Episodit
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Erlinger v. United States
Paul Erlinger pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g). At sentencing, the judge found Mr. Erlinger eligible for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, §924(e)(1), which increases the penalty for a 922(g) conviction from a maximum sentence of 10 years to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years when the defendant has three or more qualifying convictions for offenses committed on different occasions. Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit held in unrelated decisions that two of the offenses on which the government relied for Mr. Erlingerâs sentence enhancement no longer qualified as ACCA predicate offenses. The District Court vacated Mr. Erlingerâs sentence and scheduled resentencing. At the resentencing hearing, prosecutors again pursued an ACCA sentence enhancement based on a new set of 26-year-old convictions for burglaries committed by Mr. Erlinger over the course of several days. Mr. Erlinger protested that the burglaries were part of a single criminal episode and did not occur on separate occasions, as required by ACCA.
Held: The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to make the determination beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendantâs past offenses were committed on separate occasions for ACCA purposes. Pp. 5â26.
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Smith v. Arizona
The Sixth Amendmentâs Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him. In operation, the Clause protects a defendantâs right of cross-examination by limiting the prosecutionâs ability to introduce statements made by people not in the courtroom. The Clause thus bars the admission at trial of an absent witnessâs statements unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior chance to subject her to cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 53â54. This prohibition âapplies only to testimonial hearsay,â Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S. 813, 823, and in that two-word phrase are two limits. First, in speaking about âwitnessesââor âthose who bear testimonyââthe Clause confines itself to âtestimonial statements,â a category this Court has variously described. Id., at 823, 826. Second, the Clause bars only the introduction of hearsayâmeaning, out-of-court statements offered âto prove the truth of the matter asserted.â Anderson v. United States, 417 U. S. 211, 219.
Held: When an expert conveys an absent analystâs statements in support of the expertâs opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth. Pp. 11â 22. (a)
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Puuttuva jakso?
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United States v. Rahimi
Respondent Zackey Rahimi was indicted under 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(8), a federal statute that prohibits individuals subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm. A prosecution under Section 922(g)(8) may proceed only if the restraining order meets certain statutory criteria. In particular, the order must either contain a finding that the defendant ârepresents a credible threat to the physical safetyâ of his intimate partner or his or his partnerâs child, §922(g)(8)(C)(i), or âby its terms explicitly prohibit[ ] the use,â attempted use, or threatened use of âphysical forceâ against those individuals, §922(g)(8)(C)(ii). Rahimi concedes here that the restraining order against him satisfies the statutory criteria, but argues that on its face Section 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment. The District Court denied Rahimiâs motion to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds. While Rahimiâs case was on appeal, the Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1 (2022). In light of Bruen, the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Government had not shown that Section 922(g)(8) âfits within our Nationâs historical tradition of firearm regulation.â 61 F. 4th 443, 460 (CA5 2023).
Held: When an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.
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Gonzalez v. Trevino
The decision of the 5th Circuit is vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Gonzalez was 72 years old, when in 2019, she was elected to a seat on her local City Council in Texas. She collected signatures for a petition trying to get the City Manager removed. There was a long debate at the meeting about this topic. The Mayor asked for the petition at the meeting, she denied having it. She was searched and they found the petition. She said she didn't know it was there, the Mayor told the police and hired a private attorney to investigate the situation. she was arrested under a statute which purports to criminalize "intentionally removing a government record." She filed an action under Section 1983. The district court determined that she could proceed and that even though there was probable cause, it was enough to show that this type of crime was not typically prosecuted. The Appellate Court reversed, determining that she needed to show a closer analog. The Court determined that the Circuit Court's decision was too narrow and that it should be remanded for further determination. Per Curiam decision. Read by Jeff Barnum. -
Moore v. United States
Congress generally taxes the income of American business entities in one of two ways. Some entities, such as S corporations and partnerships, are taxed on a pass-through basis, where the entity itself does not pay taxes. 26 U. S. C. §§1361â1362. Instead, the entityâs income is attributed to the shareholders or partners, who then pay taxes on that income even if the entity has not distributed any money or property to them. §§61(a)(12), 701, 1366(a)â(c). Other business entities do pay taxes directly on their income. Those entitiesâ shareholders ordinarily are not taxed on that income but are taxed when the entity distributes a dividend or when the shareholder sells shares. Congress treats American-controlled foreign corporations as passthrough entities. Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code attributes income of those business entities to American shareholders and taxes those shareholders on that income. §§951â952. Subpart F, however, applies only to a small portion of the foreign corporationâs income, mostly passive income. In 2017, Congress passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. As relevant here, Congress imposed a one-time, backwardlooking, pass-through tax on some American shareholders of American-controlled foreign corporations to address the trillions of dollars of undistributed income that had been accumulated by those foreign corporations over the years. Known as the Mandatory Repatriation Tax, the tax imposed a rate from 8 to 15.5 percent on the pro rata shares of American shareholders. §§965(a)(1), (c), (d).
In this case, petitioners Charles and Kathleen Moore invested in the American-controlled foreign corporation KisanKraft. From 2006 to 2017, Kisan Kraft generated a great deal of income but did not distribute that income to its American shareholders. At the end of the 2017 tax year, application of the new MRT resulted in a tax bill of $14,729 on the Mooresâ pro rata share of KisanKraftâs accumulated income from 2006 to 2017. The Moores paid the tax and then sued for a refund, claiming, among other things, that the MRT violated the Direct Tax Clause of the Constitution because, in their view, the MRT was an unapportioned direct tax on their shares of KisanKraft stock. The District Court dismissed the suit, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Held: The MRTâwhich attributes the realized and undistributed income of an American-controlled foreign corporation to the entityâs American shareholders, and then taxes the American shareholders on their portions of that incomeâdoes not exceed Congressâs constitutional authority.
KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a concurring opinion. BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which ALITO, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined. -
Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon
This case involves a dispute between petitioner Jascha Chiaverini and police officers from Napoleon, Ohio. The officers charged Chiaverini, a jewelry store owner, with three crimes: receiving stolen property, a misdemeanor; dealing in precious metals without a license, also a misdemeanor; and money laundering, a felony. After obtaining a warrant, the police arrested Chiaverini and detained him for three days. But county prosecutors later dropped the case. Chiaverini, believing that his arrest and detention were unjustified, then sued the officers, alleging what is known as a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim under 42 U. S. C. §1983. To prevail on this claim, he had to show that the officers brought criminal charges against him without probable cause, leading to an unreasonable seizure of his person. The District Court, however, granted summary judgment to the officers, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that Chiaveriniâs prosecution was supported by probable cause. In holding this, the court did not address whether the officers had probable cause to bring the money-laundering charge. In its view, there was clearly probable cause to charge Chiaverini with the two misdemeanors. And so long as one charge was supported by probable cause, it thought, a malicious-prosecution claim based on any other charge must fail.
Held: The presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge. The parties, and the United States as amicus curiae, all agree with this conclusion, which follows from both the Fourth Amendment and traditional common-law practice.
KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion. -
Petitioner Delilah Diaz was stopped at a port of entry on the United States-Mexico border. Border patrol officers searched the car that Diaz was driving and found more than 54 pounds of methamphetamine hidden in the vehicle. Diaz was charged with importing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§952 and 960, charges that required the Government to prove that Diaz âknowinglyâ transported drugs. In her defense, Diaz claimed not to know that the drugs were hidden in the car. To rebut Diazâs claim, the Government planned to call Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent Andrew Flood as an expert witness to testify that drug traffickers generally do not entrust large quantities of drugs to people who are unaware they are transporting them. Diaz objected in a pretrial motion under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), which provides that â[i]n a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.â The court ruled that Agent Flood could not testify in absolute terms about whether all couriers knowingly transport drugs, but could testify that most couriers know they are transporting drugs. At trial, Agent Flood testified that most couriers know that they are transporting drugs. The jury found Diaz guilty, and Diaz appealed, challenging Agent Floodâs testimony under Rule 704(b). The Court of Appeals held that because Agent Flood did not explicitly opine that Diaz knowingly transported methamphetamine, his testimony did not violate Rule 704(b).
Held: Expert testimony that âmost peopleâ in a group have a particular mental state is not an opinion about âthe defendantâ and thus does not violate Rule 704(b).
Diaz v. United States
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United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC
Two Terms ago, in Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 596 U. S. 464, the Court held that a statute violated the Bankruptcy Clauseâs uniformity requirement because it permitted different fees for Chapter 11 debtors depending on the district where their case was filed. In this case, the Court is asked to determine the appropriate remedy for that constitutional violation. As noted in Siegel, there are three options: (1) refund fees for the thousands of debtors charged higher fees in districts administered by the U. S. Trustee Program, (2) retroactively extract higher fees from the small number of debtors charged lower fees in districts administered by the Bankruptcy Administrator Program, or (3) require only prospective fee parity. See id., at 480. As in Siegel, this case arises from a case filed in a U. S. Trustee district. In 2016, 76 legal entities filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Kansas. In 2018, under the amended fee statute the Court later found unconstitutional in Siegel, the debtors began paying higher fees than they would have if their case had been filed in a Bankruptcy Administrator district. In 2020, the debtors challenged the constitutionality of those fees. The Bankruptcy Court found no constitutional violation, but the Tenth Circuit, anticipating Siegel, reversed. To remedy the constitutional violation, the Tenth Circuit ordered a refund of the debtorsâ quarterly fees to the extent they exceeded the lower fees paid in the Bankruptcy Administrator districts. This Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case in light of Siegel, and the Tenth Circuit reinstated its original opinion without alteration.
Held: Prospective parity is the appropriate remedy for the short-lived and small disparity created by the fee statute held unconstitutional in Siegel. -
Campos-Chavez v. Garland
To initiate the removal of an alien from the United States who is either âinadmissibleâ under 8 U. S. C. §1182 or âdeportableâ under §1227, the Federal Government must provide the alien with âwritten noticeâ of the proceedings. §§1229(a)(1), (2). Two types of âwritten noticeâ are described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of §1229(a): Paragraph (1) provides that the alien be given a written â ânotice to appear,â â or NTA, which must set out, among other things, â[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be held.â Paragraph (2) states that âin the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings,â the agency must provide âa written noticeâ specifying âthe new time or place of the proceedingsâ and âthe consequencesâ of failing to attend. An alien who fails to attend a hearing despite receiving notice âshall be ordered removed in absentiaâ if the Government âestablishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidenceâ that âthe written noticeâ was provided and that âthe alien is removable.â §1229a(b)(5)(A). Three scenarios permit the rescinding of an in absentia removal order, one of which is when an alien âdemonstrates that [he] did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)â of §1229(a). §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). In these consolidated cases (one from the Fifth Circuit, and two from the Ninth), aliens Esmelis Campos-Chaves, Varinder Singh, and Raul Daniel Mendez-ColĂn, each moved to rescind his in absentia order of removal on the ground that he did not receive proper notice of the removal hearing. In each case, the Government provided an initial NTA, but the NTA did not specify the time and place of the removal hearing. Eventually, the Government provided each alien with a notice of hearing under §1229(a)(2) which set out the specific time and place of the removal hearing. None of the aliens showed up for his hearing, and each was ordered removed in absentia by an Immigration Judge. Each then sought to rescind the removal order, arguing that he did not receive a proper NTA under §1229(a)(1). The Fifth Circuit considered and denied one of the petitions, but the Ninth Circuit granted the other two.
Held: Because each of the aliens in this case received a proper §1229(a)(2) notice for the hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed, they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice under §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). -
The National Firearms Act of 1934 defines a âmachinegunâ as âany weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.â 26 U. S. C. §5845(b). With a machinegun, a shooter can fire multiple times, or even continuously, by engaging the trigger only once. This capability distinguishes a machinegun from a semiautomatic firearm. With a semiautomatic firearm, the shooter can fire only one time by engaging the trigger. Using a technique called bump firing, shooters can fire semiautomatic firearms at rates approaching those of some machineguns. A shooter who bump fires a rifle uses the firearmâs recoil to help rapidly manipulate the trigger. Although bump firing does not require any additional equipment, a âbump stockâ is an accessory designed to make the technique easier. A bump stock does not alter the basic mechanics of bump firing, and the trigger still must be released and reengaged to fire each additional shot. For many years, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) consistently took the position that semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks were not machineguns under §5845(b). ATF abruptly changed course when a gunman using semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks fired hundreds of rounds into a crowd in Las Vegas, Nevada, killing 58 people and wounding over 500 more. ATF subsequently proposed a rule that would repudiate its previous guidance and amend its regulations to âclarifyâ that bump stocks are machineguns. 83 Fed. Reg. 13442. ATFâs Rule ordered owners of bump stocks either to destroy or surrender them to ATF to avoid criminal prosecution. Michael Cargill surrendered two bump stocks to ATF under protest . . .
Held: ATF exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a Rule that classifies a bump stock as a âmachinegunâ under §5845(b).
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
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FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine
In 2000, the Food and Drug Administration approved a new drug application for mifepristone tablets marketed under the brand name Mifeprex for use in terminating pregnancies up to seven weeks. To help ensure that Mifeprex would be used safely and effectively, FDA placed additional restrictions on the drugâs use and distribution, for example requiring doctors to prescribe or to supervise prescription of Mifeprex, and requiring patients to have three in-person visits with the doctor to receive the drug. In 2016, FDA relaxed some of these restrictions: deeming Mifeprex safe to terminate pregnancies up to 10 weeks; allowing healthcare providers, such as nurse practitioners, to prescribe Mifeprex; and approving a dosing regimen that required just one in-person visit to receive the drug. In 2019, FDA approved an application for generic mifepristone. In 2021, FDA announced that it would no longer enforce the initial in-person visit requirement. Four pro-life medical associations and several individual doctors moved for a preliminary injunction that would require FDA either to rescind approval of mifepristone or to rescind FDAâs 2016 and 2021 regulatory actions. Danco Laboratories, which sponsors Mifeprex, intervened to defend FDAâs actions. The District Court agreed with the plaintiffs and in effect enjoined FDAâs approval of mifepristone, thereby ordering mifepristone off the market. FDA and Danco appealed and moved to stay the District Courtâs order pending appeal. As relevant here, this Court ultimately stayed the District Courtâs order pending the disposition of proceedings in the Fifth Circuit and this Court. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing. It concluded that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their challenge to FDAâs 2000 and 2019 drug approvals, but were likely to succeed in showing that FDAâs 2016 and 2021 actions were unlawful. This Court granted certiorari with respect to the 2016 and 2021 FDA actions.
Held: Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to challenge FDAâs actions regarding the regulation of mifepristone. Pp. 5â25.
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After several Starbucks employees announced plans to unionize, they invited a news crew from a local television station to visit the store after hours to promote their unionizing effort. Starbucks fired multiple employees involved with the media event for violating company policy. The National Labor Relations Board filed an administrative complaint against Starbucks alleging that it had engaged in unfair labor practices. The Boardâs regional Director then filed a petition under §10( j) of the National Labor Relations Act seeking a preliminary injunction for the duration of the administrative proceedings that would, among other things, require Starbucks to reinstate the fired employees. The District Court assessed whether the Board was entitled to a preliminary injunction by applying a two-part test that asks whether âthere is reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices have occurred,â and whether injunctive relief is âjust and proper.â McKinney v. Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC, 875 F. 3d 333, 339. Applying this standard, the District Court granted the injunction, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Held: When considering the NLRBâs request for a preliminary injunction under §10( j), district courts must apply the traditional four factors articulated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7. Pp. 4â11.
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Drawing on a 2016 Presidential primary debate exchange between thencandidate Donald Trump and Senator Marco Rubio, respondent Steve Elster sought to federally register the trademark âTrump too smallâ to use on shirts and hats. An examiner from the Patent and Trademark Office refused registration based on the ânames clause,â a Lanham Act prohibition on the registration of a mark that â[c]onsists of or comprises a name . . . identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent,â 15 U. S. C. §1052(c). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed, rejecting Elsterâs argument that the names clause violates his First Amendment right to free speech. The Federal Circuit reversed.
Held: The Lanham Actâs names clause does not violate the First Amendment.
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Petitioner Truck Insurance Exchange is the primary insurer for companies that manufactured and sold products containing asbestos. Two of those companies, Kaiser Gypsum Co. and Hanson Permanente Cement (Debtors), filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy after facing thousands of asbestos-related lawsuits. As part of the bankruptcy process, the Debtors filed a proposed reorganization plan (Plan). That Plan creates an Asbestos Personal Injury Trust (Trust) under 11 U. S. C. §524(g), a provision that allows Chapter 11 debtors with substantial asbestos related liability to fund a trust and channel all present and future asbestos-related claims into that trust. Truck is contractually obligated to defend each covered asbestos personal injury claim and to indemnify the Debtors for up to $500,000 per claim. For their part, the Debtors must pay a $5,000 deductible per claim, and assist and cooperate with Truck in defending the claims. The Plan treats insured and uninsured claims differently, requiring insured claims to be filed in the tort system for the benefit of the insurance coverage, while uninsured claims are submitted directly to the Trust for resolution. Truck sought to oppose the Plan under §1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which permits any âparty in interestâ to âraiseâ and âbe heard on any issueâ in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Among other things, Truck argues that the Plan exposes it to millions of dollars in fraudulent claims because the Plan does not require the same disclosures and authorizations for insured and uninsured claims. Truck also asserts that the Plan impermissibly alters its rights under its insurance policies. The District Court confirmed the Plan. It concluded, among other things, that Truck had limited standing to object to the Plan because the Plan was âinsurance neutral,â i.e., it did not increase Truckâs prepetition obligations or impair its contractual rights under its insurance policies. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Truck was not a âparty in interestâ under §1109(b) because the plan was âinsurance neutral.â
Held: An insurer with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims is a âparty in interestâ under §1109(b) that âmay raise and may appear and be heard on any issueâ in a Chapter 11 case.
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except ALITO, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U. S. C. §5301 et seq., enables an Indian tribe to enter into a âself-determination contractâ with the Indian Health Service to assume responsibility for administering the healthcare programs that IHS would otherwise operate for the tribe. §5321(a)(1). When IHS administers such programs itself, it funds its operations through congressional appropriations and third-party insurance payments. Healthcare programs administered by a tribe under a self-determination contract have a parallel funding structure. First, IHS must provide to the tribe the Secretarial amount, which âshall not be lessâ than the congressionally appropriated amount that IHS would have used to operate such programs absent the self-determination contract. §5325(a)(1). Second, like IHS when it runs the healthcare programs, a contracting tribe can collect revenue from third-party payers like Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers. See 42 U. S. C. §§1395qq(a), 1396j(a); 25 U. S. C. §1621e(a). These third-party funds are called âprogram incomeâ and must be used by the tribe âto further the general purposes of the contractâ with IHS. §5325(m)(1). The Secretarial amount and program income, however, do not place a contracting tribe on equal footing with IHS. That is because the tribe must incur certain overhead and administrative expenses that IHS does not incur when it runs the healthcare programs. To remedy this funding shortfall, Congress amended ISDA to require IHS to pay the tribe âcontract support costsâ to cover such âreasonable costs for activities which must be carried on by a [tribe] as a contractor to ensure compliance with the terms of the [self-determination] contract.â §5325(a)(2). Contract support costs eligible for repayment include âdirect program expenses for the operation of the Federal programâ and âany additional administrative or . . . overhead expense incurred by the [tribe] in connection with the operation of the Federal program, function, service, or activity pursuant to the contract.â §5325(a)(3)(A). Such costs are limited, however, to those âdirectly attributable toâ selfdetermination contracts. §5326. And no funds are available for âcosts associated with any contract . . . entered into between [a tribe] and any entity other than [IHS].â Ibid. These cases involve self-determination contracts between IHS and two tribesâthe San Carlos Apache Tribe and the Northern Arapaho Tribe. Both Tribes sued the Government for breach of contract, contending that although they used the Secretarial amount and program income to operate the healthcare programs they assumed from IHS under their self-determination contracts, IHS failed to pay the contract support costs they incurred by providing healthcare services using program income. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits concluded that each Tribe was entitled to reimbursement for such costs. Held: ISDA requires IHS to pay the contract support costs that a tribe incurs when it collects and spends program income to further the functions, services, activities, and programs transferred to it from IHS in a self-determination contract.
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, ALITO, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.
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Connelly v. United States
Michael and Thomas Connelly were the sole shareholders in Crown C Supply, a small building supply corporation. The brothers entered into an agreement to ensure that Crown would stay in the family if either brother died. Under that agreement, the surviving brother would have the option to purchase the deceased brotherâs shares. If he declined, Crown itself would be required to redeem (i.e., purchase) the shares. To ensure that Crown would have enough money to redeem the shares if required, it obtained $3.5 million in life insurance on each brother. After Michael died, Thomas elected not to purchase Michaelâs shares, thus triggering Crownâs obligation to do so. Michaelâs son and Thomas agreed that the value of Michaelâs shares was $3 million, and Crown paid the same amount to Michaelâs estate. As the executor of Michaelâs estate, Thomas then filed a federal tax return for the estate, which reported the value of Michaelâs shares as $3 million. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audited the return. During the audit, Thomas obtained a valuation from an outside accounting firm. That firm determined that Crownâs fair market value at Michaelâs death was $3.86 million, an amount that excluded the $3 million in insurance proceeds used to redeem Michaelâs shares on the theory that their value was offset by the redemption obligation. Because Michael had held a 77.18% ownership interest in Crown, the analyst calculated the value of Michaelâs shares as approximately $3 million ($3.86 million x 0.7718). The IRS disagreed. It insisted that Crownâs redemption obligation did not offset the life-insurance proceeds, and accordingly, assessed Crownâs total value as $6.86 million ($3.86 million + $3 million). The IRS then calculated the value of Michaelâs shares as $5.3 million ($6.86 million x 0.7718). Based on this higher valuation, the IRS determined that the estate owed an additional $889,914 in taxes. The estate paid the deficiency and Thomas, acting as executor, sued the United States for a refund. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Government. The court held that, to accurately value Michaelâs shares, the $3 million in life-insurance proceeds must be counted in Crownâs valuation. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Held: A corporationâs contractual obligation to redeem shares is not necessarily a liability that reduces a corporationâs value for purposes of the federal estate tax. -
In Cantero v. Bank of America, the Supreme Court reviewed a Second Circuit decision that struck down a New York bank regulation, finding that the State's authority was preempted by federal law. The Court held that Dodd-Frank requires a nuanced analysis -- rather than a bright line test -- on the issue of federal preemption. Justice Kavanaugh, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed and remanded with instructions on the analysis required to determine preemption.
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Petitioner National Rifle Association (NRA) sued respondent Maria Vulloâformer superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS)âalleging that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing DFS-regulated parties to punish or suppress the NRAâs gun-promotion advocacy. The Second Circuit held that Vulloâs alleged actions constituted permissible government speech and legitimate law enforcement. The Court granted certiorari to address whether the NRAâs complaint states a First Amendment claim. The NRAâs âwell-pleaded factual allegations,â Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678â679, are taken as true at this motion-to-dismiss stage. DFS regulates insurance companies and financial services institutions doing business in New York, and has the power to initiate investigations and civil enforcement actions, as well as to refer matters for criminal prosecution. The NRA contracted with DFS-regulated entitiesâ affiliates of Lockton Companies, LLC (Lockton)âto administer insurance policies the NRA offered as a benefit to its members, which Chubb Limited (Chubb) and Lloydâs of London (Lloydâs) would then underwrite. In 2017, Vullo began investigating one of these affinity insurance policiesâCarry Guardâon a tip passed along from a gun-control advocacy group. The investigation revealed that Carry Guard insured gun owners from intentional criminal acts in violation of New York law, and that the NRA promoted Carry Guard without the required insurance producer license. Lockton and Chubb subsequently suspended Carry Guard. Vullo then expanded her investigation into the NRAâs other affinity insurance programs. On February 27, 2018, Vullo met with senior executives at Lloydâs, expressed her views in favor of gun control, and told the Lloydâs executives âthat DFS was less interested in pursuingâ infractions unrelated to any NRA business âso long as Lloydâs ceased providing insurance to gun groups, especially the NRA.â App. to Pet. for Cert. at 199â 200, ¶21. Vullo and Lloydâs struck a deal: Lloydâs âwould instruct its syndicates to cease underwriting firearm-related policies and would scale back its NRA-related business,â and âin exchange, DFS would focus its forthcoming affinity-insurance enforcement action solely on those syndicates which served the NRA.â Id., at 223, ¶69. On April 19, 2018, Vullo issued letters entitled, âGuidance on Risk Management Relating to the NRA and Similar Gun Promotion Organizations.â Id., at 246â251 (Guidance Letters) . . .
Held: The NRA plausibly alleged that respondent violated the First Amendment by coercing regulated entities to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress gun-promotion advocacy.
Read by Jeff Barnum. -
Thornell v. Jones
Respondent Danny Lee Jones was convicted of the premeditated firstdegree murders of Robert and Tisha Weaver and the attempted premeditated murder of Robertâs grandmother Katherine Gumina. Arizona law at the time required the trial court to âimpose a sentence of deathâ if it found âone or moreâ statutorily enumerated âaggravating circumstancesâ and âno mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.â Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13â703(E). The trial court found three aggravating circumstances that applied to both Robertâs and Tishaâs murders: Jones committed multiple homicides, §13â 703(F)(8); he was motivated by âpecuniaryâ gain, §13â703(F)(5); and the murders were âespecially heinous, cruel or depraved,â §13â 703(F)(6). The trial court found an additional aggravating circumstance with respect to Tishaâs murder: she was a young child, §13â 703(F)(9). The trial court also concluded that Jones had established four mitigating circumstances: long-term substance abuse, drug and alcohol impairment at the time of the murders, head trauma, and childhood abuse. 9 Record 2465. The court concluded that these mitigating circumstances were ânot sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances,â so it sentenced Jones to death. Ibid. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed after âreview[ing] the entire recordâ and âindependently weighing all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented.â 185 Ariz. 471, 492, 917 P. 2d 200, 221. Jones later sought state postconviction review on the theory that defense counsel was ineffective, but the Arizona courts rejected Jonesâs claims. Jones next filed a federal habeas petition in District Court and reasserted his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing but ultimately concluded that Jones could not show prejudice because the additional information he presented â âbarely. . . alter[ed] the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge.â â Jones v. Schriro, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1043 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 700). The Ninth Circuit reversed, but this Court vacated that judgment and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to determine whether, in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170, it had been proper to consider the new evidence presented at the federal evidentiary hearing. See Ryan v. Jones, 563 U. S. 932. On reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit again granted habeas relief. The panel held that it was permissible to consider the new evidence and concluded that there was a â âreasonable probabilityâ â that âJones would not have received a death sentenceâ if that evidence had been presented at sentencing. Jones v. Ryan, 52 F. 4th 1104, 1137. Ten judges dissented from the denial of en banc review. One dissent, joined by eight judges, asserted that the Ninth Circuit panel flouted Strickland by crediting âquestionable, weak, and cumulative mitigation evidenceâ as âenough to overcome . . . weight[y] . . . aggravating circumstances.â Id., at 1155. Held: The Ninth Circuitâs interpretation and application of Strickland was in error.
Reversed and remanded.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Read by RJ Dieken -
Coinbase v. Suski
The dispute here involves a conflict between two contracts executed by petitioner Coinbase, Inc., operator of a cryptocurrency exchange platform, and respondents, who use Coinbase. The first contractâthe Coinbase User Agreement that respondents agreed to when they created their accountsâcontains an arbitration provision with a delegation clause. Per this provision, an arbitrator must decide all disputes under the contract, including whether a given disagreement is arbitrable. The second contractâthe Official Rules for a promotional sweepstakes respondents enteredâcontains a forum selection clause providing that California courts âshall have sole jurisdiction of any controversies regarding the [sweepstakes] promotion.â Respondents ultimately filed a class action in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that the sweepstakes violated various California laws. Coinbase moved to compel arbitration based on the User Agreementâs delegation clause. The District Court determined that the Official Rulesâ forum selection clause controlled the partiesâ dispute and accordingly denied the motion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Held: Where parties have agreed to two contractsâone sending arbitrability disputes to arbitration, and the other either explicitly or implicitly sending arbitrability disputes to the courtsâa court must decide which contract governs. - Näytä enemmän
