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To conclude Season Four of Talking Strategy, we talk to long-serving diplomat, policy adviser and politician The Rt Hon Baroness Neville-Jones.
With intimate experience of the functioning of governments and the EU, Lady Neville-Jones compares the respective organisational cultures and human side of strategy, drawing on lessons from her career.
Pauline Neville-Jones joined the British diplomatic service in 1963. She was posted in places as varied as Rhodesia, Singapore, Bonn, Washington and the European Commission. From the 1990s onwards her postings were specifically concerned with defence matters. She was head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat of the Cabinet Office from 1991 to 1994, and during that time she also chaired the Joint Intelligence Committee. Subsequently, she was Political Director of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office until 1996, and in that capacity negotiated the 1995 Dayton Agreement on Bosnia on behalf of the UK.
In the final episode of this season, Lady Neville-Jones reflects on the success of the Dayton Agreement: was it âgood enoughâ? Was anything better in the offing? And on relations with Russia: did the West âloseâ Moscow in the 1990s? Tune in to hear her advice to practitioners.
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Moshe Dayan (1915-1981) is a controversial figure in Israeli politics. Revered by some as a master strategist, he is criticised by others for his failure to foresee Egyptâs attack in 1973, and then for âgiving upâ the Sinai in return for a peace treaty.
Strategy-making can take two approaches. The first, âDeliberate Strategyâ, is formulated and implemented hierarchically and centrally; decisions are taken by the head of the organisation, and detailed plans and instructions are issued to those responsible for implementation. The alternative model, âEmergent Strategyâ, is characterised by its flexibility on ends as well as ways and means.
This weekâs guest, Professor Eitan Shamir, is the Director of the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies of Bar Ilan University, argues that Moshe Dayan was a strategist who took the second approach. Professor Shamir is the author of a new biography entitled âMoshe Dayan: The Making of a Strategistâ (2023, in Hebrew, and due to be published in English in 2024 by Cambridge University Press) and, with Beatrice, edited Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures (CUP, 2017).
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Marshal of the Royal Air Force Arthur Tedder was General Eisenhowerâs Deputy as Supreme Commander for Operation Overlord during the Second World War. A quiet and thoughtful leader, Tedder understood the difference between war and warfare and carefully orchestrated his campaigns â including the transportation plan concerning D-Day â in an alliance context to great effect.
Tedderâs strategic leadership can be characterised as understated and thoughtful, underpinned by his ability to manage relationships with allies and experts to get the most from each. He also understood the importance of waging war economically in a way that exploited logistics capacity as a critical enabler for his own forces and as a means of weakening his enemies. Despite the Allied victory, after the Second World War he recognised the weaknesses that loomed.
This weekâs guest, Air Marshal Edward Stringer, was the air component commander for NATO's operation in Libya in 2011, the Director of Operations in the UK Ministry of Defence and the UK liaison officer to the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his last role, he was Director General Joint Force Development. Since retirement, he has become an expert commentator and writer on defence, defence strategy and air power.
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Qasim Soleimani was arguably Iranâs most important military leader in modern history. He moved Iranâs overall strategy from a direct approach to an indirect one of proxy warfare using non-state actors.
Born in 1957, General Soleimani rose from a humble background to become a key commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. His experience of the IranâIraq War of 1980â88 gave him a desire to avoid another high-casualty conflict. Instead, he developed a proxy war approach that was much less costly to Iran, using Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and later Hamas to put pressure on Israel and the US. Soleimani was killed in a targeted strike by US forces in January 2020, which made him a martyr in Iran.
Dr Afshon Ostovar, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval Postgraduate School, joins Beatrice and Paul for this episode.
A graduate of the Universities of Arizona and Michigan, he was a Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, worked for the US Department of Defense, and taught at Johns Hopkins University. His book on the Revolutionary Guards examines the rise of Iranâs most powerful armed force and its role in regional conflicts and political violence.
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JosĂ© de San MartĂn gained his military experience serving Spain and fighting the French, sometimes with the British,meeting Wellington, Beresford, and Napoleon. Having served for 22 years in the Spanish Army, Jose de San Martin brilliantly led the armies that overthrew the Spanish to liberate the southern countries of South America.
With naval experience, in coordination with former British naval officer Thomas, Lord Cochrane, he worked out how maritime and land forces could support each other, catching the Spanish colonial forces between simulated naval attacks on the one hand and land attacks on the other, forcing them to divide their forces. With technology no different from that available to Hannibal, San MartĂn crossed the Andes, a mountain range far higher than the Alps (admittedly with horses and mules, not elephants!).
Joining us to talk about this national hero of Argentina, Chile and Peru is Lt Gen Diego Luis Suñer, Chief of the Argentine Army from 2016-2018.
General Suñer joined the Army in 1979 and retired after 40 years' service in which he commanded multinational troops in Ecuador and Peru, attended the United States Army Command and Staff Course and was a professor at the Argentine Armyâs Higher School of War.
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The relationship between Winston Churchill and his leading military advisor, the abrasive General âShrapnelâ Alan Brooke (1883â1963), was one of the most productive yet tensest in the history of civil-military relations. This episode delves into some of their strategic debates.
Viscount Alanbrookeâs relationship with Churchill was famously rocky, yet the two leaders trusted one another. It was due to Brookeâs influence that the Americans were persuaded to drop their plan to liberate Italy by starting off with a campaign to take Sardinia and to go for Sicily instead, and he also talked Churchill into dropping plans for an operation in Indonesia.
The guest for this episode is Dr Andrew Sangster, an historian and Anglican priest and the author of 17 books, including an acclaimed biography of Alanbrooke. His next book, From Plato to Putin, discusses the causes and ethical dilemmas of war.
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Generals Ulysses S Grant and Robert E Lee commanded the opposing armies in the American Civil War, each the greatest military leader of their own side. Products of the Academy at West Point, they were both expert tacticians and, most importantly, understood their sidesâ strategic goals, limitations and opportunities, and led them accordingly. But Grant only really took charge in 1863, two years into the war. Had one of his predecessors still been in command, might the South have won? Join us to find out whether it might have, and why it did not.
Joining Beatrice and Paul for this episode is Dr Christian Keller, Professor of History and Director of the Military History Programme of the Department of National Security and Strategy at the United States Army War College. Dr Keller is the award-winning author of The Great Partnership: Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and the Fate of the Confederacy, and is also the host of The Civil War Strategy Podcast. In 2017 he was named the General Dwight D Eisenhower Chair of National Security.
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Air Chief Marshal Lord Peach, the former Chair of NATOâs Military Committee and architect of NATOâs first new military strategy in 50 years, joins us to discuss the process of strategy-making in an Alliance context.
Lord Peach is the UKâs most experienced officer, having served in key 4-star appointments, including as the UKâs Chief of the Defence Staff (2016â18) and as the 32nd Chair of the NATO Military Committee (2018â21). He led the NATO military staffs through the creation of NATOâs new Military Strategy and the family of plans that sit beneath it. He is now the UKâs Special Envoy to the Balkans.
In conversation, he offers insights into the challenges and strengths of Alliance strategy-making in NATO. In his view, while NATO requires unanimity for the adoption of any new decision, this is not only possible, but vital. It is a strength rather than the weakness some, less familiar with the organisation, perceive it to be. However, once unanimously adopted, a strategy must cope with ambiguity and evolve before it is adapted to ever-changing, and inevitably ambiguous, circumstances.
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Admiral Sergey Georgyevich Gorshkov (1910â1988) was a celebrated hero of the so-called Great Fatherland War (1941â1945). He was Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy from 1956 until 1985, which he built up to be a navy fit for a superpower with global ambitions. He also furnished the navyâs theoretical strategic underpinnings through a series of publications which were studied closely by friends and foes alike.
The navy that Gorshkov inherited was significantly smaller than that of the USSRâs main competitor, the US. Gorshkov turned this navy into a strong defensive force that could keep US nuclear submarines at bay. But he also wanted his navy to project Soviet power globally.
In this episode, Beatrice and Paul and joined by Captain (ret.) Dr Kevin Rowlands, Head of the Royal Navyâs Strategic Studies Centre. Captain Rowlands spent 30 years in the Royal Navy, both at sea and in positions such as Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and was the Course Director for the UKâs Advanced Command and Staff Course.
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In an epic achievement, Shawnee chief Tecumseh (1768â1813) brought together warring Native American tribes to stand up against the European settlers as they were pushing further West. His strategy included coalitions and the mobilisation of society as America had never seen before.
In this episode, Beatrice and Paul are joined by Dr Kori Schake, Director of Foreign and Defence Policy at the American Enterprise Institute. Tecumseh, initially just the younger brother of a Shawnee chief, rose to fame along with his younger brother Tenskwatawa, a shamanic figure. Together they launched a movement that bridged age-old divisions among the Native American tribes. Social reforms â the repudiation of European imports such as alcohol, and a return to native customs â went hand in hand with political mobilisation and then military operations to roll back the encroachment of European settlements on Native American territory.
Dr Schake has developed a passion for the Shawnee chief. She is a practitioner of strategy, having served in several high positions in the US Defense and State Departments and on the National Security Council. She was a foreign policy adviser to the McCain-Palin 2008 presidential campaign and has previously held the Distinguished Chair of International Security Studies at West Point.
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Napoleon is admired as one of the greatest strategists ever; he won most of his battles and dictated the terms of the peace treaties that ended his individual wars. Yet in the end, he was defeated, and his empire fell apart. So how great a strategist was he really?
Napoleonâs âsystem of warâ remained the point of reference for generations, interpreted and publicised by Jomini and Clausewitz.
Professor Alan Forrest joins Beatrice and Paul for this episode. A graduate of Aberdeen and Oxford, he was formerly the Chair of Modern History at York University, where he taught from 1989 to 2012. A prolific author, he is the general editor of a 2023 three-volume Cambridge History of the Napoleonic Wars.
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Hailing from humble origins, Michiel Adrienszoon was later given the surname de Ruyter, the âraiderâ. His greatest triumph was the Battle of Solebay in 1672. There he launched a pre-emptive strike against and defeated the English fleet as it prepared to attack the Netherlands jointly with the French.
Originally a merchant sailor, Michiel de Ruyter operated in waters from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. A reluctant hero and an apolitical figure, he loyally served the Dutch Republic under Jan de Witt and subsequently William III of Orange. De Ruyter is most famous in England for inflicting on the Royal Navy its most embarrassing defeat of the 17th century in the raid on Chatham in 1667.
The guest for this episode, David âJDâ Davies, is the chairman of the Society for Nautical Research and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. A prize-winning and bestselling author, he specialises principally in the early history of the Royal Navy. His most acclaimed scholarly non-fiction books include Pepysâs Navy: Ships, Men and Warfare 1649-89 and Kings of the Sea: Charles II, James II and the Royal Navy. His series of naval fiction set in the 17th century, The Journals of Matthew Quinton, was described by The Times as âa series of real panacheâ, and he has also published a trilogy set in Tudor times around the fictional character of Jack Stannard.
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Catherine II of Russia prided herself on being called âemperorâ, not âempressâ. Having dumped her weak husband, she deployed her lovers strategically: one she made king of Poland, one she sent to conquer Crimea, and one to rule over it. Here are the origins of Russiaâs claims to Ukraine.
Dr Kelly OâNeill, an historian of Russia at Harvard University, and the author of Claiming Crimea: A History of Catherine the Greatâs Southern Empire, joins Beatrice and Paul for this episode.
Coming from an aristocratic family of the Holy Roman Empire, Catherine II married the heir to the Russian imperial throne, but upon his accession, managed to seize power and reigned in her own right from 1762-1796. She plunged into European great power politics with great talent and sweeping strategic moves. Previously, Russia had not had access to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean trade beckoning beyond it. Catherine even had her eye on Constantinople, and dreamed of freeing it from Turkish occupation to restore it to Christendom under the rule of her grandson, fittingly named Constantine. While this did not come to pass, by the end of her reign, Russia had occupied a large part of the Polish Lithuanian empire, dominated the Black Sea and was a European great power. It was said that no cannon in Europe could be fired without her leave, a line that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov currently likes to use in his speeches: clearly, his master would like to restore this situation.
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The Swedish campaigns in Central Europe in the Thirty Yearsâ War are remembered in folklore for their brutality, for massacres of civilians and âscorched earthâ tactics. And yet, as their leader, King Gustavus II Adolphus of Sweden (1594 â 1632) is remembered almost as a saint, even in these very same regions.
King Gustavus Adolphus, an experienced military commander who had already fought and won wars against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Denmark, intervened in the Thirty Yearsâ War like a force of nature â a âLion from Midnightâ. He was the champion of the Protestant cause, fighting the Catholic Habsburgs and their followers. In a series of huge moves, his armies swept through the Holy Roman Empire, winning battles at Frankfurt/Oder, Werben, Breitenfeld, Rain on the River Lech, and, finally, LĂŒtzen â but this last Swedish victory cost him his life.
Professor Gunnar Ă selius explains the paradox: Gustavus Adolphus prided himself on his military reforms and the discipline he kept among his soldiers, but even they would turn to pillage and murder to feed themselves when they were not paid. Holding degrees from the universities of Uppsala and Stockholm, Professor Ă selius teaches Military History at the Swedish Defence University.
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Julius Caesar is famous for describing hugely complicated strategic problems, then adding his famous Vini, vidi, vici: âI came, I saw, I conqueredâ. But what did his strategic genius consist of? And how did he justify extending the Roman Empire right across Western Europe?
Did Rome acquire her empire, not quite in a fit of absent-mindedness, but defensively, or was she ruthlessly expansionist? Gaius Iulius Caesarâs account of his Gallic Wars (58-50 BC) explained his military operations as âjustâ wars: Rome came to the rescue of allies and quelled lawless rebels. Admittedly, Caesar showed outstanding generalship. Forced marches by Roman infantry, operations - even in winter - caught adversaries by surprise. Complementing kinetic tools of siege craft and battle, Caesarâs diplomacy turned Gallic and Germanic tribes and their leaders against each other, forging alliances and isolating adversaries, just as he had done previously in Roman domestic politics.
Dr Louis Rawlings helps us dissect Caesar as a strategist and as a political animal. Rawlings holds his degrees from University College London, having previously taught there and at the Department of War Studies, Kingâs College London. He is now Senior Lecturer in Ancient History at Cardiff University.
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While most of the political and military commanders whom we now call âgreatâ were often ruthless or megalomaniacs, Korean Admiral Yi Sun-sin is remembered not only for his military prowess but also for his integrity and humility. He came to his nationâs rescue in extremis when others had failed.
The 15th and 16th century saw unprecedented creativity in naval warfare. The Chinese, Portuguese, Spanish, English, Japanese and Koreans each employed their first blue water navies in distinct ways, for distinct strategic purposes, and with distinct technological innovations. In 1592, Admiral Yi Sun-sin answered the call to rescue his country from invasion, despite having been undeservedly court-martialled twice and reduced to the ranks by hostile superiors who were jealous of his abilities. Vastly overmatched, with only a dozen innovative âturtle shipsâ and some support from Chinese naval forces, he defeated the Japanese fleet, isolating the Hideyoshi army and ending the Imjin War â a triumph that cost him his life.
Lt Cdr Dr Seok Yeong-dal teaches naval history and strategy at the Republic of Korea Naval Academy. His PhD from Yonsei University in Seoul examined the successes and limitations of the Royal Navy's reforms in the 19th century. He has written extensively on Admiral Yi, as well as on the Royal Navy in the 19th century with his recent book, A Failed Reform or The First Steps of Reforms, Achievements and Limitations of the Royal Navy's Reforms in the 19th Century, published in South Korea in 2023.
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Frederick II of Prussia, like the Era of the Enlightenment in which he lived, was torn about warfare: was it to be humanised, or was it to be perfected? As king he favoured the latter, earning the respect of contemporaries as the greatest strategist of his age.
Frederick in his youth thought Machiavelliâs instructions for princes morally reprehensible, and as a king surrounded himself with great moral philosophers, including, famously, Voltaire. But Frederick saw it as his duty, as that of any monarch, to increase the territorial possessions of his dynasty, even by war, irrespective of just causes. One of the last monarchs who was his own commander-in-chief on his military campaigns, he was also a crafty political strategist, wresting Silesia away from Empress Maria Theresia yet persuading her to colluding with him (and Catherine II of Russia) in the partition of Poland.
Dr Adam Storring helps us understand this complicated man, who like Xerxes and Alexander III before him, was obsessed with outdoing and outshining his father. A Cambridge man, Dr Storring was awarded the AndrĂ© Corvisier Prize for the worldwide Best Dissertation on Military History in 2019. His publications include works on Frederick the Great, including in the forthcoming Cambridge History of Strategy (2024). He teaches at the Department of War Studies, Kingâs College London.
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Alexander III of Macedon posed as the âSon of Zeusâ, but followed the advice of his biological father, King Philip II, to get out of Macedon and âseek a kingdom equal to yourselfâ. Between 336 and 323 BC, Alexander the Great created the largest empire the Middle East had known.
Macedonian expansionism had begun under Philip II, with his son Alexander II picking up and honing the armed forces created by his father. But where Philipâs strategic aims were to dominate all of Greece and Western Asia Minor, Alexanderâs sight was set on bringing the Persian Empire to heel. And as he moved from sieges and massacres to battle after victorious battle, his ambitions grew further â the conquest of Afghanistan and India. How did he keep his Macedonian and Greek companions motivated? Without him to lead, they did not know how to get back?
Dr Andrew Fear, Lecturer in Ancient History at the University of Manchester, joins Paul and Beatrice to tell us about the strategies of Alexander. An Oxonian, he has a spate of publications on Alexander and on warfare in Antiquity, with contributions to the Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare (CUP 2007) and to the forthcoming Cambridge History of Strategy, co-edited by Beatrice, and Isabelle Duyvesteyn. He is co-editor with Dr Jamie Wood of A Companion to Isidore of Seville (Brill, 2015).
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Shaka Zulu (c. 1787â1828) was the most powerful king in southern Africa during the pre-colonial period. He forged a polity that would become the largest in the region through the ruthless use of his reorganised and loyal army.
Initially regarded as an upstart, Shaka managed to impose himself as a regional ruler. Invaded by a powerful neighbouring tribe, he organised the collective defence of the Zulus and other tribes, reorganising the militia and drawing on indigenous traditions, without any European influences. He then turned to crushing the surrounding chiefdoms with the utmost brutality, leaving a trail of massacres and destruction in his wake. Operating with only 5,000 to 10,000 warriors at any given time, Shaka â like Napoleon â prevailed not through the introduction of new technologies, but through innovative ways of training and employing his army.
Professor John Laband is the world-leading expert on Zulu history. A graduate of the University of Natal and Cambridge, he is Professor Emeritus of History at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada. He joins Beatrice and Paul for this episode.
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Dr John O. Hyland joins Paul and Beatrice to discuss fifth-century BC Persian ruler Xerxes I, whose royal progress took him to the Western boundaries of his empire.
Xerxes I tried to extend his rule beyond the Aegean, which his father had failed to accomplish. For a land power this was a challenge, despite the formidable army that Xerxes commanded. He used two strategic tools â engineering, to construct a pontoon bridge across the Hellespont, and the hire of a navy, to tackle the Athenian fleet. While the latter did not work so well for him at Salamis, Xerxesâ army returned by land.Safely back beyond the Straits, Xerxes portrayed himself as conqueror and enforcer of order on the Greeks.
Dr John O. Hyland is the perfect specialist to talk to us about Xerxes, and also about the theory of a Greek or âWesternâ Way of War, identified and scorned by Xerxesâ cousin Mardonius, and contrasted with a supposedly more subtle âEasternâ way of war. Dr Hyland holds a PhD on the Ancient Mediterranean World from the University of Chicago and teaches at Christopher Newport University. His next book will explore Persiaâs Greek Campaigns.
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