Bölümler
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Nothing we have ever recorded on SCW has brought so much joy to
David. However, at several points during the episode, we may have witnessed Matthew Green's soul leave his body.
Our esteemed guests Justin Schuh and Matt Green joined us to debate whether `Dual_EC_DRBG` was intentionally backdoored by the NSA or 'just' a major fuckup.
Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/12/07/dual-ec-drbg
Links:
- Dicky George at InfiltrateCon 2014, 'Life at Both Ends of the Barrel - An NSA Targeting Retrospective': [https://youtu.be/qq-LCyRp6bU?si=MyTBKomkIVaxSy1Q](https://youtu.be/qq-LCyRp6bU?si=MyTBKomkIVaxSy1Q)
- Dicky George: [https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Digital-Media-Center/Biographies/Biography-View-Page/Article/3330261/richard-dickie-george/](https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Digital-Media-Center/Biographies/Biography-View-Page/Article/3330261/richard-dickie-george/)
- NYTimes on Sigint Enabling Project: [https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html](https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html)
- On the Practical Exploitability of Dual EC
in TLS Implementations: [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-checkoway.pdf](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-checkoway.pdf)
- Wired - Researchers Solve Juniper Backdoor Mystery; Signs Point to NSA [https://www.wired.com/2015/12/researchers-solve-the-juniper-mystery-and-they-say-its-partially-the-nsas-fault/](https://www.wired.com/2015/12/researchers-solve-the-juniper-mystery-and-they-say-its-partially-the-nsas-fault/)
- ProPublica - Revealed: The NSA's Secret Campaign to Crack, Undermine Internet Security [https://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-internet-encryption](https://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-internet-encryption)
- DDoSecrets - Sigint Enabling Project: [https://data.ddosecrets.com/Snowden%20archive/sigint-enabling-project.pdf](https://data.ddosecrets.com/Snowden%20archive/sigint-enabling-project.pdf)
- IAD: [https://www.iad.gov/](https://www.iad.gov/)
- Ars Technica - “Unauthorized code” in Juniper firewalls decrypts encrypted VPN traffic: [https://web.archive.org/web/20151222023311/http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/12/unauthorized-code-in-juniper-firewalls-decrypts-encrypted-vpn-traffic/](https://web.archive.org/web/20151222023311/http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/12/unauthorized-code-in-juniper-firewalls-decrypts-encrypted-vpn-traffic/)
- 2015 IMPORTANT JUNIPER SECURITY ANNOUNCEMENT: [https://web.archive.org/web/20151221171526/http://forums.juniper.net/t5/Security-Incident-Response/Important-Announcement-about-ScreenOS/ba-p/285554](https://web.archive.org/web/20151221171526/http://forums.juniper.net/t5/Security-Incident-Response/Important-Announcement-about-ScreenOS/ba-p/285554)
- Extended Random Values for TLS: [https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rescorla-tls-extended-random-00](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rescorla-tls-extended-random-00)
- The Art of Software Security Assessment: [https://www.amazon.com/Art-Software-Security-Assessment-Vulnerabilities/dp/0321444426](https://www.amazon.com/Art-Software-Security-Assessment-Vulnerabilities/dp/0321444426)
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
You may not be rewriting the world in Rust, but if you follow the findings of the Android team and our guest Jeff Vander Stoep, you'll drive down your memory-unsafety vulnerabilities more than 2X below the industry average over time! 🎉
Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/10/15/a-little-bit-of-rust-goes-a-long-way/
Links:
- https://security.googleblog.com/2024/09/eliminating-memory-safety-vulnerabilities-Android.html
- “Safe Coding”: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3651621
- “effectiveness of security design”: https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/16LZ6T-tcjgp3T8_N3m0pa5kNA1DwIsuMcQYDhpMU7uU/edit#slide=id.g3e7cac054a_0_89
- https://security.googleblog.com/2024/02/improving-interoperability-between-rust-and-c.html
- https://github.com/google/crubit
- https://github.com/google/autocxx
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stagefright_(bug)
- https://security.googleblog.com/2021/04/rust-in-android-platform.html
- https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/security/rule-of-2.md
- https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity22/presentation/alexopoulos
-https://kb.meinbergglobal.com/kb/time_sync/ntp/ntp_vulnerabilities_reported_2023-04
- https://blog.isosceles.com/the-legacy-of-stagefright/
- https://research.google/pubs/secure-by-design-googles-perspective-on-memory-safety/
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QrrH2lcl9ew
- https://source.android.com/docs/setup/build/rust/building-rust-modules/overview
- https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-bindgen
- https://security.googleblog.com/2021/06/rustc-interop-in-android-platform.html
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
Eksik bölüm mü var?
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With the 2024 United States Presidential Election right around the corner, we talk to an unnamed guest who has worked on cybersecurity for political campaigns in the United States since 2004. We recorded this in late August, 2024.
Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/10/13/campaign-security/
Links:
- Active Measures by Thomas Rind: https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374287269/activemeasures
- Aurora: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation\_Aurora
- Google APP announcement, October 2017: https://www.wired.com/story/google-advanced-protection-locks-down-accounts/
- XXD: https://linux.die.net/man/1/xxd
- Adobe Reader October 2016 Security Update: https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/acrobat/apsb16-33.html
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
We finally have an excuse to tear down Telegram! Their CEO got arrested by the French, apparently not because the cryptography in Telegram is bad, but special guest Matt Green joined us to talk about how the cryptography is bad anyway, and you probably shouldn't use Telegram as a secure messenger of any kind!
Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/09/06/telegram
Links:
- https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2024/08/25/telegram-is-not-really-an-encrypted-messaging-app/
- Lavabit / Ladar Levinson: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit
- Pavel Durov indictment statement from French authorities: https://www.tribunal-de-paris.justice.fr/sites/default/files/2024-08/2024-08-28%20-%20CP%20TELEGRAM%20mise%20en%20examen.pdf
- MTProto 2.0 protocol spec: https://core.telegram.org/api/end-to-end
- https://words.filippo.io/dispatches/telegram-ecdh/
- MTProto 1.0 (old no longer used): - https://web.archive.org/web/20131220000537/https://core.telegram.org/api/end-to-end#key-generation
- OTR: https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/otr-wpes.pdf
- AES and sha2 used in ‘Infinite Garble Extension’ mode: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1177.pdf
- Four Attacks and a Proof for Telegram: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=9833666
- History of Telegram e2ee chats availability: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telegram_(software)#Architecture
- https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/01/27/threema/
- https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2022/11/02/Matrix-with-Martin-Albrecht-Dan-Jones/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matrix_(protocol), introduced in September 2014
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
Are you going to be in Vegas during BlackHat / DEF CON? We're hosting a mixer, sponsored by Observa! We have limited capacity, so please only register if you can actually come. Location details are in the confirmation email. Tickets will be released in batches, so if you get waitlisted, there's a good chance you still get in. Looking forward to seeing you in Vegas!
The sys files may be code in addition to data.The bug might be bigger than "just" a null pointer exception.
Ticket Link: https://www.eventbrite.com/e/scwpod-vegas-2024-tickets-946939099337
We talk about CrowdStrike in this episode, but we know we made some mistakes:Luckily, none of that is actually relevant to the main issues we discuss.
Show page: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/07/24/summertime-sadness/
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/post-quantum-cryptography-standardizationhttps://dadrian.io/blog/posts/pqc-signatures-2024/https://dadrian.io/blog/posts/cto/https://www.blackhat.com/us-24/briefings/schedule/https://terrapin-attack.com/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-AqayGm0_pw
Other Links:More like ClownStrike, amirite?
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
We have Mark Dowd on, founder of Aziumuth Security and one of the authors of The Art of Software Security Assessment, to talk about the market for zero day vulnerabilities, and how mitigations affect monetizing offensive security work.
https://www.azimuthsecurity.com/https://www.vigilantlabs.com/https://github.com/mdowd79/presentations/blob/main/bluehat2023-mdowd-final.pdfhttps://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-Hack-Different-Pwning-IOS-14-With-Generation-Z-Bug-wp.pdfhttps://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Shwartz-Selling-0-Days-To-Governments-And-Offensive-Security-Companies.pdf
Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/06/24/mdowd/
Links:
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
iykyk
Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/05/25/ekr/
Links:
- https://hovav.net/ucsd/dist/draft-shacham-tls-fasttrack-00.txt
- https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/papers/fasttrack.pdf
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446
- SoK: SCT Auditing in Certificate Transparency: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2203.01661
- A hard look at Certificate Transparency, Part I: Transparency Systems: https://educatedguesswork.org/posts/transparency-part-1/
- A hard look at Certificate Transparency: CT in Reality: https://educatedguesswork.org/posts/transparency-part-2/
- E2EE on the web: is the web really that bad? https://emilymstark.com/2024/02/09/e2ee-on-the-web-is-the-web-really-that-bad.html
- Launching Default End-to-End Encryption on Messenger: https://about.fb.com/news/2023/12/default-end-to-end-encryption-on-messenger/
- ekr's newsletter: https://educatedguesswork.org
- Over 25 years of ekr RFCs: https://www.rfc-editor.org/search/rfc_search_detail.php?sortkey=Date&sorting=DESC&page=All&author=rescorla&pubstatus[]=Any&pub_date_type=any
Subscribe to his newsletter at https://educatedguesswork.org/
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
Josh Brown and Paul Grubbs join us to describe how those damned spam calls work, and how STIR/SHAKEN is supposed to try to stop them, but have other privacy and security implications as well.
Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/04/30/stir-shaken/
Links:
- https://iacr.org/submit/files/slides/2024/rwc/rwc2024/98/slides.pdf
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3trxXF0-fRU
- Paul Grubbs: https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~paulgrub/
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
(NSFW) Three AI-generated guests rank cryptography things into a tier list. Play along at home and make your own tier list: https://tiermaker.com/create/cryptography-15683166
This episode is definitely not safe for work and definitely a parody. Do not base your decision in the 2024 election off of this podcast episode. No campaigns have endorsed this podcast.
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
Apple iMessage is getting a big upgrade! Not only are they rolling out ratcheting, but they’re going post-quantum, AND they’re doing post-quantum ratcheting! Douglas Stebila joined us to talk about his security analysis of the new PQ3 protocol update and not indulge our wild Apple speculations:
Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/03/03/post-quantum-imessage-with-douglas-stebila/
Links:
- https://security.apple.com/blog/imessage-pq3/
- Security analysis of the iMessage PQ3 protocol
https://security.apple.com/assets/files/A_Formal_Analysis_of_the_iMessage_PQ3_Messaging_Protocol_Basin_et_al.pdf
- Ratcheting design: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/220.pdf
- When Messages are Keys: Is HMAC a dual-PRF?: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/861.pdf
- Real World Deniability in Messaging: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/403.pdf
- Padmé: https://www.petsymposium.org/2019/files/papers/issue4/popets-2019-0056.pdf
- Max Headroom: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cYdpOjletnc
- Extended Canetti-Krawczyk model: https://iacr.org/archive/eurocrypt2001/20450451.pdf
- Douglas Stebila: https://www.douglas.stebila.ca/
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
We welcome Franziskus and Karthik from Cryspen to discuss their new high-assurance implementation of ML-KEM (the final form of Kyber), discussing how formal methods can both help provide correctness guarantees, security assurances, and performance wins for your crypto code!
Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/01/29/high-assurance-kyber/
Links:
- https://cryspen.com/post/ml-kem-implementation/
- https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux/
- https://github.com/formosa-crypto/libjade
- https://cryspen.com/post/pqxdh/
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1933.pdf
- Franziskus Kiefer: https://franziskuskiefer.de/
- Karthik Bhargavan: https://bhargavan.info/
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
Facebook Messenger has finally been end-to-end encrypted, a couple of years after Mark Zuckerberg announced it! Plus Instagram DMs are trialing ephemeral E2EE DMs too! We invited on Jon Millican and Timothy Buck from Meta to discuss this major cross-platform endeavor, and how David Bowie fits into their personal Labyrinth.
Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/12/28/e2ee-fb-messenger/
Links:
- https://www.facebook.com/notes/2420600258234172
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1044.pdf
- https://engineering.fb.com/2023/12/06/security/building-end-to-end-security-for-messenger/
- https://www.theverge.com/2023/12/6/23991501/facebook-messenger-default-end-to-end-encryption-meta
- https://www.threads.net/@jonmillican/post/C0kQPAyoFpr
- https://engineering.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/MessengerEnd-to-EndEncryptionOverview_12-6-2023.pdf
- https://engineering.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/TheLabyrinthEncryptedMessageStorageProtocol_12-6-2023.pdf
- https://engineering.fb.com/2022/03/10/security/code-verify/
- https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/code-verify/llohflklppcaghdpehpbklhlfebooeog
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
Returning champion Martin Albrecht joins us to help explain how we measure the security of lattice-based cryptosystems like Kyber and Dilithium against attackers. QRAM, BKZ, LLL, oh my!
Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/11/13/lattice-attacks/
Links:
- https://pq-crystals.org/kyber/index.shtml
- https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/index.shtml
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/930.pdf
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_integer_solution_problem
- Frodo: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/659
- https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Events/third-pqc-standardization-conference/documents/accepted-papers/ribeiro-saber-pq-key-pqc2021.pdf
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermite_normal_form
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wagner%E2%80%93Fischer_algorithm
- https://www.math.auckland.ac.nz/~sgal018/crypto-book/ch18.pdf
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1161
- QRAM: https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.10310
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lenstra%E2%80%93Lenstra%E2%80%93Lov%C3%A1sz_lattice_basis_reduction_algorithm
- MATZOV improved dual lattice attack: https://zenodo.org/records/6412487
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/504.pdf
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/302.pdf
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
We're back! Signal rolled out a protocol change to be post-quantum resilient! Someone was caught intercepting Jabber TLS via certificate transparency! Was the same-origin policy in web browers just a dirty hack all along? Plus secure message format formalisms, and even more beating of the dead horse that is E2EE in the browser.
Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/11/07/PQXDH-etc
Links:
- https://zfnd.org/so-you-want-to-build-an-end-to-end-encrypted-web-app/
- https://github.com/superfly/macaroon
- https://cryspen.com/post/pqxdh/
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1390.pdf
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
We explore how the NIST curve parameter seeds were generated, as best we can, with returning champion Steve Weis!
“At the point where we find an intelligible English string that generates the
NIST P-curve seeds, nobody serious is going to take the seed provenance concerns seriously anymore.”
Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/10/12/the-nist-curves
Links:
- Steve’s post: https://saweis.net/posts/nist-curve-seed-origins.html
- ANSI X9.62 ECDSA: https://safecurves.cr.yp.to/grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/private/x9-62-09-20-98.pdf / FIPS 186-2 https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/fips/186-2/final/docs/fips186-2.pdf
- “A RIDDLE WRAPPED IN AN ENIGMA”: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1018.pdf
- https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/01/nsa-official-support-of-backdoored-dual_ec_drbg-was-regrettable/
- https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/origin-of-fips-186-4-elliptic-curves-over-prime-field-seed-parameters-national-institute-of-standards-and-technology-78756/
- https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/origin-of-fips-186-4-elliptic-curves-over-prime-field-seed-parameters-national-security-agency-78755/
- Filippo’s bounty: https://words.filippo.io/dispatches/seeds-bounty/
- Recommendations for Discrete Logarithm-based Cryptography: Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters - NIST 800-186 with Curve25519 and friends
- RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4492#section-6
- https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2017/12/19/the-strange-story-of-extended-random/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullrun_(decryption_program)
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BSAFE
- https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/08/04/is-extended-random-malicious/
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
We're back from our summer vacation! We're covering a bunch of stuff we saw and did:
Transcript:
https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/09/13/cruel-summer/
Links:
- Zenbleed: https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/zenbleed.html
- Downfall: https://downfall.page
- Post-quantum Yubikeys: https://security.googleblog.com/2023/08/toward-quantum-resilient-security-keys.html
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
What does P vs NP have to do with cryptography? Why do people love and laugh about the random oracle model? What's an oracle? What do you mean factoring and discrete log don't have proofs of hardness? How does any of this cryptography stuff work, anyway? We trapped Steve Weis into answering our many questions.
Transcript:
https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/06/29/why-do-we-think-anything-is-secure-with-steve-weis/
Links:
- The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited: https://eprint.iacr.org/1998/011.pdf
- Factoring integers with CADO-NFS: https://www.ens-lyon.fr/LIP/AriC/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/JDetrey-tutorial.pdf
- On One-way Functions from NP-Complete Problems: https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/513.pdf
- Seny Kamara's lecture notes on provable security: https://cs.brown.edu/~seny/2950-v/2-provablesecurity.pdf
- How To Simulate It – A Tutorial on the Simulation Proof Technique: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/046.pdf
- A Survey of Leakage-Resilient Cryptography: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/302
- A Decade of Lattice Cryptography: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/939.pdf
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
Are Twitter’s new encrypted DMs unreadable even if you put a gun to Elon’s head? We invited Matthew Garrett on to do a deep decompiled dive into what kind of cryptography actually shipped.
Transcript:
https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/05/29/elons-encrypted-dms-with-matthew-garrett/
Links:
https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/66791.html
https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/encrypted-direct-messages
https://www.techdirt.com/2023/05/11/twitter-launches-not-actually-encrypted-encrypted-dms/
BrokenKDF2BytesGenerator: https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/blob/master/prov/src/main/java/org/bouncycastle/jce/provider/BrokenKDF2BytesGenerator.java#L70
Analysis from sweis: https://twitter.com/sweis/status/1657082478727933954?s=20
https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/
https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/
https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007059752-Backup-and-Restore-Messages
Trail of Bits has not audited nor signed a contract yet, per Platformer: https://www.platformer.news/p/why-you-cant-trust-twitters-encrypted
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
WhatsApp has announced they’re rolling out key transparency! Doing this at WhatsApp-scale (aka billions and biiillions of keys) is a significant task, so we talked to Jasleen Malvai and Kevin Lewi about how it works.
Transcript:
https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/05/06/whatsapp-key-transparency
Links:
https://engineering.fb.com/2023/04/13/security/whatsapp-key-transparency/
https://github.com/facebook/akd
Parkeet: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/081.pdf
CONIKS: https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/1004.pdf
SEEMless: https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/607.pdf
WhatsApp Security Whitepaper: https://www.whatsapp.com/security/WhatsApp-Security-Whitepaper.pdf
Keybase key transparency: https://book.keybase.io/docs/server
"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian) -
Messaging Layer Security (MLS) 1.0 is (basically) here! We invited Raphael
Robert, coauthor of the MLS specification to explain it to us and answer our annoying questions (read: why does this exist?)
Transcript:
https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2023/04/22/mls/
Links:
- https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks/
- https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks/mls-protocol/draft-ietf-mls-protocol.html
- https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks/mls-architecture/draft-ietf-mls-architecture.html
- https://github.com/openmls/openmls
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1533.pdf
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1327.pdf
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/559.pdf
- https://signal.org/docs/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_encapsulation_mechanism
- https://twitter.com/beurdouche/status/1220617962182389760
- https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks/mls-protocol/draft-ietf-mls-protocol.html#mls-ciphersuites
- https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-mls-federation-02.html
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/mimi/documents/
- https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/dma/dma-workshops/interoperability-workshop_en
- Yes in the protocol document this is 1.0: https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks/mls-protocol/draft-ietf-mls-protocol.html#section-6
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