Episodes
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The British had taken most of the hills overlooking Port Stanley by the morning of 14th June 1982 – and 2 Para had been ordered to halt on their position on Wireless Ridge.
They were waiting for the SAS and the Royal Marines who were raiding from the north of Cortley Hill Ridge, a long narrow piece of land running from Moody Brook to the northern arm of Stanley harbour.
That opeation was more of a hindrance than a help to 2 Para because the SAS run into trouble and had to be supported by the artillery that had been clearing the ground for the paras.
Cortley Hill ridge was manned by the Argentinian B Battery of the 101st anti-aircraft regiment. They had eight Hispano-Suiza 30mm guns and a few 12.7mm machine guns which had been used against aircraft, but now Brigadier Jofre ordered them to swivel horizontally to provide ground defence. He’d also moved a few mortars into the position along with a Marine infantry platoon to back them up.
The SAS raiding party was heading their way but were forced to paddle past the Argentinian hospital ship Almirante Irizar. A member of the ship’s crew was as commando-trained soldier and without thinking about the Geneva convention and rules of war, grabbed a radio and called the anti-aircraft battery on the hill – warning of the SAS raid.
Subsequently the SAS raiding party was driven off with three wounded and boats damaged.
Argentina still claims the Malvinas. The British at some point will have to reassess their ownership based on the kelpers self-determination. This series was scripted in 2022, and as I sit here, the United Nations is revisiting the whole idea of who owns the wind-swept islands. This is a complex matter because the UN General Assembly is muttering about colonialism which is what London is accused of perpetuating.
The conscripts and professional soldiers on both sides remember this war like it was yesterday – some of the Argentinians want their ashes scattered on places like Mount Kent when they die. Hundreds of British servicemen still suffer the physical and mental scars.
The people of the islands want to run their own show, like a woman who told one Argentinian that she was 40 but looked 60 because of how tough it was to live on these islands.
“We feel that the country belongs to us, not to England, not to Argentina.. life is very hard.. nobody has ever cared about us…”
Which you can say if you’ve followed this story – is true. They only began caring when geopolitical issues came to the fore and in the future, both sets of countries may find these people much harder to deal with than they were in 1982.
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We heard how the assault of Two Sisters and Mount Harriet went last episode, both were taken within 2 and a half hours – but 3 Paras attack on Mount Longdon was a different proposition.
It’s a steep sided hill about a mile long running almost west to east, it’s main ridge above 600 feet in places and overall, about 300 feet on average above the surrounding ground. This hill formed only a small part of the Argentinian 7th Regiment and its commander Lieutenant Colonel Ortiz Gimenez overlooked the sector named Plata – or silver. It stretched from Mount Longdon eastwards as the northern Arm of Stanley Harbour nearly seven miles away.
The Argentinians did not build deep defences here, and 7th Regiment was stretched along its ridge. The Summit of Mount Longdon was held by only one company – Bravo – with three platoons – but behind them was another platoon of the 10th Engineer Company which was fighting as infantry. There were also eight heavy 12.7mm machine guns manned by marines. The British later claimed there were commandos amongst the Regiment, but this is wrong. So 3 Para moved quickly to the rising ground, when a corporal of 3 Company stepped on a mine. It shattered his leg but he survived, while the Argentinians realised they were being attacked and opened fire. 3 Para had expected to find a single company protecting Longdon, but as we heard there were four.The first troops in action on the 13th were 30 men of the headquarters company of the Scots Guards, commanded by Major Richard Bethell. He was a 32 year-old former SAS officer, and looking forward to the action. His role was to create a diversionary attack along with the Blues and the Royals, south east of Mount Harriet. Bethell had already survived a mine blast after his land rover triggered one on a road during the previous days patrols.
They advanced in the dark towards Tumbledown. It is a rocky ridge about a mile and a half long but very narrow, and 750 feet high at its most prominent point. It dominated the area of open ground and was the key to unlocking Stanley – and probably the end of the war.
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Episodes manquant?
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We pick up after the sinking of the Galahad and the debacle at Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. The British war cabinet was plunged into an argument over information.
New Brigade commander Moore had panicked and sent a message that he’d lost 900 men – we know it was 51. The Argentinians naturally believed the 900 figure and also thought that the British attack had been stunted.
It hadn’t, but London ironically gained as it lost.
The Ministry of Defence faced the media and responded that the casualties had been heavy and that this may delay an attack on Stanley. The war cabinet was under extreme pressure to make the casualty list public, but they were refusing. It would only be released after the end of the war, further confusing the Argentinian military who wanted to believe that the English would not finally retake the Falklands.
As Margaret Thatcher’s ministers sweated under the glare of public opinion, it was fortunate for this government that the Falkland’s War was so brief. The graphic pictures reaching the British public had shocked the nation, one in particular of a sailor on a stretcher with a bloody stump where his leg had been blown off.
The Navy had always been against reporters embedded amongst them, now they conducted a mini told you so campaign. And yet, the pictures helped the British public understand the difficulties of the campaign, and their support increased instead of waning.
However, the attempt at opening up another front for 5 Brigade instead of focusing on the main job at hand – to take Stanley – was a mistake.
Apologists for the British army point out that it could have been worse, which is rather monty pythonesque – and no solace to the families of the 51 men whose lives were thrown away, nor the shoddy communication that bedevilled the British Falklands campaign.
Brigadier Thompson’s 3 Brigade was lining up to deal with Stanley, and in the end, 5 Brigade’s involvement slowed things down. The political future of a vast area of the South Atlantic was going to be decided on the outcome of a series of battles on hills with innocuous sounding names like Mount Longdon, Two Sisters, Tumbledown, Wireless Ridge, Mount William, Sapper Hill.
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It was 30th May and the rusty liner the Canberra headed back into San Carlos water. On board were reinforcements from the 5th Infantry Brigade including the Gurkhas, the Scots and Welsh Guards.
They had been collected from the QE2 liner which had docked at South Georgia with the Guards and the Gurkhas, from where they were collected by the Canberra. Also on board was the new commander, Major-General Jeremy Moore who was to take over from Brigadier Jeremy Thompson.
The command post at San Carlos was the outside lavatory and cloakroom for the Port San Carlos Social Club in better times – and Moore surveyed his new HQ then headed out to talk to the troops.
The lack of Sea King helicopters meant the British forces were back on their transport equipment number ones, their boots. It was 3 Commando’s Brigades’ fate to continue to march across East Falkland, towards the chain of hills surrounding port Stanley. 45 commando had left San Carlos with 3 Para on the 27th May, and were plodding doggedly over the hills, marshes and streams towards Douglas settlement. That night, at ten pm, they collapsed into sleep after the 13 mile route march, across terrain that left 15 men injured – sprained ankles, pulled muscles, cracked bones.
Meanwhile, Brigadier Thompson was worried. He knew that Mount Kent was strategically important and wanted it populated by British troops before the Argentinians woke up to its crucial role – should they send artillery spotters here the British would be vulnerable to observed artillery fire.
For the next week, the Royal Navy devoted most of its attention to the problems of the 5 Brigade. On the afternoon of 3 June, the Welsh Guards began their long march to Goose Green from San Carlos, walking for 12 hours before the whole exercise was abandoned. The Guardsmen were not ready for this heavy going, and they were too heavily laden – and their snotracs broke down every few miles. Back they marched over Sussex Mountain.
3 Brigade sneered at the news – what a contemptable start they thought. Remember they were on the hills above Stanley, and now forced to hang around the freezing mountain waiting for 5 Brigade to get its act together. It was now that the fate of so many men was decided – the only other way for these soldiers to get to Fitzroy at speed was by sea – and to a scene of a tragedy that would be the worst loss of life in any single engagement for the British during the entire Falklands War.
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The night of 27th May 1982 was cold and rainy, and waiting for the British on the mile-wide isthmus to the north of the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green were one hundred Argentinian conscripts making up two platoons of 12 Regiment A company, a dozen or so Argentinian reconnaissance soldiers, First Lieutenant Jorge Manresa, three officers and 14 NCOs.
Manresa’s men weren’t in a good place. They were part of the extension of the defensive position ordered by their commander back in Stanley and it was no where nearly as well laid out as the second line of defence behind them.
They had a 120mm mortar with its tube welded to its base plate, two other 81mm mortars and two 7.62mm machine guns. The newly dug positions were about a mile and half ahead of the much better constructed main line.
At 6pm on the 27th, the British 2 battalion Charlie company began to advance towards the start line in intermittent rain. For the next three hours they probed down the track, led by engineers of 59 squadron who faced the biggest hazards initially – being blown up by mines and boobytraps.
They waded waist-deep in streams in the darkness to ensure that the three bridges between Camilla Creek and the start line were clear of mines, then lay shivering in the dark as the assault companies headed their way.
At 2.35am A Company crossed the start line in a classic infantry formation, two platoons forward and one behind.
At 2:35am HMS Arrow opened fire, firing a total of 22 star shells and 135 rounds of 4.5" high-explosive shells during a 90-minute bombardment, signalling the start of the attack. The rest of the battalion moved off at 10pm, listening to the crump crump of naval gunfire support.Still, it took a firefight until first light before the first line was broken, and the British were still two miles short of the Goose Green Settlement – they’d just arrived at Darwin. But that is further north of Goose Green, about a mile and a half away and both were located on the east side of the isthmus, the right as you look at the map.
Then dawn broke, and the battle began to swing away from the British.
They were caught in the open, on gently sloping ground, with the only shelter being little contours in the landscape and a ridge that was a great target.
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As we heard in Episode 15, the British were ascendant, but they’d paid a high price.Twenty-six Argentinian planes had been shot down since the landings at San Carlos, ten British ships had been damaged by unexploded bombs, so imagine the carnage had these been fused properly.
Five ships had been sunk – HMS Sheffield, Ardent, Antelope, Coventry and the SS Atlantic Conveyor. One more would go down before the end of this short war.
Back in the U.K. the cabinet was muttering about action and naturally, this pressure on the leadership in the Falklands became unbearable.
Their gaze switched to the south, instead of the east where Port Stanley stood. It turned to Darwin and Goose Green. Then on the morning of 23rd May, 2 Para received a warning order from 3 Commando Brigade – three of the four companies were to carry out a large-scale raid on the Argentinian positions at Darwin and Goose Green.
One company would remain behind at Sussex Mountain. The officers were not happy about the plan. Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Jones, or H as he was known, pointed out that they were advancing in exactly the opposite direction to the main strategic goal, Stanley. H was also unhappy about the plan itself, they were going to attack strongly held enemy positions from the obvious direction, the north, without full air and artillery support. He asked that 3 Para be moved by chopper or by sea to the south. No said the brigade commander, Julian Thompson. The loss of the Chinooks on the Atlantic Conveyor made any move of this sort impossible.
So on the afternoon of 24th May 1982, Delta company led off the long march to secure its first objective known as Camilla Creek House. That was eleven miles down the route, and following Delta company would be the remainder of the battalion. Camilla Creek house overlooked the Goose Green Settlement, it was the obvious strategic point.
At seven that night the attack was cancelled – poor weather meant that their supporting artillery could not be moved. D Company had to march back up Sussex Mountain, back to their waterlogged trenches and cold nights.
Two days later on the 26th May, Lieutenant Colonel Jones was summoned to another urgent meeting at Brigade HQ – 2 Para were now heading to Goose Green once more. What Jones didn’t know was that Brigadier Thompson was trying to stop the assault – he’d phoned the war cabinet back in the U.K. and tried to convince his superiors that the southern isthmus was no real danger on his flank – he could easily hold them back while he marched on Stanley. He was worried that what was a form of sideshow would go horribly wrong. But he failed. Thatcher and her cabinet wanted blood as quickly as possible, it was a political imperative because she was aware that public opinion had shifted after the loss of so many ships – and the fact that since the landing at San Carlos, the British had appeared to have frozen at the Bay.
There were a few significant failings that began about now – and one involved intelligence.
As you’re going to hear, 2 Para were sent into battle against a far bigger force because intelligence had got a few things badly wrong. They suggested that the Argentinians defending the settlement had a weak battalion, probably fewer than 600 men, and Thompson believed the 450 men of 2 Para were enough. Once his attempts at stopping this assault failed, he was determined to make it a swift victory.
Unfortunately, there were close to 4 times that number of Argentinians waiting for his men.
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The British landings at San Carlos were both a threat and an opportunity for the Argentinians. Obviously allowing the British a toehold on east Falklands was a strategic danger, but now they could concentrate their air attacks on the landing zone, and the ships providing support.
In their first sorties, the Argentinian air force flew over open seas, searching for targets and burning up precious fuel. Now the landings had altered the odds – they could aim at the warships anchored in Falkland Sound, the waterway between the two islands.
More importantly, the pilots could make their final approach over land. They’d been exposed over the ocean, its hard to hide from radar over the sea, but now they could fly the last miles over undulating and in some cases, hilly terrain.
They would use these mountains and hills to hide from radar – and return to their core training which had been done over land. They’d been forced to learn how to attack ships over open sea as kind of crash course over the past month, so the pendulum of advantage actually swung back towards the Argentinians despite the landings.
The damage inflicted on the British Task force had been unbelievable – Ardent was sunk, Argonaut badly damaged, Antrim, Brilliant and Broadsword all damaged by bombs which may have failed to explode, but left the engineers with a headache. They had to be cleared before the ships would be operational.
The 21st May attacks had been carried out at sea level and most of the Argentinian bombs had not detonated because their fuses were set for higher altitude releases. They weren’t going to make that mistake again. If the Argentinians had attacked on the day of the landings with properly fused bombs, it was estimated that around 25 percent of the English ships would have been sunk.
But the bad news for the English was that there were worse days to come. The Argentinians though, were facing a hail of anti-aircraft fire and missiles when they came in for their attacks. The Skyhawk and Mirage pilots had decided they should fly the last 150 miles at only 10 feet above the water – sometimes the sea spray blinded them and the first order of duty when they arrived back at their bases was to wash down the wings to remove the salt. Then the worst day of all dawned, May 25th – Argentina’s national Day. The British knew that this was going to be the day that the pilots and possibly ground forces would exert themselves – it was a day of pride.
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It’s still D-Day – 21st May 1982, and the British have landed over 3000 troops at the Bay of San Carlos Waters, now they need to shift thousands of tons of material from ship to shore, something that was going to be sorely tested by the Argentinian Air force.
On the morning of 21st May, and the British had made good use of the early morning mist to land their troops virtually unposed as you heard last episode – the only major hitch for the British so far was the retreating Argentinian platoons based at San Carlos and Fanning Head shooting down two Gazelle gunships killing three of the crew.
It was a fine day once the mist cleared, perfect weather for the Fuerza Aerea or Argentine Air Force. There was a mistaken arrogance amongst some in the British force that the pilots were second-grade compared to the RAF. Perhaps they should have taken better notice of the Fuerza training – these pilots had been taken under the wing, so to speak, of both the Israeli and French Air forces. At first glance on paper, the Argentinians did have the upper hand, They had a vast superiority in the numbers of aircraft, and bases. But the nearest base – Rio Gallegos was 400 miles away. That was an hour of flight time given the take-offs, landings and low level flying that was conducted in the final phases to avoid missiles.
The British had developed a dangerous misconception that their opponents were not going to put up too much of a fight. Soon after they landed on San Carlos, these illusions were laid to rest spectacularly.
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The British were preparing to land their amphibious force on the north western tip of the East Falklands at a place called San Carlos. I won’t go into the long drawn out debate that took place between commanders over alternatives, because its moot considering what happened next.
However as you’re going to hear, because they had not managed to take control of the air war, some of the landing and support vessels were going to suffer the consequences.
By 15th May, civilians aboard the ships including the press, were handed the Declaration of Active Service placing them under direct military discipline.
On the 18th May, the amphibious force lined up with aircraft carrier Hermes and Brigadier Thompson was told that the missiles from rear Admiral Woodward’s ships would provide air cover. Fortunately for the British, on that day the container ship Atlantic Conveyor had arrived carrying twelve Harrier aircraft. These were now flown aboard the carriers, four were RAF GR3 ground-attack aircraft while the others were from the hastily constituted 809 Naval Sea Harrier Squadron.
These were flown by pilots from all over the world, Hugh Slade from Australia, Bill Covington from Arizona USA, Al Craig from Germany amongst others. They’d also brought 24 much needed maintenance crew. On the 19th May, four more GR3s landed – having flown in a remarkable single seat air-fuelled flight from Britain via Ascension Island.
It was what could be called a condemned man’s final meal, the food on the ships improved dramatically, with steak on the menu for breakfast, lunch and tea. That evening on the Canberra, Lieutenant Colonel Vaux addressed 42 commando, warning that their landing would be unlike any other fighting they’d known. Most had experience of urban warfare, fighting the IRA in northern Ireland. There casualties had taken preference, here they would not.
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The HSM Sheffield has just been sunk by an Exocet days after the General Belgrano was sent to the depths by two torpedoes.
This war was turning nastier by the minute and not helped by the media on both sides – British Warship sunk by Argies – yelled the Sun Headline
The Daily Star was a bit more direct – its headline was merely:
SUNK!
The odd thing was that the Sheffield had not actually gone down by the time these stories were published – it would take three days for the Sheffield to eventually roll over but there was no denying the palpable shock which ran through the British nation on the morning of the 5th May 1982 the day after the crew abandoned ship.
The mood in the war cabinet that day reflected these views, with John Nott the most shaken of Margaret Thatchers’ ministers. He told the House of commons later
“It has been a dreadful event…” but the first effect was to infuse the British diplomatic efforts with new energy and foreign secretary Francis Pym was on the move once more. Just a few days earlier he had been waving his arms about airily dismissing the peace initiatives in a condescending manner, now he was shocked into action.
Meanwhile, since the beginning of May, the SAS and Special Boat Service had not been idle. Parties from G squadron SAS and the SBS began landing ashore on the Falklands from the 1st May to assess the strength and condition of the Argentinian forces.
Rear Admiral Woodward had ordered the frigate HMS Alacrity to steam at full speed through the Falkland Sound – the passage between East and West Falklands. The plan was to pressurise the Argentine garrison and to prove that the British had naval superiority. What Woodward didn’t know, was that there were five Argentine supply ships in various parts of the Falkland Sound that night.
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A catastrophe had befallen the Argentinians with the sinking of the Belgrano on May 2nd 1982, all in all 368 sailors died after it was torpedoed by the nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror.
While Argentina’s warships never ventured out to sea again, the diplomatic fallout from the sinking caused Britain to lose a great deal of good faith that she’d built up over the preceding few weeks.
But it was only two days later that Admiral Anaya was going to take his revenge.
Before then, a few bits of action were recorded. On the night of 2nd May a Sea King helicopter was fired on by the Argentinian naval vessel the Alferez Sobral about 100 nautical miles north of the Falklands. The helicopter escaped damage and flew back to HMS Glasgow and Coventry, based nearby. Two Lynx choppers took off and guided by the Sea King took aim at the Sobral firing two Sea Skua missiles. The British recorded two explosions and the echo of the Sobral seemed to die away – they thought it had been sunk.
It hadn’t.
Out among the British ships, the crews were working their defence watches, second-degree readiness. The surveillance radars were picking up false echoes suggesting incoming aircraft, what was known as anomalous propagation. Several of the ships were chatting about this problem, HMS Coventry was in contact with HMS Sheffield which had taken over Coventry’s usual station at the south-west corner of the task force, about 40 miles south of Port Stanley.
When war erupted most of Sheffield’s crew thought they wouldn’t be joining the Task Team, they were off Gibraltar on their way home after 4 and a half months at sea. That’s quite a stint for a destroyer. After deployment on April 2nd, some thought they wouldn’t be heading further south than Ascension Island. Eventually and ironically HMS Sheffield was the first surface ship to reach the Total Exclusion Zone – ahead of the Task Force.
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The Vulcan has just bombed Port Stanley airfield, causing significant damage and the Argentinians on the Falklands were about to experience a wave of attacks by Sea Harriers.
While this was happening, Argentina’s most powerful warship the General Belgrano was steaming into the Atlantic for the last time as it turn out.
To the north east, Vice-Admiral Woodward’s battle group of thirteen ships had entered the exclusion zone in the early hours of the 1st May and the flight-deck crews on board the carriers were prepping the sea Harriers for the next blow.
Invincible had modern radar and the smaller air group and was designated as the air-defence ship, concentrating on providing combat air patrols to fly cover for the fleet.
The twelve Harriers on board Hermes were going to fly to the Falklands. The planes led by Lieutenant Commander Andy Auld of 800 squadron took off from the Hermes at first light, assembled over the fleet, then turned towards the Falklands’ Coast. Balancing the fuel against the bomb payloads had been a mathematical challenge, but Woodward made this easier by bringing his carriers closer than 70 miles off the coast to give the Harriers an opportunity to carry heavier bomb loads and less fuel. The 12 flew in low and fast, three aircraft detached to attack the Goose Green Argentinian base, the rest were aiming at Stanley runway and anti-aircraft defences.
About 300 nautical miles west of the Total Exclusion Zone or TEZ, and close to the Argentine coast, two British submarines were venturing in search of the enemies boats. The Royal Navy knew that they had to find these before the largest and most dangerous entered the TEZ, particularly the General Belgrano. In early April 1982 the British War Cabinet had ordered the subs to keep away from the mainland lest they sink one of the more important ships and then damage the possible negotiations that but by the end of April, Margaret Thatcher’s cabinet changed their minds.
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It’s late April 1982 and the British have retaken the island of South Georgia after a sharp fight against the Argentinians who’d seized the frozen outcrop the day after the Falklands were invaded.
The Argentine fleet had returned to its base after the initial landing on 2nd April, its welcome as the force which had regained the islands muted by the United Nations resolution calling for a withdrawal and the news that the British had dispatched a task force.
It would be at least two weeks before the British arrived so the Argentinians spent the time replenishing their ships and fixing a few mechanical defects. After London had declared a Maritime Exclusion Zone of 200 nautical miles from the centre of the Falklands, any Argentinian ship entering this area was likely to be sunk by the British submarines that were already in the area.
At least, that’s what the Argentinians believed.
Submarines Spartan and the Splendid had headed off to the South Atlantic on the 1st April when it suddenly dawned on the cabinet and the Ministry of Defence that Buenos Aires was serious about invading the islands. By the 12 April these two nuclear submarines were on station – but what the Argentinians didn’t know was that the British sub commanders had not yet received permission to attack ships.
The first of May dawned, and for Argentinians this was known as the start of the Falklands, although the British had believed that was the day of invasion – 2nd April.
The bombing of Port Stanley airport by the British was an extraordinary feat of aviation endurance. First the action of the Aircraft Carriers Hermes and Invincible each with a squadron of Sea Harriers and many helicopters, along with ten destroyers and frigates supported by three supply ships gave the impression of an imminent attack. Operation Blackbuck was so unbelievably difficult, it’s difficult to believe that it was successful.
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When we ended last episode, the Argentinians had just seized Gryviken in South Georgia on 3rd April 1982 and had begun to move new units into the Falklands replacing the commandos who landed on the 2nd.
The British cabinet had met and the Task Force was at sea within 5 days. Elements of the force converged on the Ascension Islands at the end of the second week of April 1982 and were under orders to prepare a number of options for the cabinet’s decision.
Commodore Clapp and Brigadier Thompson aboard the Fearless were wrestling with how to recapture the Falklands. Thompson’s planning cell of officers was called the R Group, and were specifically instructed to concern themselves with land operations. The sea and air battle would apparently have been wrapped up by the time of their arrival at the islands.
This was not what was going to happen, but they didn’t know that then obviously.
Some in the cabinet preferred a lengthy blockade to any landings. But by far the biggest strategic debate early in this war was what to do about South Georgia. The island was 800 miles beyond the primary objective in hostile seas and anyone steaming there would be exposed to the Argentinian submarines. Whatever Thompson thought – sending his entire brigade to South Georgia was dangerous.
So conversely the use of only a small force on the Antrim and Plymouth was less risky even if they failed to take South Georgia. Eventually the decision was taken to attack this island first and this was primarily political. The British public were baying for blood, Buenos Aires remained intransigent, Washington insiders were whispering that London was afraid of a showdown. The Antrim group was dispatched in haste to deal with South Georgia as a matter of urgency.
The detached squadron led by Captain Brian Young in Antrim rendezvoused with Endurance 1000 miles north of South Georgia on 14th April. The British believed the Argentinians had placed only a small garrison on the bleak, glacier-encrusted island, but did not know that reinforcements were being sent.
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The Argentinians invaded the Falklands on 2nd April 1982 and as you heard last episode, the main force took the islands after a short firefight at Government House which left one Argentinian dead and two wounded and one Royal Marine wounded in the arm there.
The Army’s 25th Regiment was already flying in from the mainland airfield of Comodoro Rivadavia to replace the marine landing force. It would be followed by the 9th Engineer Company, and these two units would constitute the first Argentine Garrison in the Falklands.
Four of the important planes in the coming conflict, the Pucaras, of the 3rd Attack Group then carried out a fly-past and landed at Port Stanley airfield. The Argentinian 25th Regiment to be the main force in the garrison and they were chosen because they were the closest unit to the islands. Some have said they were chosen symbolically as superior troops selected from various units but Argentinians say this was false information.
They were a normal unit with professional officers and NCOs but all the privates were conscripts. This was going to have a bearing on what happened when the fighting started later. The British were sending professionals, whereas the Argentinian backbone of soldiers were all conscripts and in the coming hand-to-hand battles in trenches, this would be a telling difference.
The Falkands British officials were removed on the same day, including most of the Royal Marines which were quickly rounded up. Their commanding officer, Major Norman, later said that his men were treated well by the captors – except when the Argentinian 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion arrived. They weren’t involved in any fighting and yet had set out to humiliate the British troops. While this was going on, Argentina erupted in a day of ecstasy. A communique announced that the fifty two year-old commander of the Buenos Aires first army corps, General Mario Benjamin Menendez had been appointed governor of the Islas Malvinas. At a rally later outside the Casa Rosada presidential palace, General Galtieri told a jubilant crowd that the three commanders in chief of the junta had interpreted the will of the people. His voice constantly broke with emotion at the spectacle before him. Not since the days of Peron had a soldier been so well received. A few days before, this police had shot civilians in the same Plaza, now the square was filled with thousands weeping tears of joy.
In London, the 2nd April was a brilliant spring day – but Westminster and Whitehall were in shock – chilled to the bone by the news. Everyone was talking in hushed tones. It was only hours before that Margaret Thatchers’ cabinet had been discussing methods of deterrence and now these ideas were moot. What was even more incredible, is that throughout Friday morning long after the Argentinians had seized Port Stanley, the British establishment was incredulous about a full invasion. Their communications had been difficult with the Falklands for a number of reasons – including the weather – and they were monitoring the Buenos Aires celebrations with a sense of disbelief.
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The Argentinians have just landed commandos and attacked the Marine Barracks at Moody Brook, but missed their target as the 40 specialist brit soldiers have been on the move for more than a day already.
As your heard last episode, the British finally managed to get a warning to their Falklands Governor, Rex Hunt, a few hours before the Argentinian fleet anchored off Port Stanley.
Argentinian Rear-Admiral Büsser had been studying the problems of landing at the Falklands since January 1982 and the commandos had carried out the first obvious mission – to strike at the Marine Barracks “by surprise and without bloodshed” he told author Martin Middlebrook.
Büsser’s original plan was to land the Amphibious Commando Company during the night on a beach two miles south of Stanley, then to march overland and seize the barracks along with other key points in the town. The main landing force would then come ashore at dawn with an army platoon sent ahead to capture Government House and the governor, while the marines completed the sweep of Stanley.
A small plane would fly from the mainland once the island was secure, and its occupants would prepare the airport for the arrival of a much larger army contingent which would replace the landing force and form the first garrison.
Two more platoons were to be transported by helicopter from the Almirante Irizar to occupy Goose Green and Darwin area.
However, he hit a snag. Firstly, there was no surprise, his own state radio had told everyone the night before that by dawn the Falklands would “be ours”. So the beach was going to be defended and the airport runway likely blocked. Worse, the Puma helicopter that was supposed to be used on board the Almirante Irizar had broken loose in its hangar during the raging storm you heard about last episode and was damaged.
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As we heard last episode, Argentinian businessman Senor Davidoff had chartered a boat to take 41 of his men to South Georgia to salvage metal and other materials from abandoned whaling stations. The had not reported to the British head of a scientific mission at the port of Grytviken despite being told to.
It was March 1982 and the Bahia Buen Suceso had dropped off the scrapmen on the island who were breaking down the abandoned buildings. They’d also been joined by a French film crew who were forced to seek shelter at South Georgia. After they fixed up the broken tiller and mast, they sailed to Leith Bay from Grytviken to film the scrapping – having decided to forego their planned trip to the Antarctic which had almost ended in catastrophe.
On the 23rd March, Lord Carrington the British Foreign Secretary sent an even stronger message to Buenos Aires. If the Bahia Buen Suceso was not ordered back to remove the 41 Argentinian workers left on South Georgia, the Royal Marines would do this forcibly.
Endurance was now ordered to head straight for South Georgia and arrived there on the 24th March, then the crew awaited further orders.
By the evening of the 23rd March, Admirals, Lombardo, Allara and Busser were gathered at Puerto Belgrano. The all-important army General Garcia was at V Corps HQ only 37 kilometers away.
These men communicated and drew up a rushed plan by the evening of the 25th March. Junta leader Galtieri was told the invasion of the Falklands could begin on the 1st April, with a South Georgia operation planned for the same day.
The Falkland’s plan was simple. First they’d capture Stanley with its airport and Royal Marines barracks. Then they’d focus on the second largest settlement at Goose Green.
The Argentine navy would carry out these invasions which was partly dictated by the amphibious nature of the operations.
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As you heard last episode, Admiral Jorge Anaya had begun to plan an invasion of the Falklands by 1979, shortly after Argentina won the Soccer World Cup of 1978.
Anaya had been commander-in-chief of the Argentine Navy and a member of the military junta that controlled the country since 1976. But by far the most important player in this saga was General Leopoldo Galtieri who became president shortly before Anaya was installed as navy chief.
Incumbent president Roberto Viola’s health had been deteriorating.
One of the more hawkish members of the Argentinian government was Admiral Anaya who was the longest serving member of the junta and some suggest he made the recovery of the Falklands a condition of his support for Galtieri as President. Some military leaders say this was a fallacy – it was in fact the other way around - that both Anaya and Air Force member of the Junta, Brigadier Lami Dozo, were approached by Galtieri to select a choice military project. This was not necessarily the Malvinas, but history will show that whatever the initial idea was, the islands were at the heart of propaganda campaigns.
The military junta was in a rush. The top of the list for their foreign policy was the resolution of what they called the ‘Malvinas problem’. And of course, without the Navy’s full support there would be no resolution one way or the other.
There was another significant event however before that year – and this the arrival on the international scene of someone called Margaret Thatcher. In May 1979 Labour was voted from power. While this initially led to more of the same when it came to the perception of the Falklands inside Whitehall by government technocrats, even Thatcher did not regard the islands as of great interest at least at first.
Enter Constantino Davidoff an Argentine Businessman, who’d asked the Edinburgh-based firm of Christian Salvesen in 1977 whether it would sell the scrap material in four abandoned whaling stations in South Georgia. IT would.
By 1979 he had a signed agreement and senor Davidoff paid one hundred thousand pounds for the rights to remove material before the end of March 1982. He’d only managed to leave Buenos Aires in March 1982 to collect his scrap metal but he had to check in at Grytviken first for permission from the all-powerful Steve Martin before salvaging at Leith and two other places called Husvik and Stromness.
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This is episode three and we’re dealing with the period up to the invasion of the islands by the Argentinians on 2nd April 1982.
Had it been a day earlier, most people across the world would have thought that the news was a horrendous April Food Joke – but it wasn’t.
As we heard last episode, by 1971 negotiations between the British and the Argentinians had vascillated between good intentions and terrible breakdowns. Throughout the 1960s, the British were trying to figure out how to offload the Falklands without causing political condemnation at home. That changed by the 70s. The British were becoming more hesitant about the whole idea despite pressure from the United Nations and other international agencies.
At the same time, the Argentinian right-wing dictatorship had made the Falklands Malvinas their main target to instigate international anger – and to placate their own citizens. Foreign Minister Costa Mendes was leading the communication – he vocal and urbane, and a devout Argentinian nationalist.
The British parliament and then successive cabinets became instinctively hostile to Whitehall’s determination to pursue negotiations. The technocrats just saw rising costs at a time of economic fragility, but politicians were equally uncomfortable throwing the 1800 Falklanders under an Argentinian bus.
As Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins ask in their excellent book The Battle for the Falklands, why didn’t the Foreign Office just simply give up? Instead they kept ploughing on, trying to find a negotiated solution.
In January 1972 an Albatross flying boat landed off Port Stanley to commence a twice-monthly service to Comodoro Rivadavia – and soon, it was hoped, an airstrip would be hewn out of the heath.
350 Argentine tourists arrived onboard the first major cruise liner called the Libertad.
That single visit emptied Port Stanley of its entire stock of souvenirs. All seemed swanky, but then the backsliding began and it began with the British.
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Those who fought in their twenties would be in their mid-sixties now – and there are quite a few thousand vets on both sides commemorating fallen comrades.
As you heard last episode, the ownership of the Falklands has been disputed for centuries although the islanders themselves are very clear who they are – they’re British. Through today’s podcast you’ll hear that at times, London was not so sure about that. What some forget is that the British government in the 1960s were close to doing a deal with the Argentinians to offload the Falklands at a time of great global pressure on the UK – specifically with regard to its many colonial dependencies and its stuttering economy. Both sides in the Falkland Malvinas dispute have very long memories. We heard how the Spanish had forced the French to hand ownership of Port Egmont on West Falklands back to the British in 1770. We also heard how the British left the Port having hammered a plaque on a door in 1773.
When we left off last, the British had returned to the Falklands with two warships the Tyne and Clio under the command of Captain James Onslow on the 2nd January 1833.
Argentinians all are also convinced that the Malvina’s belong to them, outrageously seized in 1833 by a distant European colonial power called England.
Across the Atlantic and an entire century and a half later, British Foreign Secretary Francis Pym was to announce in 1982 that Her Majesty’s government “…is not in any doubt about our title to the islands and we never have been …”
But did possession amount to nine-tenths of the law?
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