Episódios
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Erlinger v. United States
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 27, 2024.
Petitioner: Paul Erlinger.
Respondent: United States.Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner)Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting the Petitioner)D. Nick Harper (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Paul Erlinger received a 15-year prison term under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), for illegally possessing a firearm. This sentence was based on his three prior convictions for violent felonies, all being Indiana burglaries. Erlinger challenged his sentence on two grounds. First, he argued that Indiana’s definition of burglary extends beyond the federal statute, making it non-applicable as a predicate offense under ACCA. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that Indiana's definition of burglary is “[a] person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony in it.” Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (1990) is no broader than the federal definition of general burglary, which is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.”
Secondly, Erlinger argued that these burglaries did not occur on separate occasions, and claimed that the determination of this fact should be made by a jury, not a judge, as per the Sixth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in Wooden v. United States (2022). The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding that under binding circuit precedent, the government was not required to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Erlinger committed the Indiana burglaries on separate occasions, only to the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence.
Question
Does the Constitution require a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant’s prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act?
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Connelly v. United States
Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 27, 2024.
Petitioner: Thomas A. Connelly, as Executor of the Estate of Michael P. Connelly, Sr.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioner)Yaira Dubin (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Brothers Michael and Thomas Connelly were the sole shareholders of a corporation. The corporation obtained life insurance on each brother so that if one died, the corporation could use the proceeds to redeem his shares. When Michael died, the Internal Revenue Service assessed taxes on his estate, which included his stock interest in the corporation. According to the IRS, the corporation’s fair market value included the life insurance proceeds intended for the stock redemption. Michael’s estate argued otherwise and sued for a tax refund.
The district court granted summary judgment to the IRS, finding that the stock-purchase agreement did not affect the valuation and furthermore, that a proper valuation of the corporation must include the life insurance proceeds used for redemption because they were a significant asset of the company. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Should the proceeds of a life insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder’s stock be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder’s shares for purposes of the federal estate tax?
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Oral argument for Connelly v. United States, argued on March 27, 2024.
Once a transcript is available on oyez.org, the recording and this description will be replaced by more detailed information.
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Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine
Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 26, 2024.
Petitioner: Food and Drug Administration, et al.
Respondent: Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al.Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the federal Petitioners)Jessica L. Ellsworth (for Petitioner Danco Laboratories, L.L.C)Erin M. Hawley (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Medication abortion in the U.S. is commonly conducted using a combination of mifepristone and misoprostol. Mifepristone was approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in September 2000 and is used in over half of all U.S. abortions. Initially, its distribution was limited to hospitals and medical facilities under FDA regulations. The 2007 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act introduced Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), reinforcing FDA's control over drug approvals. Despite REMS review in 2011, mifepristone's distribution remained restricted. In March 2016, the FDA expanded access, allowing medical practitioners to prescribe it and extending the usage period in pregnancy. In April 2021, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the FDA permitted mail distribution from certified sources, and in January 2023, approved pharmacies also began distributing it.
However, following the Supreme Court's June 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, which eliminated the constitutional right to abortion, several states sought to restrict mifepristone’s sale. The Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine and other anti-abortion groups challenged the FDA’s approval, claiming inadequate consideration of evidence in 2000. In April 2023, a federal district court judge sided with the plaintiffs, suspending the FDA’s approval. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit partially stayed this decision, maintaining the original 2000 approval but striking down the 2016 REMS changes that eased access. After a hearing on the merits, in August 2023, the Fifth Circuit upheld the ban on changes made in 2016. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and stayed the lower court’s injunction.
Question
1. Do respondents have Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration’s 2016 and 2021 actions with respect to mifepristone’s approved conditions of use?
2. Were the FDA’s 2016 and 2021 approvals of mifepristone arbitrary and capricious?
3. Did the district court properly grant preliminary relief?
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Oral argument for FDA v. Alliance Hippocratic Medicine, argued on March 26, 2024.
Once a transcript is available on oyez.org, the recording and this description will be replaced by more detailed information.
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Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 25, 2024.
Petitioner: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
Respondent: San Carlos Apache Tribe.Advocates: Caroline A. Flynn (for the Petitioners)Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Respondent in 23-253)Lloyd B. Miller (for the Respondent in 23-250)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Indian Health Service (IHS) manages healthcare for Native tribes, billing Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance for services and retaining the revenue. To enhance tribal sovereignty, Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), allowing tribes to administer their healthcare programs. These programs were funded by the IHS, equivalent to what IHS would spend on tribal healthcare. However, tribes faced financial challenges in running these programs due to the lack of bureaucratic and legal support available to the federal government. To address this, Congress mandated IHS to provide tribes with contract support costs (CSC), ensuring they could offer services at par with IHS. Despite this assistance, tribes still struggled with parity issues with IHS, primarily due to slow billing processes and imperfect remittance of funds by IHS. To remedy this, Congress permitted tribes to bill outside insurers directly and retain the third-party revenue, which the Tribe was required to spend on healthcare. The San Carlos Apache Tribe, exercising its sovereignty in Arizona, managed its healthcare programs and billed outside insurers directly. However, the Tribe encountered difficulties in funding the additional healthcare services from third-party revenue without corresponding CSC from IHS.
The Tribe sued the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, IHS, and the United States, for the CSC for the years 2011–2013. The district court dismissed the Tribe’s claim for the third-party-revenue-funded portions of the Tribe’s healthcare program from CSC reimbursement, and the Tribe appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the statutory text of 25 U.S.C. § 5325(a) warranted a reversal of the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, highlighting ongoing challenges in achieving true parity and financial sustainability for tribal healthcare programs under the existing legislative framework.
Question
Must the Indian Health Service pay “contract support costs” not only to support IHS-funded activities, but also to support the tribe’s expenditure of income collected from third parties?
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Harrow v. Department of Defense
Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 25, 2024.
Petitioner: Stuart R. Harrow.
Respondent: Department of Defense.Advocates: Joshua P. Davis (for the Petitioner)Aimee W. Brown (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Stuart R. Harrow was a federal employee who was furloughed in 2013. He appealed the furlough decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), but due to short staffing, the MSPB did not rule on Harrow’s appeal for more than five years, during which Harrow changed his email address. On May 11, 2022, the MSPB affirmed the agency’s furlough action and attempted to inform Harrow that he had 60 days to seek judicial review. However, because he had changed email addresses, Harrow did not learn of the MSPB’s denial until after 60 days had elapsed. On September 8, 2022, Harrow moved the Board for an extension of time to appeal, but the Board denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that the timely filing of a petition from the Board's final decision is a jurisdictional requirement and “not subject to equitable tolling.”
Question
Is the 60-day filing deadline in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) jurisdictional and thus not subject to equitable tolling?
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Gonzalez v. Trevino
Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 20, 2024.
Petitioner: Sylvia Gonzalez.
Respondent: Edward Trevino, II, et al.Advocates: Anya A. Bidwell (for the Petitioner)Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Sylvia Gonzalez, a resident of Castle Hills, Texas, was elected to the city council in 2019. During her campaign, she learned of widespread dissatisfaction with the current city manager. After taking office, she organized a nonbinding petition calling for the manager's removal. The petition was presented at a contentious council meeting, after which Mayor Edward Trevino questioned Gonzalez about the petition's location, found in her binder. Two days later, Trevino initiated a criminal complaint against Gonzalez for allegedly stealing the petition. Despite an atypical legal process involving Chief-of-Police John Siemens and special detective Alex Wright, Gonzalez was arrested and spent a night in jail. She is no longer on the council and has refrained from public political activity.
Gonzalez sued Trevino, Siemens, Wright, and the city (collectively, the Defendants) for violating her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. She argued that the arrest was in retaliation for engaging in conduct protected by the First Amendment, but she conceded that there was probable cause for the arrest. In support of her retaliation claim, she cited a decade-long review of misdemeanor and felony data in Bexar County that showed no similar cases.
The Defendants moved to dismiss her lawsuit on grounds of the independent-intermediary doctrine and qualified immunity, but the district court allowed Gonzalez’s claims to proceed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the outcome was controlled by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Nieves v. Bartlett, holding that, in general, the existence of probable cause will defeat a retaliatory arrest claim. The Fifth Circuit noted that Gonzalez’s facts did not trigger the narrow exception recognized in Nieves, under which a plaintiff need not plead lack of probable cause “where officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to do so.”
Question
1. Can the probable-cause exception in Nieves v. Barlett be satisfied by objective evidence other than specific examples of arrests that never happened?
2. Is Nieves limited to individual claims against arresting officers for split-second arrests?
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Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 20, 2024.
Petitioner: Texas.
Respondent: New Mexico and Colorado.Advocates: Frederick Liu (for the United States)Lanora C. Pettit (for Texas)Jeffrey J. Wechsler (for New Mexico)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
This is a continuation of an action involving a dispute over the waters of the Rio Grande Basin and Elephant Butte. The Supreme Court previously held that the United States may intervene in the action, which it did. When the Special Master filed the Third Interim Report, Colorado, Texas, and New Mexico moved for entry of a proposed "Consent Decree" that would resolve the dispute without the consent of the United States. The United States claims that the Court should deny the motion because (1) a court's approval of a consent decree cannot dispose of the valid claims of nonconsenting intervenors—i.e., the United States in this case; (2) the consent decree would impose obligations on a party, to wit, the United States, without that party's consent; and (3) the consent decree would be "contrary to the Compact."
Question
May a court enter a consent decree among Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado regarding the Rio Grande Compact without the consent of the United States, who intervened in the action?
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Oral argument for Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado, argued on March 20, 2024.
Once a transcript is available on oyez.org, the recording and this description will be replaced by more detailed information.
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Diaz v. United States
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 19, 2024.
Petitioner: Delilah Guadalupe Diaz.
Respondent: United States.Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner)Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
On August 17, 2020, Delilah Guadalupe Diaz was returning to California from Mexico. At the border, a “crunch-like sound” was heard when she rolled down the car window, leading the border agent to call for backup and check the car's door panels using a density measuring device. Inspectors found 27.98 kilos of methamphetamine hidden in these panels. Diaz claimed she was unaware of the drugs in the car, explaining that she had initially traveled to Mexico with her daughter, who returned early. Diaz stayed back to visit her boyfriend, and used his car to return home. She stated her boyfriend had told her he would retrieve the car from her in a few days.
The government charged Diaz with importation of methamphetamine in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. One of the elements of that offense is that the defendant knew she was transporting drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1). To prove that element, the government called an expert to testify that “narcotic traffickers do not entrust large and valuable quantities of narcotics to unknowing couriers.” Diaz sought to exclude the expert evidence, arguing that it would violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) by providing “a direct comment on the ultimate issue—Ms. Diaz’s knowledge.” However, the district court allowed the evidence, the jury found Diaz guilty, and the district court sentenced her to seven years in prison. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), may a governmental expert witness testify that couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters to prove that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs?
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Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc.
Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 19, 2024.
Petitioner: Truck Insurance Exchange.
Respondent: Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., et al.Advocates: Allyson N. Ho (for the Petitioner)Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)C. Kevin Marshall (for the debtor respondents)David C. Frederick (for the claimant respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, allows a Chapter 11 debtor with significant asbestos liabilities to channel all current and future asbestos claims into a trust funded by the debtor. This provision aims to treat future claimants equitably, given the long latency period of some asbestos-related illnesses, while also enabling the debtor to exit bankruptcy as a viable economic entity. To obtain relief under this section, the debtor must meet several criteria designed to protect the due process rights of claimants, especially future ones. These criteria include the appointment of a representative for future claimants and court determination that the plan is fair to both current and future claimants. Additionally, 75% of current claimants must vote to approve the plan.
In the face of over 38,000 asbestos-related lawsuits since 1978, Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., and Hanson Permanente Cement, Inc., collectively known as the "Debtors," filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2016. As part of their proposed reorganization Plan, the Debtors negotiated with multiple parties—including insurance companies, creditors, government agencies, and representatives of both current and future asbestos claimants—to establish a § 524(g) trust. This trust aimed to channel both existing and future asbestos-related claims away from the Debtors. The trust's financial viability heavily depended on primary liability insurance policies issued by Truck Insurance Exchange ("Truck") between the 1960s and 1980s, which obligated Truck to investigate and defend each asbestos claim against the Debtors up to a per-claim limit of $500,000. The Debtors would assign their rights under these Truck policies to the § 524(g) trust as part of the Plan's funding.
Truck opposed the Plan, arguing it failed to provide anti-fraud measures for insured claims that would be litigated in the tort system, thereby potentially exposing Truck to fraudulent claims. Despite Truck's objections, the bankruptcy court recommended confirmation of the Plan, finding it to be "insurance neutral" and therefore not impacting Truck's rights or obligations under the existing policies. The district court upheld this decision, confirming the Plan and thereby nullifying Truck's objections. Importantly, 100% of the asbestos personal-injury claimants had approved the proposed Plan, making Truck the sole objector.
The district court confirmed the Plan over Truck’s objections, finding Truck lacked standing to challenge the Plan because it was not a “party in interest” under § 1109(b). The U.S. Circuit Court for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Is an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim a “party in interest” that may object to a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?
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Murthy v. Missouri
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 18, 2024.
Appellant: Vivek H. Murthy, U.S. Surgeon General, et al.
Appellee: Missouri, et al.Advocates: Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioners)J. Benjamin Aguinaga (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Multiple plaintiffs, including epidemiologists, consumer and human rights advocates, academics, and media operators, claimed that various defendants, including numerous federal agencies and officials, have engaged in censorship, targeting conservative-leaning speech on topics such as the 2020 presidential election, COVID-19 origins, mask and vaccine efficacy, and election integrity. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants used public statements and threats of regulatory action, such as reforming Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, to induce social media platforms to suppress content, thereby violating the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. The States of Missouri and Louisiana also alleged harm due to the infringement of the free speech rights of their citizens.
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting the federal government from meeting with social media companies or otherwise seeking to influence their content-moderation policies. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the government’s motion for an emergency stay and granted certiorari to review the case on the merits.
Question
Did the federal government’s request that private social media companies take steps to prevent the dissemination of purported misinformation transform those companies’ content-moderation decisions into state action and thus violate users’ First Amendment rights?
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National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Mar 18, 2024.
Petitioner: National Rifle Association of America.
Respondent: Maria T. Vullo.Advocates: David D. Cole (for the Petitioner)Ephraim McDowell (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In October 2017, following a referral from the New York County District Attorney's Office, the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS), under the leadership of Maria T. Vullo, initiated an investigation into NRA-endorsed insurance programs suspected of violating New York law. This scrutiny resulted in three insurance companies acknowledging their fault through consent decrees in 2018. Concurrently, after the Parkland school shooting, Vullo issued guidance and statements encouraging banks and insurers to assess and potentially end their affiliations with gun promotion organizations like the NRA, citing reputational risks. The fallout led to several firms cutting ties with the NRA, prompting the association to file a lawsuit against Vullo and other state officials, asserting violations of its free speech and equal protection rights.
The district court dismissed most of the claims but allowed the First Amendment allegations against Vullo to proceed, citing unresolved factual questions about her qualified immunity. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court reasoned that while the First Amendment protects against the abridgment of free speech by government officials, these officials also have the responsibility to address public concerns. Here, the NRA failed to show that Vullo’s conduct sought to coerce, rather than merely to convince. Furthermore, even if her actions were coercive, Vullo’s conduct as a regulator and public official did not infringe upon any clearly established law, as she appeared to act reasonably and in good faith in performing her duties.
Question
Does a New York regulator’s discouragement of companies from doing business with the National Rifle Association after the Parkland school shooting constitute coercion in violation of the First Amendment?
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Garland v. Cargill
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 28, 2024.
Petitioner: Michael Cargill.
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, et al.Advocates: Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioners)Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
For over a decade, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) maintained that bump stocks were not machineguns as defined by statute, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b), and issued interpretation letters confirming this position. Following the October 1, 2017 Las Vegas shooting, where a shooter used bump stocks in a massacre, public demand for a ban on bump stocks surged, leading to proposed legislation. Before Congress could act, the ATF, responding to the tragedy and public sentiment, reversed its stance in 2018, reclassifying bump stocks as machineguns and exposing owners to criminal liability. Respondent Michael Cargill surrendered his bump stocks due to this new regulation and filed a lawsuit challenging the ATF regulations, arguing that the ATF exceeded its authority in defining bump stocks as machineguns.
The district court for the government, finding that the government’s new interpretation of “machinegun” is the best interpretation of the statute. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on rehearing, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc reversed. The en banc court found the definition of "machinegun" as unambiguously not applying to bump stocks, but even if it were ambiguous, the rule of lenity would compel a construction of the statute in Cargill’s favor.
Question
Is a bump stock device a “machinegun” as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b)?
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Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski
Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 28, 2024.
Petitioner: David Suski, et al.
Respondent: Coinbase, Inc.Advocates: Jessica L. Ellsworth (for the Petitioner)David J. Harris (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In June 2021, Coinbase, an online cryptocurrency exchange, launched a Dogecoin Sweepstakes that required participants to opt into "Official Rules" with a forum selection clause stipulating exclusive jurisdiction of California courts for related disputes. Respondent David Suski and three other users, who had agreed to the “Coinbase User Agreement” containing an arbitration provision when they created their accounts, entered the sweepstakes. Subsequently, they filed a lawsuit against Coinbase and Marden-Kane, Inc., the company engaged by Coinbase for the sweepstakes management, alleging violations of California’s False Advertising Law, Unfair Competition Law, and Consumer Legal Remedies Act. Coinbase sought to compel arbitration based on the User Agreement, but the district court denied Coinbase’s motion, interpreting the contractual documents to conclude that the Sweepstakes’ Official Rules, with their forum selection clause, took precedence over the User Agreement’s arbitration clause.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the dispute should be resolved within the California court system as per the Official Rules of the Sweepstakes, not through arbitration as Coinbase had sought.
Question
When parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, does an arbitrator or a court decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation?
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McIntosh v. United States
Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 27, 2024.
Petitioner: Louis McIntosh.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates: Steven Y. Yurowitz (for the Petitioner)Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
On August 22, 2013, a jury convicted Louis McIntosh of multiple Hobbs Act robbery-related offenses and gun charges, leading to a near-life sentence of 720 months. The district court granted some relief by vacating specific counts but imposed a forfeiture amount inconsistently between oral and written judgments. On appeal, the government belatedly submitted a forfeiture order, which both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld despite its tardiness. The appellate court vacated one of the §924(c) counts but reinstated others, rejecting the petitioner's arguments. After a Supreme Court decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. __ (2022), which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) the Court granted certiorari, leading to a remand. However, the Second Circuit mostly upheld its prior rulings, making only minor changes.
Question
May a district court enter a criminal forfeiture order when the time limit specified in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has already passed?
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Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A.
Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 27, 2024.
Petitioner: Alex Cantero, et al.
Respondent: Bank of America, N.A.Advocates: Jonathan E. Taylor (for the Petitioners)Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur)Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA) established a dual banking system in the United States, allowing both federal and state governments to charter and regulate banks. National banks are subject to federal authority and have broad powers, including the ability to make real estate loans and provide escrow services. Alongside the NBA, other significant federal statutes regulate national banks: The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) limits the amount banks can require borrowers to deposit into escrow accounts related to home mortgages; the Dodd-Frank Act sets the standards for when state consumer financial laws are preempted by federal law; and it also amends the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) to require the creation of escrow accounts for certain mortgages and mandates interest payment on those accounts if prescribed by state or federal law. The state law in question, New York General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-601, mandates a minimum interest rate for escrow accounts held by mortgage institutions, which was later adjusted in 2018 to create “parity” between state-chartered and national banks.
Alex Cantero purchased a house in Queens Village, New York, with a mortgage from Bank of America (BOA) in August 2010. His mortgage required him to deposit money into an escrow account for property taxes and insurance premiums, and BOA paid no interest on these funds. Cantero’s mortgage specified that it is governed by federal law and the law of the property’s jurisdiction. Cantero alleged that BOA refused to pay interest on escrow funds, contrary to New York State law.
The district court determined that New York's General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-601, was not preempted by the NBA based on its minimal “degree of interference” with national banking powers. Citing Dodd-Frank’s amendment to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) as supportive of this compatibility, the court denied BOA’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim, asserting that both federal and state laws could be read “harmoniously.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the NBA does preempt New York’s GOL because the minimum-interest requirement would exert control over a banking power granted by the federal government, thereby impermissibly interfering with national banks’ exercise of that power.
Question
Does the National Bank Act preempt the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks?
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Moody v. NetChoice, LLC
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 26, 2024.
Petitioner: Attorney General, State of Florida, et al.
Respondent: NetChoice, LLC, et al.Advocates: Henry C. Whitaker (for the Petitioners)Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents)Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Social-media platforms collect third-party posts, including text, photos, and videos, and distribute them to other users. Importantly, they are private enterprises, not governmental entities, and thus are not subject to constitutional requirements for free speech. Users have no obligation to consume or contribute to the content on these platforms. And unlike traditional media, social-media platforms primarily host content created by individual users rather than the companies themselves (although they do engage in some speech of their own, such as publishing terms of service and community standards). They are not merely conduits of that content, however; they curate and edit the content that users see, which involves removing posts that violate community standards and prioritizing posts based on various factors.
The State of Florida enacted S.B. 7072 to address what it perceives as bias and censorship by large social media platforms against conservative voices. The legislation imposes various restrictions and obligations on social media platforms, such as prohibiting the deplatforming of political candidates and requiring detailed disclosures about content moderation policies. It aims to treat social media platforms like common carriers and focuses on those platforms that either have annual gross revenues exceeding $100 million or at least 100 million monthly individual participants globally. Enforcement mechanisms include substantial fines and the option for civil suits.
NetChoice and the Computer & Communications Industry Association (together, “NetChoice”)—are trade associations that represent internet and social-media companies like Facebook, Twitter, Google (which owns YouTube), and TikTok. They sued the Florida officials charged with enforcing S.B. 7072 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the law's provisions (1) violate the social-media companies’ right to free speech under the First Amendment and (2) are preempted by federal law.
The district court granted NetChoice’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the provisions of the Act that make platforms liable for removing or deprioritizing content are likely preempted by federal law, specifically 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), and that the Act’s provisions infringe on platforms’ First Amendment rights by restricting their “editorial judgment.” The court applied strict scrutiny due to the Act's viewpoint-based purpose of defending conservative speech from perceived liberal bias in big tech. The court found that the Act does not survive strict scrutiny as it isn't narrowly tailored and doesn't serve a legitimate state interest. The State appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed these conclusions.
Question
Do Florida S.B. 7072’s content-moderation restrictions comply with the First Amendment, and do the law’s individualized-explanation requirements comply with the First Amendment?
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NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton
Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Feb 26, 2024.
Petitioner: NetChoice, LLC, et al.
Respondent: Ken Paxton, In His Official Capacity as Attorney General of Texas.Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners)Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The State of Texas enacted HB 20 to regulate large social media platforms, such as Facebook, X (formerly known as Twitter), and YouTube. The law purports to prohibit large social media platforms from censoring speech based on the viewpoint of the speaker.
NetChoice and the Computer & Communications Industry Association filed a lawsuit against the Attorney General of Texas, challenging two provisions of the law as unconstitutional: (1) Section 7, which prohibits viewpoint-based censorship of users’ posts, except for content that incites criminal activity or is unlawful. (2) Section 2, which requires platforms to disclose how they moderate and promote content, publish an "acceptable use policy," and maintain a complaint-and-appeal system for their users.
The district court issued a preliminary injunction, holding that Section 7 and Section 2 are facially unconstitutional. The court argued that social media platforms have some level of editorial discretion protected by the First Amendment, and HB 20 interferes with that discretion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, rejecting the idea that large corporations have a “freewheeling” First Amendment right to censor what people say. It reasoned that HB 20 does not regulate the platforms’ speech but protects other people’s speech and regulates the platforms’ conduct.
Question
Do Texas HB 20’s provisions prohibiting social media platforms from censoring users’ content and imposing stringent disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment?
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