is not the most recent attack, but the Kaduna train attack was heavy in people's memory, and mentality, and maybe because of the status of some of the people that were involved.
And in the weeks after there has been suggestions that the banditry issue is sort of evolving into something rather different. Maybe something akin to Boko Haram or ISWAP tactics. And some have even suggested that there are some evidence that both groups are now working together.
So I like to take it from there because in both your paper your article on this, you suggested that this is a problem that has the potential to evolve even more dangerously. So is this part of that evolution? And if so, what can you tell us about the background to that and where it's likely to go next?
James;
...In terms of the kind of the relationship between the bandits and Boko Haram, you know, the term that we talk more generally about jihadist because, really, there're kind of at least three different primary factions of what was once Boko Haram in Nigeria, today. There's ISWAP, there's the original Boko Haram, which we use the acronym JAS, which was led by Abubakar Shekau until May of last year when he was killed.
And then there's also the Ansaru splinter faction of Boko Haram. So when looking at relationships between bandits and jihadists, I think if anything, our study was maybe a bit more skeptical of some of the claims that, you know, by 2021 (by last year) there was already more speculation.
You had more comments from government officials, commentators, journalists saying, you know, the bandits, they are being recruited by Boko Haram, they're working together. I think our study was, in some ways, a bit more skeptical of the degree of, I would say, co-optation.
You know, we kind of pushed back to some extent against this idea that the jihadists were coming in and recruiting all the bandits and that they were kind of transforming the conflict. I think our argument was that the conflict in the Northwest for now is very much still one being driven by the bandits rather than by Boko Haram or the jihadists.
We do note, as you say, I think there's definitely room for closer potential cooperation. I think that from what we're beginning to see of the Kaduna train attack, the evidence so far, the details I've heard so far, there are kind of concerning issues there. But I think that for now, you know, even recognizing that the Kaduna train attack is a notable attack, a very serious one and obviously, the situation is still ongoing in terms of the the situation with the hostages, negotiations. So I think it's good to kind of avoid commenting too much right now as the situation is rather uncertain.
But I think my view is still that one of the impediments that has, kind of, historically prevented the jihadists from getting closer to the bandits is that the bandits, for the most part, they really prized their autonomy. It's very much part of their modus operandi to operate very independently, they will cooperate with, you know, different gangs, will cooperate with each other, but banditry is definitely an activity that in some ways, kind of rewards autonomy.
You know, the groups are not as rigidly structured as a jihadist organizations. It's an area where many people today if they want to get rich, they can take up arms and become a bandit. And so I think, because the bandits kind of value their autonomy, and also just given the fact that they've become, frankly, so powerful in recent years, they are not necessarily in such desperate need to kind of be recruited or trained or equipped or supported by jihadist.
So I think my view is that there are opportunities from the perspective of Jihadist to work with bandits in certain instances, you know, to cooperate on certain operations. But I think, as we've seen with for example, especially the group Ansaru, which has tried in the past several years to recruit bandits to say, 'you should stop acting like bandits, you should join our group. Your fight is not with Muslim people. It's with the Nigerian government.'
They go on this preaching tours and their efforts have really fallen flat. The bandits have not been interested in joining Ansaru. And so there have actually been many clashes. And recently, I think, as recently as a week ago, was the last one. And so, you know, the situation in Northwest is very volatile, many different militants, many different gangs, and sometimes they work together, sometimes they fight together, but I think for the foreseeable future, that the jihadist element to the northwest - this Boko Haram, this Ansaru...it's a problem, it's a challenge and makes things more complicated for sure.
But I think that, in my view, the primary challenge in the Northwest is still bandits. It's not Boko Haram.
Dr Rufai;
I should just continue from where he stopped. You see, the fundamental problem is that the bandits are not in any way a monolithic criminal formation. There are quite a number of bandit gangs and also bandit groups operating separately and individually.
Now having the unity of the bandits into a one united organization, for instance, is indeed a very difficult exercise. Because when we talk about a bandit group or a bandit gang, we've seen cases and instances where three, four, five people, for instance, form up a gang.
And they have their own independent and absolute autonomy. They could actually do and undo, they may decide to go on attack, they may decide to carry out abduction, they may decide to do whatever they feel like doing.
So now, putting all these bandits together into a one single platform - it is indeed a very difficult exercise. And there are also quite a number of them that consider this jihadist group including Boko Haram, Ansaru and ISWAP that he pointed out clearly, as their traditional enemies, and on several locations attempts by these groups to bring to the fore the members of the bandits, for instance, became so much challenging to the extent that some of the bandit groups and also bandit leaders were making it very clear to them that our problem as you were arguing is not with the Nigerian state - that is what we fail to understand.
The problem of banditry is basically and fundamentally local. Until probably recently, that the whole conflict is now taking a more national dimension. You go to the rural areas, you interact with the pundits, they will tell you that their problem is local and solution to their problem also remain local.
Local in the sense that they more or less have problem with the an sake - with the vigilante - and other local authorities than even with their state governors. So now, my argument has always been: bringing this bandits, about 120 gangs operating separately and loosely, individually, into a one single platform to probably relate with any of the jihadist groups or any of the criminal group like the case of Boko Haram, ISWAP and Ansaru is actually going to be a very difficult exercise.
But I am also not disputing the fact that there are very few number of these bandits that subscribe to the view of either Ansaru or Boko Haram. For instance, the general believe and also accusation which is actually not confirm about the train attack is actually something executed and conducted under the leadership of Ali Kachalla. Ali Kachalla has been a very good friend of Dogo Gide, who were all initially bandits under the control of Buharin Daji.
Now, there is that possibility of having that continuity in the relationship between Ali Kachalla, who was until probably recently, a bandit, relating with Dogo Gide who is actually his traditional friend while they were under the leadership and control of Buharin Daji.
Of course, going by the pattern of the attack. In terms of the train attack, for instance, we've seen actually certain features and characteristics that differ slightly the case of the bandit. And that is why people have the belief that there must be actually connections with [an]other international terrorist group like ISWAP... some said it's ISWAP. some are even talking about Ansaru, and people also talking about the involvement of Boko Haram.
But we've also seen historically, as far back as 2016 - 2017, when some Boko Haram elements were sent to the northwest to come and actually recruit and create a certain ideology on the bandits. At the end of the day, some of these members of Boko Haram became bandits. Because of what? Because they feel there is comfort, there is joy, there is freedom, and also there is wealth in banditry compared to Boko Haram.
And that has to do with nothing other than the level of independence and autonomy that is within the bandit world.
James;
I would just jump in really quickly. I think he did a very good job of explaining how the bandits prize their autonomy and that issue with the jihadists. He brought up the character Dogo Gide who I think is worth describing very quickly.
He's an interesting figure in terms of understanding, okay, who's a bandit, who's a jihadist, maybe [for] some of the listeners who don't follow these issues as closely. But he's someone that we profiled a bit in our article, our study for the CTC Sentinel, which is a big research report on the bandit-jihadist relations.
And he's someone very interesting because he's a bandit, but he has had very close ties with jihadists for several years. There are disagreements, you know, different sources, different people will place his first contact with jihadists at different points. But he's someone that a couple of years ago, he was mostly saying, 'I don't have any ties with Boko Haram.'
He is denying any relationship with the jihadist. But now in the past year or so he started to act as if he is a jihadist. But even as we did when we were digging through and doing our analysis, what we found is that he is maybe even now pretending to be more of a jihadist than he really is.
Because he will release these videos or he will be communicating with intermediaries, he will be trying to sound like a jihadist, but he doesn't actually even know the proper Arabic phrases. In one instance, he refers to the leader of ISIS to suggest that he is a member of Daesh or ISIS, but he's referring to the dead leader, who's been dead for over a year. And so I think it's one of the challenges of doing this research in the northwest. It's why I think it's good to be very cautious and skeptical and try to kind of scrutinize all the data coming out.
Because on the one hand, sometimes like Dogo Gide a couple of years ago, he would have understated his contacts with jihadists. He would have pretended that he doesn't have any at all. Whereas in fact, we do know that he has.
He has been in contact with various jihadists for some time. But then he could also maybe overstate his level of influence. Because there are instances in which the bandits find it advantageous to maybe assume the appearance of jihadists because they think it will make them seem more powerful, or because they think that it will give them some sort of advantage in negotiations, for example.
That was the case with the Kankara abductions back in December 2020 that was conducted by Awwal Daudawa in Katsina. So it's a very important question, you know, how much are these bandits and jihadists working together? And it's one that I think requires a bit of a skeptical eye.
Because sometimes things are not necessarily as they appear on the surface. And sometimes these bandits… they have [a] complicated kind of calculus that will determine how they interact with jihadists, whether they want to give you the jihadists credit for an operation or something like that. So I think that the Dogo Gide example is a very interesting one.
Tobi;
The sense I'm getting is 'this a bit hard to predict, because the tactics and the motives are constantly changing.' So before I draw you guys into the issue of causality, which is going to be my next question, briefly, given where James stopped, do you think that's part of the reason why the government and security forces have not been able to deal with this issue? Because it's constantly in flux, it's unpredictable? And like he said, there is need for a patient and cautious strategy.
Also, and this is a bit speculative, are there people in government to your knowledge who are also aware, and why is that not reflecting in the security approach?
Dr. Rufai;
Well, you see, what is important about the approach to this particular security threat, in my opinion, is to have a detailed, deeper, and clearer understanding of the issues. And even within the bandit cycle, for instance, we've seen people in the rural areas with AK 47 and AK 49, 24/7, that are not bandits.
You can see a major problem now. When you define a bandit on the basis of weapon, for instance, you've completely missed the issue. Why? Because some of these people bearing these weapons are, basically, and fundamentally, using them for self-defense.
Without these weapons, for instance, the bandits will within a twinkle of an eye, wipe them out. And that becomes a very serious problem and also challenging to the Nigerian security operatives as well. So, now, the government actually, in my opinion, the security operatives are doing their utmost best, but their best is not enough.
It is not enough because there is still a gap. And what is that gap? A knowledge gap of what actually is happening in the field. It is not just about going kinetic. Before you go kinetic, before you take the kinetic approach, for instance, it is far more important to have an underground knowledge of what is obtainable in the rural areas.
For instance, the Gide we are talking about, a long time ago, has established a mutual relationship and understanding with the rural communities. And I'm telling you, the rural communities around Dansadau, around Baba Doka, around Birnin Gwari, around Madada, around Dandala will never or have never seen Dogo Gide as a problem or as a threat.
That, rather, what he is after is the abduction of school children, abduction of expatriates, and his major problem is with the federal government. And as long as he will keep on fighting the State, the local communities have no problem with him, they may even decide to support him.
And at times, getting credible intelligence from the rural areas by the security agencies becomes a very serious problem, because the rurals will rather relate with the bandits than with the Nigerian state. You can see a major problem, a major problem here.
And again, because of this level of intermingling between the bandits, where areas that are dominated by the bandits. And also, with Boko Haram elements, where areas dominated by the Boko Haram elements with the rural communities, it becomes a very difficult exercise for the security agencies to execute operations in those areas.
And the major dilemma they are facing today, I'm talking about the agencies - the security agencies - is the issue of the collateral damage. If at all you are going to address this issue head-on, then definitely the issue of the collateral damage will be 100%. Why, because, you cannot differentiate who is a bandit and who is not? Who is a member of Boko Haram, and who is not? Who is a passive and active collaborator of these people? And these are some of the issues that actually compounded the issue more.
So we cannot say that the security agencies are not doing anything in the field. But, in my opinion, what they are doing is not enough. What is important is not going to kinetic alone, but let us have a clearer and deeper understanding of the issues.
And for that to be done, a lot of underground research(es) needs to be conducted, and a lot of sensitization and mobilization, and winning the support and confidence of the rurals or the locals must be done without which I think we are likely going to continue this war to a foreseeable future.
Tobi;
You want to weigh in James?
James;
Yeah, I guess I would just add... I think in addition to everything that Dr. Rufai has just said, one other challenge, as Dr Rufai noted in a previous answer to your question that, you know, the issue with banditry in many ways is very local. But it's also become much more of a national issue. And this also, in some ways, complicates the response of the state because the state itself is not monolithic, right.
If you look at, you know, who is involved in trying to address this issue of banditry, very often these issues are occurring at a very local level, within a particular district within a particular emirate within a particular local government area. But also, it's become much more of a national issue.
The security forces, particularly the military, since the launch of the first major military offensive operation [...] - that was now what? six, seven years ago. The military has also been engaged in the northwest in these anti-banditry operations. And so sometimes, there have been issues of a lack of coordination between all the various stakeholders on the side of, you know, the governments, if you will - broadly defined to include district officials, traditional rulers, local stakeholders like that - where sometimes you'll have one community [that] is actually attempting to negotiate something like a peace deal with some of the local bandits or an amnesty with the local bandits at the same time that the military is conducting a military offensive in the area. And so this kind of erodes trust. Or likewise, there will be times where, you know, a certain area is being really badly affected by the bandits, but the military's focusing on another area because their forces are overstretched.
And so I think it's one of the challenges that Nigeria faces so far is looking at, okay, who are the authorities or the stakeholders that are tasked with addressing this issue of banditry? And how can you increase the coordination between the state governments; but also between the state and the federal governments; between the states and the local governments; between the formal authorities and the more informal or traditional authorities which in many regions still have very significant informal influence. So that's also been one of the challenges.
And it's reflected to some extent, as he noted in the very fractured nature of the bandits themselves. We were discussing this yesterday with some colleagues of mine here at Unilag after the presentation, one of whom is from the Niger Delta area, and we're comparing and contrasting. He was saying, why can't they do what they did in the Delta? You know, what is the difference between what's happening in the Delta and what's happening in the Northwest?
And Dr. Rufai put it very well. He said, you know, in the Delta, the militants can speak with one or two or three voices. But this is a big challenge for the bandits. So, anyone can form a gang these days, there are just so many bandits that there's no one person you can talk to, that represents all the bandits and you can negotiate.
Dr. Rufai;
And I think, added to the issue of interagency rivalry that he's talking about, it is actually a major challenge. And when you look at the operations against banditry in the northwest today, it has become a military affair.
And if all is well, if teams are moving the way they should, this is an issue that's supposed to be addressed by the police. But where are the Nigerian police force today when you're talking about banditry? Nobody talks about the police. And not even the police, for instance, we have the Civil Defense.
These are very local problems, local security challenges that actually supposed to be addressed by these people. But as we speak today, it is actually the military that is in charge of addressing some of these issues. And look at it, the role of the military, within the context of provision of internal security, for instance... virtually there are so many operations taking place, virtually in every part of the country.
36 states, including Abuja, for instance, you'll find different military operations. Look at the number of the military within the context of the increasing rate of crime and the violence, insecurity, for instance, the two cannot in any way match. And that becomes a very serious problem. And by extension, the military [personnel] are overstretched and overwhelmed by the level of conflict taking place in the country.
And not only that, this problem of banditry just like I said earlier, is basically a local problem. And it is something that actually requires the activities of special forces. Do we really have the special forces within even the military, for instance, to address this issue?
Because there's not just an affair of [the military]. Of course, nobody is talking about the State Department and the underground role they are supposed to play in this. So virtually, it is the military operating alone.
And this same military [personnel] we're talking about are gradually overwhelmed by the volume, and also the gravity of the problem. They don't even know, in some cases, where to start from. Identifying who is their friend and who is their enemy becomes a problem.
The attack on the train, the Abuja-Kaduna train we are talking about, is not in any way aimed at the victims. Rather, to send a danger signal to the Nigerian state. And they've actually succeeded in doing that. And as we speak, identifying where these people are, becomes a huge problem to virtually all the security agencies. Simply because of what? Because of lack of harmony, lack of coordination, and lack of peaceful working relations amongst all the security agencies.
Tobi;
I don't want to lean too hard on the security angle, at least for now. Because I mean, primarily, you guys are researchers, not policy advisors, at least for the purpose of this conversation. So let's go back for a little bit. Because in your work, you guys stated that the manifestation of this is multi-dimensional.
There’s elements of criminality going on, economic opportunism in inter-ethnic clashes, you know, there's also the issue of climate change and damage to the environment and the strain that puts on resources between farmers and herders and many other interests.
But what ties these all together? Right? How did this become such a national Flashpoint? Because I recall, maybe, 2016 when these attacks started blasting on the pages of newspapers, we don't even know the word bandit. Right? Bandit made it into the national Zeitgeist much later.
It was always herders, Fulani herdsmen, you know. At some point, the presidency was claiming that they're actually foreigners who come to attack locals and carry out criminality and all that. So help me in as many words as you can untangle the causality of this. How did this escalate?
James;
I think Dr. Rufai can give the ... I mean, it's very multi-dimensional. And he's the historian and has been looking at this for a long time. And you know, in our different reports, we've explained this, yes, there's issues of land use, there's [the] issue of ethnicity, all these different factors that go into it.
I think the one that I always stress, and these coming from my background, I worked in Washington, DC for several years, I'm still in contact with people there. Like, when people talk about farmer-herder conflict in Africa, and very often in DC, the first thing is that people have a very reductionist view of it.
That's in many ways, kind of, very apolitical in some ways. They think farmers and herders used to get along, and then climate change meant there were fewer and there's fewer land, fewer resources and so now they're fighting each other.
And climate change is definitely real, it's definitely a problem. It's absolutely aggravating the situation there. But I think that leaning too hard on the climate change angle, and you see sometimes governments doing this, not just Nigeria, but other governments: they'll say, ah, you know, the problem here is climate change - it's a way to escape responsibility, right? Because you throw up your hands and say, we didn't do this.
Tobi;
It's not my fault.
James;
It's not my fault. I think that one of the central issues that is seen in every aspect of how this conflict escalated from people becoming angry, to the weapons flowing into the region, to people not trusting their neighbors, to not trusting the authorities… one of the central issues is corruption.
And this is an issue everywhere in Nigeria, right? It's not just in the northwest. But the specific ways it played out in the northwest, I think had a very pivotal role to play.
From people not feeling that they could trust the criminal justice system or the authorities to handle disputes or legal matters related to land use, farmer-herder issues. Herdsmen felt that they were really being extorted because they were seen as kind of an easy target by authorities… whether it's the police, village heads, judges in the courts, they were seen as people that can easily be extorted.
And then just everything from the fact that I mean, the IGP announced the other day that something like 85,000 AK 47s that belong to the police are unaccounted for.
Tobi;
Yeah.
James;
Right. And you wonder how you go out and, you know, we both interview bandits, we've seen nine-year-olds with AK 47s? How is it that that happens? It's not all coming from the Nigerian military or police stockpiles. But you know, there are many reasons that there are so many weapons in West Africa today.
But corruption is a huge challenge, both in the inability to prevent weapons from flowing into and around the country. And also the fact that very often weapons that are intended for use by the Nigerian state find their way into the hands of criminals.
So I could go on and on that, but I think interviewing people in the Northwest, and you ask them how did this start? Very often they'll talk about corruption.
Dr. Rufai;
I think he has actually said it all. What is far more important is the issue of corruption, the issue of corruption he's talking about. But again, added to that is, the collapse in our family value system actually added to the crisis.
Situations where we have families that could not in any way take care of their children. Within the context of, in some cases, poverty, unemployment, underemployment, all play significant roles in the conflict. And also within the context of the traditional authorities again, it's become a very serious problem.
And the point he pointed out on the issue of corruption. Corruption within the traditional rulers contributed and contributed significantly to the escalation of the conflict. But there are a lot of issues lumped together, more especially this issue of injustice.
All people contacted and also interacted, interviewed on this issue of rural banditry are pointing to the issue of injustice. Injustice in all sense of the word. Injustice from the traditional authorities, injustice from the security agencies, injustice from virtually every angle of the society, and that plays a very important role, and it serves as a unifying factor that contributed to and that unite virtually most of the bandits together.
For instance, you see them also talking about the activities of the vigilante and the an sake. And when you look at the operations of the vigilante and the an sake, it's nothing other than the idea of extrajudicial killings. The level of extrajudicial killings actually taking place in the rural areas is unimaginable even before the issue of rural banditry becomes a problem.
And that is why the Fulani people feel they are not actually taken care of, they are absolutely rejected and detected by the Nigerian states and they feel they are on their own. And the best thing to do is to fight for their freedom. And that idea of freedom fighting, forming a union, or a gang for the Fulani liberation movement, for instance, was the bedrock of the banditry.
So there are a lot of issues put together. And more so, within the context of the Fulani, they feel the presidency, for instance, Mr. President is a Fulani and they feel if at all they need to be taken care of, there is no regime that's supposed to take good care of them other than this particular regime that the head is someone that is their own - one of them.
And that becomes a problem. And you see some of them lamenting and lamenting bitterly about the level of neglect by the State - by both the federal government and also the state government. And when you look at it, [the] absence of state presence plays also a very important role in the rural areas.
Infrastructure-wise, for instance, the presence of security in the rural areas is virtually zero. I am talking about villages, I am talking about rural areas. You go to a village with 3000-4000 people, you cannot in any way see a single presence of the State, and that becomes a huge problem.
So there is this type of high level of disconnection between the rural world and the urban world. And now, it is the rural world fighting in the urban world. Because of what? Because the rural world was neglected, the rural world was not taken care of, the rural world was absolutely spared from [infrastructure-wise] what we see in the urban centers. And that also constitutes a major problem.
Talking about the issue of climate change, talking about the farmer-header issue, in my opinion, are just issues that are of secondary importance to this violent conflict. There has been farmer-herder conflict right from day one, right from the onset.
And not only that, traditionally, conflict resolution mechanisms or dispute resolution mechanisms, for instance, were actually at work, and also addressing the farmer-herder clashes. And then the question is, where are they? Taken away by so many things, taken away by the issue of injustice, by the issue of corruption, and lack of respect for traditional authorities.
And today, some of these traditional authorities, village heads, district heads, and to some extent, emirs, in Zamfara, in Sokoto, and in other places are under the control of these bandits. Simply because no state presence, no security presence, and the only thing they think they will do is to listen to the bandits.
Dance according to the tune of these bandits, and also subscribe to the view of the bandits. Not because they want to do so, but because they were neglected by the federal and the state authorities. And that constitutes a very big problem.
Unless we get some of these things right, unless we fix some of these issues, lacuna, and problems associated with the rural areas, I don't think peace will actually elude some of our urban centers and even at the national level.
Tobi;
It's so important for me to talk about this because in trying to analyze a lot of these issues, some things become a talking point. Right. And even though the government's censorious stance kicks in to quell some of these things, but they do happen. Whether it's on social media, or on internet radios, that's why I'm trying to tease out the issue of causality.
Because some people will tell you, without any iota of doubt, that there is a Fulanisation agenda going on and that is the underlying driver of this. Some will say there is a systematic massacre of Christians going on in that region, that has drawn the attention of the Trump administration on religious persecution and so many other issues. So it's very important for the purpose of the audience, and you know, Nigeria is a diverse multi-ethnic society, it's easy for certain talking points to get away and... I mean, it becomes something else.
So, now, I get you correctly. Even the issue of causality is not just one thing. But I'm saying it, maybe you guys are not, there's a huge level of state failure going on. Right. Now, my question then is, elections: politicians are campaigning again.
As a matter of fact, one thing I learned from this conversation is that nobody is even talking about the issue of restructuring or decentralization of power in the context of this conflict. Right? We are talking about VAT or how to administer Lagos or Port Harcourt or Kaduna. So nobody is even talking about how empowering local governance, local institutions can actually bring peace, you know.
But today, if you ask everybody, insecurity is the number one national issue. You know, all politicians are saying that if you elect me, I'm going to solve this... So then my question is, given the level of state failure that I am saying that I can tease out from this conversation, if you have to sketch some kind of starting point or an attempt at addressing the issue, where would you start from?
Dr. Rufai;
Excuse me, please, I think you've raised very critical issues that require [a] deeper and clearer explanation.
Tobi;
Please go on.
Dr. Rufai;
The first issue is the Fulanisation of maybe Nigeria or northern Nigeria, or whatever. I think if at all, there is an ethnic group that is understudied, and that is still less clear in terms of the nature, the operations, and the relationship, I think it's the Fulani.
There is a high level of internal division, internal rivalry, and internal conflict among the Fulani. They are not in any way a one united ethnic group as we see, in the case of the Hausa, in the case of the Nupe, and, to some extent, in the case of the Yoruba, and the case of the Igbo.
These are people that are so much attached to their traditional and local way of life. Even if you are born and brought up a Fulani, if you don't have respect and value for the Fulani culture, they don't consider you as part of them.
And that is why 90%, let me not exaggerate - 60 or 70%, of the victims of rural violence, rural insecurity, rural banditry are Fulani. And 90% of the victims are not just Fulani, are also Muslims. You get the point. And you interact with some of these bandits, you talk about, okay, this person you killed, this person you rustled [their] cattle, this person you intimidate, this village you actually raided, for instance, it is a Fulani dominated village, they will tell you that that particular person, that particular village, that particular community you're talking about, we don't consider them as members of the Fulani. They are not in any way respected within the Fulani circle.
They have their own code of conduct that serves as their guiding principles, that serve as their Constitution. Whoever strays away from that code of conduct, for instance, they have no value, no respect for him.
And there is also a striking difference between an urban and the rural Fulani. For instance, the town Fulani is different from the village Fulani, the village Fulani is different from the nomadic Fulani, the nomadic Fulani is different from the stationed Fulani.
All these nuances are not really clear. Now, if you decide to create a whole northern Nigeria to be under the control of the Fulani, I am sure there will be a lot of crisis and a lot of conflict, internal dynamics and internal differences will not even allow that to happen.
Now, in spite of all this, if you have the knowledge and understanding of this, you go by the code of conduct, if you also don't speak the Fulfulde language, they have no respect and no value for you. These are things that people don't understand.
Talking about now, a Fulani agenda, trying to create... No. And when it comes to the issue of suppression, exploitation, high level of injustice, I think the level of injustice committed against the Fulani in Nigeria could not be compared with injustice committed against any other ethnic group in Nigeria.
These are people that I don't want to use the word docile, but are people that don't voice out. They are people that actually have this idea of not forgiving, and also not forgetting. You commit a crime, you cheat a Fulani man, for instance, today, if he sees you after 10-20 years, he will remember. And he will also wait for a chance and a better opportunity to retaliate.
So now, we are simply paying the price of social injustice, exploitation, extortion that we've committed against these people over time, and it has manifested. And that is why when they decided to form up a union in 2011, you find a large number of Fulani people with long historical and deep-rooted grievances populating the gang. Virtually the first generation of the bandits, for instance, have that feeling.
And you see if I am given the opportunity today….
Tobi;
Yeah.
Dr. Rufai;
To address the problem of rural banditry as the president of this country... I think the easiest way to address the issue is local government autonomy, no more, no less. If you give local government autonomy today, you have no problem with the rural areas.
Rural communities will actually hold their local government Chairmen accountable, their are counselors accountable. And when there was local government autonomy in the past, for instance, we've seen the level of infrastructural development taking place in the rural areas.
Because every area, every ward, every community has a representative in the local governance. And for instance, you cannot be relating with the local authorities, with the local government chairman without complaining and we've seen the level of projects executed by these local government chairmen in the rural areas. And some of these projects we're talking about are still there in the rural areas.
But the major bottleneck is governance will certainly not allow that to happen unless and until they are overpowered, or else they will not allow local government autonomy. They will not because they are the ones controlling the resources.
All local government resources go to the state governments. And when you go to the local government areas to the rural areas, you find virtually nothing. So now, if you have this idea of local governance, they are given their autonomy, they get their subvention directly from [the] Federal [Governement], monthly, for instance, you don't even need to hold these local government Chairmen accountable over what is happening in rural areas, the local communities will be the one putting pressure on them to work.
And you set in also the idea of high level of competition among the local government chairmen, everyone will be competing. And whenever and wherever there is a rural or a local violence, rural conflict coming up, you hold the local government chairman accountable. So I think, in my opinion, the answer to some of these problems revolves around local government.
James;
I think, and I would agree with everything you said there, and I think, unfortunately, not to be too pessimistic but that's one reason I don't see this situation dramatically improving anytime soon. Because all of these issues, you know, I'm not an expert in Nigerian governance, but looking at like the security sector, for example, which is a scenario maybe I'm a bit more familiar with.
We got a question when we gave our presentation at the University of Lagos yesterday, and one of the questions I got was about state police, people are always fighting about state police. And as I was talking to the person who asked the question after the presentation; I was like, Look, I don't have a strong opinion one way or the other about state police versus Federal Police. All I can say is that there's not going to be some law that just creates state police tomorrow, like, that's not going to happen.
Because it all ties into larger questions of the federal structure. You can't just have, you know, a reform of the police into the state police level in a vacuum. Everything is about this larger question of the structure of the federal government, which also gets into this question of oil rents, and you know, how the government funds itself.
And so you're not going to be able to pick at these little issues so much and say, Okay, we'll do a bit, we'll restructure the police to the state police, we'll give local government autonomy because all of it ties into this bigger question about the structure of the Nigerian state. And I don't have like a vision for, oh, here's how you should reconstruct Nigeria to improve all these issues.
But it's simply an observation that many of these reforms or these kinds of challenges that people have identified that I think are already very much in the public consciousness about, you know, people are demanding local government autonomy, state police, all that stuff...there's a reason that hasn't happened yet.
And it's because there are significant structural political impediments to that happening. And so I think that if you know, if the problem really is that, okay, it's the structure of the federal police force, that that's one of the major challenges, then that's not something that's going to be solved overnight.
Tobi;
One thing that came to my mind now is the issue of power generation. National Assembly just passed a law that would actually require the ratification of two-thirds of the states... good luck with that happening...that then allows state governments to generate their own power. So we've all been locked into this dysfunctional structure.
So like you, James, I'm not super optimistic. But one thing I want to push you guys on... your work is gaining a lot of exposure and I'm sure a lot more international exposure is still ahead. Hopefully, there'll be a book.
So, now, one thing that regularly comes up is....there was a time the President even wrote an op-ed, on the Financial Times asking for international aid, and security, securing weapons, lifting some of the restrictions, and all that. My point is, how should the international community engage on this banditry issue?
Because we just talked about how the security forces sometimes are not the appropriate force level contact for some of these problems. There have been issues of extrajudicial killings even by the security forces, there's the huge issue of excessive force, even in bombings, air raids, you know, collateral damage, and all that.
And the same government that controls the security forces then goes to the international community, whether it's the EU, or China, or the United States for aid and assistance in tackling insecurity. But, given the complexity of this issue, how should the international community engage on this [issue]?
James;
It's really tough. The international community, I think, when we say that what you really mean is like Western governments...
Tobi;
Absolutely...
James;
China, depending on what the context is...
Tobi;
Yeah. There's a Western alliance.
James;
Yeah, exactly. The Western alliance. I think these conflicts are so complex, deep-rooted in these kinds of systemic issues in Nigeria. And frankly, we just don't have a great track record, you know, speaking as an Oyinbo man, we don't have a great track record of intervening in complex conflict situations like this.
I think that one thing that I was very wary of... this is something that we kind of touched on a bit at the end of our study on jihadisation is that, you know, for now, the bandits have a much more parochial local agenda than the jihadists.
Dr. Rufai;
Yeah.
James;
This Ansaru, one of the things that was really interesting interviewing with people who had heard Ansaru preach in their villages, in these villages Birnin Gwari, they would say: yeah, Ansaru, they're always complaining about America. They're always saying: your fight is not with Nigeria, your fight is not with this, your fight is with America. They're the great Satan, they're hurting us. And these people they think, 'huh?' you know, that doesn't really resonate with them.
They think 'no, no, my complaint is with the local governments and you know, the fact that I don't have roads and school and stuff,' they're not thinking in terms of this big ideological struggle. And I think it's the same for the bandits, you know.
I was able to interview several bandits who... they see me, a foreigner, a Christian man, they're just oh, they're very interested. They want to learn, oh, what's the, you know... they're even asking what's Bature land, like, you know, are there different tribes of Bature? Very curious, they did not have these strong preconceived notions about the West and whether or not it's a friend or an enemy. It was very remote to them, you know.
And so I think that if you had the kind of Western powers coming in and taking a more visible role in, for example, security assistance or something, then in some ways you'd be giving propaganda to the jihadist right, you know.
And I'm not saying anyone's suggesting this now. But since your question was okay, the Nigerian military is not handling the situation sufficiently, what can the international community do? I do not think that the answer is to kind of take on a more forceful role, right? If you had these, like Reaper drones flying over northwestern Nigeria, these bandits, you know, their fight is a local fight. But all of a sudden, they're getting pursued by US military hardware, they go what's happening? And then that's the moment that Ansaru can say, ah, we told you, you see? Your real enemy is America.
Dr. Rufai;
Yeah.
James;
You weren't bothering anyone but these Americans, they're ideologically hell-bent on killing Muslims. And so that's why you have to join us. So I think this is a very long way... I'm not giving you a satisfactory answer, I'm just saying what I think we shouldn't do.
But I think that it's important to stress that level of caution that whatever approach, the ''international community'' takes, I think it needs to be very careful, very clear to let Nigerians lead on this, to not be taking a too visible role in some ways, especially on the security front.
And I think that's a challenge, right? Because as you know, it's a dilemma in some ways, because the Nigerian security forces have not shown the capacity to handle this. But I think that very often, you know, the medicine can be worse than the disease. And so I think that that's kind of my word of caution. But I'll let Dr. Rufai...
Tobi;
I get you and I'll get to Dr. [Rufai] in a minute, so my question is actually a lot more subtle than that. Of course, everything you say is true. If you have drones flying over the Northwest, this will certainly make it worse but what I'm asking is [that] there is some engagement going on, either it is funding or it is selling military hardware to the Nigerian government, that probably makes this worse? Maybe not directly, from the Western alliance…
But, what I'm saying is, how should the engagement change if it's going to, to be a bit more progressive? Even if it is to fund more local researchers to better understand the problem? Right? I mean, to say the obvious, at least for me, in this particular case, it took an Oyinbo man, like you said, to be aware of his work.
James;
Yeah, it's true. It's one of the challenges.
Tobi;
Which is not supposed to be so. Right? So I'll go back to that point, how exactly should engagement be, even at [the] diplomatic level? Not just force? How do we better make the incentive and issues clear? Dr, you can weigh in?
Dr. Rufai;
You see, in my own opinion, rather than going too much international, looking at the Western world... I think, to address this issue properly and adequately, the Nigerien government [Niger Republic] has a better, clearer, and deeper understanding of Northwest's problem, unfortunately, than even the Nigerian state.
Because when these conflicts actually started, it was more or less a cross-border issue between Nigeria and Niger. And what the Nigerien Government fantastically did during that period, is to profile all the bandits along the border. Both on the Nigerian side, and also on the Nigerian side.
Not just an ordinary profiling, but rather to have the names, the locations, and also the family background of each and every potential bandit. And of course, they succeeded in drawing a map of their locations, and also their relationships.
And when that was also going on, for instance, every local head... I mean, either the village head, or a district head, or an emir in Niger, for instance, in that particular part of the world, they have the names of these people. And these people or these bandits, for instance, were declared wanted. And we've seen, of course, going by my interviews, and also fieldwork in some part of Niger, where whenever a bandit comes in, they alert the authorities. And that was how they succeeded in picking [a] larger number of them that are in Niger.
On the Nigerian side, when the Northwestern governors, for instance, feel there is need for collaboration with their counterparts in Niger. Of course, they had series of meetings with the governors of Northwest - Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Zamfara, and the rest.
But their unfortunate conclusion is that we are not serious people, these governors are not in any way committed to ending banditry anytime soon. Because there were, of course, some series of joint operations, but at the end of the day, the Nigerien side that were committed, and also ready to end the problem, were rather given out to the bandits.
To the extent that they lost some of their officers and men in the course of fighting banditry. And they felt that is basically coming from the neglect of the Nigerian or the Northwestern authorities. And on that basis, they cease to assist, they cease to discuss issues related to insecurity in the Northwest of Nigeria.
And not only that, if today, the Nigerien government decides to strengthen its border security, the movement of small arms and light weapons into the northwest, into Nigeria, will certainly reduce and reduce drastically. But since they feel we are not serious people, we are not committed to end[ing] the problem, or the security challenges, for instance, they let it go and they loosely operate along the border.
And we've seen cases and instances where people were saying that, okay, there are cases of people moving into the country with arms and ammunition across the border, but Nigerien border officials, for instance, will decide to even close their eyes and feel nothing is happening.
And some of these arms and ammunition as long as they aren't going to be used in Niger, they let it move into the northern part [of Nigeria]. So instead of looking for assistance, financial, funding, selling [buying] of military hardware from the Western world, the problem still remains local.
I said it's local because you cannot differentiate [between] the people who live in Daura, the President's hometown for instance, and the people who live in Kwangalam, which is in Niger Republic. It is a stone's throw. They are the same father... people from the same father and the same mother, they are people of the same family.
And now, there could be other forms of engagement at the local level without necessarily engaging or even involving the state government, not to talk about the federal government. So if you strengthen this old relationship between these border communities, it is enough, for instance, for you to address the issue.
And the unfortunate scenario, the unfortunate happening and now is that you see two-three kilometres... for instance, if you take Illela, you can trek from Illela which is in Nigeria in Sokoto State to Kwani, which is just three-four kilometres to Kwani. And you see absolute peace, absolute security, absolute harmony in Kwani, and a high level of insecurity in Illela.
And what the larger number of the people in Illela do now is when it is 6 'o' clock, they trek down to the other side of the border...
To sleep!
To some extent not even sleep in houses, in villages... they sleep in an open space along the border. Wake up in the following morning and move to Nigeria for their daily business and economic activities. So one begins to wonder what is actually happening?
Not only in Illela, you go to Kwangalam, you find the same thing. You go to the Medujia, you find the same thing. You go to Jibia, you find the same thing. You ask the question, what is actually happening? And today, some of these border communities have more confidence, trust, pride in the Nigerien security than the Nigerian security.
And in an event of [an] attack, they'd rather call the Zandarma, for instance, in Niger to call other security operatives along the border in Niger than to call Nigerian security operatives. So the trust, confidence, is not there at all.
So if now we can strengthen international relations within these border areas, look at issues around ECOWAS protocol, for instance, free movement and all that, strengthen that aspect. I think it is something that will go a long way in addressing some of these challenges.
Rather than seeking for funds, military hardware, support, from the international communities. And no right-thinking nation in the Western world will engage itself or involve itself in the mess that is happening in Nigeria because it is a local problem.
It is a local problem. You get the point. And probably the only thing I think they will do in cases like that is to provide, probably, the necessary advice, the necessary military training, and all that. If not, nobody will just come directly and get themselves into that.
And not only that, the major people, people having a very serious threat on this are basically the Chinese. As we speak, there are a large number of Chinese nationalities that were abducted by these bandits. Though some people say bandit and I argue, I said, no, not bandit, rather, Boko Haram, Ansaru, and the rest of them.
Because they are people that relate directly with the rural communities. And because of that relationship, they are vulnerable to abduction. And unfortunately, if you interact with some of these Chinese nationalities, the information and the news you will get from them is frightening.
It's frightening because we've seen instances and situations where the security guards that are supposed to provide security to these people were the same people collaborating, serving as informants, serving as spy agents to some of these bandits, and also to some of these Boko Haram members.
Meaning they facilitate the abduction of these nationalities. And at the end of the day, they will get their own share of the loots. So, there are lots of ugly stories taking place in the country, at times is even better you don't know than you know because you know you won't even say. Because the situation is completely hopeless.
James;
I think that last point... the penultimate point about strengthening cooperation with Nigeria and Niger. I think that's a great comment, in part because, also, it's not something that the international community, you know, the Western powers needs to do. The mechanisms for that exist, right?
Tobi;
Yeah.
James;
You have ECOWAS, you already have all these bilateral forums and stuff between them. So it's just there needs to be the political will on both sides to actually work together on this. This isn't something that you need to turn to Washington or Brussels or London for. These mechanisms for Regional Cooperation already exist, it's just a question of whether there's the political will to use them to actually channel effort towards addressing these issues.
Tobi;
So I mean, your jobs might be hard, because sometimes the numbers that you deal with, and analyse, are actual human lives. And I know we've been analytical and impersonal so far. These are serious issues with real lives at stake.
People are dying, 1000s, every month now, in Nigeria. So on that sombre note, I think we can close the podcast with this last lighthearted question. What's the one idea - it's a bit of a tradition on the show.... what's the one idea that inspires you, that you would like to see spread? That you'd like to see people everywhere believe, adopt, or just be fascinated by? And it could be anything. So what keeps you guys going...what keeps you guys slogging through this?
James;
Caffeine keeps me going. [laughs]
It can be hard to be optimistic sometimes. But I think seeing... I don't know, maybe it's a bit banal, but seeing the energy that many of my Nigerian colleagues have for actually trying to address this issue, I think that helps me avoid fatalism, maybe.
I think even Dr. Rufai, you know, we're sharing accommodation here in Unilag, he was up several hours later than I was last night and he was up before me. And so I think sometimes if I get fatalistic or tired, I remember that there are a lot of good people (not just Dr. Rufai that, you know, I got the benefit of working with a number of colleagues in Abuja, Kaduna, people up in Gusau) who genuinely believe that there are solutions to this that they need to be pushing for.
For them, the stakes are much higher than they are for me, I have to be honest about that, you know. And so I think that seeing the enthusiasm, the energy, that people bring to this…it acts as a check on my kind of instinct towards pessimism and fatalism.
Yeah, I think that's important.
Dr. Rufai;
I think for me, all I want to see is peace. Harmony. Inter-community relations and inter-community collaboration that actually used to happen in the past. Where we have a free rural world. People operate freely, relate freely, and that love for one another is there.
But the unfortunate story is that today, no trust, no freedom, in fact, nothing works actually in the rural areas. And you interact with the rural communities (more), especially in Zamfara, where I know and where I conducted a larger part of my research. Some of these people will tell you [that] they don't need anything from the state government. All they want at the moment is nothing other than peace.
A peace that will actually give them an opportunity to continue with their social, economic, and political way of life. They have their own definition of comfort. If it actually rains, cat and dog every year, they consider themselves as the most prosperous people.
Because it is from that rain, the grains they produce, [the] different types of crops they harvest, for instance, that they run their daily and yearly life. An ordinary farmer in Zamfara, in Katsina, in some parts of Sokoto is not in any way poor (going by our own definition of poverty, poverty line, and also someone to be poor). Why, because they have their own way, local and the rural way of life... they harvest, they rear their animals, and you see them every year, paying money, millions to go on pilgrimage, Hajj, without intervention from the state, without a penny from anybody.
And of course, from the foodstuff, they sustain their life. And they will tell you, if at all there is anything they need from the state, it is the infrastructure and facilities, particularly the roads. Access roads, where they will access the markets, no more, no less.
They don't need electricity, for instance, they will tell you that 'take away your education,' they don't bother about that as long as they have operational Islamiyya schools, for instance. They will tell you that 'take away even your justice system,' as long as their traditional village heads are strong, alive, and active to [sic] their responsibilities. They believe in them, and they are capable of providing them with absolute justice.
So all this beauty in the rural areas are [sic], today, no more. And what do we see in the rural areas today? A high level, an increasing number of internally displaced persons. People that were millionaires, I mean, millionaires in the actual sense of the war, before banditry, today, are beggars.
Today, lives from hand to mouth. They have become so much degraded, wallowing in absolute and abject poverty as a result of these rural conflicts. And what do we see in the rural areas today, we see a large army of internally displaced persons, as I said, child prostitution, and we've seen marriage and the respected women that lost their beloved ones, their husbands, their relatives, their breadwinners, turning into prostitutes, just for them to survive.
And the unfortunate story is that nobody cares, nobody reports and nobody tends to know that some of these things are happening. You will understand this better if you go to some of these rural areas.
They are poor, not because they are naturally been poor, but because they were denied access to their farmlands by the bandits. And their own definition of life is land. Life begins and ends with land. If they have access to land, I mean farmland, for instance, they have access to a decent living and also to a life that could be compared with any other life in the urban centers.
They don't need your water supply. They don't need your electricity. They don't need anything that one could think of within the context of a comfortable life in the urban center. Their rural setting, they are comfortable with it, because you'll see some of them spending five, six years without coming to the state capital.
You ask them 'you've never been to Gusau,' for instance, which is your State Capital, he will tell you 'what will I do in Gusau? If at all, you see me in Gusau or any of the urban centers, probably I'm going to the airport, flying out to Mecca.'
And look at it, these people will also tell you that the best people you can easily manage, govern and administer with ease are Nigerians and also the rural dwellers. You live a comfortable life, you steal their money, you engage yourself in corruption; they never bother. All they want is peace.
If you give them peace, continue with your life. Because their belief is that in the Hereafter you will account for your deed. And that is where the problem lies. So in my opinion, I want to see life going back to normal, the way it used to be in the past - a prosperous and happy, rural areas.
Thank you very much.
Tobi;
Thank you very much, Dr. RUfai. Thank you, James. It's really fantastic talking to both of you. And hopefully, when next we speak about this, things would have improved, hopefully. Thank you both so much.
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