Played
-
This week we take a look at engine issues at various stages of flight, what to look out for and how to handle these scenarios
-
In this episode Matt & Andy discuss UPRT. This is a new part of the regulatory recurrent syllabus so they thought it a relevant subject.
-
This week it's a listener request. Matt & Andy discuss the Ventilation system.
-
Fuel Leak
This week Matt and Andy go through the QRH procedure of a fuel leak and discuss some failure management tips.
There is information in the FCTM-AO-028 and of course the QRH-ABN-28
This week we also have an exclusive offer only available to A320 Podcast listeners:
Aviation Insider has given all our listeners a 10% discount on their A320 Question Bank. To take advantage of this great offer, click on the link below and enter the code a32010
https://www.aviationinsider.co.uk/product/a320-type-rating-question-bank/
-
This Week Matt & Andy look at Low Visibility Operations
All the figures and procedures in this week's episode are from EASA and Airbus' own SOP's so be sure to check your own company manual and procedure.
-
This week Matt & Andy look at the new (for some) Emergency Evacuation procedure. Remember that these procedures will still vary slightly from airline to airline so it's important to check your manuals to make sure you're doing them correctly.
-
This week Matt and Andy discuss the windshear detection systems on the A320
-
This week Matt is solo and talks about what a tailpipe fire is and how to deal with it.
As an easy summary - cut off the fuel source and then ventilate.
Do this by turning the engine master switch off and then engine mode selector to crank, man start on.
Check out your manuals for more information.
QRH ABN 70
FCTM NO-030 & AO-070
FCOM PRO-ABN-70
-
In this weeks episode we cover the last few items of our abnormal electrical system. These are AC ESS BUS FAULT, DC ESS BUSS FAULT, DC 1 and 2 BUS FAULT and the EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL CONFIG.
All the ECAM items can be found in the FCOM.
For the scenario of the week we want you to have a look at the Emer Elec Config pages in the QRH and think about how you will deal with it and what considerations you have to make before attempting an approach.
-
The electrics system can be split into two parts - AC and DC.
AC is generated by the two engine generators, an APU generator and ground power. DC is generated by the batteries.
Each part can also generate power for the other. The AC system can generate DC power using a TR and the DC system can generate AC power using a static inverter.
There's a great schematic diagram in the FCOM which helps simplify the system.
-
Matt & Andy carry on where they left off. Last week they talked about the 7 main factors affecting approach and landing accidents. As a reminder they covered,
SOPs Crew cooperation (CRM)In this episode they discuss,
Altimeter and altitude issues Descent and approach management Approach hazard awareness Readiness to go around Approach and landing techniques -
75 % of approach-and-landing incidents and accidents come under 5 categories:
• CFIT (which includes landing short of runway);
• Loss of control;
• Runway overrun;
• Runway excursion; and,
• Non-stabilized approaches.
They looked at the factors that often lead to these accidents. They broke them down into 7 different subjects,
SOPs
Crew cooperation (CRM)
Altimeter and altitude issues
Descent and approach management
Approach hazard awareness
Readiness to go around
Approach and landing techniques
Listen to episodes 15 & 21 for a refresher on the CRM topics discussed in this episode.
-
vionics Smoke - One smoke detector is fitted in the air extraction duct of the avionics ventilation system. When this detector senses smoke for longer than 5 seconds it signals the ECAM to display a warning,
A single chine sounds
The master caution lights on the glare shield light up
The ECAM displays a caution
The smoke light on the EMER ELEC PWR panel lights up,
And The blower and extract fault lights illuminate on the ventilation panel.
If the smoke is detected for longer than 5 minutes, the caution can be cleared but it remains latched and can be recalled.
When on the ground a dual Flight Warning Computer reset will unlatch the condition.
Each lavatory has a single smoke detector in each compartment and it is fitted in the extraction duct grille. When the detector finds smoke, it sends a signal to the CIDS which then transmits it to the FWC to produce an ECAM warning in the flight deck. The CIDS system generates an indication in the cabin to alert the crew.
In each waste bin there is an automatic fire extinguishing system, these operate automatically when triggered by heat. There are no controls or indications for these extinguishers. The only way to check if they have discharged is by looking at the bottle pressure gauge.
Cargo Compartments - Cavities in the cargo compartment ceiling panels each hold 2 smoke detectors. Each detector is linked to one of the 2 detection loops. The forward cargo compartment has one cavity and the aft cargo hold has 2 cavities. The CIDS receives signals from the detectors and transmits them to the ECAM which displays a warning in the cockpit. the CIDS system has dual channels.
Smoke in 1 cavity activates the cargo smoke warning if; Both smoke detectors detect it, or one smoke detector detects it and the other is inoperative.
If the aircraft is fitted with Cargo ventilation and the smoke warning is activated in either compartment the associated isolation lives automatically close and the extraction fan stops.
A fire extinguisher system protects the FWD and AFT cargo compartments. One fire bottle supplies 3 nozzles, one in the FWD compartment and 2 in the AFT compartment. The bottle has 2 discharge heads, one for each compartment. In essence this means 2 pipes leave the fire bottle, one to the FWD and AFT compartment. The pipe in the AFT then splits to discharge in 2 different areas while the pipe in the FWD compartment can only discharge in 1 area.
When the DISCHARGE pushbutton is pressed for either compartment that action ignites the corresponding squib on the fire bottle, which then discharges the agent into that compartment. If you fire the bottle in the AFT compartment and subsequently receive a warning for the FWD compartment the bottle will be empty. Only 1 compartment can be extinguished. When the bottle has discharged, the amber DISCHARGE light comes on.A summary of the QRH smoke paper checklist
- As soon as smoke is perceived, call for the paper checklist and do the initial actions.
- initiate a diversion and start descending to FL100 or MEA
- Re-enter the paper checklist and work through though procedure while descending.
- at anytime necessary, apply the REMOVAL OF SMOKE/FUMES checklist.
- If the Fire become out of control, land asap. -
Hydraulic systems can suffer from a number of abnormal situations. Pump low pressure, reservoir overheat, Reservoir low air pressure and reservoir low level. The electric pumps on the blue and yellow systems can also overheat. All of these will lead to the ECAM requesting that you switch off the pump. If this occurs to the green or yellow systems the PTU, if it is available, will transfer power, not fluid, between the systems recovering the affected system. The blue system can not be powered by the PTU. If the PTU is not available or the procedure ask you to turn it off, the failed system will not be powered. This leads to a single system failure.
In the case of a single system failure the aircraft will remain in normal law so all the associated protections are available. Certain flight controls will be affected based on which system has failed but ultimately Aileron, elevator and Rudder control surfaces will remain powered so controlling the aircraft will be conventional. Flaps and or slats will be slow depending on which of the systems has failed, we covered these in the original hydraulics podcast so it maybe worth having a listen again to refresh your memory. Certain spoilers will be unserviceable.
Things start to become more interesting when 2 hydraulic systems fail. When this occurs the Autopilot will be lost so priority must be given to flying the aircraft and stabilising the flight path, the aircraft will also revert to alt law in 2 of the cases, so this, as usual, means direct law once the gear is extended. The ECAM will display LAND ASAP red, this is a timely reminder that you are now operating on a single hydraulic system, why have we lost 2? what happens if we lose the last system? We will cover all 3 cases of Dual hydraulics failure in some detail shortly but lets just broadly go over what you can expect for each case. If you remember these as a guide.
G+B = Handling Problem
G+Y = Braking Problem
B+ Y = As the green system is available this is the least demanding of the 3 scenariosAirbus designed the summary pages to give us all of the information we need to help us during the cruise, approach, landing and if necessary the Go around. in the FCOM Pro-ABN-01- Use of Summaries section, more background information is provided. it states that the summaries are QRH procedures created to help the flight crew to perform actions. In ANY case the flight crew should apply the ECAM first, this includes the STATUS page. This is an important point, it is all too easy in a high workload situation to divert our attention to performance calculations and other tasks before completing the ECAM. The ECAM’s for dual hydraulics are not actually that long and the status page will give you valuable information as to the state of the aircraft increasing your situational awareness.
-
There are three types of aquaplaning - viscous, rubber reversion, and dynamic.
Viscous
This occurs when a thin film of contaminant creates a break in the contact of the tyre with the runway surface. This type normally only occurs on unusually smooth surfaces such as the runway touchdown zone where there is an excessive build-up of rubber. Viscous aquaplaning can occur even in damp conditions at high and low speeds. Because there's no actual contact, no marks are left on the runway.
Reverted rubberThis type of aquaplaning occurs when a stationary tyre (so either 'locked up' during braking or at touchdown) is dragged across a surface causing friction at the contact point. The heat produced by the friction boils the water on the surface creating steam. The pressure of the steam lifts the centre of the tyre off the surface leaving the edges still in contact creating a seal which traps the steam, this then melts the rubber and reverts it to its unvulcanised state. Friction levels during this type of aquaplaning are the equivalent of icy runways. The tyre will have 'bubbled' rubber deposits on it and the runway will show marks in the form of being pressure washed as the tyre effectively 'steam cleaned' it.
Dynamic aquaplaning
Now this is the most common type of aquaplaning and the one that's most likely to affect us. Aircraft in general are prone to this one because it's a relatively high-speed phenomenon that occurs when there is a film of water on the runway that is at least 2.5 mm deep. As the speed of the aircraft and the depth of the water increase, the water layer builds up an increasing resistance to displacement, resulting in the formation that wall of water beneath the tire we mentioned earlier. Once the tyre speed gets to the point where it can no longer displace the water quick enough it starts to aquaplane. At some speed, termed the aquaplaning speed (Vp), the upward force generated by water pressure equals the weight of the aircraft and the tire is lifted off the runway surface. In this condition, the tires no longer contribute to directional control, and braking action becomes very poor once in this state.
When we use the landing distance calculations, aquaplaning is taken into account when contaminated performance is selected. Airbus says "Performance data for landing on runways contaminated with standing water, slush and snow include accountability for the reduced wheel braking on the contaminated runway including negligible wheel braking above the hydroplaning speed."
As there is no surface contact during dynamic aquaplaning, there are no marks left on the runway surface or the tyre.The minimum speed for dynamic aquaplaning (Vp) in knots is about 9 times the square root of the tire pressure in pounds per square inch (PSI). The pressures on our airbus' vary depending on the MSN number but there is a placard on the back of each main undercarriage strut with the required pressure. As an example though, if an A319 has a pressure of 200 PSI, then the aquaplaning speed would be 127kts, surprisingly similar to the sort of speeds we touchdown at! A locked up wheel will aquaplane at much lower speeds - as low as 7.7√P which would be only 108kts! And once aquaplaning has started it can continue at speeds well below this.
If you touch down with some crab angle on a dry runway, the aircraft automatically realigns with the direction of travel down the runway.
But on a contaminated runway, the aircraft tends to travel along the runway centerline with the existing crab angle. This is then compounded by the side force created by the crosswind component on the fuselage and the tail fin which tends to make the aircraft skid sideways (downwind) off the centerline.
If full reverse is applied as is recommended, you could end up in a situation where you're skidding down the runway at an angle and no amount of rudder will straighten you up. This is because the reverse thrust results into two force components, a stopping force aligned along the aircraft direction of travel (runway centerline), and a side force, perpendicular to the runway centerline, which further increases the tendency to skid sideways. As the airspeed decreases, the rudder efficiency decreases and is also made worse by the airflow disruption created by the engine reverse airflow.
To get out if this situation it's quite counterintuitive. The harder the wheel braking force, the lower the tire-cornering force, so if the aircraft tends to continue skidding sideways. Releasing the brakes (by taking over from the autobrake) increases the tire-cornering force and helps to maintain or regain directional control.
Selecting reverse idle cancels the effects of reverse thrust (the side force and rudder airflow disruption) and helps in regaining directional control.
Once directional control has been recovered and the runway centerline has been regained:
• Pedal braking can be applied as required, and
• Reverse thrust can be reselected.
In conclusion then, if it is thought that there is a possibility of aquaplaning, then a positive touchdown should be made using MED autobrake and full reversers. It should also be remembered that if aquaplaning starts to occur, braking coefficient will be the equivalent of an icy runway. If unsure, as mentioned before, the landing performance calculations can be selected to a contaminated state to take aquaplaning into account.
If a crabbing skid is experienced after touchdown and directional control is lost,
cancel reverse and release brakes
Regain directional control and the centerline
Reverse thrust and pedal braking can then be reapplied -
This week Matt & Andy take a look at the ECAM system and how to run failures.
They discuss the system itself and how it works, how airbus expect us to run a failure using it and then finally, how to use ECAM if it fails.
More info can be found in the FCTM OP-040 ECAM
We also recommend using 'Read ECAM' which can be found at www.ipadecam.co.uk for practicing using ECAM and going through difference scenarios.
www.A320Podcast.com
www.facebook.com/A320Podcast
https://twitter.com/a320podcast
-
As its nearly Christmas we thought we do a more light-hearted episode. This week we discuss the film Sully.
Scenario of the week - Departing your home base, you lose both engines at 2800ft. What will you do?
-
This system is closely linked to the Air Conditioning system which we discussed back in episode 2. If you havent listened to it already it may be worth going back and listening to that first.
The main components. The system consists of:
- Two Cabin Pressure Controllers (CPCs)
- One Residual Pressure Control Unit (RPCU) (if fitted)
- One outflow valve, with an actuator that incorporates three motors (two for automatic operation, one for manual operation)
- One control panel
- Two safety valves.To work out the schedule, the current CPC uses the landing elevation and the QNH we've entered into the perf page of the FMGC, and the pressure altitude from ADIRS.
If FMGC data isn't available, the controller uses the captain BARO reference from the ADIRS and the LDG ELEV selection from the overhead panel.The system follows a schedule for each flight which consists of four general functions:
- Ground function: It Fully opens the outflow valve on ground
- Pre Pressurisation :During takeoff, it increases cabin pressure to avoid a surge in cabin pressure during rotation (we'll talk about whether this really ever happens later)
- Pressurisation in flight :It Adjusts cabin altitude, and rate of change to provide passengers with a comfortable flight
- Depressurisation :After touchdown, it gradually releases residual cabin overpressure before the ground function fully opens the outflow valve.Scenario of the Week
You get a call from the Cabin, they are complaining of a loud noise coming from door 2L (at the back).
- Show more
