Ukraine Invades Russia

20 Aug · Let's Know Things

This week we talk about Kursk, asymmetric warfare, and Russian politics.

We also discuss HIMARS, supply lines, and Kyiv.

Recommended Book: The Disappearance of Rituals by Byung-Chul Han

Transcript

About two and a half years ago, on February 24, 2022, Russia invaded neighboring Ukraine.

This invasion had been forecasted for a while, as Russian forces had at times surreptitiously, at times more overtly supported separatist factions in the eastern and southeastern portion of Ukraine for about a decade, eventually invading and them annexing the Crimean Peninsula back in March of 2014 using what became known as the "little green men" strategy because the invading soldiers had their flags, patches, and other insignia removed, which gave the Russian government deniability, saying basically some patriotic members of their military might be inclined to help their fellow travelers in parts of Ukraine that are being repressed for their Russian heritage, and who crave freedom from an oppressive central government; how these patriotic soldiers acting on their own behalf, without support from the Russian government, supposedly, were able to bring so much heavy artillery and tanks with them was never formally addressed.

So Russia had been chipping away at Ukraine for a long while leading up to this more conventional attack in 2022, grabbing an important port when they took Crimea and leaving the Ukrainian government, which had been tilting toward Europe and away from Russia's sphere of influence—which is part of what triggered that pseudo-invasion of Crimea—and all of this left Ukraine fighting those separatist groups on their eastern flank pretty much continuously for the decade leading up to that bigger invasion a few years ago.

When that invasion was launched, Russia was expected by pretty much everyone to basically waltz right into Kyiv with little opposition, as it was this huge, powerful country with nukes and a massive conventional military apparatus, so it stood to reason it should easily defeat its weaker, former supplicant neighbor.

But that's not how things played out.

Ukraine managed to hold off an initial, ill-planned but large invasion force, and for the past two and a half years they've continued to hold those lines, despite huge drafts of soldiers and new investments in wartime materials, including drones and missiles that have been near-continuously lobbed at Ukrainian cities and towns, by the Russian government.

For the past year or so, following some back-and-forth pushes by Russian and Ukrainian forces in mostly the eastern part of Ukraine, at least following that initial unsuccessful incursion toward the capitol, Ukraine's efforts to reclaim its captured territory have been fraught.

It launched a successful counterattack a little while back, retaking some earlier captured territory, but after plowing through Russian forces and arriving in the eastern portion of the country, it's next-stage offensives basically collapsed as soon as they were launched.

The Ukrainian government is still making fresh attempts in this regard, as any stagnation and seeming lack of progress could serve as justification by its allies to stop sending money and weapons to bolster their war effort, but these have been relatively small and haven't accomplished much—not for the last year, at least.

The same was generally true for Russia up until recently, it's troops on the ground exhausted and undersupplied, their pushes deeper into Ukrainian met with stern-enough resistance that they've had to pull back, or they've persisted in shouldering their way through a meat-grinder defense, capturing little tiny bits of territory, but with huge costs in terms of lives and military hardware.

This past year they've seen some decent gains, though, as freshly drafted and trained troops have subbed-in for exhausted and wounded ones, and as Ukraine's forces have suffered the consequences of delayed support from the US in particular, and as their own forces have been unable to tap-out, rest, and recover, because of the difference in the size of the two countries' populations, but also because of the nature of the conflict, Ukraine being invaded, while Russia has remained a safe-haven for the most part.

As of the day I'm recording this in late-August 2024, Russia's military controls about 20% of Ukraine's total territory—and that includes Crimea and other chunks that were taken in 2014—around 8.2 million of Ukraine's 41 million population before the invasion had already fled the country by mid-2023, some having returned in the year or so since, but millions of people are still scattered throughout Europe and the rest of the world, making this the continent's largest refugee crisis since WWII.

About 8 million Ukrainians are now considered to be internally displaced, which means they're homeless within their own country, often because their cities or towns have been captured or destroyed.

Estimates on casualties and fatalities in this conflict vary widely, as official numbers are often incomplete and filtered for public consumption and propaganda purposes, but some fairly strict and consequently probably low estimates from outside groups suggest a few hundred thousand people may have died in this conflict, so far, with hundreds of thousands more having been wounded, in some cases grievously, with some more biased figures—like those provided by Ukraine's Ministry of Defense—suggesting that well over half a million people may have been wounded on Russia's side, alone, since the 2022 invasion began.

Again, this war has been uneven but surprising from the get go, Russia taking a lot of territory, but Ukraine holding its own and performing well beyond most expectations.

But over the last year, since battle lines in the east were more firmly drawn and both sides had the opportunity to carve out defenses, lay mines, things like that, this has been a story of slow attritional conflict, which has tended to mean an advantage for Russia: they've ever-so-slowly been claimed more of Ukraine—grabbing just over 400 square miles of territory over the course of the past twelve months, including a few dozens cities and towns along those well-entrenched emplacements.

What I'd like to talk about today is a recent move by Ukraine that has seemingly surprised just about everyone, and which, depending on who you ask, is the desperate act of a flailing military, or an inspired bit of asymmetrical warfare that could help turn the tides in their favor.

—

Part of why many well-informed analysts assumed Russia's invasion of Ukraine would be a quick thing, several days-long, maybe a week or two at most, is that Russia's military is big and backed by the largest arsenal of nukes in the world. Russia's economy is also decently large, even if it is significantly dependent on fossil fuel and mineral wealth.

So Russia's military should be capable of stomping in to a smaller country's territory, especially a neighboring country, and then killing and threatening everyone into submission, and menacing them with nukes if they do anything threatening in return.

That's the ostensible promise of a nuclear arsenal: you have the whammy on everyone else if they do anything that really scares you or threatens you, no matter what you do to them, first.

That expectation didn't pan out, but the threat of nukes has hovered over this conflict from day one, and Russia's government has happily reinforced the sense that if Ukraine does anything to threaten them in return, even as they invade and gobble up Ukraine's territory, killing and kidnapping their people, Russia might use nukes, because why wouldn't they?

And they've often signaled this by saying, basically, that if the Fatherland is threatened, if anyone menaces Russia in return, that could serve as a spark that turns this invasion into a nuclear conflict.

This threat has ensured Russia's invasion of Ukraine, thus far, has been a fairly one-sided undertaking in which Russia can do basically anything they want, stomping all around Ukraine and launching endless drones and missiles at their densely populated cities, but Ukraine is not allowed to do anything like that to Russia in return.

And this nuclear threat has been taken seriously enough by Ukraine's allies that they've said, from the get-go, we'll give you money and weapons, but you have to promise not to use them on targets within Russia, because we don't want to kick off a nuclear war, or even a broader conflict between nuclear-armed nations, if Russia were to consider attacks by Ukrainians wielding American weapons against Russian civilian targets to be an attack by the US—which was always a theoretical possibility that, again, Russia was happy to reinforce.

As a result, some of the weapons provided to Ukraine by its allies were artificially limited, including the 20 HIMARS long-range rocket systems the US supplied back in late-2022, which were altered before being sent so they couldn't be used against targets within Russia territory.

The US and other allies have also been incredibly hesitant to provide Ukraine weapons with greater range, like ATMS, Army Tactical Missile System rockets, that can strike targets up to 186 miles away, and fighter jets that could be used to take out targets deep within Russian territory, if used correctly.

From the beginning, though, Ukrainian forces figured out ways to hit targets within Russia, generally using asymmetrical methods, like covert infiltrations and loose alliances with anti-government entities operating within Russia, rather than launching aerial or artillery strikes from within their own borders.

In 2022, they struck dozens of air bases, fuel depots, and similar targets across the border, though they almost always denied involvement, officially, due to fears that overtly launching such attacks could lead to significant reprisals, and could cause their allies to step back from supporting Ukraine over fears of an expanding conflict.

Several bits of manufacturing and shipping infrastructure in Russia were damaged or destroyed by Ukrainian missiles and drones in 2023, which were again, often denied, though a bit more overt than their earlier efforts, and military and civilian buildings in Russian towns along their shared borders were damaged by drones and saboteurs from the beginning of the invasion.

Artillery shelling has also incidentally or accidentally hit civilian targets across these borders, though almost all of these attacks, up until 2024, caused little damage and few deaths and injuries; they were more symbolically than practically important.

Beginning in early 2024, though, mostly drone attacks on Russia energy infrastructure seemed to impact Russia's economy, several important oil and gas terminals damaged to the point that they required a lot of time and investment to get them operational again, not to mention the further investment that would be required to protect these small, numerous, and important weak-points that Ukraine had shown a willingness to attack.

There were also a few drone attacks on major cities, like St. Petersburg, but these seemed to be mostly symbolic strikes, and were generally not claimed by Ukraine—they could have been false flag attacks, or launched by Ukraine's anti-Russian-government allies operating within Russia's borders, or attacks by ISIS or similar terrorist organizations—but whoever launched them, they seem to have caused more fear and consternation than actual, physical damage.

Causing fear, though, is still important in this conflict, because, as far as many Russian civilians have understood for years now, the war has been going fine, or fine enough, and they haven't felt they've had much to worry about, because although a lot of their people have been drafted and sent to the frontlines, the conflict itself hasn't really impacted them beyond some brands having disappeared from shelves due to international sanctions, and a general sense that the government has clamped down on several freedoms they previously enjoyed, using the invasion—which has been pitched internally as an effort to liberate Ukrainians from a tyrannical, Nazi government—as justification.

That's part of what makes a recent move by Ukraine's military so interesting.

On August 6, 2024, the Ukrainian military launched an attack across their border with Russia into the Kursk oblast, which is an administrative district of about a million people located in western Russia.

This assault included at least 1,000 troops, alongside armored personnel carriers and tanks, and they plowed more than 6 miles into Russian territory within two days, apparently wiping out local defensive positions without too much trouble.

They reportedly drove right past many defensive emplacements and came at the relatively few defenders from unexpected angles, behind rather than in front of them, and that allowed them to rapidly capture territory and prisoners.

As a result of this blitz into Kursk, more than 100,000 Russian citizens, closer to 200,000 by some estimates, have had to flee their homes, a state of emergency has been triggered in this and surrounding regions, and the Ukrainian military has captured just under 400 square miles, or around 1,000 square km of Russian territory—which is about what Russian forces have managed to capture of Ukraine over the whole of the past year. Within that held territory, they also hold 82 towns and villages, and they've captured an estimated 2,000 or so prisoners.

This rapid assault into Russian territory was unexpected, catching even Ukraine's allies by surprise, reportedly, and it struck an area that was apparently under-defended, which is part of why they were able to break through so easily, hundreds of Russian soldiers surrendering almost immediately, none of them having expected anything like this so far from what has become the front lines of the conflict all the way on the other side of the country.

In the weeks since this assault was launched, Ukrainian forces have taken out a couple of important bridges, which serves the double-purpose of making a counterattack by Russian forces more difficult, while also hobbling some of their supply lines that are fueling the Russian invasion of Ukraine further south and east.

The Ukrainian force that invaded Russia is relatively small, but because of the nature of this sort of thing, it's estimated that Russia will need something like 3 to 5-times as many soldiers as Ukraine has if they want to successfully dislodge them, which will likely mean having to pull troops and military hardware from the frontlines, or other spots along their border, which would leave those other spots less defended, in order to muster that kind of counterattack.

This spot is also reportedly somewhat protected from existing Russian artillery installations, and any attacks they launch against the occupying Ukrainian forces will be attacks against their own cities and towns—something that is arguably inevitable when you're invaded and trying to boot the invaders, but also not something that's super politically popular, because, again, as many as a few hundred thousand people have fled their homes, and if their own government bombs their homes and other infrastructure into smithereens in order to recapture it, that probably won't make all those people too happy, in addition to making them an additional burden in a way, suddenly needing more government support just to keep them fed, housed, and so on.

This is also tricky for Russia because, as I just mentioned, pulling troops from elsewhere will require weakening either some other border area, or their front lines in eastern Ukraine, meaning they either open themselves up to another incursion, or they slow the progress they're making with their own invasion, and that component of the conflict is currently going pretty well for them, so it's a tough sell, the idea of slowing that momentum in order to take back territory they didn't think was under any real threat, up till just now.

Of course, this assault also makes clear that other parts of Russia's extensive shared border with Ukraine might be under threat if they leave any gaps or weak spots, which will likely mean having to shuffle things around a bit, either way. Attacking and capturing this part of Kursk, then, would seem to be a means of forcing Russia into a two-front conflict, while also demonstrating parts of their territory they thought were well-fortified-enough possibly aren't, which could further distract their leaders and spread their forces out over a wider area.

The political aspect of this might prove to be important, too, as while Russia's economy has been doing pretty well, considering all the sanctions, because the government has been flooding the economy with war-time investment and dropping all kinds of regulations to keep businesses afloat and flourishing, authoritarian regimes are often bulwarked by certainty and the projection of strength, and anything that seems to weaken that supposed inevitability and invulnerability can lead to cracks in the facade that ultimately lead to the people up top no longer being up top.

That doesn't seem to be a major threat here at the moment, but if we're looking at the long-term, this could be one more dent in what's meant to be an impervious, pristine visage of power, which could over time lead to something more substantial, in terms of who's in charge in Russia.

All that said, most analysts seem to think this invasion of Kursk won't be terribly maintainable because it stretches Ukraine's supply lines in such a way that those who did the invading can be relatively easily cut off from the rest of their military, and because it forces Ukraine into a two-front conflict, as well, and while Russia can muddle through something like that, even if it would prefer not to, Ukraine will struggle to do the same because of the nature of their population and infrastructure at the moment.

Ukrainian forces are also already struggling on their eastern front, losing territory in small bits, but continuously, to Russian forces, and the grinding nature of the invasion has really taken a toll on those who have been fighting without a break for in some cases years at this point.

This successful and surprising move does seem to have served as a morale boost for Ukrainian troops, though, as this is the first time a rival military has taken and held Russian territory since WWII, marking a huge symbolic victory, and one that may keep Ukraine's allies optimistic as well, which is important, as many politicians in those allied countries have shown themselves to be more than willing to stop the ready flow of money and weapons into Ukraine any time it seems like the conflict might not be going their way, even momentarily.

Some reports have suggested that this assault might be part of a larger effort by Ukraine's leadership to prepare itself for what seems to be, to some at least, inevitable near-future peace talks, as holding this chunk of Russian land and all these prisoners would give Ukraine more leverage to get some of their land and prisoners back in such negotiations.

Others have suggested that the key purpose might have been to humiliate Russian President Putin, while also making everyday Russians feel the war the way everyday Ukrainians have, as that can help tip public opinion enough to, eventually, sway governmental action, even within authoritarian states like Russia.

If that's the case, Ukraine may well achieve the opposite, as while Putin has seemingly been slow to respond, focusing his public statements on the Russian military's continuing success in eastern Ukraine, he's reportedly, behind the scenes, plotting revenge, and telling his people to step back from back-room negotiations that have been focused on agreements related to not targeting energy infrastructure on either side; this is pretty speculative and there are a lot of anonymous sources on this narrative, so take it with a grain of salt, but there's a chance that Putin is playing down how bad this is for him and his forces in public, but is planning some kind of significant and devastating counterattack for sometime in the near-future, to deter future attacks on Russian soil.

Russian officials have described this attack as an escalation, which is exactly the language you would use if you were preparing your own escalation, so we maybe have that to watch out for in the coming weeks.

Simultaneous to all this, though, Russia is on the brink of capturing all of Donesk in eastern Ukraine, which it illegally annexed a little while back, but which Ukraine has partially held all this time—so we may see some kind of change to the conflict once that capture is completed, as it could prove to be a suitable moment, strategically, for Russia to walk back to the peace talks table, happy to take the land it says it owns, before stepping back from active conflict and arming itself for some later, potentially less-direct effort to claim the rest; another little green men attack, perhaps.

There's a chance that this attack will force Putin to make politically expedient, but militarily non-ideal decisions over the next few months, though.

It would arguably be smartest for the Russian military to keep at it in the east, claim what they need to claim and reinforce their holdings, there, before then going and addressing the Ukrainians in Kursk, but he may feel pressured to send forces to Kursk sooner rather than later, because of embarrassment if nothing else, but also possibly pressure from other Russian leaders, which would spread out his forces and the military's attention, while also slowing their advances in the east, which could in turn give Ukraine a chance to shore up some of their positions, and possibly even launch more small attacks into Russian territory, further complexifying the state of play and the number of emergencies the Russian military needs to address simultaneously.

Each of these attacks could be small and strategic, causing outsized damage and requiring an outsized response force: a bit like how irregular militaries, like Hamas and Hezbollah, use cheap rockets that they know will almost always be knocked out of the sky with countermeasures, but those rockets cost maybe ten thousands dollars, while the countermeasures cost ten or twenty times that.

Over time, you can deplete the enemy's reserves of money, hardware, and people by forcing them to commit a lot more than you do to a given area or attack; in this way, the outgunned and out-populated Ukrainian military could tie-up a lot of Russia's forces by making them worry about maintaining the bare-bones status quo back home.

There's also a chance, though, that Russia will play the long game, ignore opinion polls and protests by people who are forced to flee their homes, and wait to address these asymmetric incursions until later, at which point they'd be in a much stronger position within Ukraine, and that leaves them in a good spot to keep pushing forward, militarily, or to have peace talks that heavily favor them, even more than such talks would, today.

Show Notes

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3762042-us-secretly-modified-himars-for-ukraine-to-prevent-kyiv-from-shooting-long-range-missiles-into-russia/

https://www.wsj.com/world/behind-ukraines-russia-invasion-secrecy-speed-and-electronic-jamming-188fcc22

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-russia-looked-wrong-way-ukraine-invaded-2024-08-17/

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-lukashenko-says-nearly-third-army-sent-ukraine-border-belta-reports-2024-08-18/

https://www.news24.com/news24/world/news/most-likely-used-north-korean-ballistic-missiles-russia-strikes-with-for-the-third-time-ukraine-20240818

https://ca.news.yahoo.com/now-even-north-korea-weighed-103312164.html

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kursk-incursion-bridge-invasion-43d6579c82c24ffc5cfabd99d07c66db

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/17/world/europe/ukraine-russia-bridge.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/17/world/europe/ukraines-incursion-russian-conscripts.html

https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraines-raid-kursk-russia-shift-tactical-narrative/

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4829506-how-ukraines-surprise-offensive-into-russia-has-changed-the-war/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_2024_Kursk_Oblast_incursion

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/19/world/europe/ukraine-russia-zelensky-putin-ceasefire.html

https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/17/safety-at-ukraines-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-deteriorating-iaea-warns

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/18/vladimir-putin-kursk-crisis-reponse/

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-08-17/ukraine-military-incursion-into-russia-maps-satellite-images/104233912

https://www.barrons.com/news/russia-says-captured-another-village-near-ukraine-s-pokrovsk-6dc20994

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/18/world/europe/kursk-russia-ukraine-incursion.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/16/world/europe/russia-ukraine-pokrovsk-kursk.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_2024_Kursk_Oblast_incursion

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy0ngzg9754o

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/10/ukraine-braces-for-reprisals-as-russia-to-send-more-troops-to-kursk

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attacks_in_Russia_during_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2024

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-incursion-kursk-afa42b9613323901bef07800ac2cae9e

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Federation

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Episodes

Online Tutoring
12 Nov· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about the Double Reduction Policy, gaokao, and Chegg.
We also discuss GPTs, cheating, and disruption.
Recommended Book: Autocracy, Inc by Anne Applebaum
Transcript
In July of 2021, the Chinese government implemented a new education rule called the Double Reduction Policy.
This Policy was meant, among other things, to reduce the stress students in the country felt related to their educational attainment, while also imposing sterner regulations on businesses operating in education and education-adjacent industries.
Chinese students spend a lot of time studying—nearly 10 hours per day for kids ages 12-14—and the average weekly study time for students is tallied at 55 hours, which is substantially higher than in most other countries, and quite a lot higher than the international average of 45 hours per week.
This fixation on education is partly cultural, but it’s also partly the result of China’s education system, which has long served to train children to take very high-stakes tests, those tests then determining what sorts of educational and, ultimately, employment futures they can expect.
These tests are the pathway to a better life, essentially, so the kids face a whole lot of pressure from society and their families to do well, because if they don’t, they’ve sentenced themselves to low-paying jobs and concomitantly low-status lives; it’s a fairly brutal setup, looked at from elsewhere around the world, but it’s something that’s kind of taken for granted in modern China.
On top of all that in-class schoolwork, there’s abundant homework, and that’s led to a thriving private tutoring industry. Families invest heavily in ensuring their kids have a leg-up over everyone else, and that often means paying people to prepare them for those tests, even beyond school hours and well into the weekend.
Because of all this, kids in China suffer abnormally high levels of physical and mental health issues, many of them directly linked to stress, including a chronic lack of sleep, high levels of anxiety, rampant obesity and everything that comes with that, and high levels of suicide, as well; suicide is actually the most common cause of death amongst Chinese teenagers, and the majority of these suicides occur in the lead-up to the gaokao, or National College Entrance Exam, which is the biggest of big important exams that determine how teens will be economically and socially sorted basically for the rest of their lives.
This recent Double Reduction Policy, then, was intended to help temper some of those negative, education-related consequences, reducing the volume of homework kids had to tackle each week, freeing up time for sleep and relaxation, while also putting a cap on the ability of private tutoring companies to influence parents into paying for a bunch of tutoring services; something they’d long done via finger-wagging marketing messages, shaming parents who failed to invest heavily in their child’s educational future, making them feel like they aren’t being good parents because they’re not spending enough on these offerings.
This policy pursued these ends, first, by putting a cap on how much homework could be sent home with students, limiting it to 60 minutes for youngsters, and 90 minutes for middle schoolers.
It also provided resources and rules for non-homework-related after-school services, did away with bad rankings due to poor test performance that might stigmatize students in the future, and killed off some of those fear-inducing, ever-so-important exams altogether.
It also provided some new resources and frameworks for pilot programs that could help their school system evolve in the future, allowing them to try some new things, which could, in theory, then be disseminated to the nation’s larger network of schools if these experiments go well.
And then on the tutoring front, they went nuclear on those private tutoring businesses that were shaming parents into paying large sums of money to train their children beyond school hours.
The government instituted a new system of regulators for this industry, ceased offering new business licenses for tutoring companies, and forced all existing for-profit businesses in this space to become non-profits.
This market was worth about $100 billion when this new policy came into effect, which is a simply staggering sum, but the government basically said you’re not businesses anymore, you can’t operate if you try to make a profit.
This is just one of many industries the current Chinese leadership has clamped-down on over the past handful of years, often on cultural grounds, as was the case with limiting the amount of time children can play video games each day. But like that video game ban, which has apparently shown mixed results, the tutoring ban seems to have led to the creation of a flourishing black market for tutoring services, forcing these sorts of business dealings underground, and thus increasing the fee parents pay for them each month.
In late-October of 2024, the Chinese government, while not formally acknowledging any change to this policy, eased pressure on private tutoring services—the regulators in charge of keeping them operating in accordance with nonprofit structures apparently giving them a nudge and a wink, telling them surreptitiously that they’re allowed to expand again—possibly because China has been suffering a wave of economic issues over the past several years, and the truncation of the tutoring industry led to a lot of mass-firings, tens of thousands of people suddenly without jobs, and a substantial drop in tax revenue, as well, as the country’s stock market lost billions of dollars worth of value basically overnight.
It’s also worth noting here that China’s youth unemployment rate recently hit 18.8%, which is a bogglingly high number, and something that’s not great for stability, in the sense that a lot of young people, even very well educated young people, can’t find a job, which means they have to occupy themselves with other, perhaps less productive things.
But high youth unemployment is also not great for the country’s economic future, as that means these are people who aren’t attaining new skills and experience—and they can’t do that because the companies that might otherwise hire them can’t afford to pay more employees because folks aren’t spending enough on their offerings.
So while it was determined that this industry was hurting children and their families who had to pay these near-compulsory tutoring fees, they also seemed to realize that lacking this industry, their unemployment and broader economic woes would be further inflamed—and allowing for this gray area in the rules seems to be an attempt to have the best of both worlds, though it may leave them burdened with the worst of both worlds, as well.
What I’d like to talk about today is another facet of the global tutoring industry, and how new technologies seem to be flooding into this zone even more rapidly than in other spaces, killing off some of the biggest players and potentially portending the sort of collapse we might also see in other industries in the coming years.
—
Chegg, spelled c-h-e-g-g, is a US-based, education-focused tech company that has provided all sorts of learning-related services to customers since 2006.
It went public on the NYSE in 2013, and in 2021 it was called the “most valuable edtech company in America” by Forbes, due in part to the boom in long-distance education services in the early days of the Covid-19 pandemic; like Peloton and Zoom, Chegg was considered to be a great investment for a future in which more stuff is done remotely, as seemed likely to be the case for a good long while, considering all the distancing and shut-downs we were doing at the time.
In early 2020, before that boom, the company was already reporting that it had 2.9 million subscribers to its Chegg Services offering, which gave users access to all sorts of school-related benefits, including help with homework, access to Q&As with experts, and a huge database of solutions for tests and assignments.
The company then released a sort of social-publishing platform called Uversity in mid-2021, giving educators a place to share their own content, and they acquired a language-learning software company called Busuu, which is a bit like Duolingo, that same year for $436 million.
In May of 2023, though, the company’s CEO said, on an earnings call, that ChatGPT—the incredibly popular, basically overnight-popular large-language-model-powered AI chatbot created by OpenAI—might hinder Chegg’s near-future growth.
The day after that call, Chegg’s stock price dropped by about 48%, cutting the company’s market value nearly in half, and though later that same month he announced that Chegg would partner with OpenAI to launch its own AI platform called Cheggmate, which was launched as a beta in June, by early November the following year, 2024, the company had lost about 99% of its market valuation, dropping from a 2021 high of nearly $100 per share, down to less than $2 per share as of early November.
This isn’t a unique story: LLM-based AI tools, those made by OpenAI but also its competitors, including big tech companies like Google and Microsoft, which have really leaned into this seeming transition, have been messing with market valuations left and right, as this collection of tools and technologies have been evolving really fast—a recent five-year plan for Chegg indicated they didn’t believe something like ChatGPT would exist until 2025 at the earliest, for instance, which turned out to be way off—but they’ve also been killing off high-flying company valuations because these sorts of tools are by definition multi-purpose, and a lot of the low-hanging fruit in any industry is basically just providing information that’s already available somewhere in a more intuitive and accessible fashion; which is something a multi-purpose, bot-interfaced software tool is pretty good at doing, as it turns out.
Chegg’s services were optimized to provide school-related stuff to students—including test and homework answers those students could quickly reference if they wanted to study or cheat—and serving up these resources in a simple manner is what allowed them to pay the bills.
ChatGPT and similar AI tools, though, can do the same, and for practically or literally—for the end-user, at least—free. And it can sometimes do so in a manner that’s even more intuitive than the Cheggs of the world, even if these AI offerings are sometimes jumbled along the way; the risk-reward math is still favorable to a lot of people, because of just how valuable this kind of information provided in this way can be.
Other companies and entire industries are finding themselves in the same general circumstances, also all of a sudden, because their unique value proposition has been offering some kind of information intuitively, or in some cases they’ve provided human interfaces that would do various things for customers: they would look up deals on a particular model of car, they would write marketing copy, they would commentate on sporting events.
Some of these entities are trying to get ahead of the game, like Chegg did, by basically plugging their existing services into AI versions of the same, replacing their human commentators with bots that can manage a fair approximation of those now-unemployed humans, but at a fraction of the cost. Others are facing a huge number of new competitors, as smaller businesses or just individuals are realizing they can pay a little money for AI tokens and credits, plug an API into a website, which allows that AI to populate content on their site automatically, and they can then run the same sort of service with little or no effort, and vitally, little or no overhead.
This creates a race-to-the-bottom situation in many such cases, and often the bots are nowhere near as good as the humans they’re replacing, but especially in situations where human jobs have been optimized so that one human can be replaced with another human relatively simply, it has proven to be fairly easy to fire people and then replace them with non-humans that seem human-enough most of the time.
So blog-writing and video-making and inventory-organizing and, yes, school-tutoring and similar services are increasingly being automated in this way, and while, sure, you could pay a premium to stick with Chegg and access these AI tools via their portal for $20 a month, the bet many investors are making is that folks will probably prefer to get what amounts to the same thing cheaper, or even free, directly from the source, or via one of those other lower-end intermediaries with fewer overhead costs.
Chegg has lost about $14.5 billion in market value since early 2021, and the company is now expected to collapse under the weight of its debts sometime in the near-future; the shift in fortunes brought about by the deployment of generally capable, if not perfectly capable, chat-interface accessible AI tools has been that sudden.
None of which means this is a permanent thing, as entities in industries currently being challenged by AI equivalent or near-equivalent tools might push back with their own, difficult to replicate offerings, and there’s a chance that the small but burgeoning wave of vehemently non-AI tools—those that wave their human-made-ness, their non-AI-ness like a flag, or like an organic, cruelty-free label—might carve out their own sustainable, growable niche. That becomes their unique value proposition in place of what these AI-focused companies stole from them.
But this kind of disruption sometimes leads to an extinction-level event for the majority of operators in a formerly flourishing space.
Chegg, for their part, decided to revamp their AI offering, moving away from the Cheggmate name and working with Scale AI instead of OpenAI, to build a few dozen AI systems optimized for different academic focuses; which could prove to be a valuable differentiator for them, but it could also fall flat in the face of OpenAI’s own re-skinned versions of ChatGPT, called GPTs, which allow users to do basically the same thing, coming up with their own field focused experts and personalities, rather than using the vanilla model of the bot.
There’s a chance this will also help Chegg deal with another AI-related issue—specifically, that ChatGPT was providing better answers to some students’ questions than Chegg’s human-derived offerings; they’re trying to out-bot OpenAI, essentially, doing the homework-AI thing better than ChatGPT, and there’s a chance that offering a demonstrably higher quality of answers might also serve as a survival-enabling differentiator; though their ability to consistently provide better answers in this way is anything but certain.
It’s also worth noting that what we’re talking about here, so far, isn’t the sci-fi dream of a perfect digital tutor—something like the Young Lady’s Illustrated Primer from Neal Stephenson’s novel The Diamond Age, which is something like an AI-powered storybook that adapts its content to the reader, and which then teaches said reader everything they need to know to flourish in life, day by day. Chegg and ChatGPT serve up tools that help students cheat on tests and homework, while also helping them look up information a lot easier when they decide not to cheat, and to practice various sorts of assignments and exams beforehand.
So this is a far easier space to compete in than something more complex and actually tutor-like. It may be, then, that moving in that direction, toward tools that focus more on replacing teachers and tutors, rather than helping students navigate schoolwork, might be the killer app that allows some of these existing tutoring-ish tools to survive and thrive; though it may be that something else comes along in the meantime which fulfills that promise better—maybe ChatGPT, or maybe some new, more focused version of the same general collection of tools.
It’ll probably be a few years before we see how this and similar bets that’re being made by at-risk companies facing the AI barbarians at the gate turn out, and at that point these tools will likely be even more powerful, offering even more capabilities and thus disrupting, or threatening to disrupt, even more companies in even more industries, as a consequence.
Show Notes
https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/how-chatgpt-brought-down-an-online-education-giant-200b4ff2
https://openai.com/index/introducing-gpts/
https://ai.wharton.upenn.edu/focus-areas/human-technology-interaction/2024-ai-adoption-report/
https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/07/ai-tutor-china-teaching-gaps/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double_Reduction_Policy
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/20965311241265123
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0738059324000117
https://archive.ph/VKkrL
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/07/22/asia-pacific/china-private-tutoring/
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/chinas-youth-unemployment-hits-fresh-high-economic-slowdown-restrictiv-rcna172183

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British Coal
5 Nov· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about peat, pig iron, and sulphuric acid.
We also discuss the Industrial Revolution, natural gas, and offshore wind turbines.
Recommended Book: Deep Utopia by Nick Bostrom
Transcript
This episode is going live on election day here in the US; and this has been quite a remarkable election season for many reasons, among them that there’s been just a boggling amount of money spent on advertisements and events and other efforts to claim attention and mindshare, and in part because the vitriol and tribalism of the past several elections—an evolved, intensified version of those things—has almost completely dominated all those messages.
And as someone who’s based in a swing-state, Wisconsin, I can tell you that it’s been a lot. It’s been a lot everywhere, as US elections also claim more than their fair-share of news reportage in other countries, but in the US, and in the relatively few states that are assumed to be the kingmakers in this election, it’s been just overwhelming for months, for basically a year, actually. So instead of doing anything on the election, or anything overtly political—there’ll no doubt be time for that in the coming weeks, once the dust has settled on all this—let’s talk about coal. And more specifically, British coal.
Coal has been used throughout the British Isles for a long time, with early groups burning unrefined lumps of the substance to heat their homes, though generally only when their local, close-enough-to-the-surface-to-be-gathered source for the stuff was pure enough to beat-out other options, like peat and wood, which was seldom the case in most of these areas.
It was also used to create lime from limestone, the lime used for construction purposes, to make mortar, and it was used for metal-shaping purposes by blacksmiths.
Beyond that, though, it was generally avoided in favor of cleaner-burning options, as coal is often accompanied by sulphur and other such substances, which means when burned in its natural form, it absolutely reeks, and it can make anyone unlucky enough to be caught in the smoke it creates tear-up, because the resulting sulfurous gas would react with their eye-moisture to create sulphuric acid; not pleasant, and even though it was generally better than peat and wood in terms of the energy it contained, it was worse in basically every other way.
Earlier groups of people had figured out the same: there were folks in China as early as 1000 BC, for instance, who used these rocks as fuel for copper smelting, and people in these same early-use areas, where coal veins were exploitable, were really leaning into the stuff by the 13th century AD, when Marco Polo visited and remarked that the locals were burning these weird black stones, which granted them wild luxuries, like being able to take “three hot baths a week.”
Groups in Roman Britain were also surface mining, using, and trading coal at a fairly reasonable level by around 200 AD, though it was still primarily used to process things like grain, which needed to be dried, and to work with iron—as with those Chinese groups, coal has long been appreciated for its smelting capabilities, because of its high energy density compared to other options.
In the British Isles, though, coal was largely imported to major cities by sea, until around the 13th century when the easily accessed deposits were used up, and shaft mining, which granted access to deeper deposits via at times long tunnels that had to be dug and reinforced, was developed and became common, including in areas that hadn’t previously had surface sources that could be exploited.
In the 16th century, this and similar innovations led to a reliable enough supply of coal that folks living in the city of London were able to largely replace their wood- and peat-burning infrastructure with coal-burning versions of the same.
It’s thought that this transition was partly the consequence of widespread deforestation that resulted from a population boom in the city—more lumber was needed to build more buildings, but they also required more burnable wood fuel—though some historians have argued that what actually pushed coal to the forefront, despite its many downsides compared to wood and peat, is the expansion of iron smelting and the increasing necessity of iron for Britain’s many wars during this period, alongside England’s burgeoning glass-making industry.
Both of these manufacturing processes, making iron and glass, required just a silly amount of fuel—making just one ton of the lowest-grade cast iron, so-called pig iron, consumed something like 28 tons of seasoned wood, and glass was similarly wood-hungry.
What’s more, that combination of city expansion and the King’s desire to massively build-out his Navy meant timber resources were continuously being strained anywhere industry popped up and flourished, so those industries would then expand to areas where wood was still cheap, over time making wood it more expensive there, too. Eventually, wood was costly pretty much everywhere, and coal thus became comparably cheap in these regions, and you could use a lot less of it to achieve the same ends.
Even if that subbing-in led to bad smells and burning eyes and clouds of dense, black smoke wherever it was burned, then, the cost differential was substantial enough to make using coal the better option in many such cases and areas.
This boom in coal usage was amplified still further by the rapid clearing of forests due to the expansion of farm- and pastureland.
It was determined, by the late 17th century, that an acre of farm- or pastureland was worth a lot more than woodland used for timber or other purposes—around three-times as valuable—so there was a large-scale deforestation effort to basically claim as much value from these forested lands as possible, dramatically changing the landscape of the British Isles over the course of just a few decades; this transition in part enabled and powered by coal.
Around the year 1700, about five-sixths of all coal that was mined, globally, was mined in Britain, and that helped power the empire’s industrial revolution later that century, beginning in something like 1760, as the majority of clever devices that arose during that period were powered by coal, and the global industrial revolution that eventually created what we might consider technological modernity arose, initially—at least in this manifestation of the concept—from coal-powered Britain.
What I’d like to talk about today is a remarkable coal-related milestone, considering that history, that Britain recently marked, and what it might mean for this and other fuel-types, moving forward.
—
In 1882, the first-ever coal-fired power station opened in London—a thermal power station that uses coal as its fuel, which basically means you refine the stuff, break it into tiny, semi-uniform pieces, and then feed those pieces into a coal-fired boiler. In that boiler the coal is burned to generate heat, and that heat boils water, the resulting steam spinning turbines which turn generators that produce electricity.
Coal-fired power stations are massively inefficient, with modern versions of the model only boasting a 34-ish% efficiency, meaning about 34% of the total energy contained in the fuel source is ultimately converted into electricity—the rest, about 66% of the energy contained in the coal that’s burned, is lost along the way.
That’s not uncommon for power plants, though other fossil fuel-burning plants are somewhat more efficient on average, with oil-powered plants weighing in at about 37% efficiency, and gas-powered versions managing something like 50-60% at their most modern and sophisticated, though simpler variations of the design only achieve about the same as coal.
All fossil fuel-powered power stations emit greenhouse gases into the atmosphere as a byproduct of their operation, which has been shown to stoke climate change, and they all have pollutant-related byproducts, as well, though there’s a spectrum: gas is relatively clean-burning compared to its kin, while coal is the absolute worst, releasing all sorts of pollutants into the air with at times severe health consequences for anyone in the general vicinity; oil plants are somewhere in between those two extremes, depending on the type of oil used and the nature of the plant.
Those downsides are part of why newer technologies like large-scale wind turbines and solar panel arrays have been replacing fossil fuel-based power plants in many locales, and quite rapidly, though the infrastructure in many areas is optimized for these older-school options, which means there are the plants themselves, which are often quite large and real-estate-spanning, but there’s also all the mines, there’s the shipping facilities, the processing capacity for the coal or oil or whatnot—it’s a nation-spanning network of buildings and machinery and businesses, not to mention all the people who work jobs related to these vital, energy-creating industries.
Coal was already beginning to decline in the UK 100 years after that first plant was built, so by the 1990s, as gas, often called natural gas as a sort of branding effort by gas companies to make it sound cleaner and more desirable, was at that point already beginning to replace coal in many electricity-generating facilities.
Gas has done the same in many countries—especially those with vast natural sources of it, and the US has opened up a lot of new markets for this fuel type in recent decades, and in the past decade in particular, as it mastered the means of compressing gas into a liquid, often called LNG, and shipping it to ports in Europe around the same time Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was fundamentally rewiring the energy mix on the continent.
So gas has played a role in disrupting coal’s hold in many previously coal-happy areas, including the US. But it was renewables that really turned the tide against coal in the UK, with a combination of solar and wind making up about 6% of Britain’s electricity in 2012—compared to 40% for coal, at the time—but just over a decade later, in 2023, renewables were making up a whopping 34% of the UK’s energy mix, mostly due to the widescale deployment and success of offshore wind farms.
This, paired with the emergence of increasingly efficient appliances and lighting, which sip energy compared to previous-generation bulbs and kettles and refrigerators, meant the UK was able to deplete its coal-usage, even as energy demand increased—because that demand was less than anticipated, due to those efficiencies, and enough new renewables and gas facilities were coming online to meet that reduced demand.
At the tail-end of September this year, 2024, the UK witnessed the shut-down of its last remaining coal power plant, which was built 57 years ago.
This was a meaningful moment, as it marked the first time in about 142 years that coal wasn’t contributing to the UK’s electrical grid, and it has global significance, as while 23 European countries have announced that they will phase out coal in the relatively near-future, and while Belgium was the first previously coal-burning European nation to go fully coal-free, back in 2016, the UK is the first G7 nation to do so—the rest of the G7 having committed to accomplishing the same by 2035.
Decommissioning the plant will take about two years, and that will include the task of reallocating the plant’s 170-or-so employees to other positions within the power network, and going through the many steps required to clean up the area after decades of voluminous pollution, while also getting the area ready for other types of development.
In many cases right now, globally, that means swapping in some other piece of energy infrastructure; in some cases coal-fired plants can be replaced with gas-fired plants, which is still not ideal in terms of emissions, but much better than coal, and in some cases it’s a more significant change, like building-out grid-scale battery arrays, which allow nearby wind turbines and solar panels to store the excess energy they generate when the wind is blowing and sun is shining, so that none of that energy goes to waste, and so it can be used when the wind and sun aren’t cooperating.
The British government is also planning to expand its nuclear power capacity, quadrupling its currently five-strong nuclear power plant holdings by 2050, which is a choice that comes with a lot of its own consequences, including, often, very high price tags on building and operating such facilities. But because of the nature of nuclear power plants—specifically, that they produce high levels of consistent, reliable, emissions-free electricity—that additional expense is often okay, because that steady consistency nicely blends with the inconsistent output of solar and wind.
It’s worth noting that coal-heavy nations elsewhere around the world, like Russia, are currently having trouble with the stuff, Russia’s coal industry reportedly experiencing its worst crisis in 30 years due in part to sanctions, in part to a lack of demand from previous customers that’re transitioning away from coal, and in part due to issues within the industry, itself.
Coal production in Russia dropped by 6.7% year on year in July of 2024, marking the lowest output since the height of the covid pandemic, and it’s estimated that they’ve lost around 27% of monthly output compared to recent peaks.
There are different types and grades of coal, so those numbers are averages, and not all coal-exporting nations are having as much trouble as Russia right now. Australia is the world’s foremost exporter of coal, for instance, and while China is going through some economic complications right now—which is an issue for Australia, because they shipped the majority of their coal to China until just recently—India has been stepping in to pick up the majority of that slack.
Australia has still cut its coal export outlook by 6% because of those and other geopolitical ripples, and there’s a chance their sales could continue to drop due to the transition to renewables on one hand, and the move toward gas-powered plants on the other.
But some types of coal remain the cheapest form of energy production in some countries, so there’s a good chance that rising stars like India, and possibly Indonesia and other Southeast Asian booming economies, as well, could step in and grab what they can, despite all the downsides of coal, because they can get it at a discount; which won’t be great for coal companies that are used to higher prices, but it likely will allow them to keep operating at something close to their previous capacity for longer than would otherwise be the case, lacking these rising nations that need cheap fuel, whatever the consequences of using it.
In the UK, though, coal is gone, and the remnants of its use are slowly being wiped away: the land cleaned up and repurposed, more of the grid being optimized for cleaner production types.
We’ll probably see a few other big nations accomplish the same over the next decade, but because of all that aforementioned geopolitical turmoil, there’s also a chance those planned end-dates will be pushed: the cheap, dirty needs of the present overshadowing these nations’ cleaner, healthier next-step ambitions.
Show Notes
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=107&t=3
https://e360.yale.edu/digest/uk-last-coal-plant
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/electricity-mix-uk?stackMode=absolute&facet=none
https://www.wsj.com/us-news/coal-ash-cancer-epa-north-carolina-b39ddf6a
https://beyondfossilfuels.org/europes-coal-exit/
https://www.npr.org/2024/09/30/nx-s1-5133426/uk-quits-coal-climate-change
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/sep/30/end-of-an-era-as-britains-last-coal-fired-power-plant-shuts-down
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-06/documents/4783_plant_decommissioning_remediation_and_redevelopment_508.pdf
https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/peak-coal/
https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2024/10/07/samii-tyazhelii-krizis-za30-let-vrossii-nachala-rushitsya-dobicha-uglya-a144209
https://interactive.carbonbrief.org/coal-phaseout-UK/index.html
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y35qz73n8o
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/30/climate/britain-last-coal-power-plant.html
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/interactive/2024/uk-coal-power-exit/
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/sep/30/the-deep-history-of-british-coal-from-the-romans-to-the-ratcliffe-shutdown
https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/uks-last-coal-plant-shutdown-bodes-well-us-lng-exports-maguire-2024-10-01/
https://www.wired.com/story/uk-no-coal-fired-power-plants-first-time-in-142-years/
https://www.statista.com/statistics/371069/employment-in-coal-mining-industry-in-the-united-kingdom-uk/
https://apnews.com/article/high-court-rejects-uk-coal-mine-whitehaven-83b9b7ceedebee1b70927667987b4dd7
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20240927-how-coal-fired-power-stations-are-being-turned-into-batteries
https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/britain-become-first-g7-country-end-coal-power-last-plant-closes-2024-09-29/
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/30/opinion/england-coal-wind-power.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coal-fired_power_station
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coal_in_Australia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_Revolution
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coal

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Politics and Podcasts
29 Oct· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about Joe Rogan, Call Her Daddy, and podcast monetization.
We also discuss Kamala Harris, Donald Trump, and double-haters.
Recommended Book: You Sexy Thing by Cat Rambo
Transcript
In the world of US politics, double-haters are potential voters who really just don’t like the candidate from either major political party, and thus they decide whether and how to vote based on who they dislike least—or in some cases who they would like to hurt, the most.
This isn’t a uniquely American concept, as voters in many global democracies face similar situations, but it seems to be an especially pressing issue in this year’s upcoming US Presidential election—and election day is a week away as of the day this episode goes live—because the race is just so, so close, according to most trusted polls.
In that same context, swing states are states that could swing either way, theoretically at least, in terms of who their votes go to, and because these swing states contain enough electoral college votes to allow even the candidate who doesn’t win the popular vote to win the presidency, that makes them especially vital battlegrounds.
So there’s a scramble going on right now, for both parties, to muster their existing bases, to shore-up some of the demographic groups they’re relying upon in this election, and to get their messaging in front of as many of those double-haters and other undecideds as possible so as to maybe, possibly swing this neck-and-neck race in their direction.
Toward that end, we’ve seen simply staggering sums of money pulled in and spent by both major parties’ campaigns: it’s looking likely that this will be the most expensive election season in US history, with just under $16 billion in spending across federal races, alone—which is up from just over $15 billion in 2020, according to nonpartisan group Open Secrets; that actually means this election will probably end up being just a smidgeon cheaper than 2020’s election, if you adjust for inflation, rather than comparing in absolute dollar terms, but both of these races will have been several times as expensive as previous elections, weighing in at about double 2016’s cost, and triple what these races tended to cost previously, in the early 2000s.
For perspective, too, US elections were already quite a lot more expensive than elections held in other wealthy countries.
According to a rundown by the Wall Street Journal, Canada’s 2021 election only cost something like $69 million in inflated-adjusted dollars, and US elections tend to cost about 40-times more, per person—so this is a population-scaled figure—than elections in the UK and Germany.
The cost of local elections in the US have been increasing, as well, in some cases substantially, and that’s part of why unpaid exposure and promotion is becoming increasingly valuable: it takes a lot of communications oomph to puncture the hubbub of commercial marketing messages in the US, and while pulling in a lot of money to buy ads and fund other promotional efforts is one way to do that, it’s also possible to approach the problem asymmetrically, going to people where they already are, basically, and getting some of that valuable face-time without having to spend a cent on it.
And that’s what I’d like to talk about today—specifically, efforts by candidates to get on popular podcasts, and why this medium in particular seems to be the go-to for campaigns at a moment in which the electoral stakes are historically high.
—
Podcasts, by traditional definition, are audio files delivered using an old-school, open technology called RSS.
In the years since they first emerged, beginning in the early days of the 2000s, the transmission mechanisms for these audio files have become a bit more sophisticated, despite being based on essentially the same technology. They’ve been joined, though, by utilities that allow folks to stream undownloaded audio content, to ping the servers where these audio files are stored more regularly, and to attach all kinds of interesting and useful metadata to these files, which add more context to them, while also providing the fundaments of basic micropayment schemes and the capacity to include video versions of an episode, alongside audio.
That video component has been pushed forward in part by the success of content-makers on YouTube, where for a long while podcasters have promoted their audio shows with visualized snippets, behind-the-scenes videos, and other such add-on content. Over the past handful of years, though, it has also become a hotbed of original video podcast content, some podcasters even using YouTube as their native distribution client—and that, combined with Spotify’s decision to start offering video podcasting content alongside audio podcasting content, in part to compete with YouTube, has pushed video-podders to the forefront of many charts.
Multi-person conversational and interview shows have maybe benefitted most from that shift toward video, as being able to see the people recording these shows, and to watch their body language, all the little microexpressions and other components of conversation and social dynamics that are left out of pure audio shows, has helped them attract more listeners / viewers, while also making these shows an even more potent source of parasocial camaraderie—which was especially valuable during the lockdown-heavy phase of the covid-19 pandemic, but which is also arguably a valuable thing to provide at a period in which a lot of people across all demographics are suffering from intense loneliness and a perceived lack of connection; the sense of familiarity that folks felt listening to a familiar voice in their ear on a regular basis has been emphasized still-further by the ability to see those people on their phones, TVs, and laptops in the same way, and at the same regular cadence.
The business model of podcasting has also contributed to the expansion of this type of show, as while podcasting has never been as big and spendy an industry as comparable broadcast mediums, it has been growing, with most shows leaning on some combination of ads, sponsorships, memberships, patronage models, and subscriptions to keep their operations in the black.
Some shows make use of many or all of these income-generation approaches, and many of them have varied their business models based on the boom and bust phases the industry has seen over the years; so when ad revenue plummets, formerly ad-heavy shows will pivot to memberships, and when the listener membership well grows shallow, they might shift to some kind of featured sponsor model.
As of early 2024, there are more than half a billion regular podcast listeners, globally, and ad spending in this space, globally, reached over $4 billion for the first time this year.
That aforementioned shift toward video has tilted a lot of listening in that direction, with about a third of all podcast listeners in the US also watching at least one podcast, rather than just listening to it.
That watchability component has also nudged YouTube and Spotify into the lead in terms of podcast delivery, alongside Apple, which didn’t invent the podcast, even though the medium is named after their iPod product, but they did bring it to the forefront and make it widely available—Apple’s relative lack of investment in this space, for years, left the doors open for those other competitors, and again, their decision to feature video podcast content alongside pure audio shows has shifted the landscape of this industry substantially, raising questions about what a podcast even is, if any old YouTube show could also theoretically be categorized as such; it’s a blurry distinction at this point, a bit like the debate over whether audiobooks should be considered books, or if only written, visual versions should bear that label.
Also worth noting here is that nearly half, about 47%, of all US citizens ages 12 and up listen to a podcast at least once a month, and 34% listen every week.
11% of that demographic’s daily audio-time is spent listening to podcasts, which is quadruple the figure a decade ago, in 2014, and 23% of weekly podcast listeners in the US spend 10 or more hours with these shows each week, though the average listening time each week is also pretty high, weighing in at 7.4 hours.
Podcasts have diverse audiences and hit a range of economic classes and people of varying education levels—though it leans slightly higher than the average in terms of both educational attainment and income—and interestingly, folks seem to be especially influenced by podcast recommendations, 46% of weekly podcast listeners reporting that they purchased something based on a recommendation or advertisement they heard on a show.
All of which points at why podcasts, and especially interview podcasts, and even more especially video-heavy interview podcasts, have become such highly desired media real estate in this year’s US presidential election; these sorts of shows aren’t always the most desired medium for brands, because tracking return on investment, money earned per dollar spent, is difficult with podcasts compared to, for instance, buying ads on streaming TV shows or social media, but they’re great for raising awareness and general brand-building efforts, which is exactly what these candidates and their parties are aiming for.
So more people are listening to these things, people tend to trust what they hear on podcasts more than on other types of media, and the demographics these shows reach are highly desirable, politically.
This is why, over the past few weeks, candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump have appeared on some of the biggest podcasts in existence, right now: Call Her Daddy for the former, and the Joe Rogan Experience for the latter.
Both of these appearances were ostensibly pretty risky, as podcast interviewers tend to color outside the lines compared to hosts on conventional television or radio shows, but the potential upsides were huge for both, as Alex Cooper, the host of Call Her Daddy, which is kind of a comedic advice show, has become a massive force in the world of women’s issues, and she recently became one of the best-paid and most influential podcasters in the world by leaving Spotify for SiriusXM, that change beginning in 2025, for a reported $100 million.
Joe Rogan, in contrast, has consistently been the number one podcast in the world for years, and his audience skews toward the people Trump wants to reach: the listening base is 80% male, more than half of those listeners are ages 18-34, more than a third identify as Independents, politically, and a little over a quarter are Democrats who might be convinced to switch sides for this election, because of Rogan’s somewhat conservative-leaning, independent stance on most things.
Trump recorded a 3-hour podcast interview with Rogan, leaning into the host’s chilled-out, but often heavy and asymmetric-question laden format, and that was blasted out to the show’s 14.5 million Spotify followers and 17.5 million YouTube subscribers.
Call Her Daddy is the second-biggest podcast on most networks after Rogan’s show, and while it has a comparably meager 5 million weekly listeners, the show’s demographics lean heavily toward women, and especially young women, which is seemingly favorable to the messaging Harris wants to megaphone at this point in her campaign; she’s rounded-out that appearance with appearances on other shows, like All The Smoke, which is hosted by a pair of NBA stars, and The Breakfast Club, which is hosted by the popular personality, Charlamagne Tha God.
Trump has appeared on quite a few podcasts of late, as well, though they’ve largely been in the same demographic vein as Joe Rogan—Trump went on YouTuber Logan Paul’s show, Impaulsive, for instance, alongside This Past Weekened with Theo Von and the Lex Fridman Podcast—all shows that lean heavily toward the young, male demographic, and which skew somewhat conservative and/or the libertarian side of independent.
Like many aspects of this election, we don’t really know if these bets will pay off for these candidates and their campaigns. There’s a lot to suggest that folks trust podcasts and podcasters, and that this industry may therefore be an excellent means of blasting a message to the right people, allowing politicians to realize a huge return on the time they invest preparing for their appearances and recording these interviews.
On the other hand, there’s a chance that, like many supposed means of reinforcing brand awareness and identity, that the numbers are kind of fuzzy and don’t necessarily reflect the reality many people think they reflect: it could be that folks tune in, listen, and then don’t do anything with what they learn; a more passive means of engagement that results few, if any, real-world conseqences.
It could also be that one or the other, or both of these parties aimed at the wrong audiences, or at the wrong influencers to help them reach those audiences, which could result in the same outcome, but with their demographic assumptions to blame, rather than the nature of the medium.
We won’t know for sure until after the election, and even then it’ll still be an open question, because it’s difficult to definitely link action to outcome when it comes to this facet of the political world.
That said, it does seem pretty likely, that for the next few elections, at least, podcasters will carry somewhat higher credibility and weight, and consequently attract even more attention, and probably ad-dollars, too, because it’s becoming more and more difficult to reach the right people, the right potential voters, and podcasts are still new and wild westy enough that they could break through the hubbub, even when other content types struggle to do so.
Show Notes
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy8nn0913e8o
https://backlinko.com/podcast-stats
https://www.insideradio.com/free/candidates-embrace-podcasts-but-is-it-working-here-s-what-one-survey-shows/article_b8858d76-92a8-11ef-9063-13e0c716cedd.html
https://www.npr.org/2024/10/27/nx-s1-5162304/politics-chat-trump-gives-3-hour-joe-rogan-interview-harris-leans-on-fascist-label
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/23/trump-harris-turn-to-podcasts-and-maybe-joe-rogan-for-us-election-boost
https://www.elle.com/uk/life-and-culture/culture/a62526922/kamala-harris-call-her-daddy/
https://www.quillpodcasting.com/blog-posts/podcast-stats-and-facts-2024
https://soundsprofitable.com/research/the-podcast-landscape-2024/
https://www.edisonresearch.com/the-podcast-consumer-2024-by-edison-research/
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/alex-cooper-lands-100-million-143000863.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Call_Her_Daddy
https://www.edisonresearch.com/the-race-to-rogan-who-will-candidates-reach-on-americas-top-podcast/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/2024/10/25/trump-joe-rogan-podcast-interview/
https://time.com/7099104/presidential-podcast-media-tour-donald-trump-kamala-harris/
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/digital/alex-cooper-interview-call-her-daddy-1236023570/
https://apnews.com/article/trump-election-lies-rogan-interview-ballots-voting-c8c06eb608c1b1ae8ca0e93ec1022b02
https://www.wsj.com/politics/elections/elections-cost-us-highest-spend-b8475961
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/10/21/meet-the-worlds-double-haters-00184634
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/10/25/wisconsin-swing-state-undecided-voters-trump-harris/

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Political Betting Markets
22 Oct· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about DJT, Polymarket, and Kalshi.
We also discuss sports betting, gambling, and PredictIt.
Recommended Book: Build, Baby, Build by Bryan Caplan
Transcript
Trump Media & Technology Group, which trades under the stock ticker DJT, has seen some wild swings since it became a publicly tradable business entity in late-March of 2024.
The Florida-based holding company for Truth Social, a Twitter-clone that was released in early 2022 following former President Donald Trump’s ousting from Twitter—that ousting the result of his denial of his loss in the 2020 presidential election—is a bit of an odd-bird in the technology and media space, as while it’s ostensibly an umbrella corporation for many possible Trump-themed business entities, Truth Social is the only one that’s gotten off the ground so far, and that platform hasn’t done well in traditional business or even aspirational tech-business terms: a financial disclosure in November of 2023 indicated that the network had tallied a cumulative loss of at least $31.5 million since it was launched, and the holding company’s numbers were even worse: when they filed their regulatory paperwork in March of 2024, they noted that Trump Media & Technology Group had lost $327.6 million, while making a mere $770,000 in revenue.
Those kinds of numbers, the company hemorrhaging money, would be a huge problem if DJT was a typical media business, or business of any kind, really. But for most people who invest in the company’s stock, this entity seems to be less a traditional stock holding, like you might buy shares of NVIDIA or Coca-Cola, hoping to earn dividends or see the value of the stock increase over time based on the performance and assumed future performance of the company in question, but instead it seems to operate as a means of betting on Trump and his political aspirations: many people who have been asked why they’re buying the stock of a clearly fumbling company say that they do it because they like Trump and what he stands for, and some have suggested they assume the stock will do much better if and when he’s back in office.
Other entities, especially those who oppose Trump and his politics, have pointed out that this publicly traded business provides foreign and US entities an easy, and easily deniable means of basically bribing Trump—or getting on his good side, if you want to use less charged language—as they could simply, and legally pick up a large number of shares, raising the price of the stock, which in turn increases the size of Trump’s fortune, which he could then, if he so chooses, cash out of at some point, but in the mean time this allows him to do the more typical rich person thing and just borrow money against the non-money, stock assets he owns.
All of which would be difficult to prove, which is part of why this would, in theory, be an excellent means of funneling money to someone who might hold the reins of power in the near-future, if one were so inclined to do so.
But at the moment that’s all speculation, and with ongoing investigations into other purported bribery schemes on the part of Trump and his campaign, it’s not clear that Trump would need DJT in order to get money into his coffers, as more direct approaches—like simply depositing ten million dollars into his campaign account from Egypt’s state-run bank, seem more straightforward, and just as unlikely to result in any kind of pushback from the US’s oversight panels, based on how they’ve addressed that particular accusation so far, at least.
Of course, some people are simply looking for points of leverage anywhere they can find it, not for political or regulatory manipulation purposes, but to earn money by gambling on assets that change value in dramatic and seemingly predictable ways.
For day traders and other arbitrage-seekers, then, a stock that goes up and down based on the perceived successes and failures of a public figure who’s constantly saying and doing things that can be construed in different ways by different people is an appealing target, even lacking a political motivation for tracking (and perhaps even influencing, to a limited degree) those numbers.
What I’d like to talk about today is another type of political betting, and how a recent court case may make politics in the US a lot more tumultuous, maybe more measurable, and possibly more profitable, for some.
—
In mid-2021, a New York-based online prediction market called Kalshi launched in the US, and this service was meant to serve as a platform through which users could place bets—in the form of trades—on all sorts of things, ranging from when the Fed would next cut interest rates, and by how much, to who would win various global awards, like the Nobel in chemistry.
Bets can only be placed on yes or no questions, which shapes the nature of said questions, and delineates the sorts of questions that can be asked, and in general the platform pays out a dollar for each winning contract—so if you buy one contract saying the Republican party will control the House after November’s election, and they do, you would win a dollar, but if they don’t, you would lose whatever money you spent to buy that contract—and these contracts can be purchased for sums that are based on how likely the event is currently expected to be: so if there’s a low chance, based on all available variables, that the Republicans will take the House, that contract might cost substantially less than a dollar to purchase, whereas if it’s likely they’ll take it, it would cost close to a dollar—so the payout is larger for events considered to be unlikely.
The original idea behind Kalshi, and similar platforms, of which there are many, operating in many different places around the world, was to provide investors with a hedge against events that are otherwise difficult to work into one’s asset portfolio.
It’s relatively simple to have a bunch of bets that will pay out big time if the US economy does well, for instance, and simple enough to buy counter-bets that will pay out decently well if it does badly—many investors buying some of each, so they’re not wiped out, no matter what happens—but there are all sorts of things that can mess with one’s otherwise well-balanced investment strategies, like the emergence of global pandemics and the surprise decision of the UK to leave the European Union.
If you can place bets that will pay out big-time when unlikely things happen, though, that can help re-balance a financial loss that arises from the occurrence of said unlikely events; if you lose a bunch of money from your stock portfolio because the UK voted for Brexit, but you also bought a bunch of contracts on this kind of market that would pay out substantially if Brexit was successful, you’ll reach a kind of equilibrium that isn’t as simple to achieve using other markets, because of how difficult it can be to directly link a stock or bond with that kind of not-directly-financial event.
So Kalshi pitched itself as that kind of alternative asset market, predicated on bets, but while they had a license from the US Commodities Futures Trading Commission, or CFTC, to function as a contract market in the States, acquired the year before they launched, their proposal to start a political prediction market, which would allow folks to bet on which party would control the US congress, was denied by the CFTC in September of 2023, the agency claiming that allowing such bets would create bad incentives in the electoral process, and that offering these sorts of contracts would violate US market regulations for derivatives.
A judge ruled in Kalshi’s favor a year later, in September of 2024, saying that the agency had exceeded its authority in banning this type of contract-issuance by Kalshi, and while the CFTC attempted to stall that component of their market’s implementation, on October 2 of this year, a federal appeals court ruled in Kalshi’s favor, and the platform was thus formally allowed to offer contracts that served as a betting market for US politics on which actual money could be lost and earned.
That last point is important, as throughout this process, and even before Kalshi was launched, other betting markets have been common, including those that have allowed bets on US political happenings.
It’s just that the majority of them, and the ones that have persisted and grown in the US in particular, haven’t allowed folks to bet actual money on these things: they’ve allowed, in some cases, the betting of on-platform tokens, which represent credibility, not money, though a few money-trading entities, like PredictIt, have been on the agency’s radar, but in PredictiIt’s case, it was granted what amounts to a “we won’t take action against you, despite what you’re doing being questionable” letter from the CFTC, which until Kalshi’s case turned out in their favor, meant PredictIt was one of the few, large-scale, reputable real-money political prediction markets available in the US.
Not all such markets have been so lucky, but that luck has been highly correlated with their approach to handling money, the structure of the company, and the degree to which they’ve been willing to play ball with the CFTC and other interested agencies.
All that said, we’ve reached an interesting point in which these markets have conceivably become more serious and useful, because rather than relying on not-real tokens that have no actual value to anyone—so you could create an account on one of these sites, bet all your tokens on a silly position that makes no sense, and suffer no consequences for that bet—we now have platforms that allow folks to put their money where their beliefs are, which in turn should theoretically make these markets more reliable in terms of showing what a certain segment of the population actually believes; how likely different candidates are to win, different parties are to hold Congress, and how likely various bills are to be passed into law.
Interestingly, though, that theory may already be destined for the dustbin, as one of the larger betting platforms, Polymarket—which allows folks to place bets on all sorts of things using a crypto asset called USDC, and which isn’t regulated by the CFTC because its operations are not based in the US—is experiencing what looks like market manipulation, possibly meant to sway poll forecasts that take these sorts of markets into account.
What that means in practice is that of the nearly $2 billion in bets that have been placed on the outcome of the upcoming US presidential election on Polymarket, as of the day I’m recording this, about $30 million seems to have been recently bet by just four accounts, all of which have behaved so similarly that a report from the Wall Street Journal posits that they might be the same person, or a collection of people operating alongside each other.
In any case, the net-impact of this investment, which landed in late-October, was to bump Trump’s odds of winning to 60% from where it was previously, at 53.3%.
There’s a chance, of course, that this is just the result of a person or some people with money wanting to earn what they consider to be an easy buck, betting on the candidate they think is most likely to win, and there’s also a chance that they’re plowing that money into this bet in order to show support for their favored candidate.
But there’s also a chance that this is the first example, at this scale at least, of betting market manipulation that’s sizable enough to shift the balance of polls that take betting market numbers into consideration.
Some of the poll predictions you in see in the news work these numbers from these betting markets into their formulae alongside the findings of more conventional polling entities, basically, so if you have tens of millions of dollars to throw into this kind of market, you can bump your favored candidate’s seeming chances significantly higher, which then in turn can make it seem like that candidate has achieved a surge in support more broadly—despite that seeming support actually just having been bought and paid for by one or a few enthused supporters on this kind of market.
So if it does turn out that this is a conscious effort on someone’s part to shift perceptions of the election—maybe big-time Trump fans, maybe someone affiliated with him or one of the PACs trying to get him elected—that could be a big deal, especially considering that Trump and his people have said that they won’t accept the outcome of the election if they don’t win, and if they can show strong expectations, or seeming expectations in the shape of favorable poll numbers that their candidate was meant to win, that could be a point of seeming evidence in favor of their argument that there was voter manipulation by their opponent; this of course wouldn’t be the case, but because of how the news, and even more so social media platforms, sometimes present superficial versions of what’s actually happening, seeing the candidate who had 60% support lose could seem like a valid argument at a highly charged post-election moment, despite all the other evidence to the contrary.
One more important point to make here is that election markets don’t actually represent probabilities—they represent a relatively small population of people’s expectations or hopes about what will happen.
It’s in the interest of these markets to imply that there’s substantial meaning and real-deal data in their numbers, but that’s mostly marketing copy to try to get more people involved; at the end of the day, these markets are often wrong, are populated by outliers who don’t represent the voting public, and in many cases they’re heavily biased in all sorts of directions—some of them more popular with folks on the left, some more popular with folks on the right, and some more popular with folks who just love making big bets that feel like gambling, and in some cases creating chaos or funny outcomes just for laughs.
On that final point, it’s worth mentioning that sports gambling has recently become legal, to some degree at least, across much of the United States, and this has already become a huge industry, representing an expected $14.3 billion in 2024, alone, with an anticipated annual growth of something like 10%, which is astonishing for something that was mostly illegal until just recently—the Supreme Court decision that paved the way for it as a nation-spanning market was only made in 2018.
So there’s a chance that these prediction markets will boom, as there’s clearly an appetite for betting on stuff in the US, as a form of entertainment, as a means to try to get ahead, and potentially as a way to put one’s money where one’s mouth is.
Though all of these incentives and purposes could potentially make these markets less valuable for political researchers hoping to better understand odds, as the incentives may or may not align with those that lead to more accurate predictions, and there’s no way to really know how those post-money-injection numbers will align with actual voting tallies, or fail to do so, until we have more data about this and other near-future elections’ outcomes.
Show Notes
https://www.wsj.com/finance/investing/how-investors-are-betting-on-the-election-from-utility-stocks-to-djt-c2b9e838
https://www.yahoo.com/news/hes-sale-trump-djt-stock-001901595.html
https://www.cnbc.com/2024/09/03/trump-egypt-democrats-letter.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth_Social
https://www.axios.com/2024/09/10/prediction-markets-election
https://stanfordreview.org/kalshis-court-victory-a-turning-point-for-prediction-markets-2/
https://www.politico.com/news/2024/10/04/harris-trump-election-betting-00182432
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prediction_market
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/prediction-market.asp
https://www.axios.com/2024/09/16/prediction-markets-election
https://asteriskmag.com/issues/05/prediction-markets-have-an-elections-problem-jeremiah-johnson
https://www.chapman.edu/esi/wp/porter_affectingpolicymanipulatingpredictionmarkets.pdf
https://www.ft.com/content/82199ea0-9707-4d37-b4c4-b65a65d17ecb
https://worksinprogress.co/issue/why-prediction-markets-arent-popular/
https://www.wsj.com/finance/betting-election-pro-trump-ad74aa71
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/10/19/election-betting-trump-harris-odds-polymarket-predictit/
https://www.wsj.com/finance/investing/how-investors-are-betting-on-the-election-from-utility-stocks-to-djt-c2b9e838
https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/stock-market-today-dow-sp500-nasdaq-live-10-03-2024/card/betting-markets-on-the-presidential-race-set-to-go-live-NnRne85QCyVAnc9nZy8z
https://www.wsj.com/finance/regulation/are-you-ready-to-bet-on-u-s-elections-a-judges-ruling-opens-the-door-556abc73
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalshi
https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2024/09/13/kalshis-new-political-prediction-markets-halted-as-cftc-appeals-loss/
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-betting-platform-predictits-legal-struggle-could-hamper-regulators-and-hurt-regulated-firms/
https://www.wsj.com/finance/betting-election-pro-trump-ad74aa71
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polymarket
https://www.statista.com/outlook/amo/online-gambling/online-sports-betting/united-states

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Mixed Reality Eyewear
15 Oct· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about the HoloLens, the Apple Vision Pro, and the Meta Ray-Ban Smart Glasses.
We also discuss augmented reality, virtual reality, and Orion.
Recommended Book: The Mountain in the Sea by Ray Nayler
Transcript
Originally released as a development device in 2016—so aimed at folks who make software, primarily, not at the general public—the HoloLens, made by Microsoft, was a fairly innovative device that looked like virtual reality headgear, but which allowed folks to interact with graphical elements overlayed on a transparent surface so that they seemed to be positioned within the real world; so-called augmented reality.
This functionality relied upon some of the tech Microsoft had developed for its earlier Kinect accessory, which allowed Xbox owners to play games using their bodies instead of more conventional controllers—it used a camera to figure out where people, and their arms, legs, and so on, were in space, and that helped this new team figure out how to map a person’s living room, for instance, in order to place graphical elements throughout that room when viewed through the HoloLens’ lenses; so stuff could appear behind your couch, pop out of a wall, or seem to be perched atop a table.
The HoloLens was not the only option in this space, as several other companies, including other tech titans, but also startups like Magic Leap, were making similar devices, but it was arguably the most successful in the sense that it both developed this augmented reality technology fairly rapidly, and in the sense that it was able to negotiate collaborations and business relationships with entities like NASA, the US Military, and Autodesk—in some cases ensuring their hardware and software would play well with the hardware and software most commonly used in offices around the world, and in some cases showcasing the device’s capabilities for potential scientific, defense, and next-step exploratory purposes.
Like many new devices, Microsoft positioned the HoloLens, early on, as a potential hub for entertainment, launching it with a bunch of games and movie-like experiences that took advantage of its ability to adapt those entertainments to the spaces in which the end-user would consumer them: having enemies pop out of a wall in the user’s kitchen, for instance, or projecting a movie screen on their ceiling.
It was also pitched as a training tool, though, giving would-be astronauts the ability to practice working with tools in space, or helping doctors-in-training go through digital surgeries with realistic-looking patients before they ever got their hands dirty in real life. And the company leaned into that market with the second edition of the headset, which was announced and made available for pre-order in early-2019, optimizing it even further for enterprise purposes with a slew of upgrades, and pricing it accordingly, at $3,500.
Among those upgrades was better overall hardware with higher-end specs, but it also did away with controllers and instead reoriented entirely toward eye- and hand-tracking options, combined with voice controls, allowing the user to speak their commands and use hand-gestures to interact with the digital things projected over the real-world spaces they inhabited.
The original model also had basic hand-tracking functionality, but the new model expanded those capabilities substantially, while also expanding upon the first edition’s fairly meager 30 degrees of augmented view: a relatively small portion of the user’s line of sight could be filled with graphics, in other words, and the new version upgraded that to 52 degrees; so still not wall to wall interact-with-able graphics, but a significant upgrade.
Unfortunately for fans of the HoloLens, Microsoft recently confirmed that they have ended production of their second generation device, and that while they will continue to issue security updates and support for their existing customers, like the US Department of Defense, they haven’t announced a replacement for it—which could mean they’re getting out of this space entirely.
Which is interesting in the sense that this is a space, the world of augmented reality, which some newer entrants are rebranding as mixed reality, that seems to be blowing up right now: two of Microsoft’s main competitors are throwing a lot of money and credibility into their own offerings, and pitching this type of hardware as the next-step in personal devices.
Some analysts have posited, though, that Microsoft maybe just got into this now-burgeoning arena just a little too early, investing in some truly compelling innovations, but doing so at a moment in which the cost was too high to justify the eventual output, and now they might be ceding the space to their competition rather than doubling-down on something they don’t think will pay off for them, or they may be approaching it from another angle entirely, going back to the drawing board and focusing on new innovations that will bypass the HoloLens brand entirely.
What I’d like to talk about today are the offerings we’re seeing from those other brands, and what seems to be happening, and may happen in the near-future, in this augmented-reality, mixed-reality segment of the tech world.
—
I did an episode on spacial computing and the Apple Vision Pro back when the device was made available for purchase in the US, in February of 2024.
This device was considered to be a pretty big deal because of who was making it, Apple, which has a fairly solid record of making new devices with unfamiliar interfaces popular and even common, and because the approach they were taking: basically throwing a lot of money at this thing, and charging accordingly, around $3,500, which is the same price the second HoloLens was being sold for, as I noted in the intro.
But because of that high price point, they were able to load this thing up with all sorts of bells and whistles, some of which were fundamental to its functionality—like super-high-density lenses that helped prevent nausea and other sorts of discord in their users—and some that were maybe just interesting experiments, like projecting a live video of the user’s eyes, which are concealed by the headset, on the front of the headset, which to me is a somewhat spooky and silly effect, but which is nonetheless technically impressive, and is something that seems aimed at making these things less anti-social, because you can wear the Vision Pro and still see people, and this projection of their eyes allows them to see you and your facial expression at the same time.
I’ve actually had the chance to use this device since that episode went live, and while there are a lot of weird little limitations and hindrances to this device going mainstream at the moment, the technology works surprisingly well right out of the box, with the eye- and hand-tracking elements working shockingly, almost magically well for relatively early-edition tech; Apple is pretty good at making novel user-interfaces intuitive, and that component of this device, at least, seemed like a slam dunk to me—for casual use-cases, at least.
That said, the company has been criticized for that high price point and their seeming fixation on things like putting the users’ eyes on the outside of the headset, rather than, for instance, investing in more content and figuring out how to make the thing more comfortable for long periods of time—a common complaint with basically every virtual reality or mixed-reality headset ever developed, because of the sheer amount of hardware that has to be crammed into a finite, head-and-face-mounted space, that space also needing to be properly balanced, and it can’t get too hot, for perhaps obvious reasons.
Those criticisms related to price are the result not of comparison to HoloLens, as again, the pricing is basically the same between these two devices, but instead the result of what Meta has done with their mixed-reality offerings, which are based on products and technology they acquired when they bought Oculus Labs; they’ve leaned into providing virtual reality devices for the low- and mid-market consumer, and their newest model, the Meta Quest 3S is a stand-alone device that costs between about $300 and $400, and it has mixed-reality functionality, similar to the Vision Pro and HoloLens.
While Meta’s Quest line doesn’t have anywhere near the specs and polish of the Vision Pro, then, and while it didn’t arrive as early as the HoloLens, only hitting shelves quite recently, it does provide enough functionality and serves enough peoples’ purposes, and at a far lower price point, that it, along with its other Quest-line kin, has managed to gobble up a lot of market share, especially in the consumer mixed-reality arena, because far more people are willing to take a bet on a newer technology with questionable utility that costs $300 compared to one that costs them more than ten-times as much.
Interestingly, though, while Meta’s Reality Labs sub-brand seems to be doing decently well with their Quest line of headsets, a product that they made in collaboration with glasses and sunglasses company EssilorLuxottica, which owns a huge chunk of the total glasses and sunglasses global market, via their many sub-brands, may end up being the more popular and widely used device, at least for the foreseeable future.
The Ray-Ban Meta Smartglasses looks almost exactly like traditional, Ray-Ban sunglasses, but with slightly bulkier arms and with camera lenses built into the frames near where the arms connect to them.
If you’re not looking carefully, then, these things can be easily mistaken for just normal old Ray-Bans, but they are smartglasses in that they contain those two cameras on the front, alongside open-air speakers, a microphone, and a touchpad, all of which allow the wearer to interact with and use them in various ways, including listening to music and talking on the phone, but also taking photos of what they’re looking at, recording video of the same, and asking an AI chatbot questions like, what type of flower is this, and getting an audible answer.
These things cost around what you would pay for a Quest headset: something like $300-400, but their functionality is very different: they don’t project graphics to overlay the user’s view, in that regard they function like normal sunglasses or prescription glasses, but if you want to snap a photo, livestream whatever it is you’re seeing, or ask a question, you can do that using a combination of vocal commands and interacting with the built-in touchpad.
And while this isn’t the mixed-reality that many of us might think of when we hear that term, it’s still the same general concept, as it allows the user to engage with technology in real-life, in the real-world, overlaying the real world with digital, easily accessed, internet-derived information and other utilities. And it manages to do so without looking super obtrusive, like earlier versions of the same concept—Google’s Google Glass smartglasses come to mind, which were earlier versions of basically the same idea, but with some limited graphical overlay options, and in a form factor that made the wearer look like an awkward, somewhat creepy cyborg.
Snap, the parent company of Snapchat, has a similar offering which originally leaned into the same “these look just like glasses, but have little camera lenses in them” strategy, though with their newest iteration, their Spectacles smartglasses product has reoriented toward a look that’s more akin to a larger, clunkier version of the free 3d glasses you might use at the movie theater—not exactly inconspicuous, though offering much of the same functionality as Meta’s Raybans, alongside some basic graphical overlay functions: a lightweight version of what the Vision Pro and Quest offer, basically, and in a much small package.
These new Spectacles are only available for folks who sign up for the company’s developer program at the moment, however, and are purchased not as a one-off, but for $99/month, with a minimum commitment of 12 months—so the price tag is quite a bit higher than those Quests and Raybans, as well.
Interestingly, Meta’s Reality Labs recently held an event in which they showed off an arguably more advanced version of Snap’s Spectacles, called Orion.
These things are being pitched as the be-all, end-all mixed-reality solution that every company is trying to develop, but which they can’t develop yet, at least not at scale. They look like giant, cartoony glasses—they’re shaped like glasses, but comically oversized ones—and they provide many of the same benefits as today’s Quest headset, but without the large, heavy headset component; so these could theoretically be used in the real-world, not just in one’s living room or office.
The company announced this product along with the caveat that they cannot make it on scale, yet, because cramming that much functionality into such a small device is really stressing the capacity of current manufacturing technologies, and while they can build one of these glasses, with its accompanying wristband and a little controller, both of which help the glasses do what they do, in terms of compute and the user interface, for about $10,000 per unit, they could not, today, build enough of them to make it a real, sellable product, much less do so at a profit.
So this was a look at what they hope to be doing within the next decade, and basically gives them credibility as the company that’s already building what’s next—now it’s just a matter of bringing down costs, scaling up production, and making all the components smaller and more energy efficient; which is a lot of work that will take years, but is also something they should theoretically at least be able to do.
To be clear, most other big tech companies should be capable of build really snazzy, futuristic one-offs like the Orion, as well, especially if they, like Meta, offload some of the device’s functionality into accessory hardware—the Vision Pro has offloaded its battery into a somewhat clunky, pocketable appendage, for instance, and most of these devices make use of some kind of external controller, to make the user interface snappier and more accurate.
But Meta is attempting to show that this is the direction they see wearable technology going, and maybe our engagement with the digital world more holistically, as well. It’s easy to imagine a world in which we all have these sorts of capabilities built into our glasses and wristbands and other wearables, rather than having to work with flat, not-mixed-reality screens all the time, especially once you see the tech in action, even if only as a not-for-sale example.
One aspect of this potential future that Meta is forecasting is already leading to some soul-searching, though.
Some students at Harvard modified a pair of Meta Ray-Bans to use facial recognition and reverse-image search technology so they could basically look at a stranger, then learn a bunch of stuff about them really quickly, to the point that these students were able to do this, then pretend to know the that stranger, talk about their work, find their spouse’s phone number—a bunch of details that made it seem like they knew this person they’d only just met.
All of which is pretty wild and interesting, but also potentially frightening, considering that this is basically doxing someone on demand, in public, and it could be used—like many other tech innovations, granted—to enable and augment stalking or kidnapping or other such crimes.
None of which is destiny, of course. Nor is the success of this product type.
But there does seem to be a lot of interest in what these gadgets seem like they might offer, especially as the prices drop, and as more entrants carve out space in that relatively lower-cost space—which is a space Apple is reportedly planning to enter soon, too, with a new edition of their Vision Pro that would cost maybe something like half as much as the first one, and possibly smart glasses and maybe even Airpods with cameras meant for release over the next couple of years.
So it may be that the early divulgence of these next-step devices, showing us where these things might go with these higher-priced, smaller audience initial editions, could allow us to predict and prepare for some of their negative externalities before they go completely mainstream, so that when they finally arrive in their finished form, we’re a bit more prepared to enjoy the benefits while suffering fewer (though almost certainly not zero) of their potential downsides.
Show Notes
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spatial_computing
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_Vision_Pro
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta_Quest_3S
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta_Platforms
https://www.reddit.com/r/RayBanStories/comments/1e3frhc/my_honest_review_of_the_rayban_metas_as_everyday/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ray-Ban_Meta
https://www.spectacles.com/spectacles-24?lang=en-US
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectacles_(product)
https://forums.macrumors.com/threads/students-add-facial-recognition-to-meta-smart-glasses-to-identify-strangers-in-real-time.2438942/
https://archive.ph/6TqgF
https://www.theverge.com/24253908/meta-orion-ar-glasses-demo-mark-zuckerberg-interview
https://about.fb.com/news/2024/09/introducing-orion-our-first-true-augmented-reality-glasses/
https://www.reddit.com/r/augmentedreality/comments/1frdjt2/meta_orion_ar_glasses_the_first_deep_dive_into/
https://appleinsider.com/articles/24/10/13/cheaper-apple-vision-headset-rumored-to-cost-2000-arriving-in-2026
https://www.uploadvr.com/microsoft-discontinuing-hololens-2/
https://www.theverge.com/2024/10/1/24259369/microsoft-hololens-2-discontinuation-support
https://www.theverge.com/2022/6/7/23159049/microsoft-hololens-boss-alex-kipman-leaves-resigns-misconduct-allegations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_HoloLens

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Remigration
8 Oct· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about the AfD, the Freedom Party, and the Identitarian Movement.
We also discuss Martin Sellner, Herbert Kickl, and racialism.
Recommended Book: The Ministry of Time by Kaliane Bradley
Transcript
Racialism, sometimes called scientific racism, is the pseudoscientific belief that groups of human beings are inherently, biologically different from each other based on different evolutionary paths that have carved up the species into different races that are distinct enough from each other to make interbreeding undesirable, and cultural exchange a dangerous hazard.
Said another way, racialism posits, using all sorts of outdated and misinterpreted scientific understandings—like determining intelligence based on the shape of a person’s skull—that black people and white Europeans and folks from Asia are different enough (which is an idea also called polygenesis) that they should stay in their own parts of the world, and that by separating everyone out according to presumed racial background, we would all be able to do as we like, based on our own alleged cultural guide rails, and in accordance with our own, alleged biological destinies; which in some cases would mean invading and killing and maybe enslaving the other, inferior, in our minds at least, races, but in the polite, political telling, usually means something like putting up walls to keep out the racially inferior riffraff, so they don’t pollute our good and pure and obvious superior bloodlines.
Important to note is that different people with genetic lineages in different parts of the world do tend to have distinct collections of biological traits, ranging from skin tone to height to propensities to, or defenses against various sorts of disease.
There’s actual no clean line between groups of people the way this theory says, though: race, the way the word is used today, references a collection of qualities that tend to be found within different groups of people, but every person is a unique collection of genetic mutations and variations, and the old-school concept of biological race has not held up to modern scientific scrutiny—it’s mostly a cultural concept at this point, and even then it’s a fairly fuzzy one.
That said, a lot of very smart people used to believe in the racialism concept back in the Enlightment era, from around the mid-1600s to the late-1700s, as science back then was helping us delineate between all sorts of species, and giving us a hint of the more complete evolutionary understandings that would arrive the following century; but as with many fields of inquiry, this initial glimpse granted us as much new confusion, masquerading as insight, as it did actual, novel understandings.
Today, this concept is almost exclusively cleaved to by folks belonging to various racial supremacist groups, including but not limited to those who are part of the so-called Identitarian Movement, which is a far-right, European nationalist ideology that spans many countries and political organizations, and which aims, among other things, to significantly truncate or end globalization, to do away with multiculturalism in all its forms, to combat what this group sees as the spread and influence of Islam across Europe, and to significantly limit or even completely end immigration of people from outside Europe into European nations.
Folks and parties that subscribe to this ideology are often considered to be ultra-conservative, but also xenophobic and racist—racism being distinct from racialism, as racialism posits there are different, hard-coded biological racial realities that cleanly delineate one group of humans from another, while racism tends to be the belief that one group of people is superior to another, with folks who are racist at times acting on that belief in various ways.
The Identitarian Movement is officially categorized as a right-ring extremist group by the German intelligence agency, and the Southern Poverty Law Center considers a slew of groups that align with this movement to be hate groups.
Though based on the writings and principles of earlier thinkers and politicians, this group is actually fairly modern, only coming into being in its current form in the early 2000s—though the collection of ideas and efforts that informed this movement arose in France in the 1960s as part of a neo-fascist effort to inject out-of-vogue, extremist ideas into respectable, post-WWII political debate.
This was essentially an effort to rebrand Nazi ideology so as to make it seem smart and with-it in the still-stunned, but rebuilding European idea marketplace, and its primary innovation was taking some of those fascist concepts and hiding them under the more palatable label of nationalism—which was experiencing a resurgence following the wave of multiculturalism that began to flourish after the war, though not without imperfections and conflict.
One of the most popular elements of this ideology, though, was introduced a fair bit later, in the early 2000s and 2010s.
Remigration refers to the idea that liberals, people on the left of the political spectrum, want to replace good, hard-working, morally correct, white French people—and later this idea was expanded to encompass all white Europeans—with folks from other countries, especially Muslim-majority countries, but also other places where folks don’t tend to be white.
These lefties are keen to do this for a variety of reasons, apparently, but one of the most popular claims is that they want to give handouts to these new arrivals, and thus get their votes, capturing the government forever by slowly reducing the overall population of the good, wholesome white locals, in order to out-populate them with new arrivals, whose votes will forever be captured by the politicians who gave them all these handouts.
Sometimes called The Great Replacement Theory, this idea serves as justification for the aforementioned, increasingly popular concept of remigration, which basically means rounding up everyone who’s living in Europe, but not originally from Europe, and shipping them elsewhere—even if they are citizens, and even if they aren’t citizens of the countries they’re being shipped to.
Some versions of this idea also say that the descendants of immigrants, folks who were born in their European homes, not elsewhere, should nonetheless be shipped back to where their grandparents came from, due to a lack of sufficient assimilation—which means taking up the culture of the place you’ve moved to, but in this case usually serves as a stand in for “has a different faith, likes different food, adheres to different norms,” and other multiculturalism-linked, distinctions.
This rounding up and shipping would be based on the person’s supposed racial identity, not on their national identity—so in a way, this concept is a means of smuggling racialism into politics, by making it seems as if the modern way of organizing the world and its people—that of nation states, and those nation states granting an identity, a national origin—is not inherent or ideal, and that we should instead force people to stay where we believe other people like them, according to our beliefs about such things, originally came from, and thus, belong.
That underlying concept isn’t one that’s taken seriously by most scientists, philosophers, demographers, or anyone else who’s profession is linked to this collection of ideas, but it’s proven to be a useful narrative and justification for folks who feel as if they’re becoming strangers in what they consider to be their homeland, their culture, their city, and so on. And that’s made it a useful point of leverage for traditionalist and conservative political parties across Europe; and increasingly, in recent years especially, elsewhere around the world, as well.
What I’d like to talk about today is a party in Austria that has leaned heavily into this collection of ideas, and which claimed the most votes in the country’s recent election, as a consequence.
—
The Freedom Party, or FPO, is an Austrian political party that’s a founding member of the European-scale Identity and Democracy Party, which recently merged with other, fellow traveler parties from the Czech Republic and Hungary, to become the Patriots for Europe group; though all of these entities share roughly the same ideological platforms and practical, political ambitions.
And among those ambitions is the desire to tackle the issue of immigration across the EU, reducing especially the number of people coming into the bloc from Muslim-majority nations, which large numbers of people in many European countries have complained about, usually because they feel the cultures of their hometowns and home countries are changing rapidly, and they consequently feel like they’re being elbowed out and replaced by these newcomers.
This is not a new complaint, and this isn’t only a European thing; across history, even very modern history, when a wave of immigrants arrive in a new home, that can make the people who were there before them feel like they’re under assault—and if those new arrivals have a different religion than the majority of the people in the place they’ve immigrated to, that can increase the perceived differences and threats, as can a difference in skin color, the clothing they wear, cultural customs, foods, fragrances, language, and just about anything else.
This angle of politicking has become increasingly popular with mostly but not exclusively conservative parties around the world in recent years, though, as some of those parties have gotten pretty good at spreading this message to disaffected people, including disaffected youths, in some of the most immigrated-to places in the world.
So young men in the United States have, according to recent polls, been hearing a lot about this and seem to be open to the idea that some of the, on average, at least, issues they seem to be facing in terms of educational attainment and employment options, among other things, are the fault of those new arrivals, and that’s possibly a component of the gender-skewed shift we’re seeing in the lead-up to November’s election, with young people in general leaning liberal, but more young men leaning conservative than young women.
That’s almost certainly not the only issue at play here, of course, but it’s something conservative politicians in the US seem to be leveraging, even to the point that former president and current Republican candidate Donald Trump recently mentioned the term “remigration” in a social media post: something that’s being seen by political analysts as a trial balloon to see if the concept might be picked up by folks in his political orbit, and might in turn garner him more support amongst people who feel like too many immigrants are entering the US, and that all that immigration is bad for one of several possible, and well-promoted, reasons; maybe, this trial balloon implies, we should just ship them all back from where they came from, and that may then free up housing and jobs and maybe set things back to normal, how things used to be.
It’s worth noting that the word remigration was initially used to refer to the return of European Jews to their homes after WWII, but it was adopted by French white nationalists in the mid-2010s to allude to deporting immigrants and the children of immigrants, en masse.
The term became more widely known after an investigation found that, in late-2023, members of the Alternative for Germany, or AfD party had a secret meeting with neo-nazis, at which there was a presentation by a thirty-something far-right Austrian political activist named Martin Sellner, who among other things is the leader of the Identitarian movement I mentioned in the intro, and in that talk he supported the idea of a program that would involve identifying and removing minorities of various kinds from Germany by force—remigration, basically, a topic he’s also written a book about.
Sellner later said that his words were twisted by the media and that remigration is really just a collection of policies that would slow or stop some types of immigration in the future, but he was banned from Germany because of that talk, until a German court revoked that ban last May, and he was denied entry into the UK in 2018, and into the US in 2019 because of a large donation he received from the mass-shooter who attacked two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019, killing 51 people and injuring 89.
Sellner himself has said that until 2011 he was a neo-nazi, and his wife, an American pro-Trump online influencer—who was a big proponent of the so-called Pizzagate conspiracy theory among other notable, and demonstrably untrue narratives that became popular in the lead up to previous elections—she spreads a lot of the same content, but with a US bent, rather than a European one.
Both Sellners, and other members of the Identitarian movement, have been accused of parroting Nazi talking points, promoting things like Holocaust denial, and calling for minorities to be mass-executed, but they generally contend that they’re simply proud nationalists who love their countries and don’t want to see them changed or ruined by a bunch of people from other places with different ideas, beliefs, and priorities coming in and taking all the jobs, and tweaking everything to suit their wants and needs, against the desires of those who were there first.
The concept of remigration has attained popularity at a more rapid rate in some places than others, and it seems to have done especially well in Austria—the country’s Freedom Party won 29% of the vote in the country’s last election in late-September of this year, and that was the highest tally of all the parties that participated; which is notable in part because of what the Freedom Party believes now, in remigration and adjacent policies, but also because this is a party that was founded in the 1950s by a former SS officer and Nazi politician.
It’s expected that the Freedom Party won’t be able to form a government, because every other party has said they won’t form a coalition with them—the currently governing conservative People’s Party has said they might be open to it, but not with Herbert Kickl, the group’s current leader, involved in the resultant government.
Kickl is an ardent ally of Russian president Putin and has been accused of attempting to meld right-wing populism with nazi-valenced, fascist extremism—a common accusation against folks in this corner of the political spectrum, though in some cases an accusation that is also seemingly true.
Like Sellner and other folks with this ideological orientation, Kickl promotes the idea of Remigration, which in the context of Austrian politics, in his mind at least, would help reinforce the strength of a Fortress Austria with completely closed borders and which is run by an all-powerful security state apparatus, that is capable of managing those borders, and keeping the peace inside the nation’s impermeable walls.
Kickl has said, in the wake of the election in which his party was victorious, that Austrian politicians are making a decision, by excluding his party, and him specifically from government, that is a slap in the face to the electorate—though he’s continued to make overtures to other conservative parties in the hope that they might be willing to work with the Freedom Party to form a functioning government; this seems unlikely, at this point, though it’s not impossible.
Even without a functioning coalition, though, Kickl and his party’s win at the polls, bringing in the most support of any party, speaks volumes about the popularity of this general collection of concepts and ideas; and the same seems to be true in many other countries where these ideas are being spread: despite a few let-downs for European far-right parties in recent years, this collection of political entities and personalities have done pretty well over the past decade, making substantial gains in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, in particular.
That these parties often align themselves with fascist governments and subscribe to easily disproven conspiracy theories doesn’t necessarily outweigh their support of increasingly popular anti-immigration policies, it would seem, and that popularity seems to be the result of their success in tying immigration to all manners of social and economic ills.
Much of Europe is still experiencing economic downswings, high levels of inflation, and overall underperformance compared to their peers, post-pandemic peak, so this sort of messaging may be decently well-received even by folks who wouldn’t typically agree with much of the rest of their platform or narrative, but who are currently looking for anything that defies the current status quo, and anyone who provides something that seems like it might be an explanation for those many and varied downswings and other perceived ills.
Show Notes
https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/56618/italyalbania-asylumseeker-deal-to-cost-%E2%82%AC653-million-report-finds
https://archive.ph/PFWhk
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/29/world/europe/austria-election-freedom-party-kickl.html
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/austrian-far-right-head-urges-rivals-let-him-govern-after-election-win-2024-10-05/
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/austria-holds-tight-election-with-far-right-bidding-historic-win-2024-09-28/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remigration
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Race_(human_categorization)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identitarian_movement
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Replacement
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_New_Right
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_racism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Sellner
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brittany_Sellner
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_Kickl

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Soft Landing
1 Oct· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about the Fed, interest rates, and inflation.
We also discuss cooling economies, the Federal Funds Rate, and the CPI.
Recommended Book: Dirty Laundry by Richard Pink and Roxanne Emery
Transcript
I’ve done a few episodes on this general topic over the past several years, so I won’t get super in-depth about many of the specifics, but the US Federal Reserve has a dual-mandate to keep prices stable and to maximize employment in the country—though that core responsibility has been expanded in recent years to also include regulatory control over banks, providing a variety of services to banks and other savings associations, and doing what it can to moderate long-term inflation rates.
A lot of these responsibilities are intertwined, in the sense that, for instance, if you increase interest rates, that can lead to less spending by corporations that might otherwise borrow and spend liberally, creating more jobs; so adjusting one lever often tweaks seemingly disconnected outcomes—which is part of why this agency’s activities often fly below the radar of non-regulation, non-monetary-world people and publications; they’re super-careful with their powers, because one wrong move can cause ripples of discomfort throughout the US and global economy.
When one of those metrics they’re meant to moderate goes haywire, on the other hand, they’re all over the news; their every action, even the seemingly unimportant ones, tracked in great details, and breathlessly reported-upon.
For a variety of reasons, including the large-scale shut-down of various aspects of society and the global economy, and the consequent disruption of global supply chains, inflation—as measured by CPI, or the Consumer Price Index—shot through the roof, pretty much everywhere on the planet, beginning in 2020.
Leading up to that moment, many wealthy countries had been doing pretty well in terms of moderated inflation levels, and the US was no different: year-over-year inflation growth was down to sub-1% levels in 2014 and 2015, and it was close to the Fed’s 2% target level from 2010, when the worst of the 2007-2008 economic crisis had receded, until 2020, when it was down to 1.4%.
That year, the Federal Funds Rate, which is the lever the Fed uses to adjust interest rate levels throughout the US government and economy, setting the interest rate banks charge to lend each other money short-term, basically, that number eventually influencing everything from savings account interest payments to mortgage rates to what you can expect to pay for a car loan—that Federal Funds Rate was down to .25% in 2020 and 2021, which is very low, which meant that debt was very cheap and easy to acquire, corporations happily borrowing as much money as they wanted, as it would cost them very little to do so, and that meant expansion across the economy, that expansion further aided by low interest paid on savings accounts and similar, safe-havens for money, which made investing in startups, stocks, and similar, risky investment vehicles more appealing—because the safe stuff didn’t pay much of anything.
All of which meant a spending bonanza—right up to the point that COVID-19 started rippling outward from China, and the world’s governments responded with lockdowns and similar, economy-stifling measures.
By the end of 2021, year-over-year inflation in the US was up to 7%, from 1.4% the previous year, and it was 6.5% the following year.
In 2022, the Fed bumped the Federal Funds Rate from that incredible low of .25% up to 4.5%—a huge jump, and a staggering blow for an economy that was experiencing a dramatic surge in prices; the goal being to slow things down, and consequently, hopefully, also slow that inflation rate.
Other factors likewise influenced inflation around the world during this period, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which massively complicated the global energy market, alongside other disruptions, and the weirdening of politics, which have become increasingly tribal and extreme over the past decade or so in many governments around the world, have made it trickier to legislate, and have carried a wave of unserious and obstructive lawmakers into office.
That hiking of the Federal Funds Rate ended what’s been called the US’s ZIRP era: a period in which zero interest-rate policy, or so close to zero that it’s essentially zero interest rate policy, defined the shape of the economy, what professions everyone chose to pursue, which players became dominant in their industries, and what sorts of bets made financial and reputational sense.
The US, and much of the world, especially the wealthy world, was thus suddenly plunged into a very different financial and regulatory environment, changing its posture and the politics of money and spending, while also queueing things up for a potential future in which inflation might be tackled and the Fed might start adjusting the dial downward once more, tipping the economy back into something more spendy and risk-taking, after a handful of years in which the name of the game has been cutting costs, laying off as many people as possible, and recalibrating toward today’s profits over investing in tomorrow’s potential gamechanging outcomes.
What I’d like to talk about today is the Fed’s recent decision to do exactly that, adjust their interest rate dial, and how the way they did it is being received by those who are the most affected by this choice.
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The mechanism of the Federal Funds Rate is fairly straightforward: make it more expensive to borrow money and you tend to cool the economy.
Do this at the wrong time—when the economy is already cool—and you hurt the businesses that make up the production side of things, but also consumers, as there likely won’t be enough jobs, and enough jobs paying enough for folks to earn a living, buy things, and keep those businesses operating at nominal capacity.
Don’t do it when you need to, though, and the economy can get out of hand, running too hot, expanding wildly, and possibly also pumping up inflation at a rate that makes everything pricier, which can lead to similar consequences: folks not able to afford as much because the price of things is going up, despite their pay being decent and the job market being on fire.
This rate has to be used like a scalpel, not a chainsaw, then, lest you tip things one way or the other, in either case resulting in some type of economic truncation and various types of suffering for the citizenry of the country in question.
In this context, a “soft landing” is a semi-mythical accomplishment involving the just-right application of the Federal Funds Rate so that you increase interest rates, maybe dramatically, to stifle high inflation, but then pull those interest rates back at just the right moment so that the economy is cooled, but not damaged, and you’re thus able to put things back on a nice growth trajectory, but with something like a 2% inflation rate, rather than something much higher, or just as bad in some ways, much lower than that.
It’s been speculated that a soft landing might be attainable by this Fed’s current leadership because they seemed to be acting prudently and objectively, despite the politics surrounding their efforts, and they also seemed willing to hold off on lowering the rate even when much of the business world and parts of the government were losing its mind over worry that they would keep it high for too long.
In late September 2024, the Fed announced that they’d decided to finally cut this rate, from a target range of 5.25-5.5%, down to a target range of 4.75-5%.
That’s a drop of .5%, which is unusual except in emergency circumstances, and while it wasn’t totally out of the blue—many analysts and betting markets had given a high probability to this potentiality, as opposed to the usual .25% cut—it was still quite a big event, as it makes pretty clear that the Fed sees their job as being mostly done, at least in the sense that they need to cut inflation quickly and dramatically.
That decision was made on the basis that US inflation rates, using the Fed’s preferred index, had dropped for the fifth consecutive month in August of this year, down to 2.2%, which marked the lowest level since February of 2021; that’s down from 2.9% in July, and is tantalizingly close to their target rate of 2%.
The implications of this double-the-usual drop in the Federal Funds Rate are many, and the specifics and claims vary depending on who you ask.
One perspective of why this did this how they did it is that the Fed sees that it’s work is done on this matter, and they’re keen to get interest rate levels back to something more moderated as quickly as possible so that the economy can keep its solid momentum going apace. They also recognize that there’s a delay on these sorts of decisions and their impact, so getting close to 2% and then pulling back is more likely to ultimately land them somewhere close to 2%, while waiting for reports that show 2% before pulling back would be likely to lead to an overshoot, which could be really bad for economic outcomes.
Another view is that the Fed accidentally held on a little too long and maybe should have cut rates by .25% at their previous meeting, and now, to make up for that, they doubled the cut; but because of that accidental delay, the economy could suffer a bit, the Fed overshooting after all, which again, wouldn’t be ideal, but is a possibility because of that aforementioned delay in cause and effect.
Some prognosticators in this space, however, are seeing this as a panicky indication that we’re actually careening toward a recession, as some of the economic indicators folks watch to predict such things are flashing red, and while a successful soft landing could theoretically help the US avoid such a path, the current wave of relief and optimistic anticipation could also be an illusion that’s concealing structural weaknesses in the US economy that are about to rupture.
The most popular version of that more pessimistic prediction is that the US will experience a recession in 2025, maybe 2026 at the latest, and it will have to make it through that trough before it can start climbing up the peak, again—which would be bad news for investors and businesses, and would mean basically resetting to a standing start, in terms of growth, as opposed to perpetuating the momentum of the economy as it exists, today, which is doing pretty well by most metrics.
That could also be quite bad for burgeoning industries like those connected to AI systems, renewable energy, and microchips, as these are all investment-intensive corners of the economy, and a recession would almost certainly significantly truncate the amount of money sloshing around in investors’ bank accounts, waiting to be injected into businesses operating in such spaces.
All that said, at the individual level, while inflation has been moderated by many measures, prices dropping substantially from where they were even a few months ago, what’s been called the “vibecession” seems to still be hampering the everyday person’s sense of how things are going economically in the US—the numbers look pretty good, but the average person reports that they think things are going catastrophically.
It’s thought that this is at least partly the consequence of economic ignorance—folks only remembering the many negative headlines they see, and not realizing how historically low unemployment is, and how historically high the stock market has climbed, alongside other positive measures.
But the more potent ingredient, almost certainly, is that while inflation has moderated for many common goods and expenses, others, like food, are still quite high, and that’s an expense that we don’t just see periodically, like when we buy new shoes or a new car, but every week or even every day, which is a far more regular punch to the gut that hits not just our pocketbooks, but also our perception of how far our money goes, and how well off we feel as a consequence.
There’s already a great deal of speculation as to what the Fed will do at its next meeting in November, and bets on popular futures markets indicate there’s a 54% chance of another half-point cut, as opposed to a 46% chance of a quarter-point cut.
That latter potentiality would arguably support the assertion that the Fed is scrambling to make up for lost time, hoping to avoid an inflation reduction overshoot—or from a more positive perspective, maybe just wanting to get back to a more neutral interest rate stance sooner rather than later, to help keep the economy chugging along, without any periods of sluggishness, while the former potentiality, a quarter-point cut in November, would ostensibly seem to be a more confident stance from the Fed, but could also worry investors, as it might mean it’ll take a bit longer to fully return to that neutral stance.
Whatever speed the Fed ends up opting for in dropping interest rates, though, most analysts see the rate falling to something like the 3-3.25% range by the middle of 2025, which is at the top end of what’s generally see as a neutral rate for such things—a rate that won’t add fuel to a hot economy, but also won’t cool things artificially.
By that point, we’ll probably also know if the Fed has managed to nail a soft landing; it seems like they might have, but at this point there is still reason to suspect they didn’t, and that this is just the silence before the storm.
Show Notes
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/interactive/2024/john-lanchester-consumer-price-index-who-is-government/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumer_price_index
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Misery_index_(economics)
https://apnews.com/article/federal-reserve-barkin-interest-rates-inflation-bba49b528649cf866e391a783033c067
https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/23/economy/rate-cut-what-next/index.html
https://www.wsj.com/business/entrepreneurship/fed-interest-rate-cut-small-business-spending-abfed941
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgecalhoun/2024/09/26/the-feds-rate-cut--a-soft-landing--or-fake-news/
https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/fed-is-aligned-rate-cuts-upcoming-data-will-shape-pace-2024-09-27/
https://apnews.com/article/interest-rates-inflation-prices-federal-reserve-economy-0283bc6f92e9f9920094b78d821df227
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/federal-reserve-rate-cut-credit-cards-mortgages-already-lowering-rates/
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20240918a.htm
https://www.investopedia.com/will-fed-rate-cuts-save-commercial-real-estate-cre-loans-banks-8719181
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/new-pce-reading-supports-case-for-smaller-fed-rate-cut-in-november-143349577.html?guccounter=1
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-09-28/powell-speech-and-jobs-data-to-help-clarify-fed-rate-path?embedded-checkout=true
https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/traders-bet-second-straight-50-bps-fed-rate-cut-november-2024-09-27/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_funds_rate
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero_interest-rate_policy
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/softlanding.asp
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/federal-reserve-rate-cut-credit-cards-mortgages-already-lowering-rates/
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/sep/27/stock-markets-hit-record-highs-after-news-of-a-fall-in-us-inflation

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Hand of God Operations
24 Sep· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about interdiction, the NSA, and Mossad.
We also discuss exploding pagers, targeted strikes, and paramilitary organizations.
Recommended Book: Uncertainty in Games by Greg Costikyan
Transcript
In the world of technology, and especially computers—or anything with microchips and thus, some computing capabilities—a “backdoor” is a bit of code or piece of hardware that allows someone (or a group of someones) to get inside that computer or compute-capable device after it’s been delivered and put into use.
At times the installation of backdoors is done beneficently, allowing tech support to tap into a computer after it’s been sold so they can help the end-user with problems they encounter.
But in most cases, this term is applied to the surreptitious installation of this kind of hardware or software, and generally it’s meant to allow those doing the installing to surveil the activities of whomever is using the product in question, or maybe even to lock them out and/or hijack its use at some point in the future, should they so desire.
There are potential downsides to the use of backdoors even when they’re installed with the best of intentions, as they can allow malicious actors, like hackers, working independently or for agencies or nation states, to tap into these devices or networks or whatever else with less effort than would have otherwise been required; in theory such a backdoor would give them one target to work on, rather than a bunch of them, which would mean attempting to access each and every device individually; a backdoor in an operating system would allow hackers who hacked that backdoor system access to every device that uses said OS, for instance.
Backdoor efforts undertaken by the US National Security Agency, the NSA, were famously divulged by whistleblower Edward Snowden, revealing all sorts of—to many people outside the intelligence world, at least—unsavory activities being conducted by this agency, among them efforts to install backdoors in software like Linux, but also hardware like routers and servers, at times opening these devices up and installing what’s called a Cottonmouth, which allows the NSA to gain remote access to anything plugged into that device.
This sort of interdiction, which is basically the interception of something before it reaches its intended destination—so intercepting a modem that’s been ordered by a big company, opening it up, installing a backdoor, then repackaging it and sending it on its way to the company that ordered it as if nothing has happened—is not uncommon in the intelligence world, but the scope of the NSA’s activities in this regard were alarming to pretty much everyone when they were divulged, with leaks and reporting showing, basically, that the NSA had figured out ways to put hardware and software backdoors in just about everything, in some cases resulting in the mass collection of data from American citizens, which goes beyond their legal remit, but also the surveillance of American allies, like the chancellor of Germany.
What I’d like to talk about today is another, recent high-visibility example of an intelligence agency messing with devices ordered by a surveillance target, and what consequences we might expect to see now that this manipulation has come to light.
—
In the world of covert operations—spy stuff, basically—a “hand of God” operation is one that is almost immaculately targeted to the point where it might almost seem as if those who are struck did something to piss off a deity; those who the targeters want to hit are hit, and everyone else is safe or relatively safe.
In 2020, a hand of God operation was launched against an Iranian general named Qassem Solaimani while he was near the Baghdad airport, an American Reaper drone hitting Solaimani and his escorts’ cars with several missiles, killing the general and nine other people who were with him, but leaving everyone else in the area largely unscathed—not an easy thing to do.
Hamas’s leader, Ismail Haniyeh, was assassinated in July of 2024 by Israel, which blew up his bedroom in a military-run guesthouse in Iran’s capital city, Tehran, either using a well-targeted missile or a bomb that they somehow managed to hide in that room ahead of time—either way, it was a very precise attack that made use of a lot of intelligence data and assets in order to hit the target and just the target, avoiding other casualties as much as possible—which again, can make this sort of strike, though still massively destructive, seem like an act of god because of how highly specific it is.
On September 17 of 2024, at around 3:30 in the afternoon, local time, thousands of pagers, which were purchased and used by the militant group Hezbollah, which governs the southern part of Lebanon, and which is locked in a seemingly perpetual tit-for-tat with Israel, mostly using rockets and drones across their shared border, these pagers began to buzz, indicating there was a new message from Hezbollah leadership, and then seconds later they exploded—some in their owners’ pockets or on their hips, some in their hands, if they lifted them to their faces to see what the message contained.
These sorts of devices were subbed-in for smartphones by the organization’s leadership in recent years, especially following the early October attacks on Israel by Hamas in 2023, due to fears that Israel’s notorious intelligence agency, Mossad, would be able to tap their communications if they used more sophisticated tools.
The pagers in question were a bit more modern than those that were common a few decades ago, allowing users to basically text each other, and it was thought that they were simple enough that they would reduce the number of software backdoors that Mossad could use to intercept their messages, while still allowing those in the higher-levels of the organization to communicate with each other quickly and efficiently.
Instead, it looks like Hezbollah acquired these pagers from an Israeli shell company—maybe several shell companies—operating out of Hungary which licensed the device schematics and branding of a Taiwanese company in order to make it seem legit.
This company or companies were set up in mid-2022, and the tangled web of activities surrounding them is still being unspooled by journalists and intelligence agencies, but pretty much everyone, from the pager brand’s parent company to the Hungarian government deny any connection to any of this, the US and Israel’s other allies deny having any foreknowledge of the operation, and Israel’s Mossad is of course not divulging their secrets, so it could be a little while before we know all the details, if we ever do, but it seems like this larger operation, the infrastructure for it, anyway, may have been in the works for a decade or more.
The way it played out, though, is that those thousands of pagers seem to have been filled with a few ounces of explosives and rigged with software that would detonate said explosives when a specific message was received by them. These pagers, then, were delivered to Hezbollah, distributed to their higher-ups, their inner-circle, basically, and then on September 17 thousands of them received the detonate message, blew up, and killed at least 12 people and injured nearly 3,000.
Lebanon’s hospitals were filled with the dead and grievously injured, shutting down a significant chunk of their overall medical capacity, and the following day a wave of radios—the kind used to communicate, not the kind used to listen to music, so basically walkie-talkies—alongside a few mobile phones, laptops, and some solar power cells, all owned and used by Hezbollah officials and operatives, blew up, killing at least 25 people and injuring about 450.
Then, a few days later, Israel launched an airstrike on a suburb in Beirut—the capital city of Lebanon—killing two senior Hezbollah officials and something like 36 other people with the 140 or so rockets it launched during the operation.
Anonymous officials from the US and Israel have told reporters that the explosives hidden in those pagers and other devices, were originally meant to be used as an opening salvo of an all-out attack against Hezbollah, which by definition would probably mean an invasion of Lebanon, since Hezbollah controls a fair portion of the country, but they were growing concerned that Hezbollah might have been on to them and their explosives-hiding efforts, so they decided to move sooner than planned and detonate these devices without having that immediate full-bore followup ready to go.
This might be part of why the attack is generally being seen, in analytical and intelligence circles, at least, as a tactical success but a strategic question mark, as the end-goal isn’t really clear, especially since Israel is still partly tied-up in Gaza and increasingly the West Bank, as well, and thus not super well-prepared for a potential real-deal war with Lebanon, to its north. This operation’s culmination would have made a lot more sense several months in the future, when they would theoretically have been in a better spot to detonate these devices, launch a bunch of missiles, and then move in with soldiers on the ground to capture or kill the rest of Hezbollah’s leadership.
It has been posited that this effort still serves a few important purposes for Israel’s military and intelligence agencies, though. For the latter, it serves as a reinvigoration of the “don’t mess with us” reputation they held up until the successful sneak-attack by Hamas last October; Mossad has been heavily criticized for ignoring the signals they were receiving about that attack, and this could have been partly meant to show their government and the world that they still have plenty of gas in the tank; it was a highly sophisticated operation, and it’s fairly terrifying to think that the devices we all carry in our pockets might be weaponized in this way; Iran’s military is reportedly disallowing the use of such devices for the time being, and local airlines are not allowing folks to bring these sorts of things aboard, either, so the scare-factor has definitely worked, and it will likely make it a lot more difficult for Hezbollah and similar organizations in the area to function, since they won’t know for certain which of their communication channels have been compromised and potentially weaponized against them.
The Israeli military, too, would seem to benefit from what amounts to a decapitation attack on an organization that has declared its intention to wipe Israel off the face of the map.
Hezbollah and similar organizations are more fluid than typical government organizations by necessity, but Hezbollah is a lot more established and entrenched than other Iran-backed entities, like Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen, which means they have more infrastructure, a larger military force, and a more concrete leadership structure—the latter of which was hit hard by these strikes and hand of God operations, and the former of which has been hit hard over the past year or so, airstrikes targeting Hezbollah’s rocket, drone, and missile capabilities in particular having become more common since Hamas attacked Israel.
There are several interesting, and in a few cases alarming, possible implications of this operation and its accompanying airstrikes.
First is that it could represent a time-delayed unofficial declaration of war by Israel against the Hezbollah-controlled portion of Lebanon.
There have been very clear red-lines honored by both militaries for the past several years, both of them generally sticking to hitting targets within a few miles of their shared border, and both sides generally avoiding hitting major cities or higher-ups from the opposing side with their strikes; a lot of rockets and missiles and drones flying, but few of them hitting anything meaningful, other than the sites from which those projectiles were launched.
Israel seems to be indicating that the rules have changed, though, and while Hezbollah has made similar gestures in recent days, aiming at and hitting a few Israeli targets beyond the typical projectile launch-sites and military installations close to the border, including towns dozens of miles from that border, they’re still proving to be less brazen than Israel in this regard, so far at least.
So it could be that Israel is leaving Hezbollah some space to back off, giving them a taste of what’s to come if they don’t accept that ultimatum, and it could be that Hezbollah is gesturing at hitting back, but avoiding doing anything they can’t step back from in order to give themselves time to either tone things down on what feels like their own terms, or to prepare for a more formal conflict; this could change at any moment, of course, but that seems like the most likely resting stance for Hezbollah at the moment—though in recent days both sides have indicated they’re not just prepared, but actually keen for a more formal conflict, including an Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which would allow the Israelis to do more capturing and disassembling of Hezbollah’s infrastructure, but could also bog them down in street combat, which would make them less effective in Gaza, while also probably requiring the summoning of thousands of new soldiers, or already active, but exhausted soldiers—which wouldn’t be a popular move on the Israeli homefront.
This also raises all sorts of questions about the safety, or lack thereof, of international supply chains.
Some of these supply chains have already suffered as a consequence of their tangling and breaking during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, but others are beginning to shrink or even wither as a result of concerns about, for instance, China integrating itself in global communications systems via its 5G technology and mobile devices, which has led to all sorts of sanctions and import bans by countries like the US and their allies.
Could iPhones built in China be messed with before they’re shipped to their end-users in other countries? It’s not impossible, and the same is true of just about anything that’s made in one place and exported to another. That doesn’t mean it will happen, but the knowledge that it could—and the line that’s been crossed by Israel in blowing up seemingly safe personal devices in this way—could lead to more such bans, or at least concerns and posturing by political figures about these fears. That, in turn, could expedite the truncating and culling of some of these supply chains, further curtailing the expansiveness, range, and openness of global trade.
And finally, this raises more concerns about the possibility of Israel’s invasion and occupation of Gaza sparking a larger, regional conflict, as Hezbollah is backed by Iran, which also backs an array of other non-government interests in the region, including several paramilitary groups. And the Israeli government seems keen to take down as many of the threats it’s surrounded by as possible before any peace treaties are signed; which perhaps understandable when you’re running a country that’s been invaded by all of its neighbors simultaneously as many times as Israel has in its relatively short history as a sovereign nation, but it’s also pretty alarming as Israel is a hugely potent military force in the region, and it’s backed by many of the world’s most globally potent military forces, which means it could wreak a whole lot of havoc if it wants to, and if such an effort increases in scope, that could pull other regional powers, like Iran, more formally and overtly into the conflict.
There are other forces at play, here, too, like the political machinations of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who’s walking a fine line attempting to stay in office in the midst of large and seemingly endless protests by Israelis who oppose his seeming kowtowing to the country’s far-right political establishment, and who’s scrambling to stay in office, in part to avoid facing ongoing corruption charges against him.
There are also external factors that could influence the region’s next steps, like Russia, which would love to see this conflict expand because that would take resources and attention away from its invasion of Ukraine, while other nations, like Saudi Arabia, would likely prefer to continue along a previous course of regional stabilization and normalization—of more trade enabled by more peace, basically—though it now seems inclined to put those efforts on pause because of the unpopularity of dealing directly with Israel until and unless it recognizes a Palestinian state, which doesn’t seem likely in the immediate future, given everything that’s happened in the past year.
Lots going on, then, and this most recent wave of attacks would seem to stir the pot more than it settles much of anything for everyone involved; which means, most immediately, and this is true whether or not Israel and Lebanon more formally go to war with each other, the ongoing peace talks that many of Israel’s neighbors and allies have been hoping for have been essentially back-burnered for the time being.
Show Notes
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Qasem_Soleimani
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Ismail_Haniyeh
https://archive.ph/OqfPt
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israel-strikes-lebanon-hezbollah-revenge-device-blasts-nasrallah-rcna171946
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hezbollah-commanders-killed-israel-strike-beirut-device-blasts-rcna172085
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/21/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-exploding-pagers/
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz04m913m49o
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/21/business/dealbook/exploding-pagers-deliver-supply-chain-warning.html
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-exploding-pagers-israel-supply-chain-a4937b48
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israels-ultimatum-to-hezbollah-back-off-or-go-to-war-f1b99924
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/09/21/israel-lebanon-pager-explosions-hezbollah-warfare/
https://www.axios.com/2024/09/21/hezbollah-launches-medium-range-rockets-israel
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/09/22/world/gaza-israel-hamas-hezbollah
https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-755733f50ad52c5af05a2ea7ef082e26
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/21/world/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-lebanon.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/20/world/middleeast/gaza-cease-fire-talks-hezbollah-lebanon.html
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/israel-s-hand-of-god-operation/ar-AA1qMval
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/17/world/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-pagers-explosives.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/17/world/middleeast/hezbollah-pager-explosions-lebanon.html
https://www.axios.com/2024/09/18/hezbollah-pager-explosions-supply-chain-terror
https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-pager-explosion-e9493409a0648b846fdcadffdb02d71e
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/22/world/middleeast/mideast-diplomacy-hezbollah-israel.html
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/09/22/world/gaza-israel-hamas-hezbollah
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/23/world/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-escalating.html
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-guards-ban-communications-devices-after-strike-hezbollah-security-2024-09-23/
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa-upgrade-factory-show-cisco-router-getting-implant/
https://www.reuters.com/article/world/spy-agency-ducks-questions-about-back-doors-in-tech-products-idUSKBN27D1DO/
https://www.extremetech.com/defense/173721-the-nsa-regularly-intercepts-laptop-shipments-to-implant-malware-report-says
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Agency
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_backdoor

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Extended-Range EVs
17 Sep· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about EREVs, Ford’s CEO, and Hertz.
We also discuss the used EV market, plug-in hybrids, and the Tesla Model 3.
Recommended Book: Not the End of the World by Hannah Ritchie
Transcript
In late-2021, car rental giant Hertz announced that it would purchase 100,000 Tesla Model 3 sedans for its fleet, giving customers the opportunity to drive what had recently, in 2019, become the best-selling plug-in electric car in US history, beating out the Chevy Volt, and then in 2020 become the bestselling plug-in in the world, bypassing the Nissan Leaf.
This was announced about six months after the company went through a massive restructuring, triggered by a bankruptcy filing in May of 2020, which landed Hertz in the hands of a pair of investment firms that purchased a majority stake in the company for about $4.2 billion.
Part of the goal in making such a huge electric vehicle purchase was that it would ostensibly set Hertz up with some of the snazziest, most future-facing vehicles on the road, and it should—if everything went according to plan—also provide them with some advantages, as full-bore EVs have far fewer parts than traditional internal-combustion vehicles, which means a lot less that can go wrong, and fewer moving pieces that need maintenance; which is pretty vital for vehicles that will be driven pretty much continuously.
So the single largest purchase of electric vehicles in history would represent a massive up-front investment, but the hope was that it would both pay off in dollars and cents, maintenance-wise, and help differentiate a brand that had recently been through some very rough patches, business and competition-wise.
Unfortunately for Hertz, that’s not what happened.
Initially, this announcement bumped the company’s stock up by about 40% over the course of just two weeks, but the Model 3s they purchased weren’t as popular as they thought they would be, and though EVs should in theory be easier to maintain than their ICE peers, the relatively low number of specialized repair shops and high cost of relatively scarce spare parts meant that the cars were actually more expensive to maintain than more common and less flashy alternatives.
The company was also dinged by Tesla’s decision to raise its prices around the same time Hertz was making the majority of its purchases, and Hertz decided to start offloading some of the Model 3s it had bought—which only ended up being about 30,000, rather than the originally announced 100,000—selling the cars at a fire-sale discount, in some cases as low as $25,000, which could drop to about $21,000 in areas where EV tax credits applied to used vehicles.
Unfortunately for those who bought them, many of these used Teslas were hobbled by the same issues Hertz was scrambling to address, but couldn’t make work for their business model.
Many initially happy used-Tesla purchasers found that their car’s battery pack was fundamentally damaged in some way, in some cases costing half, or nearly the same as the price they paid for the car, to repair or replace.
This fire sale arrived at around the same time as an overall drop in used EV prices across the market, too, which meant that Hertz’s prices—though at times falling to about half of what a new Model 3 would cost—weren’t as great as they could have been, especially for cars with so many potentially costly problems.
In other words, at this moment the whole of the EV industry was experiencing a bit of a price shock, as most automobile companies selling in the US were introducing new EV models, and they were finding that supply had surged beyond demand, leaving some of them with lots full of cars—especially in parts of the country where EV charging infrastructure still hasn’t been fleshed out, dramatically diminishing the appeal of EVs in those regions.
In early 2024, Hertz’s CEO resigned, mostly because his bet on Teslas and other EVs, hoping to making about a fifth of the company’s fleet electric, didn’t go as planned, and that’s left the company’s stock trading at around 11% of its 2021 high price point as of early September 2024.
To replace him, the company brought in a former executive from Cruise, which is an autonomous car technology company that’s owned by General Motors; another company that’s been trying to figure out the proper balance between investing in where the automobile market in the US is, today, and where it will be in the coming years.
What I’d like to talk about today is another facet of the automobile industry that’s changing pretty rapidly, and a new take on a third option, straddling the internal combustion engine and EV worlds, that seems to be evolving in a compelling—to those running these companies, at least—manner.
—
In January of 2023, the CEO of Toyota, who was the 66-year-old grandson of the company’s founder and who had been running the company since the early 2000s, stepped down from his position following a wave of criticism about his outspoken focus on hybrids over electric vehicles.
This company, which in some ways has been defined in recent years by its gamble to release the very well-received Prius, an early hybrid that really leaned into the concept of using a battery to support the activities of the car’s conventional fuel-burning engine, which resulted in a bunch of energy-efficiency benefits, the company had lagged behind its competitors in developing, announcing, and releasing new electric vehicle models to compete with the likes of Tesla—a company that was eating everyone else’s lunch in the EV department, and which was seeing sky-high valuations as a consequence.
Toyota was also being criticized by environmentalist groups for failing to move toward fully electric, zero-emissions vehicles, as while it did have a few EV models on the market, they were seemingly afterthoughts, accounting for less than 1% of the company’s US sales, and the main model, the cumbersomely named bZ4X, experienced a significant safety recall that upended its rollout plans.
Toyota’s new CEO leaned a bit more into EVs, announcing 10 new models in 2023, alongside plans to sell 1.5 million of them per year by 2026. But the company was still selling more cars than any other automaker on the planet, and the vast, vast majority of them were some kind of fuel-burning vehicle.
Despite the change in leadership, then, and the slight tack toward EVs the new CEO made soon after ascending to his new position, the company was still being criticized by environmentalist groups for not doing enough or moving fast enough, and the market seemed to think Toyota was setting itself up for a pretty grim next decade, since it was falling so far behind its competition in terms of supply chains and manufacturing know-how, related to EVs.
This general storyline, though, seems to have changed over the past year.
Yes, it’s still generally assumed that EVs are the future, that the electrification of everything is where we’re headed as a globe-spanning civilization, not just our transportation, but everything moving toward renewables—and that’s for climate-related reasons, but also the economics of renewables, which, once installed and connected, tend to be a lot more favorable, economically, than fossil fuel-based alternatives, almost always.
That said, the aforementioned disconnect between EV availability and investment, and EV demand in the United States has increased over the past year. EV sales are continuing to increase overall, but the huge spike in sales we saw over the past handful of years has tempered into a slower ascension, and many automakers have found themselves with car lots filled with models that aren’t the ones people want—at least not in the requisite numbers to keep lot turnover happening at the rate they like, and in some ways need, to see.
This is not the case in many other countries, I should note.
In China, EVs already made up something like 37% of the country’s total automobile marketshare, the share of new cars sold, in 2023, and across Europe, about 24% of all new cars sold were plug-in electric vehicles that same year.
In the US, the number is still in the single-digits, something like 8% as of Q2 2024, which is a lot bigger than the 5% or so in early 2022, but again, not the kind of rampant growth carmakers were planning for.
Another component of the automobile industry in the US has continued to grow a fair bit faster, though, up more than 30% year-over-year, accounting for up to 9.6% of the country’s total light-duty car marketshare in the second quarter of 2024.
And that slice of the market is the world of hybrids—the component of the car industry that Toyota has bet heavily on, despite antagonism from all sides, over the past several years, and which other automakers like Ford, are pivoting toward, as well; Ford recently announced that it would no longer be releasing a full electric, large SUV in the near-future, and will instead be releasing hybrid models, possibly including plug-in hybrid models.
Plug-in hybrids are like traditional hybrid vehicles, except they have a larger on-board battery pack that can be plugged into an electrical outlet, which allows them to be even more efficient than their traditional hybrid kin; so they're like a traditional ICE vehicle, but with a big, plug-innable battery that helps that engine be more efficient, giving it much better gas mileage.
Another recent development in this space, though—one that’s already pretty well-known in China, but still foreign enough in the US that the CEO of Ford said, after being exposed to the idea for the first time earlier this year, that he thinks it might be the right variation of existing approaches to help the US make the transition to electric vehicles—is called an extended-range electric vehicle, or EREV, and rather than being a hybrid with a suped-up battery, it’s an EV with a built-in, smaller internal combustion engine that serves as an onboard generator, allowing the car to burn fuel to generate electricity, which then charges the car’s giant battery, giving it more range when it’s needed.
The CEO of Ford thought this lined up well with how the American market works, and could help temper the range-anxiety many Americans feels, worrying that the battery packs in their EVs won’t allow them to take road trips, or might run out of juice when they’re partway through their homeward-bound commute at the end of the day; recharging an EVs battery still takes a fair bit longer than filling up a tank of gas, and there are way more gas stations than EVs plug in points around the country, as of 2024.
So if there were a little engine inside their EV capable of giving it a backup charge when necessary, and if that little generator could be fueled using gas that’s widely and relatively inexpensively available across the US, that could in theory help people transition to driving with electricity—which can be generated cleanly, using renewables—most of the time, while having that backup system in place, for when it’s needed, which might be rarely or never.
In late-2023, car-maker Stellantis unveiled their Ram 1500 Ramcharger, which is an EREV that can drive up to 690 miles on its battery pack, but it also includes a 3.6-liter V6 engine that activates when the main 92kW battery is running low on juice; a little generator that burns fuel to recharge the main battery.
One of the big, market-defining questions related to that new Ram and similar models, though, is whether US government regulators will categorize EREVs as zero-emissions vehicles, because, in theory at least, they will at times not be zero-emissions, even though for many people they would probably run on just their batteries most of the time.
This judgement call could impact sales substantially, though, as such determinations help define what would-be customers pay up front, what sorts of tax benefits, if any, they can expect on their purchases, and what sorts of taxes and other fees they’ll pay along the way, for the life of the vehicle.
Whether this topsy-turvy version of the hybrid—the traditional version having a conventional engine with battery backup, and this new riff on the theme defined by a massive main battery with a conventional engine backup—whether it will do well on the market anywhere outside of China has yet to be seen, and there’s still the question of whether other automakers will be able to spin up their own versions of the concept before the market moves again, trends realigning, and more plug-in electricity infrastructure maybe making vanilla EVs more desirable and useable in more parts of the country.
In the meantime, though, we seem to be seeing—rather than the clean transition from ICE vehicles to EVs that some people had hoped for and expected—something more akin to a Cambrian Explosion, where new pressures and innovations are sparking all kinds of interesting offshoot evolutions, and rather than just two options, one supposedly the future and the other supposedly on its way out, we have a half-dozen core themes around which most new vehicles are being built, some of them interchangeable, some not so much, and that suggests we could see more large recalibrations and broad market shifts, alongside a slew of new combinations and innovations, before the previous paradigm fully gives way to whatever ultimately replaces it.
Show Notes
https://electrek.co/2023/01/26/toyota-ceo-steps-down-amid-electric-vehicle-movement/
https://caredge.com/guides/electric-vehicle-market-share-and-sales
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_car_use_by_country
https://cleantechnica.com/2024/08/28/u-s-share-of-electric-hybrid-vehicle-sales-increased-in-2nd-quarter-of-2024/
https://electrek.co/2023/04/07/toyotas-new-ceo-adjusts-ev-plans-but-sticks-to-a-hybrid-approach/
https://www.thestreet.com/electric-vehicles/ford-ceo-says-this-type-of-vehicle-can-be-the-bridge-for-electrification
https://www.wsj.com/business/autos/the-plug-in-hybrid-car-starts-to-win-over-buyers-2155e054
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plug-in_hybrid
https://fortune.com/2024/06/07/buy-used-tesla-hertz-fire-sale/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tesla_Model_3
https://www.roadandtrack.com/news/a60232041/hertz-ceo-resigns-after-big-bet-on-evs-fails-to-pay-off/
https://www.roadandtrack.com/news/a35698039/hertz-potentially-saved-from-bankruptcy/
https://www.roadandtrack.com/news/a38053117/hertz-buying-100000-teslas/
https://qz.com/tesla-hertz-used-electric-cars-evs-damage-glitches-1851482632
https://archive.ph/364dj
https://www.cnbc.com/2023/10/26/hertz-pulls-back-on-ev-plans-citing-tesla-price-cuts-repair-costs.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cruise_(autonomous_vehicle)

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Compounded Semaglutide
10 Sep· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about Wegovy, Eli Lilly, and HIMS.
We also discuss pig pancreases, beneficial side-effects, and shortages.
Recommended Book: The Death Café Movement by Jack Fong
Transcript
In the 1970s, a pair of researchers looking into possible ways to address duodenal ulcer disease were studying the way we secrete different hormones while eating, and that led to an experiment in which they pumped a hormone called glucagon-like peptide 1, or GLP-1, extracted from pigs, into pig pancreases to see what effect that would have.
As it turned out, this hormone stimulated the secretion of insulin while inhibiting the secretion of glucagon, and that was notable to these researchers because folks with diabetes have too much glucagon in their bodies, which is what causes high blood sugar.
The idea, then, was that by stoking the production of more insulin and limiting the amount of glucagon being produced, you might be able to help folks with type 2 diabetes control their symptoms.
These researchers shopped around the idea of building a treatment based on this hormone a little bit in subsequent years, but didn’t get much interest from the major drug companies. In 1993, though, they were able to do a study that showed that infusing folks who have type 2 diabetes with GLP-1, they could reset their blood glucose levels back to normal within just four hours, which was a pretty big deal—a lot better than most other options at the time.
A drug based on this hormone was approved by the FDA for medical use in the US in 2017 under the name Semaglutide, and by 2021 it had become one of the top 100 most-prescribed drugs in the country—which is saying something, as the US is awash in pharmaceutical options, these days.
Even before that approval, though, there were signs that GLP-1 receptor agonists, which is what Semaglutide and other drugs based on this concept are called, might have also had some other uses.
In some of the clinical trials in which they were trying to gauge how well folks with type 2 diabetes faired while using the drug, for instance, they found that many of their subjects had trouble finishing the meals they were supposed to eat, which was a problem, as having that meal was part of the process, and after they ate it, ideally the whole thing, researchers would measure their blood insulin—so keeping that controlled was kind of important for their results, but the subjects consistently just weren’t as hungry as they typically would have been.
Interestingly, this realization led to a proposal by one of those original researchers to the drug company Novo Nordisk, the company that brought Semaglutide to market, for another drug that would help people control their appetite and consequently limit food intake, perhaps serving as a means of remediating obesity, which at the time, in 1998, was already becoming a big health issue of significant global concern and widespread impact.
The company didn’t end up doing anything with the patent they went in on with that researcher, but they did pursue something along those lines a little bit later, which approached the issue with a similar underlying substance, but via a different route.
And in March of 2021, the company started clinical trials for that drug, which eventually became Wegovy, using basically the same substance as Semaglutide, but in a different volume, and the adult subjects in that trial lost a significant amount of weight.
A few months later, in June of 2021, Wegovy was approved for use in the US to treat adults with obesity, and then in December the following year it was approved for use by obese teens, as well.
Now, Wegovy and its effects were in some ways forecasted in those trials for Semaglutide when test subjects were eating less than usual while on the drug, and something similar happened here, as subjects who were being given Wegovy for weight loss purposes were showing other, unanticipated positive effects, as well.
Among those effects were positive cardiovascular outcomes, which Novo Nordisk then tested for specifically, noting that the drug reduces the risk of major adverse cardiovascular events like heart attacks and stroke by about 20% in obese adults. The FDA approved the drug for this purpose in March of 2024, and another study that looked into Semaglutide’s effect on folks with liver disease resulting from HIV found that it meaningfully reduces the severity of that disease—another unexpected win.
Several earlier studies that showed positive results, and which are now being looked into on larger scales and with human subjects, include those looking into its impact on depression and suicidal ideation, its potential to reduce alcohol consumption, and the possibility that it might also help with gambling addiction and other non-substance-related addictions, alongside substance-based ones like nicotine.
Semaglutide seems to help with eating disorders and may help with infertility issues. It may also help with persistent inflammation, enhance autophagic activity, meaning it could help the body break down the cells that don’t work anymore so new ones can grow, and it might help prevent the buildup of what’s called alpha-synuclein in our brains, which is thought to maybe be a cause of or contributor to Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s.
There’s even early evidence that GLP-1-based drugs might reduce our risk of developing some types of cancer, and maybe the worst, long-term sorts of COVID outcomes, as well.
It’s a very interesting time in this space, in other words, as the more we test these things, and the more people who take them, the more we learn about their effects and potential other use-cases.
And a lot of people are using this class of drug right now: up to 12% of the US adult population has used a GLP-1 drug at some point, as of early 2024, according to research from KFF, and Novo Nordisk has been struggling to make enough of the stuff in its different manifestations, branded for different purposes, as have its competitors who have launched their own copy-cat products, and in some cases products that up the ante with even more impressive clinical results than what the first wave of GLP-1 drugs can boast.
Novo Nordisk has become Europe’s most valuable company on the strength of this drug class, growing by about 230% since 2021 when it first launched Wegovy; it’s now hovering at something like $500 billion in market cap.
But the company has suffered a few recent stock value hits due to the one-two punch of patients not being able to afford the drug, which can cost more than $1000 per month, and a dearth of production capacity, which means they’ve been unable to meet this drug class’s perhaps understandably significant demand.
What I’d like to talk about today is an aspect of the pharmaceutical industry in the US that has generally operated under-the-radar, but which has recently stepped into the limelight because of this rush to get GLP-1 drugs to market and in the hands of those who want them.
—
In the world of pharmaceuticals, especially in the US, but also in a few other countries, “compounding” refers to the practice of creating a drug on-demand for a patient, usually because they need a dosage or specific composition that isn’t manufactured in bulk, or which isn’t readily available in its mass-manufactured form.
So while the majority of drugs in the US and similar wealthy countries are produced on scale, these days, and in a variety of common portions or doses, in some cases you might need an exact dosage that’s somewhere between two doses that are manufactured on scale by the company that makes the drug, and a pharmacist will make that specific you-sized dose for you, maybe by measuring out the right amount of drug powder into a gel-cal pill, maybe by blending two substances into a single liquid that you can take all at once.
These days, the most common compounding tasks revolve around removing non-active ingredients from a drug—something in the gel-capsule, for instance, or a binding agent that allows a drug to be delivered in liquid form—for folks who need that drug, but who are allergic or otherwise sensitive to something in the final, mass-produced form; a color additive, a suspension, a flavoring, something like that.
This is often referred to as “traditional compounding,” and it can only be done by a licensed pharmacist; and while all licensed pharmacists will have at least a rudimentary understanding of how to compound custom medications, much of this kind of work is done in facilities that have compounding-specific equipment on hand; some that can do sterile work, and some that can only be used for non-sterile final products.
Many pharmacies have some basic tools that allow them to do things like mix flavorings into a gross substance to make it more palatable to kids or pets, or to weigh and mix and divvy-up medicinal powders into properly sized capsules, but some pharmacies are a lot more specialized and have far fancier tools that allow them to output more elaborate concoctions for their customers.
Another role these compounding pharmacies can play, though—and in this case I’m referring to that latter type, the ones with specialized tools and machines that allow them to compound on a larger and more specialized scale, if they need to do so—is that the FDA, the Food and Drug Administration which regulates the US drug market, can allow them to make drugs that are experiencing a shortage on the market; when those who have the patent for a drug are unable to scale-up fast enough and meet market demand, in other words, these compounding pharmacies can be given the legal go-ahead by the FDA to make and sell that drug.
To be clear, these pharmacies aren’t allowed to make the exact drug: they can make a drug with the same active ingredients, and sometimes they’ll be quite similar and sometimes they’ll be in a different form (an injectable rather than a powder, a capsule rather than a tablet, etc). These things are also not FDA approved, so while the FDA says it’s okay for them to make and sell them in those limited circumstances, it’s not meant to be equivalent to the real-deal, market-approved product; it’s a temporary, emergency measure meant to help people who would be in a lot of pain or discomfort or even danger if they don’t get a drug they need on a regular basis because of a shortage.
And that brings us to what’s happening now: Novo Nordisk is experiencing a shortage of its GLP-1 inhibitor-based drugs, and the FDA gave these compounding pharmacies legal permission to make GLP-1 inhibitor based drugs, with the same active ingredients, usually in the same dosage, while this shortage persists.
Consequently, there are a bunch of drugs made by compounding pharmacies being marketed all over the place, produced by existing companies like HIMS and 23andMe, alongside brands like Mochi and Eden and HenryMeds—most of them selling doses equivalent to those that are sold by Novo Nordisk for something like $1,000 to $1,300 a month, but those sold by the compounding pharmacies are usually going for closer to $250-300 per month.
It’s been estimated, by the way, that it probably costs only about $5 to produce each of those doses—so even the compounding pharmacies selling at that dramatic cut to the sticker price are likely making money hand over fist on each of these doses, which is probably why ads for these alternative branded versions of the drug are plastered all over the internet, TV, billboards, and magazines, at the moment.
The FDA does keep tabs on these compounded pharmacies, and they can shut down them down if they sell unsafe products, and they can threaten to do so if they don’t toe various lines—which is something the FDA has already done, as a version of the drug that was being delivered attached to salt, which would be dissolved in water before injecting, wasn’t considered to be as safe as the free base version of the drug, so the FDA put out a warning and all the folks who were making the salt version converted over to the free base version, lest they lose their legal ability to sell this product type.
Even with that regulatory pseudo-oversight, there have been reports of people ordering these cheaper versions and getting shoddy products.
One study found that those reports are probably of a kind with reports about side effects experienced by people who take the Novo Nordisk version, as folks taking any version of this drug can experience some pretty uncomfortable side effects, but it’s hard to say right about that right now, as the drug is still relatively new and this aspect of the pharmaceutical industry is, again, approved but not as well-regulated.
So it’s a buy with caution and at your own risk sort of situation, though the cost savings very well might be worth it for many people, regardless of the potential risks.
All of which is interesting, in part because this category of drug-maker is becoming more brazen with its flogging of products, probably at least in part because this particular drug is such a cash-cow and very popular right now, and in part because it will be a little while before the patent-holding drug-makers like Novo Nordisk and Eli Lilly can scale-up their manufacturing capacity appropriately. So investments they make in marketing will pay off longer than they might have, had this shortage been a brief one.
But it’s also interesting because of what this implies about the market, as, conceivably at least, a lot of potential customers for this drug will become accustomed to paying just a few hundred dollars per month for it, rather than more than $1,000, and while that lower price is doable for the compound pharmacies, there’s a chance the Novo Nordisk’s of the world won’t consider that reduced profit margin to be worth their time and up-front investment in developing this drug, which could lead to some weird market effects and a potential whipcrack in the other direction, especially if national insurance plans don’t get on board with adding this type of drug to their acceptable list; a higher sticker price paired with a lack of support from insurance companies would mean this drug remains out of reach for the majority of people who might otherwise benefit from it, and that, in turn, could mean a rough couple of years for Novo, until they can recalibrate their expectations and/or their product catalog, accordingly.
That said, Novo Nordisk competitor Eli Lilly recently announced that they will be selling a version of their Wegovy competitor, Zepbound, which will be sold in vials instead of in auto-injector pens, reducing their packaging costs and requiring that customers load the syringes themselves, that will have a shelf price as low as $399 per month.
That’s a staggering undercut of Novo’s offerings. And while this is partially an attempt to address the shortage of this drug, as this lower priced version will also be available in smaller doses, it will almost certainly also help them compete with Novo and the many compounded pharmacy offerings that are still cheaper, but not as dramatically cheaper as this name-brand offering, as before.
There’s a good chance this move by Eli Lilly is just the first of many reworks to a drug type that will permanently shift the average price, allowing the fully FDA-backed versions to compete with the compound versions, remaining a little pricier, but not much, which should help them maintain market share until they can get their new manufacturing capacity online, knocking those compounding competitors out of the game entirely.
Of course, there’s a chance that within months or just a few years, this whole industry could shift once more, as what’s generally considered to be the “holy grail” in this space—a pill-delivered drug that accomplishes the same or better outcomes as the injectables—is in development by pretty much everyone, and some of them already have pills in phase 2 trials.
For the moment, though, the name of the game seems to be discovering new benefits of this drug type, opening it up for more use-cases and, thus, customers, and repackaging it in different ways so that the price can go lower without fully depleting the massive profits those who are producing it—big pharma and compounding pharmacies, alike—are enjoying.
Show Notes
https://qz.com/ozempic-shortage-ema-novo-nordisk-1851638383
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/compounding_pharmacy
https://www.pharmacist.com/Practice/Patient-Care-Services/Compounding/Compounding-FAQs
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2816824
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compounding
https://www.goodrx.com/classes/glp-1-agonists/compounded-semaglutide
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/human-drug-compounding/drug-compounding-and-drug-shortages
https://archive.ph/Czn0t
https://qz.com/viking-therapeutics-weight-loss-drugs-amazing-1851631337
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11227080/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semaglutide
https://www.wired.com/story/obesity-drugs-researcher-interview-ozempic-wegovy/
https://www.drugs.com/history/wegovy.html
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11011817/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9417299/
https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/30/health/liraglutide-alzheimers-trial/index.html
https://sci-hub.st/https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16529340/
https://www.jci.org/articles/view/72434
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7606641/
https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2023.10.31.564990v1.full.pdf
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5711387/
https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3425/14/6/617
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3700649/
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24133407/
https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adn4128
https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/most-patients-stop-using-wegovy-ozempic-weight-loss-within-two-years-analysis-2024-07-10/
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2819949
https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/obesity-drugmaker-novo-nordisk-misses-q2-profit-forecast-2024-08-07/
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/30/health/wegovy-covid-deaths.html

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Sick Week
3 Sep· Let's Know Things
Friends!
It looks like Covid got me (my girlfriend is just getting over her own Covid-y week, and we live together—so despite our best efforts this was maybe unavoidable).
In accordance with my policy of aggressively resting when I get sick, I’ll be taking the week off to sleep, feel generally sore and uncomfortable, and consume alarming quantities of ibuprofen.
Sorry about the gap in programming, but unless something unexpected and worrying happens I’ll be back to my usual publishing schedule beginning next week, on the 10th.

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The Boeing Starliner
27 Aug· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about the Falcon 9, the Saturn V, and NASA’s bureaucracy.
We also discuss Boeing’s mishaps, the Scout system, and the Zenit 2.
Recommended Book: What’s Our Problem? by Tim Urban
Transcript
In 1961, the cost to launch a kilogram of something into low Earth orbit—and a kilogram is about 2.2 pounds, and this figure is adjusted for inflation—was about $118,500, using the Scout, or Solid Controlled Orbital Utility Test system of rockets, which were developed by the US government in collaboration with LTV Aerospace.
This price tag dropped substantially just a handful of years later in 1967 with the launch of the Saturn V, which was a staggeringly large launch vehicle, for the time but also to this day, with a carrying capacity of more than 300,000 pounds, which is more than 136,000 kg, and a height of 363 feet, which is around 111 meters and is about as tall as a 36-story building and 60 feet taller than the Statue of Liberty.
Because of that size, the Saturn V was able to get stuff, and people, into orbit and beyond—this was the vehicle that got humans to the Moon—at a dramatically reduced cost, compared to other options at the time, typically weighing in at something like $5,400 per kg; and again, that’s compared to $118,500 per kg just 6 years earlier, with the Scout platform.
So one of the key approaches to reducing the cost of lifting stuff out of Earth’s gravity well so it could be shuffled around in space, in some rare cases beyond Earth orbit, but usually to somewhere within that orbit, as is the case with satellites and space stations, has been to just lift more stuff all at once. And in this context, using the currently available and time-tested methods for chucking things into space, at least, that means using larger rockets, or big rocket arrays composed of many smaller rockets, which then boost a huge vehicle out of Earth’s gravity well, usually by utilizing several stages which can burn up some volume of fuel before breaking off the spacecraft, which reduces the amount of weight it’s carrying and allows secondary and in some cases tertiary boosters to then kick in and burn their own fuel.
The Soviet Union briefly managed to usurp the Saturn V’s record for being the cheapest rocket platform in the mid-1980s with its Zenit 2 medium-sized rocket, but the Zenit 2 was notoriously fault-ridden and it suffered a large number of errors and explosions, which made it less than ideal for most use-cases.
The Long March 3B, built by the Chinese in the mid-1990s got close to the Saturn V’s cost-efficiency record, managing about $6,200 per kg, but it wasn’t until 2010 that a true usurper to that cost-efficiency crown arrived on the scene in the shape of the Falcon 9, built by US-based private space company SpaceX.
The Falcon 9 was also notable, in part, because it was partially reusable from the beginning: it had a somewhat rocky start, and if the US government hadn’t been there to keep giving SpaceX contracts as it worked through its early glitches, the Falcon 9 may not have survived to become the industry-changing product that it eventually became, but once it got its legs under it and stopped blowing up all the time, the Falcon 9 showed itself capable of carrying payloads of around 15,000 pounds, which is just over 7000 kgs into orbit using a two-stage setup, and remarkably, and this also took a little while to master, but SpaceX did eventually make it common enough to be an everyday thing, the Falcon 9’s booster, which decouples from the rocket after the first stage of the launch, can land, vertically, intact and ready for refurbishment.
That means these components, which are incredibly expensive, could be reused rather than discarded, as had been the case with every other rocket throughout history. And again, while it took SpaceX some time to figure out how to make that work, they’ve reached a point, today, where at least one booster has been used 22 times, which represents an astonishing savings for the company, which it’s then able to pass on to its customers, which in turn allows it to outcompete pretty much everyone else operating in the private space industry, as of the second-half of 2024.
The cost to lift stuff into orbit using a Falcon 9 is consequently something like $2,700 per kg, about half of what the Saturn V could claim for the same.
SpaceX is not the only company using reusable spacecraft, though.
Probably the most well-known reusable spacecraft was NASA’s Space Shuttle, which was built by Rockwell International and flown from the early 1980s until 2011, when the last shuttle was retired.
These craft were just orbiters, not really capable of sending anyone or anything beyond low Earth orbit, and many space industry experts and researchers consider them to be a failure, the consequence of bureaucratic expediency and NASA budget cuts, rather than solid engineering or made-for-purpose utility—but they did come to symbolize the post-Space Race era in many ways, as while the Soviet, and then the successor Russian space program continued to launch rockets in a more conventional fashion, we didn’t really see much innovation in this industry until SpaceX came along and started making their reusable components, dramatically cutting costs and demonstrating that rockets capable of carrying a lot of stuff and people could be made and flown at a relatively low cost, and we thus might be standing at the precipice of a new space race sparked by private companies and cash-strapped government agencies that can, despite that relatively lack of resources, compared to the first space race, at least, can still get quite a bit done because of those plummeting expenses.
What I’d like to talk about today is a reusable spacecraft being made by another well-known aerospace company, but one that has had a really bad decade or so, and which is now suffering the consequences of what seems to have been a generation of bad decisions.
—
Boeing is a storied, sprawling corporation that builds everything from passenger jets to missiles and satellites.
It’s one of the US government’s primary defense contractors, and it makes about half of all the commercial airliners on the planet.
Boeing has also, in recent years, been at the center of a series of scandals, most of them tied to products that don’t work as anticipated, and in some cases which have failed to work in truly alarming, dangerous, and even deadly ways.
I did a bonus episode on Boeing back in January of this year, so I won’t go too deep into the company’s history or wave of recent problems, but the short version is that although Boeing has worked cheek-to-jowl with the US and its allies’ militaries since around WWII, and was already dominating aspects of the burgeoning airline industry several decades before that, it merged with a defense contractor called McDonnell Douglas in the late-1990s, and in the early 2000s it began to reorganize its corporate setup in such a way that financial incentives began to influence its decision-making more than engineering necessities.
In other words, the folks in charge of Boeing made a lot of money for themselves and for many of their shareholders, but those same decisions led to a lot of inefficiencies and a drop in effectiveness and reliability throughout their project portfolio, optimizing for the size of their bank account and market cap, rather than the quality of their products, basically.
Consequently, their renowned jetliners, weapons offerings, and space products began to experience small and irregular, but then more sizable and damaging flaws and disruptions, probably the most public of which was the collection of issues built into their 737 MAX line of jets, two of which crashed in 2018 and 2019, killing 346 people and resulting in the grounding of 387 of their aircraft.
A slew of defects were identified across the MAX line by 2020, and an investigation by the US House found that employee concerns, reported to upper-management, went ignored or unaddressed, reinforcing the sense that the corporate higher-ups were disconnected from the engineering component of the company, and that they were fixated almost entirely on profits and their own compensation, rather than the quality of what they were making.
All of which helps explain what’s happening with one of Boeing’s key new offerings, a partially reusable spacecraft platform called the Starliner.
The Starliner went into early development in 2010, when NASA asked companies like Boeing to submit proposals for a Commercial Crew Program that would allow the agency to offload some of its human spaceflight responsibilities to private companies in the coming decades.
One of the contract winners was SpaceX’s Crew Dragon platform, but Boeing also won a contract with its Starliner offering in 2014, which it planned to start testing in 2017, though that plan was delayed, the first unmanned Orbital Flight Test arriving nearly 3 years later, at the tail-end of 2019, and even then, the craft experienced all sorts of technical issues along the way, including weak parachute systems, flammable tape, and valves that kept getting stuck.
It was two more years before the company launched the second test flight, and there were more delays leading up to the Starliner’s first Crew Flight Test, during which it would carry actual humans for the first time.
That human-carrying flight launched on June 5 of 2024, and it carried two astronauts to the International Space Station—though it experienced thruster malfunctions on the way up, as it approached the ISS, and after several months of investigation, the Starliner capsule still attached to the Station all that time, it was determined that it was too risky for those two astronauts to return to Earth in the Starliner.
That brings us to where we are now, a situation in which there are two astronauts aboard the ISS, in low Earth orbit, who were meant to stay for just over a week, but who will now remain there, stranded in space, for a total of around eight months, as NASA decided that it wasn’t worth the risk putting them on the Starliner again until they could figure out what went wrong, so they’ll be bringing Starliner back to earth, remotely, unmanned, and the stranded astronauts will return to Earth on a SpaceX Crew Dragon craft that is scheduled to arrived in September of this year, and which will return to Earth six months in the future; that craft was originally intended to have four astronauts aboard when it docks with the ISS, but two of those astronauts will be bumped so there will be room for the two who are stranded when it returns, next year.
All of which is incredibly embarrassing for Boeing, which again, has already had a truly horrible double-handful of years, reputationally, and which now has stranded astronauts in space because of flaws in its multi-billion-dollar spacecraft, and those astronauts will now need to be rescued, by a proven and reliable craft built by its main in-space competitor, SpaceX.
One of the key criticisms of NASA and the way it’s operated over the past several decades, from the shuttle era onward, essentially, is that it’s really great at creating jobs and honorable-sounding positions for bureaucrats, and for getting government money into parts of the country that otherwise wouldn’t have such money, because that spending can be funneled to manufacturing hubs that otherwise don’t have much to manufacture, but it’s not great at doing space stuff, and hasn’t been for a while; that’s the general sense amongst many in this industry and connected industries, at least.
This general state of affairs allowed SpaceX to become a huge player in the global launch industry—the dominant player, arguably, by many metrics—because it invested a bunch of money to make reusable spacecraft components, and has used that advantage to claim a bunch of customers from less-reliable and more expensive competitors, and then it used that money to fund increasingly efficient and effective products, and side-projects like the satellite-based internet platform, Starlink.
This has been enabled, in part, by government contracts, but while Boeing and its fellow defense contractors, which have long been tight-knit with the US and other governments, have used such money to keep their stock prices high and to invest in lobbyists and similar relationship-reinforcing assets, SpaceX and a few similar companies have been stepping in, doing pretty much everything better, and have thus gobbled up not just the client base of these older entities, but also significantly degraded their reputations by showing how things could be done if they were to invest differently and focus on engineering quality over financial machinations; Boeing arguably should have been the one to develop the Falcon 9 system, but instead an outsider had to step in and make that happen, because of how the incentives in the space launch world work.
One of the big concerns, now, is that Boeing will retreat from its contract with NASA, leaving the agency with fewer options in terms of ISS resupply and astronaut trips, but also in terms of longer-term plans like returning to the Moon and exploring the rest of the solar system.
Lacking industry competition, NASA could become more and more reliant on just one player, or just a few, and that’s arguably what led to the current situation with Boeing—its higher-ups knew they would get billions from the government on a regular basis whatever they did, no matter how flawed their products and delayed their timelines, and that led to a slow accretion of bad habits and perverse incentives.
There’s a chance the same could happen to SpaceX and other such entities, over time, if they’re able to kill off enough of their competition so that they become the de facto, go to option, rather than the best among many choices, which they arguably are for most such purposes at the moment.
And because Boeing seems unlikely to be able to fulfill its contract with NASA, which will necessitate flying six more Starliner missions to the ISS, before the International Space Station is retired in 2030, this raises the question of whether the company will move forward with the reportedly expensive investments that will be necessary to get its Starliner program up to snuff.
It’s already on the hook for about $1.6 billion just to pay for various delays and cost overruns the project has accrued up till this point, and that doesn’t include all the other investments that might need to be made to fulfill that contract, so they could look at the short-term money side of this and say, basically, we’re ceding this aspect of the aerospace world to younger, hungrier companies, and we’ll just keep on collecting the reliable dollars we know we’ll get from the US military each year, no questions asked.
We could then see Boeing leave the race for what looks to be the next space-related government contract bonanza, which will probably be related to NASA’s smaller, more modular space station ambitions; the ISS may get a second-wind and be maintained past 2030, but either way NASA is keen to hire private companies to launch larger craft into low Earth orbit for long-term habitation, supplies and crew for these mini space-stations shuttled back and forth by companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin, the latter of which is a direct competitor to SpaceX owned by Amazon founder Jeff Bezos.
Boeing has been tapped by Blue Origin to help keep their in-orbit assets supplied under that new paradigm, but it could be that they show themselves incapable of safely and reliably doing so, and that could open up more opportunities for other, smaller entities in this space, if they can figure out how to compete with the increasingly dominant SpaceX, but it could, again, also result in a new monopoly or monopsony controlled by just a few companies, which then over time will have to fight the urge to succumb to the save perverse incentives that seem to be weighing on Boeing.
Show Notes
https://www.npr.org/2024/03/20/1239132703/boeing-timeline-737-max-9-controversy-door-plug
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_Starliner
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing
https://arstechnica.com/space/2024/08/after-latest-starliner-setback-will-boeing-ever-deliver-on-its-crew-contract/
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/24/science/nasa-boeing-starliner-astronauts.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scout_(rocket_family)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saturn_V
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zenit-2
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long_March_3B
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-space-launches-low-earth-orbit
https://www.cradleofaviation.org/history/history/saturn-v-rocket.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_orbiter
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reusable_spacecraft
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spaceplane
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_9

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Ukraine Invades Russia
20 Aug· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about Kursk, asymmetric warfare, and Russian politics.
We also discuss HIMARS, supply lines, and Kyiv.
Recommended Book: The Disappearance of Rituals by Byung-Chul Han
Transcript
About two and a half years ago, on February 24, 2022, Russia invaded neighboring Ukraine.
This invasion had been forecasted for a while, as Russian forces had at times surreptitiously, at times more overtly supported separatist factions in the eastern and southeastern portion of Ukraine for about a decade, eventually invading and them annexing the Crimean Peninsula back in March of 2014 using what became known as the "little green men" strategy because the invading soldiers had their flags, patches, and other insignia removed, which gave the Russian government deniability, saying basically some patriotic members of their military might be inclined to help their fellow travelers in parts of Ukraine that are being repressed for their Russian heritage, and who crave freedom from an oppressive central government; how these patriotic soldiers acting on their own behalf, without support from the Russian government, supposedly, were able to bring so much heavy artillery and tanks with them was never formally addressed.
So Russia had been chipping away at Ukraine for a long while leading up to this more conventional attack in 2022, grabbing an important port when they took Crimea and leaving the Ukrainian government, which had been tilting toward Europe and away from Russia's sphere of influence—which is part of what triggered that pseudo-invasion of Crimea—and all of this left Ukraine fighting those separatist groups on their eastern flank pretty much continuously for the decade leading up to that bigger invasion a few years ago.
When that invasion was launched, Russia was expected by pretty much everyone to basically waltz right into Kyiv with little opposition, as it was this huge, powerful country with nukes and a massive conventional military apparatus, so it stood to reason it should easily defeat its weaker, former supplicant neighbor.
But that's not how things played out.
Ukraine managed to hold off an initial, ill-planned but large invasion force, and for the past two and a half years they've continued to hold those lines, despite huge drafts of soldiers and new investments in wartime materials, including drones and missiles that have been near-continuously lobbed at Ukrainian cities and towns, by the Russian government.
For the past year or so, following some back-and-forth pushes by Russian and Ukrainian forces in mostly the eastern part of Ukraine, at least following that initial unsuccessful incursion toward the capitol, Ukraine's efforts to reclaim its captured territory have been fraught.
It launched a successful counterattack a little while back, retaking some earlier captured territory, but after plowing through Russian forces and arriving in the eastern portion of the country, it's next-stage offensives basically collapsed as soon as they were launched.
The Ukrainian government is still making fresh attempts in this regard, as any stagnation and seeming lack of progress could serve as justification by its allies to stop sending money and weapons to bolster their war effort, but these have been relatively small and haven't accomplished much—not for the last year, at least.
The same was generally true for Russia up until recently, it's troops on the ground exhausted and undersupplied, their pushes deeper into Ukrainian met with stern-enough resistance that they've had to pull back, or they've persisted in shouldering their way through a meat-grinder defense, capturing little tiny bits of territory, but with huge costs in terms of lives and military hardware.
This past year they've seen some decent gains, though, as freshly drafted and trained troops have subbed-in for exhausted and wounded ones, and as Ukraine's forces have suffered the consequences of delayed support from the US in particular, and as their own forces have been unable to tap-out, rest, and recover, because of the difference in the size of the two countries' populations, but also because of the nature of the conflict, Ukraine being invaded, while Russia has remained a safe-haven for the most part.
As of the day I'm recording this in late-August 2024, Russia's military controls about 20% of Ukraine's total territory—and that includes Crimea and other chunks that were taken in 2014—around 8.2 million of Ukraine's 41 million population before the invasion had already fled the country by mid-2023, some having returned in the year or so since, but millions of people are still scattered throughout Europe and the rest of the world, making this the continent's largest refugee crisis since WWII.
About 8 million Ukrainians are now considered to be internally displaced, which means they're homeless within their own country, often because their cities or towns have been captured or destroyed.
Estimates on casualties and fatalities in this conflict vary widely, as official numbers are often incomplete and filtered for public consumption and propaganda purposes, but some fairly strict and consequently probably low estimates from outside groups suggest a few hundred thousand people may have died in this conflict, so far, with hundreds of thousands more having been wounded, in some cases grievously, with some more biased figures—like those provided by Ukraine's Ministry of Defense—suggesting that well over half a million people may have been wounded on Russia's side, alone, since the 2022 invasion began.
Again, this war has been uneven but surprising from the get go, Russia taking a lot of territory, but Ukraine holding its own and performing well beyond most expectations.
But over the last year, since battle lines in the east were more firmly drawn and both sides had the opportunity to carve out defenses, lay mines, things like that, this has been a story of slow attritional conflict, which has tended to mean an advantage for Russia: they've ever-so-slowly been claimed more of Ukraine—grabbing just over 400 square miles of territory over the course of the past twelve months, including a few dozens cities and towns along those well-entrenched emplacements.
What I'd like to talk about today is a recent move by Ukraine that has seemingly surprised just about everyone, and which, depending on who you ask, is the desperate act of a flailing military, or an inspired bit of asymmetrical warfare that could help turn the tides in their favor.
—
Part of why many well-informed analysts assumed Russia's invasion of Ukraine would be a quick thing, several days-long, maybe a week or two at most, is that Russia's military is big and backed by the largest arsenal of nukes in the world. Russia's economy is also decently large, even if it is significantly dependent on fossil fuel and mineral wealth.
So Russia's military should be capable of stomping in to a smaller country's territory, especially a neighboring country, and then killing and threatening everyone into submission, and menacing them with nukes if they do anything threatening in return.
That's the ostensible promise of a nuclear arsenal: you have the whammy on everyone else if they do anything that really scares you or threatens you, no matter what you do to them, first.
That expectation didn't pan out, but the threat of nukes has hovered over this conflict from day one, and Russia's government has happily reinforced the sense that if Ukraine does anything to threaten them in return, even as they invade and gobble up Ukraine's territory, killing and kidnapping their people, Russia might use nukes, because why wouldn't they?
And they've often signaled this by saying, basically, that if the Fatherland is threatened, if anyone menaces Russia in return, that could serve as a spark that turns this invasion into a nuclear conflict.
This threat has ensured Russia's invasion of Ukraine, thus far, has been a fairly one-sided undertaking in which Russia can do basically anything they want, stomping all around Ukraine and launching endless drones and missiles at their densely populated cities, but Ukraine is not allowed to do anything like that to Russia in return.
And this nuclear threat has been taken seriously enough by Ukraine's allies that they've said, from the get-go, we'll give you money and weapons, but you have to promise not to use them on targets within Russia, because we don't want to kick off a nuclear war, or even a broader conflict between nuclear-armed nations, if Russia were to consider attacks by Ukrainians wielding American weapons against Russian civilian targets to be an attack by the US—which was always a theoretical possibility that, again, Russia was happy to reinforce.
As a result, some of the weapons provided to Ukraine by its allies were artificially limited, including the 20 HIMARS long-range rocket systems the US supplied back in late-2022, which were altered before being sent so they couldn't be used against targets within Russia territory.
The US and other allies have also been incredibly hesitant to provide Ukraine weapons with greater range, like ATMS, Army Tactical Missile System rockets, that can strike targets up to 186 miles away, and fighter jets that could be used to take out targets deep within Russian territory, if used correctly.
From the beginning, though, Ukrainian forces figured out ways to hit targets within Russia, generally using asymmetrical methods, like covert infiltrations and loose alliances with anti-government entities operating within Russia, rather than launching aerial or artillery strikes from within their own borders.
In 2022, they struck dozens of air bases, fuel depots, and similar targets across the border, though they almost always denied involvement, officially, due to fears that overtly launching such attacks could lead to significant reprisals, and could cause their allies to step back from supporting Ukraine over fears of an expanding conflict.
Several bits of manufacturing and shipping infrastructure in Russia were damaged or destroyed by Ukrainian missiles and drones in 2023, which were again, often denied, though a bit more overt than their earlier efforts, and military and civilian buildings in Russian towns along their shared borders were damaged by drones and saboteurs from the beginning of the invasion.
Artillery shelling has also incidentally or accidentally hit civilian targets across these borders, though almost all of these attacks, up until 2024, caused little damage and few deaths and injuries; they were more symbolically than practically important.
Beginning in early 2024, though, mostly drone attacks on Russia energy infrastructure seemed to impact Russia's economy, several important oil and gas terminals damaged to the point that they required a lot of time and investment to get them operational again, not to mention the further investment that would be required to protect these small, numerous, and important weak-points that Ukraine had shown a willingness to attack.
There were also a few drone attacks on major cities, like St. Petersburg, but these seemed to be mostly symbolic strikes, and were generally not claimed by Ukraine—they could have been false flag attacks, or launched by Ukraine's anti-Russian-government allies operating within Russia's borders, or attacks by ISIS or similar terrorist organizations—but whoever launched them, they seem to have caused more fear and consternation than actual, physical damage.
Causing fear, though, is still important in this conflict, because, as far as many Russian civilians have understood for years now, the war has been going fine, or fine enough, and they haven't felt they've had much to worry about, because although a lot of their people have been drafted and sent to the frontlines, the conflict itself hasn't really impacted them beyond some brands having disappeared from shelves due to international sanctions, and a general sense that the government has clamped down on several freedoms they previously enjoyed, using the invasion—which has been pitched internally as an effort to liberate Ukrainians from a tyrannical, Nazi government—as justification.
That's part of what makes a recent move by Ukraine's military so interesting.
On August 6, 2024, the Ukrainian military launched an attack across their border with Russia into the Kursk oblast, which is an administrative district of about a million people located in western Russia.
This assault included at least 1,000 troops, alongside armored personnel carriers and tanks, and they plowed more than 6 miles into Russian territory within two days, apparently wiping out local defensive positions without too much trouble.
They reportedly drove right past many defensive emplacements and came at the relatively few defenders from unexpected angles, behind rather than in front of them, and that allowed them to rapidly capture territory and prisoners.
As a result of this blitz into Kursk, more than 100,000 Russian citizens, closer to 200,000 by some estimates, have had to flee their homes, a state of emergency has been triggered in this and surrounding regions, and the Ukrainian military has captured just under 400 square miles, or around 1,000 square km of Russian territory—which is about what Russian forces have managed to capture of Ukraine over the whole of the past year. Within that held territory, they also hold 82 towns and villages, and they've captured an estimated 2,000 or so prisoners.
This rapid assault into Russian territory was unexpected, catching even Ukraine's allies by surprise, reportedly, and it struck an area that was apparently under-defended, which is part of why they were able to break through so easily, hundreds of Russian soldiers surrendering almost immediately, none of them having expected anything like this so far from what has become the front lines of the conflict all the way on the other side of the country.
In the weeks since this assault was launched, Ukrainian forces have taken out a couple of important bridges, which serves the double-purpose of making a counterattack by Russian forces more difficult, while also hobbling some of their supply lines that are fueling the Russian invasion of Ukraine further south and east.
The Ukrainian force that invaded Russia is relatively small, but because of the nature of this sort of thing, it's estimated that Russia will need something like 3 to 5-times as many soldiers as Ukraine has if they want to successfully dislodge them, which will likely mean having to pull troops and military hardware from the frontlines, or other spots along their border, which would leave those other spots less defended, in order to muster that kind of counterattack.
This spot is also reportedly somewhat protected from existing Russian artillery installations, and any attacks they launch against the occupying Ukrainian forces will be attacks against their own cities and towns—something that is arguably inevitable when you're invaded and trying to boot the invaders, but also not something that's super politically popular, because, again, as many as a few hundred thousand people have fled their homes, and if their own government bombs their homes and other infrastructure into smithereens in order to recapture it, that probably won't make all those people too happy, in addition to making them an additional burden in a way, suddenly needing more government support just to keep them fed, housed, and so on.
This is also tricky for Russia because, as I just mentioned, pulling troops from elsewhere will require weakening either some other border area, or their front lines in eastern Ukraine, meaning they either open themselves up to another incursion, or they slow the progress they're making with their own invasion, and that component of the conflict is currently going pretty well for them, so it's a tough sell, the idea of slowing that momentum in order to take back territory they didn't think was under any real threat, up till just now.
Of course, this assault also makes clear that other parts of Russia's extensive shared border with Ukraine might be under threat if they leave any gaps or weak spots, which will likely mean having to shuffle things around a bit, either way. Attacking and capturing this part of Kursk, then, would seem to be a means of forcing Russia into a two-front conflict, while also demonstrating parts of their territory they thought were well-fortified-enough possibly aren't, which could further distract their leaders and spread their forces out over a wider area.
The political aspect of this might prove to be important, too, as while Russia's economy has been doing pretty well, considering all the sanctions, because the government has been flooding the economy with war-time investment and dropping all kinds of regulations to keep businesses afloat and flourishing, authoritarian regimes are often bulwarked by certainty and the projection of strength, and anything that seems to weaken that supposed inevitability and invulnerability can lead to cracks in the facade that ultimately lead to the people up top no longer being up top.
That doesn't seem to be a major threat here at the moment, but if we're looking at the long-term, this could be one more dent in what's meant to be an impervious, pristine visage of power, which could over time lead to something more substantial, in terms of who's in charge in Russia.
All that said, most analysts seem to think this invasion of Kursk won't be terribly maintainable because it stretches Ukraine's supply lines in such a way that those who did the invading can be relatively easily cut off from the rest of their military, and because it forces Ukraine into a two-front conflict, as well, and while Russia can muddle through something like that, even if it would prefer not to, Ukraine will struggle to do the same because of the nature of their population and infrastructure at the moment.
Ukrainian forces are also already struggling on their eastern front, losing territory in small bits, but continuously, to Russian forces, and the grinding nature of the invasion has really taken a toll on those who have been fighting without a break for in some cases years at this point.
This successful and surprising move does seem to have served as a morale boost for Ukrainian troops, though, as this is the first time a rival military has taken and held Russian territory since WWII, marking a huge symbolic victory, and one that may keep Ukraine's allies optimistic as well, which is important, as many politicians in those allied countries have shown themselves to be more than willing to stop the ready flow of money and weapons into Ukraine any time it seems like the conflict might not be going their way, even momentarily.
Some reports have suggested that this assault might be part of a larger effort by Ukraine's leadership to prepare itself for what seems to be, to some at least, inevitable near-future peace talks, as holding this chunk of Russian land and all these prisoners would give Ukraine more leverage to get some of their land and prisoners back in such negotiations.
Others have suggested that the key purpose might have been to humiliate Russian President Putin, while also making everyday Russians feel the war the way everyday Ukrainians have, as that can help tip public opinion enough to, eventually, sway governmental action, even within authoritarian states like Russia.
If that's the case, Ukraine may well achieve the opposite, as while Putin has seemingly been slow to respond, focusing his public statements on the Russian military's continuing success in eastern Ukraine, he's reportedly, behind the scenes, plotting revenge, and telling his people to step back from back-room negotiations that have been focused on agreements related to not targeting energy infrastructure on either side; this is pretty speculative and there are a lot of anonymous sources on this narrative, so take it with a grain of salt, but there's a chance that Putin is playing down how bad this is for him and his forces in public, but is planning some kind of significant and devastating counterattack for sometime in the near-future, to deter future attacks on Russian soil.
Russian officials have described this attack as an escalation, which is exactly the language you would use if you were preparing your own escalation, so we maybe have that to watch out for in the coming weeks.
Simultaneous to all this, though, Russia is on the brink of capturing all of Donesk in eastern Ukraine, which it illegally annexed a little while back, but which Ukraine has partially held all this time—so we may see some kind of change to the conflict once that capture is completed, as it could prove to be a suitable moment, strategically, for Russia to walk back to the peace talks table, happy to take the land it says it owns, before stepping back from active conflict and arming itself for some later, potentially less-direct effort to claim the rest; another little green men attack, perhaps.
There's a chance that this attack will force Putin to make politically expedient, but militarily non-ideal decisions over the next few months, though.
It would arguably be smartest for the Russian military to keep at it in the east, claim what they need to claim and reinforce their holdings, there, before then going and addressing the Ukrainians in Kursk, but he may feel pressured to send forces to Kursk sooner rather than later, because of embarrassment if nothing else, but also possibly pressure from other Russian leaders, which would spread out his forces and the military's attention, while also slowing their advances in the east, which could in turn give Ukraine a chance to shore up some of their positions, and possibly even launch more small attacks into Russian territory, further complexifying the state of play and the number of emergencies the Russian military needs to address simultaneously.
Each of these attacks could be small and strategic, causing outsized damage and requiring an outsized response force: a bit like how irregular militaries, like Hamas and Hezbollah, use cheap rockets that they know will almost always be knocked out of the sky with countermeasures, but those rockets cost maybe ten thousands dollars, while the countermeasures cost ten or twenty times that.
Over time, you can deplete the enemy's reserves of money, hardware, and people by forcing them to commit a lot more than you do to a given area or attack; in this way, the outgunned and out-populated Ukrainian military could tie-up a lot of Russia's forces by making them worry about maintaining the bare-bones status quo back home.
There's also a chance, though, that Russia will play the long game, ignore opinion polls and protests by people who are forced to flee their homes, and wait to address these asymmetric incursions until later, at which point they'd be in a much stronger position within Ukraine, and that leaves them in a good spot to keep pushing forward, militarily, or to have peace talks that heavily favor them, even more than such talks would, today.
Show Notes
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3762042-us-secretly-modified-himars-for-ukraine-to-prevent-kyiv-from-shooting-long-range-missiles-into-russia/
https://www.wsj.com/world/behind-ukraines-russia-invasion-secrecy-speed-and-electronic-jamming-188fcc22
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-russia-looked-wrong-way-ukraine-invaded-2024-08-17/
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-lukashenko-says-nearly-third-army-sent-ukraine-border-belta-reports-2024-08-18/
https://www.news24.com/news24/world/news/most-likely-used-north-korean-ballistic-missiles-russia-strikes-with-for-the-third-time-ukraine-20240818
https://ca.news.yahoo.com/now-even-north-korea-weighed-103312164.html
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kursk-incursion-bridge-invasion-43d6579c82c24ffc5cfabd99d07c66db
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/17/world/europe/ukraine-russia-bridge.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/17/world/europe/ukraines-incursion-russian-conscripts.html
https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraines-raid-kursk-russia-shift-tactical-narrative/
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4829506-how-ukraines-surprise-offensive-into-russia-has-changed-the-war/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_2024_Kursk_Oblast_incursion
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/19/world/europe/ukraine-russia-zelensky-putin-ceasefire.html
https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/17/safety-at-ukraines-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-deteriorating-iaea-warns
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/18/vladimir-putin-kursk-crisis-reponse/
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-08-17/ukraine-military-incursion-into-russia-maps-satellite-images/104233912
https://www.barrons.com/news/russia-says-captured-another-village-near-ukraine-s-pokrovsk-6dc20994
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/18/world/europe/kursk-russia-ukraine-incursion.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/16/world/europe/russia-ukraine-pokrovsk-kursk.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_2024_Kursk_Oblast_incursion
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy0ngzg9754o
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/10/ukraine-braces-for-reprisals-as-russia-to-send-more-troops-to-kursk
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attacks_in_Russia_during_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2024
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-incursion-kursk-afa42b9613323901bef07800ac2cae9e
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Federation

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UK Riots
13 Aug· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about Taylor Swift, knife attacks, and immigration politics.
We also discuss immigration rationales, riffraff, and terrorist plots.
Recommended Book: AI 2041 by Kai-Fu Lee and Chen Qiufan
Transcript
American musician, singer, and songwriter Taylor Swift, at age 34, recently became the world's first music industry billionaire who's primary source of income is their music—as opposed to side-businesses, work, and royalties in adjacent or completely disconnected industries.
A lot of that wealth has stemmed from her incredibly successful, and ongoing—as of the day I'm recording this at least—Eras tour, which began in March of 2023 and which is her sixth tour, and by far the biggest in scope, scale, and success.
The Eras Tour, by itself, has surpassed a billion dollars in revenue—the first tour to ever hit that milestone—and it's had all sorts of interesting direct ramifications and repercussions, like bolstering Swift's music sales and streams, but also indirect ones, like creating a sort of economic weather system wherever these tour stops are planned: it's been estimated, for instance, that the Eras Tour contributed something like $4.3 billion to the GDP of the United States, and the WSJ dubbed these economic impacts "Taylornomics," as the combination of travel, food, entertainment, and other spending surrounding her tour dates, folks coming from all the around the world to visit the relevant cities, attend the concert, and spend on those sorts of things while in town, has all had a meaningful impact legible in even the huge-scale numbers of national income figures.
Swift, then, has been having quite the moment, following the several decades of work in this industry leading up to this tour.
And the swirl of activity—economic and cultural, especially—around her Eras Tour stops have made these events central to the collective consciousness, grabbing lots of airtime and watercooler talk wherever she shows up, because of how much of an event each of these stops are; and notably, they have been very well reviewed, in terms of the performance, the sets, the planning, everything—so it would seem that the attention being focused on these shows isn't superficial and reflexive, it's the result of having put together something pretty special for people who are willing to spend to attend that kind of event.
It maybe shouldn't come as a surprise, then, that there may be people out there looking to garner attention for themselves and their causes who see these events as an opportunity to do exactly that.
Three sold-out shows in Vienna, Austria were cancelled in early August due to a plot by what seems to have been several teenagers looking to kill as many people as possible outside the tour's local concert venue.
An investigation into this plot is ongoing, so there's still a fair bit we don't know, but what's been divulged so far is that three people have been connected to the plot and detained, the main suspect is a 19-year-old who planned to use knives and/or explosives to kill as many of the 30,000 or so onlookers who gather outside the show venues each night as possible—and another 65,000 people would have been inside the venue, so that's a lot of people, and a lot of potential for stampede-related injuries and deaths, alongside those that could be caused with knives and bombs—and that he, alongside two other suspects, a 17-year-old and an 18-year-old, was inspired by the Islamic State group and al-Qaida—the 18-year-old, who is an Iraqi citizen, apparently having pledged himself to the Islamic State.
Propaganda materials from both terrorist organizations were found at the 17-year-old's home, alongside bomb-making materials, and he was hired just a few days before being caught by a company that provides some type of service to the concert venue; specifics about what said company provides haven't been officially divulged yet, but the theory is that this job was meant to give him and his accomplices some kind of access, allowing them to do what they intended to do more effectively.
There were a lot of disappointed Swift fans in Vienna who in some cases spent thousands of dollars just getting and staying there for the concert, only to be told that it was cancelled; most of the response from those affected in this way seems to be relatively upbeat, though, considering the circumstances, pretty much everyone breathing a sigh of relief that this plot wasn't pulled off successfully, which could have resulted in something like what happened at Manchester Arena in 2017, when an Ariana Grande concert was attacked by an Islamic extremist with a bomb who killed 22 people and injured more than 1,000.
Swift's representatives have said that her next concert, scheduled for between August 15 and the 20th, are still on the books and ready to go, at London's Wembley Stadium, which will close-out the European leg of this record-setting tour.
London's mayor has said that local authorities are prepared for whatever might happen, having learned a lot from that aforementioned Ariana Grande concert in 2017.
What I'd like to talk about today is a bout of violent rioting that broke out in the UK recently, which is loosely connected to Swift and her music, though only adjacently, and is primarily focused on the roiling topic of immigration and its British discontents.
—
At the tail-end of July, 2024, there was a knife attack in Southport, a town in northwestern England, in which three young girls were killed and ten other people, eight of whom were also children, were injured—some very badly injured.
This attack targeted a Taylor Swift-themed yoga and dance workshop that catered to children ages 6 to 11, twenty-five of whom were in attendance—hence that large number of young victims. And the adults who tried to stop the attacker were all themselves injured, in some cases critically, and the assailant was only ultimately halted when a pair of police officers managed to subdue him.
The person behind this attack, and those murders, is a 17-year-old British citizen who was arrested at the scene, and whose identity was initially concealed from the public because of how privacy laws work in the UK, related to minors; they tend not to divulge identifying details when crimes are committed by people who are legally children, though in this case they ultimately decided to do so, for reasons I'll get into in a moment.
Thus far, there isn't a clear motive behind this attack—the attacker has been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and was apparently deep in the midst of some kind of self-imposed isolation leading up to his apparent decision to take a taxi to this workshop and kill a bunch of children.
He's been charged with possession of a bladed article, ten counts of attempted murder, and three counts of murder, and his trial date is currently set for the end of January in 2025.
This attack is currently not being treated as a terrorist incident, though again, no clear motive has been established, and there's a lot that's not known, and likely quite a bit that hasn't been publicly divulged yet.
This knife attack, unto itself, led to a lot of headlines and attention because of how just brutal and horrible it was.
But in the aftermath of the attack, possibly because the attacker wasn't named, again, because he was a minor, rumors and then outright misinformation began to spread around less-than-legitimate news entities in the UK, and across social media platforms and messaging apps like Telegram, many of them suggesting or directly alleging that the attacker was someone he was not—a false name was given to him by some of those spreading these rumors—and even in cases when a name wasn't misattributed or fabricated, he was alleged to be an immigrant seeking asylum—which is also incorrect; his parents are from Rwanda, but he was born in Cardiff, and is thus a British citizen.
Within days these rumors and this mis- and dis-information, this accidental and purposeful spreading of mistruths, began to reach a fever-pitch, the zone flooded with patently untrue claims and narratives, which is why the police decided to release the attacker's name publicly on August 1; it was going to happen within a week or so, anyway, because he was turning 18 on the 7th, so the idea was to get ahead of that impending forced divulgence, and to try to temper some of that false information spread within facets of British society in the meantime.
Most of the false stories, though, hung on, even after officials made this information public, and to understand why, it's important to understand what a political force anti-immigration sentiment has become in Britain over the past few decades.
The British aren't alone in this, of course: especially in wealthier countries, mostly but not exclusively conservative politicians and parties have been making hay with claims about folks from other countries coming into their territory, taking their jobs, gobbling up their social services, and changing their culture into something those who came before feel they no longer recognize.
Part of this is just the consequence of societies changing being reframed into something devilish and wrong, part of it is the reframing of stagnating economic conditions as something that's being done to their societies by outside forces, not by uncontrollable macro variables like pandemics, and controllable variables that are being mismanaged by those in power.
Part of it, though, is related to real-deal demographic shifts, as folks flee from repression, violence, economic deterioration, and dangerous climactic happenings in less-wealthy parts of the world to those that are currently not suffering from these things, or not to the same degree.
Thus, we see waves of people show up to the US's southern border, all hoping to get into the country, legally or otherwise, and the same is true of European nations with Mediterranean coasts, and, as is the case here, people arriving legally, by ship and plane and train into England, but also illegally, often in makeshift boats crossing the channel, the people who arrive in this way arrested and filtered into a system that often moves sluggishly and puts these new arrivals up in hotels or other housings for the duration of their processing at government expense.
From the perspective of someone in a smaller British town, then, where the economic conditions are not much better than those in a similarly sized town in a much poorer country—since London is the only city in Britain doing really well in that regard, right now—this looks like a bunch of people from elsewhere, who don't belong, taking resources that should go to them, should be spend on their housing and healthcare, should be making jobs for them, and the ones that are allowed to stay continue to take those resources, leaving a lot less to go around, again, in circumstances in which it already feels like there's not anywhere near enough—no chance for growth, few opportunities, and diminishing value in the social services they've been promised.
These are potent political topics, then, because in some cases these are real-deal issues already, and in others it can be useful and effective to stoke fears that this could happen in the future, if we allow these foreigners to keep flooding across our borders, legally or illegally.
In the UK, the Conservatives, the Tories, have used this issue as a very effective lever, and at the height of fervor about this topic, they seemingly accidentally led the country to a successful Brexit referendum in 2016, leading to the UK leaving the European Union, in large part because this would allow them to set their own immigration policies separate from those of the EU, which are much more open in terms of movement between member nations.
All of which, I think, helps explain what happened next, following that knife attack, and the torrent of false information that flooded the zone following the attack, which included all sorts of claims that the attacker was an illegal immigrant, that he was a Muslim, and that if nothing else, he was a black teenager who had brutally murdered several young, British girls.
On July 30, a crowd in Southport gathered outside a local mosque and started causing trouble and making threats. The police showed up to keep the peace, and the protestors attacked them, set fire to a police van, and damaged the mosque—in the process injuring more than 50 police officers and three police dogs.
This initial group of protestors was formed around a nucleus of people belonging to the English Defense League, which is a far-right, anti-Muslim organization, and members of Patriotic Alternative, which is a neo-Nazi group.
Similar protests that became riots popped up in cities across the country in subsequent days, and amidst all the resulting tumult, a police station was set on fire in Sunderland, and more mosques, alongside businesses and homes owned by people who were purported to be, often incorrectly, immigrants, were also damaged or destroyed.
Hotels housing asylum seekers were attacked, and something like 750 of these anti-immigration rioters have been arrested, thus far.
The nature of these riots changed on August 7, when a protest, populated by the same sorts of people as were seen at the other ones, mostly anti-immigrant, neo-Nazi, and far-right folks, was met by a group of anti-racist counter-protestors that dramatically outnumbered them. The police helped support the peaceful anti-racist protestors, and since that day, most of these would-be riots have been quelled by oversized groups of counter-protestors augmented by a police presence.
Before that tactic arose, though, several cities saw a handful of nights in a row of rioting by those far-right groups, many of them pillaging and burning shops, and attacking strangers and the police, and the government has gone out of its way to really throw the book at folks they've arrested, handing down significant punishments to some of the instigators of these riots, in particular, while also publishing their names and faces, in an attempt to embarrass and make examples of them.
As of the second week of August, we're still seeing periodic attacks on mosques and attempted protests and riots by far-right activists pop up here and there, though they're happening a lot less frequently than in previous weeks, and peaceful anti-fascist, anti-racist protests have become a lot more common, in response to attempted riots, but also unto themselves.
There are several ways of looking at what has happened here, in response to that attack, and in response to the riots that followed.
One narrative of all this is that far-right politicians and ideologues int the country have attempted to convert a truly horrible event into something it wasn't for the purpose of regaining some of the power they lost with the last round of parliamentary elections.
It's been alleged by the new British Prime Minister, Kier Starmer, that these riots were instigated by far-right troublemakers like Nigel Farage, who was one of the key proponents of Brexit, and who has recently reemerged in British politics as the leader of a vehemently anti-immigrant, further-right than the Conservatives party in the country.
Farage and similar anti-immigrant leaders flooded the informational zone with disinformation and nudge-nudge-wink-wink innuendo that implied this was one of the consequences of allowing immigrants into the UK, and that, according to Starmer and other government leaders, led to some of this violence and destruction—they've even hinted that it might be prudent to clamp down on those sorts of posts and false claims, because of the real-world consequences that can follow; though that hint has been met with skepticism and worry from free-speech advocates.
It's also been alleged that foreign agencies, like those in Russia, have been helping amplify these false claims, as part of their larger effort to sow discord and to augment the potency of reactionary groups in countries they want to influence, and folks who have aligned themselves with global conservative movements, like Tesla CEO Elon Musk, have been accused of doing the same, Musk himself sharing a lot of misinformation related to this attack and the riots that followed on the social network he bought, formerly Twitter, now X, clashing with the new Labour government on the network while saying that he believes a civil war is inevitable in the UK.
So we could look at all this through the political-leverage lens, as there's a lot of power to be gained by successfully attaching reins to this sort of movement, and amplifying trouble for those in power, if those in power are your political rivals.
We might also look at this through the lens of actual on-the-ground issues, though.
There was a piece in the Financial Times, recently, in which it was posited that how we perceive these riots, and the people sparking and perpetuating them, will tend to depend on whether we subscribe to the "rational actor" or "riffraff" models of riot interpretation.
The rational actor model says people who riot are doing what they do because of real-deal grievances that they can't seem to get addressed in any other way, while the riffraff model says rioters are basically low-lifes who have nothing better to do, and/or who like to mindlessly give in to the animalistic urge to belittle, attack, and maybe even kill those who seem different from them and theirs, and all they're looking for is an excuse to do so.
Most social scientists, today, support the rational actor model, suggesting that even people who lean toward violence will keep those behaviors tamped-down most of the time, and only allow them out at moments in which they feel like there's no other way to get themselves and their grievances heard and addressed; and that's true whether we're talking about people of color rioting because they feel like they're being unfairly and violently targeted by police, or when it's mostly white, British Christians who feel like they're being elbowed out of society by Muslim immigrants and various other people of color.
That folks like Farage might step in and try to ride this kind of wave, then, might ultimately be less important than identifying a pressure-valve that'll allow these sorts of grievances to be worked out and addressed in socially positive, legal ways.
Government healthcare infrastructure in many of these areas is stretched to the breaking point, social safety nets are unraveling, and years of Conservative-instigated austerity measures have left these and other social baselines way below where they were in recent memory—and the messaging from the Conservative Party has been that immigrants are to blame, not their good and logical and responsible monetary policies.
Starmer, as the head of the new Labour government, which won the last election in a landslide, booting the Conservatives from their perch for the first time in a long time, has the opportunity to address these issues, then, but it's likely he'll have to do so in such a way that the actual problems are addressed—providing better funding for these services, helping stimulate more economic activity so there are enough, and high-quality enough jobs for everyone, and ensuring there's enough immigration so that systems that rely on folks coming in from elsewhere (which is especially true of the nation's healthcare system and its construction industries) can function properly—while also addressing some of the seeming issues, like cracking down on illegal immigration; which probably isn't the core problem it's been promoted as by the Conservatives and those to their political right, but is an issue, and is something Starmer has said he will crack down on.
It currently seems like he might aim to grease the wheels of the immigration system, so that folks applying for citizenship are processed faster, which will mean fewer resources expended putting them up in the country while they're waiting to see if they can stay—which would possibly help free up government resources, while also representing a kinder model for those who are otherwise left in limbo for long periods of time.
Whether this can be framed and communicated correctly by the Labour government so that it appeals to those who are worried about immigration is an open question, though, as it's possible that anything other than a hardcore lockdown of the borders and a denial of new immigration requests—which would cause even more chaos in the country's healthcare and other immigration-related systems—might seem like non-solutions, even if they technically solve some of the underlying problems the rioters have been complaining about.
Show Notes
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Southport_stabbing
https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/30/uk/taylor-swift-southport-stabbing-reaction-gbr-intl/index.html
https://www.thetimes.com/article/e87b09fb-b8fe-408d-a961-c89e6ae0f098?shareToken=620a021a38d86ed3af11587c36a52afd
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y38gjp4ygo
https://apnews.com/article/britain-unrest-riot-southport-police-response-ec348340c7d223f0117ae8c62638dd6f
https://newrepublic.com/article/184691/day-riots-stopped-uk
https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-examines-foreign-states-role-sowing-discord-leading-riots-2024-08-05/
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp35w0kj2y4o
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/8/why-is-elon-musk-clashing-with-the-uk-government-over-far-right-riots
https://archive.ph/vKdeu
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyg7dzr8wko
https://www.newstatesman.com/comment/2024/08/is-cocaine-driving-the-british-riots
https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2024/august/this-time-it-s-worse
https://www.bristolpost.co.uk/news/bristol-news/amid-chaos-far-right-protests-9459421
https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/29/uk/northern-england-stabbing-intl/index.html
https://apnews.com/article/uk-southport-children-stabbed-dance-class-8a9c7d7ed01441ce96332cd3d1250e43
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_Kingdom_riots
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_Defence_League
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriotic_Alternative
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/southport-far-right-disinformation-russia-b2589041.html
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/article/2024/jul/30/misinformation-southport-attack-suspect-social-media-conspiracy-theories
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brexit
https://www.ft.com/content/a0a4fb08-40cc-4627-a58f-b3a8d2d0e009?accessToken=zwAGH1UwRNrgkdOgpPsIQMxGJ9Olj7Oo0tDgCQ.MEYCIQChxhfA2SBamOb_Y_c0vQwPJmzXo0fHfucpW2v_dBGr2gIhANMcXEtBzZqY7R0Z9RkAZMkEoGMSy5P49MRnprFYWvAH&sharetype=gift&token=75895b79-b6c8-4e1f-a3ab-dc4d87161131
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/taylor-swift-concert-terror-plot-austria-foiled-2-men-arrested-shows-w-rcna165591
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manchester_Arena_bombing
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taylor_Swift
https://www.investopedia.com/swiftonomics-definition-8601178
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impact_of_the_Eras_Tour
https://apnews.com/article/austria-taylor-swift-concerts-canceled-extremism-arrests-17b494f1a164b205128d7faeb607e731
https://www.billboard.com/music/music-news/taylor-swift-vienna-terror-plot-third-person-detained-1235750067/
https://apnews.com/article/austria-taylor-swift-concerts-canceled-extremism-arrests-feff9108d0a14d9941c4bc416c0eb05f

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Venezuelan 2024 Election
6 Aug· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about Chávez, Maduro, and Bolivarianism.
We also discuss authoritarianism, Potemkin elections, and the Venezuelan refugee crisis.
Recommended Book: Nuclear War by Annie Jacobsen
Transcript
Venezuela, a country with a population of about 30.5 million people, has lost something like 7 to 9 million people, depending on which numbers you use, to a refugee crisis that began about a decade ago, in 2014, and which has since become the largest ever in the Americas, and one of the top ten all-time biggest outflows of people from a region in recorded history—just under the outpouring of people from Bangladesh into mostly India, which I mentioned in last week's episode, during the country's war of independence from Pakistan, and just above the number of people who have fled Syria over the course of its now 13-year-long civil war.
That means Venezuela has lost around a quarter of its total population in the span of just ten years.
The spark that lit the fire of Venezuela's refugee crisis wasn't a civil war, but a political movement called the Bolivarian Revolution, which is named after Simón Bolívar, who is renowned and respected throughout the region for leading the area's independence movement against Spain.
This revolution was kicked-off by a soldier-turned-polician named Hugo Chávez who has long worked to implement what he calls Bolivarianism across the Americas, which calls for a nationalistic, socialistic state of affairs in which hispanic governments would work together, these governments would own most vital aspects of industry and the economy, according to a social model, it calls for self-sufficiency driven by that state-owned nature—the government reining in the purported excesses of capitalism-oriented competition, basically, and it calls for the elimination of corruption and the expulsion and exclusion of what it calls colonialist forces, alongside the equitable distribution of resources to the people.
It's a riff on other socialist and communist models that have been tried, basically, with a South American twist, but it has many of the same implications for day-to-day realities, including the supposition that everything is owned and run by The People, though generally what that means in practice is a pseudo- or full-on police state, meant to keep those outside, enemy forces—which are blamed for anything that goes wrong—from meddling in local affairs, and it also tends to mean a lot of self-enrichment at the top, those in charge of the police state apparatus, and all the state-owned businesses giving a lot of handouts to their friends and family, and generally becoming quite wealthy while the rest of the population becomes increasingly disempowered and impoverished.
This isn't the way these sorts of models necessarily have to go, of course, and it's not the way they're meant to go according to their own ideals and tenets, but historically this combination of claimed goals seems to lead in that direction, and in Venezuela's case we've seen that same trend play out once more, the Bolivarian Revolution putting Chávez at the top of a system predicated largely on oil wealth, which allowed Chávez to reinforce his hold on power, the reinforcement including the jailing, threatening, and harassing of political opponents, and keeping the main opposition party mostly out of power, despite their widespread popularity.
In 2013, Chávez's Vice President, Nicolás Maduro, stepped into the role of acting president when Chávez had to step aside due to cancer complications. He then won an election that was triggered by Chávez's death by less than 1.5% of the vote, though his opponent claims there were irregularities. The National Election Council carried out an investigation and said that the vote was legit, and Maduro became president later that year.
The seeming illegitimacy of that election, though, remains a huge point of contention between the political forces in Venezuela, and in the years since, the government has engaged in what's often euphemistically called "democratic backsliding," which means those in charge are implementing increasingly authoritarian policies in order to maintain control and keep themselves at the top, at the expense of democratic norms and values, like fair and free elections.
All of which has been bad for morale and for locals' sense of power within their own governmental system, but this has all been maintainable to a certain degree because Venezuela is sitting on the world's largest known oil reserves, and has thus able to just keep pumping oil, and expanding their own pumping capabilities, and that has allowed them to fail across a lot of other metrics of success, but still keep things afloat, the average person doing just well enough that they had something to lose if they stepped too far out of line—challenging the government in some way, for instance.
This increasing mono-focus on oil and similar raw materials, like gold, though, became a huge issue when a series of what are generally considered to be hamfisted policy decisions—including abundant and generous fuel subsidies for citizens and local businesses—that left them with wild levels of inflation that led to an intentional devaluation of the country's currency, as part of an effort to address that inflation, but which ultimately just ended up making things worse.
The government also took out a bunch of debt to help increase their oil-pumping capacity, and that combination of debt, a weak currency, and a local economy that had done away with basically everything else except oil left them without everyday fundamentals, including food, alongside issues like burgeoning disease rates, child mortality rates, high levels of crime and corruption, and a whole lot of violence, politically motivated and otherwise.
As of mid-2024, nearly 82% of Venezuela's population lives in poverty, and 53% of the population lives in extreme poverty, unable to afford enough food, and slowly starving to death.
Maduro seems to have won another election in 2018, though that vote is even more widely considered to be a farce than the one in 2013, and though outside governments like the US supported the ascension of opposition candidate Juan Guaidó, who seems to have actually won, that support didn't lead to any real change within Venezuela—though it did lead to more sanctions by the US and its allies against the Venezuelan government and many higher-ups within that government, of which there were already quite a few, and the weight of these sanctions on their oil industry in particular have made it very difficult to Venezuela to openly sell their oil on the international market at full price, which has further deteriorated their economic situation.
There was some hubbub within the Trump administration in 2020 that a military option, like a full-on naval blockade, to keep under-the-table oil deals that dodge US sanctions from occurring, might be on the table, as Maduro was proving resilient to other, less forceful attempts to dethrone him, like the aforementioned sanctions.
But nothing came of that, and a few years later the Biden administration offered to ease sanctions on Maduro's government, and to begin the process of normalizing relations between the two countries, if Maduro agreed to have a fair and free election, letting Venezuelans decide whether to keep him or not, but in an actual election, not rigged election, this time.
What I'd like to talk about today is how that election played out, and the local and international response to its results.
—
Some of that promised loosening of sanctions began well before the election, which took place at the tail-end of July 2024—and that allowed Venezuela to reap some profits from selling oil, gas, and gold that would have otherwise been tricky to get onto the global market.
But while Maduro made a few gestures at allowing things to be free and fair, and released some political prisoners, as demanded, he figured out a way to justify keeping his main opposition, a woman named María Corina Machado, who has been incredibly popular with Venezuelans, from being on the ballot. So she picked someone to basically serve as a stand-in for her and her party, a man named Edmundo González.
Official numbers released by the government indicate that Maduro won about 52% of the vote, and will thus remain in office.
According to data and analysis from outside watchdog groups, however, the voter numbers released by the government are highly suspect, the numbers giving every indication that they were falsified.
Evidence, including two-thirds of the tally sheets that the electronic voting machines printed out after polls closed on Election Day, provided by González's opposition alliance to some of those watchdog groups and to journalistic entities like the New York Times and Associated Press, suggest that Maduro probably only got something like 31% of the vote, while González, and through him, Machado and her party, received around 66%—a landslide victory, if those numbers are even close to accurate, and there's additional evidence that they are, as that's very similar to the results tallied by an independent exit poll on Election Day.
Despite that evidence, the Venezuelan election authority has confirmed Maduro's reelection, saying that González only garnered 43% of the vote, and the governments of Venezuela's allies, like Russia, China, and Iran, have also recognized the results as valid—though to be clear, China, Russia, and Iran are all renowned for their Potempkin elections that have all the trappings of a democratic act, but which are largely ceremonial and always predetermined to some degree, even if they claim to take the will of the people into account. So this is a group of governments that regularly run invalid elections who are vouching for the legitimacy, the apparent validity, of an election that keeps their preferred, authoritarian ally, in power. Do with that information what you will.
On the other side, we have a slew of mostly Western nations that have come out against the results, saying, with varying degrees of certitude, that there's abundant evidence these election results were faked, and that González is the actual winner.
The US government is included on that list, and many of Venezuela's neighbors—some of whom have recently publicly spoken about their concerns related to Maduro's belligerence in the region, and seeming intention of rigging the vote in his favor—like Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, they've said they want the Venezuelan government to release the full details of the vote, so everyone can see and analyze the totality of data the government is supposedly working from.
Some of Maduro's allies and former allies, and some hardcore supporters of his predecessor, Chávez, have likewise told Maduro he needs to release the baseline voter data, to clear things up.
Maduro has said, instead, he'll have the country's Supreme Court audit the results, but this is being seen as a sidestep move by Maduro, as the court was recently packed with Maduro loyalists, and is therefore not capable of undertaking an independent review of the data—like other aspects of the country's government, the high court is basically in Maduro's pocket.
Maduro is also saying that the US and other long-time enemies of his government are trying to rig the election against him, and that he can't release detailed vote counts because the National Electoral Council is under attack, including cyberattacks, and they're not able to provide those numbers right now because of that aggression—though he's provided no evidence to support this supposed reason he can't make any of this information public.
So while it's still not 100% certain what has happened here, it's looking a lot like what happened in the last election, Maduro pulling out all the stops to muddle what information is being released, looking like he's playing ball whenever possible, but within a context in which he can make it look that way without facing any real risk of being challenged, and it would seem that he's leveraged the powers of state, once more, to lock in his position at the top for another six years, minimum.
In addition to those international governments and groups calling foul on his actions, we're seeing widespread protests against the government and these alleged results, and in a few cases these protests have become violent—the government supports groups of loyalists called colectivos, giving them weapons and telling them to go attack peaceful protestors, which can spark such violence, though formal police and military forces have also seemingly triggered pushback in some cases.
The government is accusing foreign nations like the US, and immigrant groups of causing this violence, saying these are special covert ops to make the government look bad and attack good loyal citizens basically—which is a common authoritarian move in such circumstances—and police and military forces have been rounding up protestors, and hunting them down afterward, arresting thousands of people for what they're calling anti-government or terrorist activities.
This has led to a situation in which there are still protests, and the opposition is still pushing hard against these supposed results, but many people involved have been pulling down their social media profiles and not posting photos or videos, because they're worried the government will send people to their homes to black-bag them and take them away, which is apparently happening around the country right now, to folks from the opposition party, but also everyday people who went to a rally or protest.
The question, now, is whether the outcome this time around will be any different than it was in 2013, and then again in 2018, when Maduro first stepped into power and when he retook power.
Something the opposition has this time, but which it didn't have in those previous elections is Maria Corina Machado—the candidate who was booted from the ballot and who had to select González to run in her stead.
Machado has become a public figure of almost religious significance in the country, and her star has arguably only gotten brighter the more Maduro has pushed back against her ability to participate in the formal processes of state.
She won 90% of the vote to become the head of the opposition coalition last October, and she's been in politics since 2004, when she promoted a referendum to recall then-President Chávez, and that effort earned her a conspiracy charge.
In later years, as she continued to hold various political roles, she was accused of corruption, disqualified from holding public office, accused of being involved in a plot to assassinate Maduro—all of these accusations seemingly false, and only applied to keep her from causing trouble, by the way—and then, after nearly a decade staying out of the spotlight, she became a candidate in that party primary that she won so handedly, which in turn led to her being banned from running for office for 15 years—all of which just seems to have further empowered her with everyday Venezuelans.
She seems to be a lot more popular and to hold a lot more sway than Guaidó, the candidate who was held up as the actual victor of the 2018 election, and treated as such by several other governments in subsequent years.
Die-hard fans of Machado also seem to have a bit more zeal than Guaidó's followers did, which could mean if the government acts against her or González, as they've threatened to do, and which both candidates seem to be daring the government to do, having shown up in public a few times despite those threats to lock them up or worse, since the election—if something like that happens, that could result in even bigger and potentially more destructive and violent protests, despite her calls for nonviolent opposition against what seems to have been a grave injustice.
The world has also changed quite a lot since 2018, and many of Venezuela's neighbors, even those that would have previously stayed carefully neutral in this election, have outright recognized González as the winner, including Uruguay, Argentina, and Peru, among others.
This changed world could also bring more support for Maduro, though, as their global allies, the Russias, Chinas, and Irans of the world, in particular, are busily building a collection of relationships with governments that oppose the de facto hegemony of the US and Europe, and that's manifesting in all sorts of ways, including providing resources, trade, and misinformation and military support to other fellow travelers who are holding the authoritarian line against pushback from their democratic and close-enough-to-democratic peer states.
There's a good chance there will be more tumult in neighboring nations as a result of all this—most immediately Colombia, as that's where the majority of Venezuelans who have left the country as part of that larger, decade-long exodus, have been going, and there's abundant indication that many people who held out, hoping this election would change something in the country and sticking around on that possibility, are planning to leave, now that Maduro has apparently managed to cling to power.
There's a chance this could trickle into other nations' politics, too, as many of those Venezuelan migrants who don't stay in Colombia end up heading north to US borders, and those borders have been at the center of the past several elections, and the new Democratic nominee for president this November, Kamala Harris, was tasked with handling border issues in the country at a truly tumultuous moment for the border. So a surge in new migrants could lead to more criticism of her on that front, as her performance in that role is generally considered to have been not great.
The Venezuelan military seems to be standing with Maduro, so far, which means it's unlikely the citizenry will have much of a chance of forcing the government to take them seriously and do anything about this seemingly rigged election, beyond protesting at such a scale and regularity that it messes with their ability to get anything else done, which could, at some point, nudge those in positions of power within the military to take the citizenry's side.
This is considered to be unlikely at this point, as Maduro has made sure to tie those leaders to him, giving them all sorts of monetary and business benefits, and arranging the country's military and intelligence apparatuses so that all the agencies and people running them are tasked with watching each other, as much as the other elements they're meant to defend against—again, a common authoritarian tactic, as this can help stave off the potential for coups, no one willing to risk losing their own power to oust the person up top.
The most likely outcome, based on how things have gone previously, at least, and how this has played out so far, is probably that this will remain a talking point internationally for a while, protests will continue to bubble up and be tamped-down, periodically becoming violent enough to warrant international news, but then in a handful of months, Maduro will have reinforced his position in power, still further, neighboring governments will be forced to reckon with his staying power and will figure out ways to deal with him, even if not happily, and the exodus of citizens from the country will continue as the economy continues to get worse in most ways, though perhaps bolstered a bit by support from the Russia/China/Iran alliance.
All of which will reshape the population and demographics of the region, while causing all sorts of economic ripples globally, as well.
Show Notes
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/28/world/americas/venezuela-election-results.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/29/world/americas/venezuela-election-takeaways.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/31/world/americas/venezuela-maduro-election-results.html
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd1d10453zno
https://www.wsj.com/articles/i-can-prove-maduro-got-trounced-venezuela-election-stolen-772d66a0
https://statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu/2024/07/31/suspicious-data-pattern-in-recent-venezuelan-election/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/trump-administration-announces-sanctions-targeting-venezuelas-oil-industry/2019/01/28/4f4470c2-233a-11e9-90cd-dedb0c92dc17_story.html
https://www.axios.com/2024/07/30/venezuela-election-biden-trump-response
https://theintercept.com/2024/08/02/venezuela-election-maduro-us-sanctions-democracy/
https://www.barrons.com/news/venezuela-election-body-ratifies-maduro-s-poll-win-official-39010070
https://archive.ph/izdLU
https://apnews.com/article/colombia-president-maduro-vote-count-venezuela-election-00d399b74300b6d1ed010bed9539a166
https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-08-05/venezuelas-political-crisis-enters-uncharted-territory.html
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10715
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_refugee_crises
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sim%C3%B3n_Bol%C3%ADvar
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolivarianism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolivarian_Revolution
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crisis_in_Venezuela
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Venezuelan_presidential_election
https://dialogue.earth/en/business/8768-fuel-subsidies-have-contributed-to-venezuela-s-economic-crisis/
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/venezuela-election-preview-1.7274864
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venezuela
https://archive.ph/20240726145913/https://www.r4v.info/en/refugeeandmigrants
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanctions_during_the_Venezuelan_crisis
https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-maduro-machado-biden-gonzalez-elections-protests-d6e70bd88ee9511298a4850c224a12e2

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Bangladesh Protests
30 Jul· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about student protests, curfews, and East Pakistan.
We also discuss Sheikh Hasina, Myanmar, and authoritarians.
Recommended Book: The Identity Trap by Yascha Mounk
Transcript
Bangladesh is a country of about 170 million people, those people living in an area a little smaller than the US state of Illinois, a hair over 57,000 square miles.
It shares a smallish southeastern border with Myanmar, and its entire southern border runs up against the Bay of Bengal, which is part of the Indian Ocean, but it's surrounded to the west, north, and most of its eastern border by India, which nearly entirely encompasses Bangladesh due to the nature of its historical formation.
Back in 1905, a previously somewhat sprawling administrative region called Bengal, which has a lot history of human occupation and development, and which for the past several hundred years leading up to that point had been colonized by various Europeans, was carved-out by the British as a separate province, newly designated Eastern Bengal and Assam, at the urging of local Muslim aristocrats who were playing ball with then-governing British leaders, the lot of them having worked together to make the region one of the most profitable in British India, boasting the highest gross domestic product, and the highest per-capita income on the subcontinent, at the time.
This division separated Bengal from its Hindu-dominated neighboring provinces, including nearby, and booming Calcutta, which was pissed at this development because it allowed the British to invest more directly and lavishly in an area that was already doing pretty well for itself, without risking some of that money overflowing into nearby, Hindu areas, like, for instance, Calcutta.
This division also allowed local Muslim leaders to attain more political power, in part because of all that investment, but also because it freed them up to form an array of political interest groups that, because of the nature of this provincial division, allowed them to focus on the needs of Muslim citizens, and to counter the influence of remaining local Hindu landowners, and other such folks who have previously wielded an outsized portion of that power; these leaders were redistributing power in the region to Muslims over Hindus, basically, in contrast to how things worked, previously.
In 1935, the British government promised to grant the Bengalese government limited provincial autonomy as part of a larger effort to set the subcontinent out on its own path, leading up to the grand decolonization effort that European nations would undergo following WWII, and though there was a significant effort to make Bengal its own country in 1946, post-war and just before the partition of British India, that effort proved futile, and those in charge of doing the carving-up instead divided the country into areas that are basically aligned with modern day India and modern day Pakistan, but two-thirds of Bengal were given to Pakistan, while one-third was given to India.
This meant that a portion of Pakistan, the most populous portion, though with a smaller land area, was separated from the remainder of the country by Indian territory, and the logic of dividing things in this way was that the British wanted to basically delineate Hindu areas from Muslim areas, and while large, spread-out groups of Muslims lived roughly within the borders of modern day Pakistan, a large, more densely crowded group of Muslims lived in Bengal, hence the otherwise nonsensical-seeming decision to break a country up into two pieces in this way.
Frictions developed between mainland Pakistan and the portion of Pakistan, formally Bengal, that was initially called East Bengal, and then renamed East Pakistan in 1955, almost immediately.
There was a movement to get the Bengali language officially recognized as a state language, alongside Urdu, which was promoted as the exclusive federal language of Pakistan, early on, and a list of six demands were presented to the Pakistani government by East Pakistan-based politicians, all of which aimed to get the region equal representation in what they felt was a West Pakistan-biased system, despite the fact that, again, East Pakistan, formally Bengal, was the most populous part of the country, and they had the most thriving economy, as well, bringing in most of the country's income.
These demands led to what's become known as the Six Points Movement, which in turn, just a few years later, kicked off the Bangladesh War of Independence, which was exactly what it sounds like: an effort by folks in East Pakistan to achieve independence from the larger government of Pakistan, which had in recent years been taken over by a military junta which, like the previous government, didn't give as much political power to Easy Pakistanis.
That junta, in late March of 1971, launched a military operation called Operation Searchlight that was meant to take out separatists in East Pakistan—but in practice this meant they swooped in and started targeting academics, members of the local intelligentsia, and people of Hindu faith, alongside members of the rabble-rousing groups that were petitioning for more power in this smaller-by-landmass, but larger by population and income, segment of the country.
Operation Searchlight sparked the aforementioned Bangladesh War of Independence, and nine months later, the military government's efforts during this conflict were deemed to be genocidal because of how they targeted ethnic Bengalis, killing somewhere between 300,000 and 3 million of them, while also intentionally and systematically raping hundreds of thousands of Bengali women, the soldiers who committed these acts doing so with the formal go-ahead from their government—they were told to do so, basically.
These atrocities eventually pulled India into the conflict, in part because millions of Bengalis were fleeing across their border to escape the genocide, and in part because the genocide was occurring, to begin with, and that sparked the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, which eventually led to an end to that genocide when Pakistan's government surrendered at the tail-end of 1971.
That victory led to, formerly Bengal, then East Pakistan, now Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan. It also concretized India's military dominance in the region, and Pakistan, what remained of it, lost more than half its population, much of its economic base, and suffered a long period of embarrassment that left it questioning the basis of its militant, braggadocios approach to both nationalism and foreign policy; it was previously a well-respected and feared military force, but it became a somewhat eyes-downcast entity in the region for a while, lots of reforms eventually helping it shore-up its economy, but remnants of this period still percolate in its internal politics and government operation, to this day, including its antagonism toward India, and its support of local jihadist groups, which the government uses as a counterbalance against India and other local power structures, which it can no longer face head-on.
What I'd like to talk about today is a swirl of new tumult in modern day Bangladesh, and what this moderate uproar might mean for the country's future.
—
Modern Bangladesh is surrounded by conflict.
Myanmar's military government is in the midst of a civil war, following the recent overthrow of its democratically elected civilian government, and the subsequent rise and loose collaboration between rebel groups in various parts of the country.
India is booming, and is broadly considered to be the next big power player on the world stage, though it's already a regional titan. It also continues to scuffle with Pakistan to its northwest, and with China along its shared borders, which are located just a short distance north of Bangladesh.
Bangladesh's coast, along the Bay of Bengal, has long underperformed economically, despite being surrounded by some of the most impactful producers of goods in the world, and this coastline, including the one occupied by Bangladesh, has become incredibly unpredictable in recent years: regularly flooding, entire villages being swept out to sea, and freshwater sources increasingly tainted by those incursions of salt water.
This area already has a lot going on, in other words, and many of those goings on seem primed for amplification in the coming years, as global power structures and economic tangles continue to flex and break and rearrange, and as the climate continues to behave in increasingly distressing ways; there's a political and military realignment happening in this part of the world, but geopolitics and global economics are also swirling and rearranging in all sorts of unpredictable ways.
All of which serves as context for a recent series of protests that arose around Bangladesh beginning in July of 2024.
These protests were held by mostly students who were not fans of a quota scheme that was originally implemented by the government in the wake of that 1971 war with Pakistan, this system abolished in 2018, but which was reimplemented by the country's High Court shortly before the protests began.
And this system basically promised that 30% of all government jobs would go to the descendants of people who fought in that war against Pakistan, for independence, alongside some jobs for minority groups, folks from traditionally underrepresented districts, and people who are disabled—though mostly it was meant to honor the descendants of those veterans.
The protesting students were pissed about this reimplementation because the country's economy isn't great at the moment, and unemployment is rife; the jobs that are available are not paying much, and are not terribly secure. About 18 million young people are currently unemployed in Bangladesh.
Government jobs, in contrast, tend to provide some level of consistency and predictability, pay relatively well, and tend to stick around—folks in such jobs aren't worried about being fired or their jobs disappearing, because of their very nature. So the best jobs, by that standard, are government jobs, and nearly a third of those jobs have been promised to people who, in many cases, just happened to be born to the right parents or grandparents; and notably, the majority of folks with families who fought in that conflict, are also supporters of the current, authoritarian Bangladeshi government—so part of the criticism here is that these quotas offer a means of giving cushy, reliable jobs to supporters of the current regime, without seeming like that's what they're doing.
These peaceful student protests were met with heavy resistance and violence by the government, which deployed police and soldiers who shot at protestors and shut down universities and the internet in the country, and that led to more protests, including by non-students, who were also met with at times deadly force.
About 150 people have been confirmed killed, so far, though that's the government's figure, and other, independent counts have tallied more than 200 dead. Hundreds of protestors were also arrested and curfews were implemented.
The Supreme Court responded to the initial protests by reducing the quota in late July, to the point that about 5% of government jobs would go to descendants of those veterans, which in practice meant about 93% of all government jobs would be divvied-out in a normal way, hiring people based on who's the best candidate.
Protests largely ceased after that announcement, and the government restored internet services 11 days after shutting it down across the country. Social media platforms like WhatsApp and TikTok remain restricted, however, as these services were used to promote and organize protests.
Curfews have also been relaxed somewhat, though police are reportedly sweeping through schools and cities, grabbing people who were recorded at protests, arresting thousands of them, including at least half a dozen students who led the initial protests that kicked everything off.
Protest leaders are now demanding that the remaining curfews be lifted, that those who were arrested are released, charges against them dropped, and that the leaders responsible for the heavy-handed response should resign.
Some protestors have also called for the country's Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, to step down, as she initially called the students traitors, though she later backtracked and said she didn't want them to be harmed.
Hasina is the longest-serving Prime Minister in Bangladeshi history, having initially stepped into the position in 1996, then stepping back into the role in 2009—she's held the office ever since.
She's generally considered to be an authoritarian, and has been accused of fixing elections, extrajudicial killings, and the imprisonment, or worse, of politicians and journalists who challenge her in any way.
She is, given all that, then, perhaps not surprisingly blaming these protests not on the students—not any longer, at least—but instead on opposition political parties who she says are attempting to challenge her rule, and thus, the wellbeing of the country as a whole.
Given that this is a relatively well-established authoritarian regime, there's a nonzero chance those who are in charge of these protests will take the win with the quota system, even though it wasn't fully removed, and step back from these other, more substantial demands that are unlikely to be met, short of perhaps a token resignation here and there by lower-run government officials who take the bullet for those higher up.
Outside demands for impartial investigations into who caused what are likewise unlikely to move forward, and the government has made it pretty clear it intends to double-down on the "it's the political opposition doing this to us, and you" narrative, which could help them justify further clamping-down on these groups, even to the point of more imprisonments and killings, but bare-minimum, in such a way that it makes dislodging the current ruling party even more difficult in the future.
It's possible that tumult elsewhere around the world, including in Bangladesh's own backyard, might encourage overreaction, not under reaction, from those in charge, as Myanmar's military government is having a lot of trouble with rebels, these days, and while it's not impossible that the prime minister will give in to more moderate demands, publicly apologizing for the violent response and firing some of her higher-level ministers, her government's history hints that things are more likely to tilt in the other direction, at least for the foreseeable future, and at least if the protestors fail to scale-up their operations to incorporate more of the country's population than they have, thus far.
At the moment, then, things have calmed a bit in terms of protests and government responses to those protests in Bangladesh. But there are elements to this story that have made things even more volatile than they already were, and because of how uncertain so many variables in the region are right now, there's a chance we'll see this, or connected movements and storylines, bubble back up at some point in the near-future.
Show Notes
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2024/bay-of-bengal-climate-change/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheikh_Hasina
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-protests-quelled-anger-discontent-remain-2024-07-26/
https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/26/bangladesh-student-protests-mass-movement-against-dictator
https://apnews.com/article/bangladesh-campus-violence-hasina-bc513b6d68cf5b94cfd898f3c7f153d2
https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/bangladesh-student-group-vows-to-resume-protests-if-demands-not-met/article68456310.ece
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/25/bangladesh-minister-defends-govt-response-to-protests-amid-calls-for-probe
https://www.aljazeera.com/program/newsfeed/2024/7/24/bangladeshs-deadly-protests-explained
https://www.britannica.com/topic/largest-U-S-state-by-area
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_war_of_1971

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July Surprises
23 Jul· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about assassination attempts, presidential drop-outs, and October Surprises.
We also discuss election narratives, the frictions of age, and brief attempts at unity messaging.
Recommended Book: The Day the World Stops Shopping by JB MacKinnon
Transcript
On October 7 of 2016, The Washington Post released a video from 2005 in which Presidential Candidate Donald Trump bragged about how you can get away with sexually assaulting women if you're famous.
That same day, Wikileaks released transcripts of three paid speeches given by Presidential Candidate Hillary Clinton to banking giant Goldman Sachs as part of a larger bundle of divulgences from the hacked personal Gmail account of her campaign chairman, John Podesta—these speeches were pretty controversial as they were very well paid—she earned $675,000 in speaking fees from Goldman for the appearances, and fellow Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders lambasted her for the apparent conflict of interest this payout implied.
Also on October 7, 2016, mere hours before that tape was released and those talks were leaked, Trump publicly claimed that the Central Park Five—a group of black men who were wrongly convicted of assault and rape in 1989, and who were later exonerated by DNA evidence and a confession from the actual perpetrator—Trump claimed they were guilty, which was a silly and to some, quite offensive thing to say, but it also seemed to gesture at the candidate's ignorance, at minimum, and according to some responses to this statement, at least, his possible racism, as well.
So October 7 of 2016 was a pretty big day in terms of political divulgences, and it's considered to be one of the most prominent modern aggregations of what are, in US politics, often called October Surprises.
The term October Surprise was coined by former President Ronald Reagan's campaign manager during the run-up to the 1980 presidential election in reference to fears that a last-minute deal negotiated by incumbent president, and Reagan's competitor in the race, Jimmy Carter, to get American hostages in Iran freed could net Carter enough votes to win re-election, despite many other variables operating against him.
News reports were abuzz over these negotiations, so the narrative leaning in the President's favor could tilt things against Reagan, and his campaign manager was thus concerned that this bit of news, which was outside of his control, part of a spiral of larger events, would drop like a bomb on his campaign maneuverings, upending everything and completely changing the nature of the race, if it were to happen.
That ended up not being the case, as Iran's leaders eventually notified their counterparts in the US that they wouldn't be releasing anyone until after the election, but this sort of last-minute narrative change-up had occurred in US elections before, including then-National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger saying, at a press conference, that he believed the Vietnam War would end soon, just twelve days before the 1972 election, which is thought to have helped Nixon win another term in office, and—also on October 7, but in 1964—one of then-President Johnson's top aides was arrested for engaging in homosexual acts with another man at a DC YMCA, which seemed likely to tip the scales against his campaign, as that was a big no-no at the time, but then, just a week later, hardliners in the Soviet Union booted Nikita Khrushchev from power, the Labour Party narrowly took over the UK government, and China conducted its first nuclear weapons test; all of which pushed that YMCA incident from the news and rebalanced the election in various ways.
These sorts of last-minute surprises—last-minute because US presidential elections occur in early November, and these things seem to land like clockwork sometime in October, give or take a week—abound throughout US history, and though they usually only have a small or moderate impact on the final vote, in some cases they've been so dramatic, surprising, or paradigm-shifting they've completely upended expectations and seemingly changed the course of history.
What I'd like to talk about today are two recent narrative change-ups in the ongoing US election, which will culminate with a vote this November, both of which have the potential to dramatically influence the outcome of the election, and who ultimately occupies the White House early next year.
—
It feels like I've been doing a lot of US-centric news lately, and though that's not intentional, and a trend I intend to defy in the coming weeks, there have been two potentially historic storylines playing out in US politics in recent weeks that I believe justify explanation and analysis; in part because they are so historic and unusual, and in part because they seem likely to define the narrative of the presidential race over the next 100 days or so between now and the November 5 vote.
Of course, I say that knowing full well I could end up eating crow, acting, today, as if these are defining moments, when in reality either more dramatic and seemingly historic stuff could happen in the next three months-ish, or they moments could be set aside and largely forgotten in mere weeks, voter attention refocused on other things, like the actual policies being proposed by the two major parties in this race.
There are good arguments for both eventualities, as the communication environment in which this election is playing out is novel in many ways, and the people involved and the things they stand for, and the larger global context in which they're operating, are also quite bizarre by historical standards.
So these two stories are, I think, important to understand, as they could shape the path the rest of the race takes, and the moves both Republicans and Democrats, up and down the ballot, make in the coming months, which in turn will influence happenings globally in all sorts of important ways.
But it could also be that life takes over, other stuff takes precedent, and folks mostly just vote along party lines as has tended to be increasingly the case these past handful of elections—we'll see how that goes.
In the meantime, though, let's talk about the apparent attempted assassination of former President and current Presidential Candidate Donald Trump, and the seeming deterioration of current President Joe Biden's mental and physical health, the resultant calls from within his own party for him to step aside and let someone else run in his stead, and the decision he announced just a few days ago to step aside and let his party select a new candidate.
On July 13 of this year, 2024, Trump was at a campaign tour stop in Butler, Pennsylvania, up on stage, presenting his speech, when a 20-year-old man named Thomas Crooks shot at him, firing eight rounds from an AR-15-style semi-automatic rifle from a rooftop about 400 feet, which is about 120 meters, away from the stage.
One of the bullets seemed to clip Trump's ear, and others hit members of the audience, one of whom was killed, and two others were critically wounded.
A Secret Service sniper killed Crooks right after he took those shots, and Trump was surrounded by Secret Service agents moments after he was hit, briefly emerging from their huddle to raise his fist and shout "fight, fight, fight," before being hustled away from the stage.
Some of the photos of the shooting and the aftermath quickly became famous, and a few of them are already considered to be historic, including several that show Trump, still bloody, pumping his fist, seemingly defiant and even victorious, from within the protective embrace of his Secret Service team, an American flag waving in the background—even commentators who don't like Trump have publicly said he looks pretty badass in these photos.
And that general sense of badassery has been played up by the Trump campaign since the shooting. The Republican National Convention was just days after that campaign stop, and several attendees wore fake ear bandages, mimicking the one worn by the former-President, and many political analysts went ahead and called the election for Trump, citing the significance of surviving an assassination attempt, especially during a race between two elderly men, both of whom have been struggling to demonstrate their youthful vigor and favorably contrast themselves to their opponent.
In the wake of the shooting, several big name donors committed money to Trump's campaign, including Tesla and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, and an array of Silicon Valley bigwigs, like the founders of Andreessen Horowitz, which is the most prominent venture capital firm in California.
This wave of new support, from big donors and small, allowed Trump to out-raise Biden for the month for the first time in this election cycle.
The campaign also signaled it may lean into a unity message, rather than what's become Trump's more combative, aggressive tact, which seemed likely to help him scoop up some on-the-fence voters, and possibly even some centrist Democrats who were increasingly concerned about Biden as the face of their party—though at the RNC event, Trump named further-right Ohio Senator, and author of bestselling book, Hillbilly Elegy, JD Vance as his VP, which is being seen as a doubling-down on aggression, not a balancing, moderating move, on Trump's part, and the scripted unity speech he gave, which used a lot of religious, "Jesus rising from the dead" language, alongside some gestures at the country coming together in the wake of violence, pretty quickly derailed into a somewhat rambling series of attacks against Trump's perceived enemies—so that approach, at least for the moment, is not being seen as a serious path for Trump and his team.
On the other side of the political fence, current President Biden has long faced calls to step down, mostly because of his advanced age and what that age portends: he's already 81 years old, and he'll be 82 in late November, shortly after the upcoming election.
People are living longer these days, and enjoying more of those years healthfully and productively, but Biden has had a speech impediment his entire life, which, as an older man, has at times made it seem like he's not as with-it as his fellow candidates—fairly or unfairly—and the frictions and scars of simply having lived a long, long time seem to be catching up with him, as well, and some fairly high-profile stumbles and mis-speakings, alongside caught-on-camera missteps and other signs of age and possible not-wellness, have amplified calls for him to step aside and allow someone younger to lead the Democrat's ticket in November.
These calls were a not insignificant component of his opponents' campaign in the 2020 election, but they ticked up several notches following what's generally considered to be a disastrous debate, for Biden, in late-June of this year.
The debate rules were in some ways stacked in Biden's favor, as there wouldn't be a studio audience for Trump to play off of, which is considered to be a strength of his debate style, and the candidates' microphones would be muted when it wasn't their turn to speak, which was meant to help temper Trump's tendency to go way over time, and speak over his opponent.
Despite those seeming advantages, though, from the moment he walked onto the debate stage, Biden looked and seemed...unwell. His face was kind of drooping, his eyes looked uncanny and surprised, his words seems to tumble over each other, not in his typical fashion, influenced by his speech impediment, but in a confused, rambling, at times disjointed and not-well-seeming way.
Even die-hard supporters of Biden began to question his ability to serve another term following that debate, and while most analysts pointed out that Trump's statements were riddled with lies, he did present those lies mostly intelligibly, while Biden, though mostly sticking to the truth, had trouble communicating much of anything, his delivery and overall visage suggesting that he's not okay, and if that's where he is now, where will he be in another several months, much less several years, if he were to take office for another four?
Those long-simmering concerns about his age surged into a full-on rolling boil from that point forward, and higher-ups in the Democratic Party started to call for Biden to step aside, some of them probably due to concerns about their own races, his unpopularity—which is ticking upward, according to recent polls—impacting their electoral outlook, and others because they worried about Trump being elected, not on his own strengths necessarily, but because Biden had become toxic due to his stumbles, and the general, and seemingly growing sense that he's just not up to the job anymore, because of the impacts of age.
As of the morning of Sunday, July 21, 39 Democratic congresspeople had overtly called for Biden to drop out, 23 had publicly expressed concerns about Biden, which is a lighter-weight way to say the same, basically, and 7 had said it's Biden's choice—though to be clear, Biden had said he's not dropping out, over and over again, so the folks who said it's his choice, following that clear declaration, seemed to be, in some cases at least, playing both sides, as they stating their support for him while leaving the door open for him to change his mind at some point in the future.
57 congresspeople, in contrast, were saying Biden should stay in the race, which is fewer than had said he should drop out, overtly or subtly; though a lot of people were apparently expressing concerns behind closed doors, and the wave of anonymous sources talking to reporters on the matter, telling stories about his various fumbles and their election-related worries, reinforced the supposition that there are more people hoping he steps back than not, including a lot of top-tier donors, it's just that many of them are concerned about their role within the party if they express those concerns publicly.
Then, in the early afternoon that same day, Biden's team released a statement from the President saying that he would be withdrawing from the 2024 election, followed shortly thereafter by a message indicating he was endorsing Vice President Kamala Harris to replace him.
Biden is apparently sick with COVID at the moment and is expected to speak on the matter sometime this week, once he's able to do so without coughing and rasping, but it's possible this news was released in this way, in writing rather than live and on camera, because it was just a truly difficult decision for someone who—according to his political career and bio, or the public-facing version of those things presented by his campaign, at least—tended to focus on sticking it out and persevering when faced with doubters, which in this case would have meant holding out and remaining the Democratic candidate, despite all the factors working against him.
This represents an historic shift in the election, though, as no US presidential candidate has ever dropped out this close to the vote, and he's the first to ever drop out after winning his party's primaries.
What happens now is thus up in the air, but the outline being shared by Democratic leaders as of the day I'm recording this seems to be that they'll hold some kind of lightning-fast election to see who replaces Biden on the ticket—possibly as part of an effort to avoid the mistake they made with Hillary Clinton, party higher-ups pushing too hard to favor one of their own who's turn it was, basically, over the candidates the voters actually wanted—though there's only about a month in which to figure out what that looks like, set it up, allow folks to decide to run and figure out campaign strategies, and then actually hold a vote; which is a lot, and that process could be chaotic, and it could result in fracturing within the Democratic Party, as folks might go negative against each other, despite guidelines telling them not to, and voters might not like it if their chosen person doesn't win, and they're then told to cast their lot in the actual presidential election with someone they voted against in this mini-, lightning-fast primary.
At the moment, current VP Harris seems to have the lion's share of her party's support: as of the day I'm recording this, 179 democratic leaders, out of 286 congresspeople and governors, have publicly endorsed her candidacy, alongside other big names in the party like the Clintons, and prominent former presidential candidates, like current transportation secretary Pete Buttigieg.
Right now, though, it's a big unknown who will ultimately take up the mantle of the Democratic party's presidential electee, and that makes things more difficult for the Democrats, because of those aforementioned potential issues with unity and clarity, but it also makes things trickier for the Trump campaign, as they can't be certain who they're running against, and some reports suggest the whole campaign has been optimized to compete against Biden, whereas now Trump is the oldest-ever presidential candidate for a major US political party, and many of the criticisms they were planning to level against Biden can be leveled against him, instead.
The assassination attempt on Trump is still a variable here, too, as it seems to have rallied Republicans around him in a big way, but whether or not that will translate to larger support beyond existing die-hards is a big question mark.
Important to note, too, is that while assassination attempts of presidents in the US are rare in modern history, thankfully, so we don't have tons of data as to how they influence election outcomes, the assumed consequence of this one, namely, supporting Trump's election bid, might not be the one we actually get.
The attempted killing of President Reagan in 1981 seems to have bumped his numbers about 8% in the months that followed, but earlier assassination attempts of former-President Teddy Roosevelt and George Wallace didn't win them their bids for the office, and the larger context of the election and would-be electee seem to matter more, statistically, than the attempt, itself, when it comes to polling changes.
Similarly, it may be that the Democrats are able to leverage Biden's decision to drop out, and the elevation of someone else from their party to the position of would-be president, could help drive a new, exciting narrative: that of a veteran statesman stepping down for the good of his party and the country, and new, younger blood taking up that mantle, fighting against another member of the old guard who himself would never consider stepping down.
It's also important to remember, though, as I mentioned earlier, that this is all happening months before the election, and there's a chance these won't be the most important and dramatic stories shaping the narrative by the time we reach November; these July surprises could be replaced by October surprises, which upend the table once more, leaving everything chaotic and confusing right before votes are cast.
So while these seem like very big deals right now, and they're dominating headlines, and will almost certainly be historically relevant, we may be in for a lot more planned and unplanned election-impacting divulgences and happenings in the months to come.
Show Notes
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-07-17/trump-shooting-3d-model-of-showground-rally-site/104104418
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/20/us/politics/trump-vance-michigan.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/20/us/politics/secret-service-trump-shooting.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/21/us/politics/trump-biden-fundraising.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/18/us/politics/elon-musk-trump.html
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/jul/17/co-founders-of-silicon-valley-venture-capital-firm-back-trump-presidential-bid
https://www.newyorker.com/science/medical-dispatch/doctors-are-increasingly-worried-about-biden
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/20/us/politics/trump-harris-strategy.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/21/us/politics/biden-harris-nomination.html
https://elections2024.thehill.com/projects/biden-drop-out/
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/joe-biden/steve-kornacki-biden-pressure-party-can-get-wrong-rcna162783
https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7982f2a0-42af-40a3-938e-8512c2ce8689_1338x755.png
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/democrats-are-gaming-post-biden-options-remains-insistent-remain-race-rcna162857
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/21/us/politics/biden-replace-harris.html
https://www.npr.org/2016/10/15/498085611/wikileaks-claims-to-release-hillary-clintons-goldman-sachs-transcripts
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/history-october-surprise-180960741/
https://theintercept.com/2016/10/07/excerpts-of-hillary-clintons-paid-speeches-to-goldman-sachs-finally-leaked/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October_surprise
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/07/22/us/biden-harris-trump-news-election

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The Great Green Wall
16 Jul· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about protectionist policy, solar panels, and rare earths.
We also discuss Chinese business investment, EVs, and extreme weather events.
Recommended Book: Meet Me By the Fountain by Alexandra Lange
Transcript
The Great Green Wall—the one in China, not the one meant to span the Sahel region, straddling the upper portion of Africa—is officially called the Three-North Shelter Forest Program, and was initially implemented by the Chinese government in 1978.
This program is scheduled to be completed sometime mid-century, around 2050, and its purpose is to keep the Gobi Desert, which spans the lower portion of Mongolia and part of China's northern border, from expanding, which is something large deserts otherwise tend to do through a collection of natural, but often human-amplified processes called aeolian desertification.
The Gobi currently gobbles up about 1,400 square miles, which is around 3,600 square km, of Chinese grassland every year, as dust storms that roll through the area blow away topsoil that allows grasses and other plants to survive. And those storms become more powerful as the climate shifts, and as more grassland is turned to desert, giving the winds more leeway, fewer things keeping them from blowing hard and scooping up more soil, and as the roots of the plants on the fringes of the desert dry up, which usually keep the soil in place, become newly exposed to these influences, withering, their roots holding things together less tight than before, the process continuing to move ever outward.
Around a quarter of China's total landmass is already desert, and while there are a number of other causes of the country's desertification, including coastal erosion and the incursion of salty water into otherwise freshwater areas, this type, aeolian desertification, is one that they can tackle somewhat directly, if still at great expense and with muddled levels of success.
So the Great Green Wall of China is meant to stop that desertification, it is a potential means of tackling this issue, and it does this by keeping those winds from blowing away the topsoil, and over time is meant to help reclaim areas that have been turned into desert by this collection of processes.
And those in charge of this program do this by basically planting a huge number of trees, creating sturdier root systems to keep soil from blowing away, blocking the winds, and over time, the trees are meant to help new ecosystems grow in areas that have been previously diminished; holding everything together, soil-wise, but also adding nutrients to the ground as their leaves fall; those natural processes slowly reestablishing new layers of productive soil.
The area they're attempting to swathe with newly planted trees is huge, and by that 2050 end date, it's anticipated that they'll need to plant something like 88 million acres of forests across a belt of land that's about 3,000 miles wide and nearly 900 miles deep in some areas.
Local governments that have been largely tasked with making all this happen in their jurisdictions have claimed some successes in this ambition over the years, though one of the biggest criticisms leveled against those same governments is that they often spend a lot of time and money planting large swathes of trees, stabilizing some areas for a time, but then they fail to maintain those forests, so they more or less disappear within just a few years.
This can actually leave some of the afflicted areas worse off than they would have otherwise been, as some of these trees are essentially invasive species, not optimized for the local conditions, and they consume more water than is available, gobbling up resources other plants need to spring up around them, and they thus blight the areas they're meant to enrich, killing off the smaller plantlife, not supporting and expanding it, and then they die because they're undernourished, themselves.
While China plants more trees than the rest of the world, combined, due to this and similar projects, then, the system underpinning all of this planting isn't typically optimized for long-term success, and it often succumbs to the needs of local politicians, not the desired outcomes of the program, overall.
Also, in the cases where the forests are sustained longer-term, they often to create monocultures that are more akin to plantations than forests, which makes them more susceptible to disease—like the one that killed more than a billion poplar trees that were planted in Northwestern China in 2000, leading to a 20-year-or-so setback in the program—and that also makes them faster-growing, but less effective as carbon sinks than slower-growth versions of the same; they get big faster, but they don't absorb and store as much CO2 as other trees options would.
The forests they've planted that have sustained for more than a few years have periodically served as giant carbon sinks, though, pulling down as much as 5% of the country's total industrial CO2 emissions from 1978 to 2017, which is a pretty big deal for a country with such a huge volume of such emissions.
That said, it's still an open question as to whether this Great Green Wall will do what it's meant to do, by 2050 or ever, as while the concept is solid by some estimations, its implementation has been uneven at best, and it seems to be plagued by short-term thinking and metrics of success that don't line up with the stated purpose of the program.
What I'd like to talk about today is the implementation of what's being called, in some economic circles at least, a new Great Green Wall, this one around China and its exports, especially renewable energy exports, by the US and its allies, at a moment in which those sorts of exports are both highly desirable, and arguably, highly necessary.
—
The International Energy Agency recently said it expects to see about $2 trillion-worth of clean energy investments, globally, in 2024 alone.
This spending is partly the consequence of the $13 billion in damage China sustained from natural disasters in January to June of this year, and the something like $37.9 billion in damages the US suffered from just the 15 most damaging storms it saw during the same period, not inclusive of all the other ones.
Nations around the world are paying out gobs of money in the aftermath of increasingly brutal weather disasters, and that's on top of the slower-moving devastation that's being caused by the impacts of the climate shifting, messing with everything from crops to water cycles to where people can afford to live, because insurance companies are wholesale pulling out of some areas, and the cost of rebuilding over and over again in the same, previously habitable areas, just isn't worth it any more.
While there's still some political and ideological opposition to the concept of climate change, then, even some of the folks who are vehemently against the concept, publicly, are privately investing huge sums of money in infrastructure meant to help them survive and thrive in a future in which the climate has changed, and that includes things like sea walls and buildings that are cooler, passively, allowing more airflow and reflecting sunlight rather than absorbing it, but we're also seeing surges of investment in renewable energy sources, as they don't further contribute to the issue of climate change, but also because they come with a slew of advantages over fossil fuel based versions of the same; hence, that $2 trillion clean energy spending in 2024, compared to the estimated $1 trillion for fossil fuel-based energy sources the same year.
In May of 2024, US President Biden announced a near-future wave of tariff increases on a slew of Chinese goods, especially those related to the renewable energy transition.
For those aforementioned reasons, alongside a bunch of economic ones, as renewables are cheaper over time than fossil fuels, it's expected by essentially everyone that the planet will largely shift to renewable energy sources this century, with many governments hoping to make the transition entirely or almost entirely by 2050, with some nations that are moving more slowly, because of issues related to existing infrastructure, population, or poverty, arriving sometime in the 2070s or 2080s.
Thus, whomever owns the industries that will be relevant in that future—electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, and so on—they will be something like the new oil giants of the latter-half of the century, and beyond, massively enriched because they're the ones that allow everyone to generate energy in this new reality.
Making those sorts of investments now, then, in terms of manufacturing capacity, but also the knowledge and trade secrets and brands and supply chains that get those products to the world, may yield incredible dividends for those willing to make them.
And at the moment, as of mid-2024, China is by far the king of the hill when it comes to pretty much every component of this transition, dominating the world's output of solar panels, EVs, wind turbine blades, batteries, and rare earth metals that are currently fundamental to the making of basically all of those things, while also owning some of the most valuable intellectual property, developing some of the most vital innovations, and controlling the most active, resilient, and competitive supply chains that make them available, globally.
The push by the Chinese government to own these spaces began in earnest in 2009, when it started providing subsidies to companies that were willing to invest in and start producing electric vehicles and accompanying technologies, and that successful effort has allowed the country to leapfrog other countries, like the US, which by some measures had a leading advantage up till that point because of other capacities and investments, and which has long served as the home bases of traditional car companies, and exciting new brands like Tesla and other startups that were beginning to gobble up global market share.
The Chinese government poured tens of billions of dollars into tax breaks and subsidies, though, and that helped stoke a highly competitive market that's led to the development of ultra-cheap electric vehicles, which are now outselling rivals in almost every market they've entered.
This effect is perhaps even more pronounced when we look at solar panels and batteries.
Chinese exports of these goods have easily outpaced and outcompeted rival producers overseas, and that's, combined with demand on the local, Chinese market, has pulled the price of solar panels from about $126 per watt in 1975 all the way down to about 26 cents per watt in 2022.
Over that period, these panels have become more efficient and effective, more resilient, and more useful—reshapable to fit more use-cases.
And the concomitant drop in lithium-ion battery prices, down about 97% since 1991 due to similar economic variables, has made solar even more useful and in demand, as solar setups are usually, these days, connected to battery backup systems that allow the panels to capture sunlight during the day and to stockpile that energy for later, when the sun isn't shining, ameliorating one of the biggest and most common concerns about solar power at the individual home scale, but also at the utility, city-sized scale; that it's an intermittent source. Attaching a battery, though, makes it a consistent source of power, that's also incredibly, and increasingly, inexpensive compared to other options offering similar levels of power.
That's been a major contributor to the expansion of solar installations, and recent innovations in the development of alternative, non-lithium-based batteries could do the same, as some novel battery types, like sodium-ion batteries, use a similar setup as their lithium counterparts, but without the issues associated with mining lithium, and with a better power-to-weight ratio, much lower fire risk, and lower theoretical expense, and flow batteries, made from iron, salt, and water, which are a lot worse than lithium ion batteries in essentially every practical regard, are just silly cheap and incredibly resilient, and thus could be built and deployed essentially everywhere—into the walls of homes and other buildings, into driveways and roads, everywhere—providing widespread, low-grade energy backup to whole cities at a very low cost.
So all of these products are already in high demand, and that demand is just expected to grow as these things continue to get better and cheaper.
China owns the majority of the best companies in these spaces, and makes the best, cheapest versions of these products.
Biden's recently announced tariff increases are an example of what're called protectionist monetary policy, the idea being to make competing products from elsewhere, like China, more expensive, by requiring folks pay another 25-100% of the product's price in tariffs, which in practice can double the price of these goods, which in turn makes locally produced goods, or those produced in allied countries, like in Europe, more competitive, despite not actually being competitive 1-on-1, without these policies in place.
The argument for this type of policy is that while on some level it could be beneficial to have these high quality, cheap Chinese solar panels and batteries flooding into the US market in the short-term, as it would help companies shift to clean energy sources faster than would otherwise be possible, in the long-term it would allow China to own those spaces, killing off all US-based competition in these industries, which would make the US economy, and by association all US businesses and people, and the US government, reliant on China, and a constant flow of such goods.
That would mean China would have a permanent whammy on the US because if they ever wanted to invade Taiwan, for instance, and keep the US off their back, they could just say, hey, let us do what we want to do, or we'll stop sending you solar panels and batteries, and we'll stop providing support for the ones you already have, which would devastate the US, because that would be equivalent to what happened when OPEC stopped exporting oil to the US in the 1970s—it was brutal, and we've only become more reliant on cheap, abundant energy in the decades since.
And that's on top of concerns that China, if it owned all the infrastructure related to these technologies top to bottom, which they kind of do, they would also conceivably have all sorts of potential backdoors into the US electrical grid, giving them the ability to shut things down or cause other sorts of havoc in the event of a conflict.
So while these are kind of just theoretical concerns at the moment, the risks associated of becoming reliant on one country, and one run by an authoritarian government that isn't the biggest fan of the US and its allies, controlling all aspects of a nations energy capacity in that way are substantial enough that the US government seems to think it's worth taking a hit in the short-term to avoid that potential future.
This situation in which short-term loss is necessary to avoid long-term energy dominance by China is arguably a problem of the US and other wealthy governments' own making, as again, China started wholeheartedly investing in these technologies back in 2009, and the US and Europe and other entities that are trying to play catch up, now, didn't make the same bet at the same scale, and that's a big part of why they're so far behind, scrambling to figure out how to catch up, and how to avoid having all their own solar and battery and EV companies killed off in the meantime.
Some of these governments are doing what they can, now, to pick up the pace, Biden's Inflation Reduction Act and Infrastructure Act, for instance, shoring up these sorts of businesses and seeding potential next-step technologies—but again, these and similar efforts are more than a decade behind the same in China, and the Chinese government often entangles itself more directly with Chinese businesses than Western governments are conformable attempting with their own versions of the same, so Chinese businesses have that additional entanglemented-related leg-up, as well.
There's an argument to be made, then, that while these tariffs—in the US and otherwise—are almost certainly at least a little bit performative, for political purposes, and at least a little bit reactive, in the sense that they attempt to reframe Chinese superiority within these spaces as unfair, rather than the winnings associated with making different, and ultimately better bets than other governments back in the day, there's an argument to be made that this is one of the only ways to prevent Chinese companies from killing off all their foreign competition, locking themselves in as the makers of solar panels and wind turbines and battery backup systems and electric vehicles, and more or less owning that component of the future, which—because of how fundamental electricity is already, and how much more fundamental it's becoming as more nations segue away from fossil fuels as primary energy sources—means they have a slew of adjacent industries in an economic headlock, as well. Arguably the whole of every economy on the planet.
Attempts to label one side good and pure and the other a malicious economic actor may be just set dressing, then, and the real story is how one side managed to lock-in a true advantage for themselves, while their competitors are scrambling at the 11th hour to figure out a way to dilute that advantage, and maybe grab something of the same for themselves.
Biden's attempt, here, and similar policies elsewhere—especially Europe, but we're seeing some protectionist ideas flutter to the surface in other nations, as well, most of them aimed specifically at China—is meant to give competitors time to catch up. And many of them use a stick approach, increasing the price of these goods on foreign markets, while others are carrots, offering subsidies for locally made panels and EVs, for instance, but only if their key components are made in friendly countries; so Chinese-made vehicles don't benefit from those subsidies, but those manufactured elsewhere often do.
Some businesses in tariffed areas are bypassing, or attempting to bypass these concerns by making licensing deals with, for instance, Chinese battery giant CATL, which makes the world's best and cheapest batteries, and which US-based Ford and Tesla have been dealing with in ways that they all claim still work, legally, under the new policy system.
Other countries, like Brazil and Chile in South America, and Hungary and Germany in Europe, have been making deals to attract Chinese foreign direct investment within their borders, basically having Chinese companies build offshoots in their territory so they can benefit from the additional job creation and local know-how, and in both cases the idea is to dodge these policies, still benefitting from relationships with Chinese companies but in ways that allow them to avoid the worst of those sticks, even if they don't always benefit from the carrots.
China, for its part, has been investing in reinforcing its global supply chains against these sorts of tariffs for years, especially following former US President Trump's decision to begin disentangling the US and China when he was in office, which caught a lot of businesses and governments off guard at the time.
In the years since, Chinese officials have been moving things around so that many of their supply chains end in third countries before headed to US and European markets, giving them backdoor access to those markets without suffering the full impact of those amplified tariffs.
This is just a riff on an existing strategy, as China did the same with their solar panels back in the industry's relatively early days of the 2010s, rerouting their panels through Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam and Cambodia to avoid tariffs, which is part of why something like 80% of the US's solar panels still come from these countries, today: they're Chinese panels, in most of the ways that matter, but those buying and selling them can claim otherwise for tariff purposes.
Now, China is developing the capacity to build their EVs in Mexico, before then shipping them to tariff-defended countries around the world, including the US to the north, and Chinese-mined and refined rare earths, which are necessary components for batteries and other such technologies, are being mined in and diverted through a variety of different countries, their origins visible but still obfuscated for legal, tariff-related purposes.
The US and its allies are beginning to insist that other trade partners implement similar tariffs against China when it comes to these sorts of products, but results have been hit and miss on that front so far, and it could be that, even though this sort of trade war stance has been ongoing for nearly a decade at this point, policies related to these increasingly vital goods will be what finally fractures the global economy into rival collections of supply chains and viable markets, smaller countries forced to choose between dealing with the US and other Western nations on one hand, and China and its allies on the other.
Of course, again, intensifying weather events and the changing climate is stressing a lot of infrastructure and causing a lot of damage, globally, which is making the shift to renewables an increasingly pressing need.
At some point that need could strain or break existing relationships, depending on who ends up wielding the most leverage in this regard, and that in turn could contribute to the ongoing and substantial realignment we're seeing in the global world order that has determined how things work, economically and legally and militarily, for the better part of the past century.
Show Notes
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/solar-pv-prices
https://ourworldindata.org/battery-price-decline
https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/02/21/1068880/how-did-china-dominate-electric-cars-policy
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/us-trade-representative-katherine-tai-take-further-action-china-tariffs-after-releasing-statutory
https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/great-green-wall/
https://archive.ph/MxOTZ
https://www.trade.gov/commerce-initiates-antidumping-and-countervailing-duty-investigations-crystalline-silicon
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/natural-disasters-china-caused-13-bln-economic-loss-january-june-2024-07-12/
https://knowablemagazine.org/content/article/society/2023/abandon-idea-great-green-walls
https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-us-fusion-race-4452d3be
https://asiatimes.com/2024/07/chinas-subsidies-create-not-destroy-value/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/09/china-floods-climate-change/
https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/iea-expects-global-clean-energy-investment-hit-2-trillion-2024-2024-06-06/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Green_Wall_(China)
https://phys.org/news/2023-10-china-great-green-wall-boosts.html
https://earth.org/what-is-the-great-green-wall-in-china/

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Project 2025
9 Jul· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about the Heritage Foundation, Agenda 47, and the Democrats in turmoil
We also discuss Christian Nationalism, France’s surprising election outcome, and authoritarianism.
Recommended Book: Filterworld by Kyle Chayka
Transcript
The world is awash with interesting elections this year—there are a record number of people participating in democratic activities, from Indonesia to the EU's 27 governments—and we've just seen the UK's citizenry topple their long-governing Conservative Party in favor their Labour Party, while in France, the far-right party, which was previously relegated to the outskirts, has taken a huge number of parliamentary seats—not dominating the government as some had anticipated, but grabbing a convincing third place, after the first place far-left party, and the current government's second-place, none of which has a majority, which will likely make it difficult for anyone to get anything done in the country until some of these groups figure out a way to work together with each other, which isn't something they've had to do in recent history.
The US election, which arrives later this year, in November, is being especially closely watched by pretty much everyone, even those in far-flung, barely connected to the US, in a practical sense, portions of the world, because the stakes are very high—the US remains the most powerful nation on the planet according to most metrics, and it sets the tone for a lot of geopolitical happenings, as a consequence. It's also being watched because the visions of the two leading contenders, and their respective parties, couldn't be more different.
We've also seen a recent wave of pushback against current President Biden, who's 81 years old, currently, and who has been showcasing some of the consequences of age in a very public manner in recent weeks: perhaps most notably during a debate with his opponent, former President Trump, in late June.
Biden seemed visibly not well during that debate, stumbled and mumbled and lost his train of thought near-constantly, and this brought to the forefront a till-then simmering discontent with his advanced years, and all the potential ramifications of those advanced years, when it comes to running a country like the US, from supporters within his own party.
At the moment, as of the day I'm recording this at least, Biden is saying he'll remain the Democratic candidate and that those murmurings will die down, because that was just a bad night, and he's committed to regaining everyone's confidence.
But there are folks within his loyalty base, including those on the editorial board of the New York Times, and some of his most prominent campaign funders, who have called for him to step aside to make way for someone younger who can continue to carry the torch for the things he's done while in office.
It's time to allow someone like his VP, Kamala Harris, or possibly someone else from within the party, though Harris seems like the obvious choice for many reasons right now, to step in while there's still time to shift the narrative and get people used to the idea of someone else leading the ticket—that's the dominant argument right now, at least.
It's anyone's guess as to whether that'll happen—some prediction markets indicate the odds are something like 33-50% that the Dems will oust Biden somehow, or that he'll step aside willingly, but that would be a significant and historical decision, and it's likely that if it happens, up until the very last moment he'll continue to say he's running, because there would be no upside to doing otherwise.
Interestingly, though, while Biden-related drama has dominated a lot of headlines and airwaves in recent weeks, Trump has had his own, currently smaller, but possibly growing drama to deal with, this one related to a manifesto of sorts written by a collection of some of his most powerful and influential backers.
And that's what I'd like to talk about today: the Project 2025 plan, what's in it, and why Trump has been going out of his way to distance himself from it.
—
Donald Trump's official proposal package—the jumble of policy ideas most campaigns put together and publish as a sort of "here's what we believe and what we'd like to do" document that they can point while running for office—is called Agenda 47, and as tends to be the case with these sorts of documents it contains all sorts of ideas about all sorts of things, including but not limited to implementing universal tariffs on all imported foreign products while lowering taxes on all American people and businesses, cutting federal funding for any school or educational program that teaches Critical Race Theory, increasing the President's ability to fire whomever they want, and negotiating an end to Russia's invasion of Ukraine within the first 24 hours of Trump stepping into office.
Some of these policies were met with general, widespread favor, like implementing term limits on Congresspeople and keeping federal employees from taking jobs with the companies they regulated while working for the government, both of which could tamp down on various sorts of corruption and regulatory capture by business entities.
Others were met with general happiness with folks on the right side of the US political spectrum, like cutting federal expenses, killing off policies that allow gender affirming care, and labeling news entities that don't toe the political line, saying anything that goes against what Trump's people say, basically, as misinformation or disinformation.
Still other policies have been criticized even by some people on the right because they basically seem to serve Trump's desires, but don't necessarily align with the broader movement's ambitions—giving Trump the ability to investigate and potentially imprison his political enemies and folks in the press who say things he doesn't like, for instance.
Agenda 47 was getting a lot of promotion from Trump and his campaign up to the early months of 2023, when they were still releasing video clips of Trump talking about specific aspects of these policies, but following that last push, they seemed to step away from it, apparently deciding it was better to keep their specific policy ideas vague—as otherwise their opponents, and the press, could call them out on specifics, and in some cases because their own people wouldn't like something they were proposing, and keeping things fuzzy allowed them to talk around those ideas in the moment: it's much more difficult to criticize and critique if a campaign doesn't say anything concrete, and seems like they're willing to bend on just about everything they do say, depending on who they're talking to.
That pivot toward a blurrier vision of the future of the country seems to be part of why Trump's campaign has been trying to distance itself from another policy document—this one called Project 2025, and penned by folks working with the conservative think-tank, the Heritage Foundation.
Trump even went so far as to say, unprompted, that he didn't know anything about it, the former President posting on the Twitter-clone he partially owns, Truth Social, "I know nothing about Project 2025. I have no idea who is behind it. I disagree with some of the things they're saying and some of the things they're saying are absolutely ridiculous and abysmal. Anything they do, I wish them luck, but I have nothing to do with them."
This statement—as has been pointed out by numerous in-the-know political analysts—is riddled with let's call them fabrications.
More than 200 of Trump's former officials and current campaign employees and allies have worked on elements of Project 2025, and the Heritage Foundation, and many of the people who run or are otherwise aligned with it, are his biggest donors: he knows these people, hangs out with them, relies upon them for campaign funds and to rally his base, and many of his policies from when he was in office, including some of his statements and other specific details, were proposed and even written by folks at the Heritage Foundation.
So while there's a chance that Trump genuinely doesn't know anything about this document or the people who wrote it, that would imply he's either so far disconnected from his campaign and the administration he ran while in office that he can barely be said to have been in office at all, or he's so far gone mentally that he actually can't remember, in which case his state of mind would arguably be the bigger scandal here.
Assuming that he does know about this document and who's pushing it, though, it makes sense that he might want to distance himself from it, in part because of that aforementioned strategy of keeping things blurry enough that everything's deniable, and in part because of what it is: 900-plus pages of plans for installing what most independent analysts are calling some version of an authoritarian regime, or a Christian Nationalist kingdom, in the United States.
It proposes doing this rapidly, providing instructions for how Trump could whip into office following a 2024 election victory, and within 180 days or so basically restructure the whole of the government so that he would wield near-absolute power, do away with the systems of checks and balances that could prevent him from doing whatever he wants, and would thus be able to implement the Heritage Foundation's far-right, fundamentalist Christian-oriented plans.
The document doesn't mention Trump specifically, because the Heritage Foundation is technically a non-profit, and thus can't be directly, demonstrably involved in supporting one political party or another, lest it lose that tax-free status.
And in the eyes of the folks writing these policies—many of whom have been involved in past administrations, and who thus have a solid understanding of how the government works and how to get things done within that system, this isn't an instruction manual for an overthrow or gutting of the democratic system, it's a battle plan for good, Christian soldiers who want to see their country revert to its (in their minds) Christian roots, after generations of straying from path.
To most non-partisan, outside analysts though—folks who know what they're looking at with this sort of thing—Project 2025 amounts to a guide, specifically aimed at Trump and his people, for how they can enter the White House, post electoral victory, strip the system of any means it has of fighting him and his whims, and systematically wipe out all opposition, including those within the government, but also political opposition, journalists, and other outside entities that typically serve as a check on those in power.
And they've done this, seemingly at least, because they see Trump as their way into government.
Christian Nationalist political candidates, with rare exceptions, don't win many elections, and when they do, they're often successfully challenged in the next election. This approach to governance would allow them to bypass the democratic system and take control of the reins of government, and that, in turn, would allow them to work their version of fundamentalist Christianity into US federal law; to reshape law in their preferred image.
Again, this is a more than 900-page document, so there are a large number of policy proposals and plans, but they almost all orient around implementing fundamentalist Christian ideology as law, including banning all types and methods of abortion and contraception, criminalizing the production and consumption of pornography, removing protections for groups that have been traditionally discriminated against, including people of color and folks from the LGBTQ+ community, and removing the separation of church and state, making the US, formally and in a legally binding and enforceable way, a Christian nation.
These plans would allow Trump's administration to essentially get rid of the so-called "administrative state," do away with a slew of government bodies and agencies, including the Department of Education, while also allowing the Republican Party to take full, partisan control of the Department of Justice, the FBI, the FCC and FTC, and the Department of Commerce by firing everyone and replacing the whole of these agencies with people hired based on their ability to pass ideology and loyalty tests, and they would do away with the Department of Homeland Security and other bodies that have been keeping an eye on right-wing extremist militias and other groups that the Heritage Foundation considers to be freedom fighters, not terrorists.
They would use the military to round up undocumented immigrants, placing them in interment camps, while also having soldiers act as police, to keep folks from protesting as their plans are implemented, the government gutted and public servants replaced by people who are Trump and Heritage loyalists; those soldiers instructed to use violence to keep protests from arising and spreading.
The National Guard in red states, those that consistently vote Republican, would be deputized as immigration enforcement officers and deployed to blue states, those that consistently vote Democrat.
These policies advise doing away with renewable energy programs and projects, protecting the fossil fuel industry indefinitely, and incentivizing the production of more oil and gas and coal, while making the production of more wind, solar, and similar types of energy nearly impossible.
They want to restart nuclear weapons testing programs, build a lot more nukes, and only extend the US nuclear umbrella, which is the country's promise to basically use nukes to protect sovereign, allied nations from invasion and being nuked, to NATO countries, and to only respect the US's NATO responsibilities for NATO nations that spend at least 2% of their GDP on their military.
There are guidelines for how to privatize essentially everything, and for removing the government's power to influence or regulate the free market almost entirely. It would do away with most social programs, and taxes would be reformed to dramatically reduce those applied to businesses and wealthy people, while also reforming how congress works so that increasing taxes in any amount and for any reason is a lot more difficult, in the future, creating what they call a "wall of protection" for businesses and the wealthy to whom these reductions would apply.
Again, that's just a brief cross-section of what this document calls for, but I think it gets the general point across.
And the response to this document has been telling, as some sub-section of the country has been positively thrilled by it, considering most of its tenets to be obvious and wonderful, and seeing the blitzkrieg-like implementation of these policies, whipping into Washington DC alongside Trump, passing as many of these things as possible within mere weeks of his inauguration, to be one of the most beneficial things that could happen to the US—a country that they, almost universally, see as a failing, flailing state that has wandered too far to the left, been taken over by the secular and woke, and which has thus lost what made it great to begin with.
The opposite response is that of concern and even horror that something like this is being considered, and that it's being so brazenly and publicly proposed by some of the most politically powerful people in the country.
When Trump first came into office, he was seemingly unprepared for the task, and a significant portion of his time in the White House was spent just getting his government set up—something that by some estimates never really, fully happened.
And part of the idea here is that the Heritage Foundation is offering to do all that work for him, having handpicked and trained people for this task for years, giving him a pop-up government from day one, that would, in practice, make him something closer to a monarch than a President, and all he has to do is say yes, and allow them to implement their vision for America through his administration.
In doing so, in the tradeoff, he would be empowered to take revenge on the people he believes have wronged him: and there's apparently a list of such people—his former Chief Strategist Steve Bannon recently said, on a podcast, that the former President is "dead serious" about getting revenge on his enemies, especially political opponents and members of the media he feels have mistreated him.
Former US National Security Council Adviser under Trump, Kash Patel, on the same podcast episode where Bannon made that threat, said “We will go out and find the conspirators—not just in government, but in the media. Yes, we’re going to come after the people in the media who lied about American citizens, who helped Joe Biden rig presidential elections.”
It's worth mentioning here, too, that the leader of the Heritage Foundation, on Steve Bannon's podcast, the War Room, recently said that the Supreme Court's ruling on presidential immunity, which is broadly seen as favorable to Trump's position in the various court cases he faces, will reinforce a "second American Revolution," which he says will "remain bloodless, if the left allows it to be."
The unconcealed implication being that the right, under Trump's banner and with the support of Heritage and similar groups, is launching a revolution, intending to remake the American government in their image, and if the left, their political opponents, stand in their way at the ballot box, keeping them from doing this peacefully, physical violence may be necessary.
The ruling he was alluding to, which said the US president couldn't be prosecuted for things done while in office, while working on presidential things, would allow Trump, if he returns to office, to get away with just about anything, as long as he could say he was doing it as part of his job.
So the argument is that these Project 2025 plans could be implemented relatively easily, as long as Trump is willing to do a bunch of illegal stuff, which wouldn't be illegal because he would be president, and could systematically strip the government of its ability to fight back—its authoritarian immune system—all while enjoying that legal protection.
The degree to which this will matter, in the immediate future, at least, comes down to who wins at the ballot box in November, though there's a good chance Heritage will continue to push this agenda in the future, as well, either way.
Leading up to the election, Trump may successfully convince those who don't like these policies and the movement behind them that it's nothing to do with him, and that he'll be doing his own thing if and when he returns to office.
The heat may also stay on Biden, or whomever replaces him, if someone ultimately does, stepping in for him on the Democrat's ticket.
In that latter case, the Project 2025 people have said they will hold up the election and nomination process if Biden decides to step down, flooding the zone with lawsuits and other legal challenges in order to keep the Democrats from focusing on the election and the issues they'd like to keep at the forefront of the conversation. So there's a chance this group could influence the election from that angle, as well.
It's possible, of course, that Trump will genuinely push back against this group, rather than just seeming to, as Heritage, in many ways, would become a second power loci within the government, challenging his own power even as they position him as a figurehead for their activities.
They would reinforce his position, grant him new powers, and thus allow him to pursue whatever agenda he likes—include a revenge tour, if he so chooses—and that could prove to be too compelling to ignore, but he could also resent their support, realizing that they hold a lot of cards he doesn't hold, and that could keep him from fully embracing their vision and offerings, maybe giving them a little leeway, but otherwise doing his own thing.
Again, at the moment, Trump seems to be distancing himself from a group that's pitching broadly unpopular policies that the majority of the US electorate would not support, and there's a chance he'll continue to distance right up to the moment he has the presidency again, at which point he could allow Heritage to partially or fully move forward with their plans.
All of this is very new, though, and in addition to it not being clear that Heritage's theories on how to change the government would work, it's also not clear Project 2025 would be implementable, even most of it, without a majority in both the House and Senate.
So this could turn out to be an ambitious dream and nothing more than that if a lot of things don't go really well for the Republicans in November; but it could also end up sparking a huge, anti- small-d democratic movement, as well, if enough cards turn up their way, in the coming months.
Show Notes
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agenda_47
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_2025
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Heritage_Foundation
https://www.axios.com/2024/07/05/trump-project-2025-heritage-foundation
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/06/18/trump-has-unveiled-an-agenda-his-own-he-just-doesnt-mention-it-much/
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/21/magazine/heritage-foundation-kevin-roberts.html
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/donations-surged-groups-linked-conservative-project-2025-rcna125638
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/may/26/what-is-project-2025-trump
https://apnews.com/article/america-first-trump-biden-russia-ukraine-policy-54080728c6e549c8312c4d71150480ba
https://thehill.com/homenews/4344065-bannon-patel-trump-revenge-on-media/
https://newrepublic.com/post/182797/steve-bannon-exposes-trump-revenge-list
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/jul/05/donald-trump-project-2025
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/07/05/trump-project-2025-disavowal/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/07/03/heritage-foundation-trump-revolution/
https://www.snopes.com/news/2024/07/03/project-2025-trump-us-government/
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/09/19/project-2025-trump-reagan-00115811
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-seeks-disavow-project-2025-despite-ties-conservative-group-2024-07-05/
https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4757210-heritage-blowback-bloodless-revolution/
https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4753439-heritage-leader-second-american-revolution/
https://x.com/alaynatreene/status/1809250958251077983
https://thebulletin.org/2024/07/trump-has-a-strategic-plan-for-the-country-gearing-up-for-nuclear-war/
https://archive.ph/liWg9

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Chevron Deference
2 Jul· Let's Know Things
This week we talk about the APA, the Supreme Court, and Marbury v. Madison.
We also discuss the Chevron Doctrine, government agencies, and the administrative state.
Recommended Book: A City on Mars by Kelly and Zach Weinersmith
Transcript
The Supreme Court's 1803 Marbury v. Madison decision was pivotal to US legal theory and practice because it established the concept of judicial review, which essentially said that US courts could assess laws passed through the typical legislative system, through Congress, and, if they determined those laws were unconstitutional, strike them down.
This was a huge rewiring of the US government, as it gave a substantial amount of new power to the court system, and it provided a new check on the legislative system that recentered the Constitution as the source of all law; if the judges decided new laws didn't line up with that original Constitutional intent, according to their interpretation of said intent, the new laws would be a no-go.
This is true of statutes that declare policy, as well, which are generally part of the law-making process, and also help shape regulations, guidelines, and other things of that nature—the fuzzier stuff that goes on to effect things, even when some of those fuzzy statements and implications aren't formalized in law, yet.
So any and all of this stuff that Congress decides on could, at some point, be looked into by the US court system, and that system can say, nope, that doesn't line up with what's in the Constitution—it's not Constitutional—and that means the Constitution, following Marbury v. Madison, became a lot more of a legal reality in the country, rather than just a collection of principles and ideals, which is how some legislators and legal scholars thought of it before this ruling.
Within this same entwined governmental/legal system, Congress sometimes delegates policy decision-making powers to US agencies, allowing them to make legal decisions in cases where Congress passes a law that it is some way ambiguous—saying that there need to be emissions standards on cars, for instance, but leaving the task of coming up with those standards to the Environmental Protection Agency, the EPA.
This delegation ability was reinforced by a 1984 Supreme Court decision, Chevron v. The Natural Resources Defense Council, today usually referred to as "Chevron" or the "Chevron decision," the justices unanimously deciding against the DC judicial circuit's ability to set government policy, reminding those justices that judges are unelected officials and thus shouldn't be making law, and that when Congress isn't specific enough in their lawmaking, this can represent an implicit desire for the agencies in charge of implementing the relevant laws in the real world to figure out the specifics for themselves; after all, they would probably know better how to do so than a bunch of lawmakers who are not experts on the subject matter in question.
That case also limited the US court system's ability to review an agency's interpretation of the law, which in that specific case meant that judges shouldn't have the right to look into how US agencies decide to do things, willy-nilly, just because they don't like the outcome.
Instead, they have to adhere to what has become known as the Chevron Doctrine or Chevron Deference, which says, first, the judges have to decide if Congress was clear on the matter—and if so, they go with what Congress said, no questions asked. If Congress was unclear on something, though, then they have to decide if the agency in charge of executing Congress' decision has made reasonable and permissible decisions on that implementation; and if the answer is yes in both cases, the court must accept the agency's decision on the matter.
If not, though, then the court can step in and make some kind of judgement; but it's a fairly ponderous process to get to that point, because of this doctrine, and they will almost always defer to the decision made by the relevant agency, because of that 1980s-era court case.
The Chevron decision is generally considered to be one of the most formative in modern case-law because it empowered US agencies with all sorts of responsibilities and rights they wouldn't have otherwise enjoyed.
The Chevron case, itself, was predicated on a disagreement about the 1963 Clean Air Act, which failed to specifically define what "source" meant, in terms of emitted pollutants; Congress didn't specify. And this ambiguity led to a clarification in 1981, by then-President Reagan's EPA, that allowed companies to bypass the Act's procedures by building-out new, highly polluting components to their plants and factories, as long as they also modified other aspects of those plants and factories in such a way that emissions were reduced.
An environmentalist advocacy group challenged this new definition, which amounted to a loophole that allowed companies to get around otherwise sterner emissions rules, and that's how we got the Chevron court case.
What I'd like to talk about today is a recent, successful challenge to that Chevron ruling, and what it might mean for the powerful regulatory state that emerged in the US in the wake of that decision.
—
On June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court announced their decision in a case that was originally argued in January of the same year—Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, along with a companion case on a connected matter, Relentless Inc v. Department of Commerce—the Court's decision being that the Chevron deference, which says agencies can define fuzziness left in law by Congress, conflicts with the Administrative Procedure Act, or APA, which itself says the US court system has oversight powers when it comes to all agency actions.
The long and short of this decision—which was made along what are generally considered to be ideological lines within the court, the more conservative 6 justices ruling against the Chevron doctrine, the 3 more liberal justices ruling to keeping it—is that federal agencies will now have far less wiggle-room and legally backed authority when it comes to the laws and policies they enforce.
And while the court also said this doesn't immediately strip prior judgements of their impact and consequences, it does mean—according to most experts who have responded to and analyzed to this ruling, at least—that we're likely to see a wave of lawsuits against agencies that have done things or refined regulations in a way that individuals or companies didn't like, which could amount to the same thing within the next couple of years: many such regulations being done away with, those agencies becoming husks of their former selves because their capabilities will be pruned back significantly.
This is being seen as a victory by mostly conservative activists and lawmakers who are keen to see the regulatory components of the US government shrunk, their powers and funding depleted as a much as possible, doing away with what they sometimes derisively call the "administrative state," which they consider to be a limit on the free market and in some cases their own powers within politics and the economy.
And among many other regulations, thousands of them, by some estimates, this could impact the government's ability to regulate environmental pollution, safety measures for cars and airplanes, workers' rights and health considerations, and even somewhat more wonky things like net neutrality and the legality or illegality of very specific aspects of the e-cigarette and crypto industries.
For decades, these regulations have been to greater and lesser degrees interpreted—in their specifics, at least—by regulatory bodies like the FDA, the FCC, the EPA, and other such agencies. Congress has mapped out the broad strokes, leaving the details for the relevant agencies to sort out, because they knew this ruling would give those agencies the power to do so.
So those laws passed in this way by a Congress that knew this was how things worked, legally, will suddenly find themselves incredibly challengeable, the legal basis of their specifics now based on flimsy justifications that the court no longer supports.
These policies won't immediately disappear, then, but all of them, in their details and as a whole, are now more vulnerable to lawsuits from anyone who wants to bring them, and those who bring them will likely win, because the court system has taken away the protections those agency powers formerly leaned-upon.
Consequently, there are fresh concerns from folks working in environmental spaces, those attempting to incentivize the deployment of renewable energy infrastructure, and those who are trying to protect workers' rights, that they could soon be tied up in endless court cases, many aspects of the legal understanding they've worked in accordance with other the past four decades pulled out from under them—their capacity to enforce anything not spelled out in detail by congress, which is very little because congress has gotten used to leaving that to them, in many cases, dramatically reduced.
There are parallel concerns that standards that have made the US market relatively trustworthy, compared to other global marketplaces, at least, in terms of the safety of foods and medicines and all sorts of other products, might be diminished, leading to a bunch of new safety challenges, but also a demotion of American goods on the global market, because fewer sturdy regulations, at least in the short-term, could lead to more rip-offs and fakes, lower-quality items subbed in for higher-quality ones, and a bunch of risky, and even dangerous new products and services hitting the market, because these agencies are suddenly less empowered to check them out before approving them.
One of the larger concerns, especially amongst folks on the political left in the US, is the impact this could have on health care.
The Affordable Care Act, which provides reduced-cost insurance plans to folks who make less than a set amount of income, is enabled by a huge jumble of regulations that determine how things are paid for, who can and must participate—citizens and hospitals and pharmaceutical companies and so on—and how everything fits together, ensuring Medicare, Medicaid, and the ACA can continue to function, despite relying upon often arcane methods and cost overruns.
The US Treasury and IRS, too, rely heavily on regulatory powers to draft new rules and enforce the tax code, which allows for the management of money throughout government agencies and other bodies, but which also helps the government develop and deploy sticks and carrots throughout its portfolio of laws, acts, and policy-based nudges.
The deployment of clean energy tax credits and incentives to help push solar and wind power development, and to encourage the construction of chip-making facilities on US soil, for instance, are all reliant on the ability to divvy out those credits, to decide how big they should be, and to determine who should get them, based on what criteria.
The general outline of most of these programs is still on solid ground, because Congress decides that sort of thing, even today, but so many specific details and numbers and implementation strategies are left to agencies, and though it's possible to shore those up, Congress stepping in to vote on and pass new details into law, it will take time to do that, and especially in highly competitive spaces like chip-making, and arguably time-sensitive spaces like those related to healthcare and climate change, a gap in implementation and legality could be incredibly meaningful, and even devastating to some of these projects and their outcomes.
In addition to having grown accustomed to being able to leave those sorts of details to agencies, which has impacted how they make law, the US Congress, too, has become highly polarized and at times somewhat stagnant, moving sluggishly on controversial areas, in particular, one side or the other bogging down even debate about things they don't like, rather than working with the other side to find a middle-ground they can agree upon.
So while many lawmakers may want to move fast to fill in some of these gaps that have suddenly appeared across US law and capability, that desire may be held up by the reality of US politics at the moment, and systems that are often weighed-down by the people who operate them, and the systems meant to keep them ticking along, but which sometimes do the opposite.
One way of looking at all this—through the lens of those who generally support this decision—is that this ruling could force Congress to get more specific in its laws, and in the meantime it could reduce the amount of bloat that can accumulate within any regulatory system; some of the sluggishness in getting new products to market, building-out new infrastructure, and passing new laws could actually be reduced, streamlining processes that currently, arguably, take too long, cost too much, and provide little benefit, all because these agencies have developed too many hoops to jump through and piles of paperwork to fill out.
Another way of looking at it, from the perspective of those who generally decry this outcome, is that this will lead to a huge shock, bordering on chaos, throughout the US legal and governmental system, will do away with all sorts of government supports, leaving us with fewer protections and filters that help keep people safe, and which keep businesses from abusing their positions of power, and that it puts more power in the hands of judges, who—especially at the very top, within the Supreme Court, which made this decision—are usually put into their positions by whomever happens to be in power, occupying the presidency, when one of their predecessors retires or dies. Which is why there's such a huge 6 to 3 imbalance between conservative and liberal justices in the Supreme Court at the moment, that imbalance unlikely to go away any time soon, because those unelected positions are for life; though Republicans during the Trump administration also made it a priority to fill lower rungs of the justice system with ideological fellow travelers, so the justice system in the US, broadly, is more conservative than it has historically been, at this particular moment.
There's a chance, then, that this ruling could lead to a period of reduced regulatory bloat, which could help some industries and governments cruise forward with things they've long wanted to do, but have been unable to make progress on because of all the bureaucracy standing between them and their intended goals. There's also a chance this could shake the foundations of some of the agencies that have been essentially captured by the industries they're meant to regulate, messing with those relationships in a way that's arguably better for citizens and institutions, and worse for the businesses that lobbied their way into informal regulatory power over themselves.
On the other hand, it could also be that progress on much of anything will be almost impossible until these laws can be revisited and made more specific at the Congressional level, because there will be so many court challenges to everything, from all sides, that the US justice system will have a full dance card for years just sorting out the basics, and everyone will be too afraid to proceed with anything in the meantime, lest they make investments that ultimately turn out to be illegal.
Notably, the Supreme Court decision in this case did say that Congress could still delegate decision-making powers to federal agencies: they just have to specifically say that's what they're doing, rather than leaving things fuzzy and assuming that will be implied. So we may also see a brief period of relative chaos, followed by basically more of the same, everything going back to how it is today because Congress makes sure to include a line of text in every law they pass that specifies that delegatory intent.
One more major consideration here is that the court system, and especially the Supreme Court up at the top of the pecking order, is only so big, and already often moves at a relatively sluggish pace.
That means it could have trouble addressing all the little issues Congress fails to address, regulatorily, and that it will likely take the court system a while to weed through all the cases that are expected to pop up in the wake of this decision.
And that means we could see a somewhat slowed-down implementation of this new, anticipated reality—whichever version we get—which could also mean Congress, and the other facets of the government that will have to change the way they operate, has more time to get their ducks in a row, maybe reducing the impact of the shock the legal system is expected to experience over the next few years as a result of this decision.
Show Notes
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loper_Bright_Enterprises_v._Raimondo
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_Procedure_Act
https://apnews.com/article/supreme-court-chevron-regulations-environment-4ae73d5a79cabadff4da8f7e16669929
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/28/us/politics/chevron-deference-decision-meaning.html
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2024/06/28/supreme-court-chevron-environmental-rules/
https://thehill.com/homenews/ap/ap-health/ap-what-it-means-for-the-supreme-court-to-throw-out-chevron-decision-undercutting-federal-regulators/
https://www.axios.com/2024/06/28/supreme-court-chevron-doctrine-ruling
https://www.theverge.com/2024/6/28/24180118/supreme-court-chevron-deference-decision-opinion
https://www.theverge.com/24188365/chevron-scotus-net-neutrality-dmca-visa-fcc-ftc-epa
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/19/climate/supreme-court-climate-epa.html
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marbury_v._Madison
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevron_U.S.A.,_Inc._v._Natural_Resources_Defense_Council,_Inc.

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