Folgen
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“This is the effect of philosophy, which is the medicine of our souls: it banishes all groundless apprehensions, frees us from desires, and drives away fears: but it has not the same influence over all people; it is of very great influence when it falls in with a disposition well adapted to it. …
For how few philosophers will you meet with, whose life and manners are conformable to the dictates of reason! who look on their profession, not as a means of displaying their learning, but as a rule for their own practice! who follow their own precepts, and comply with their own decrees. …
For just as if one who professed to teach grammar should speak with impropriety, or a master of music sing out of tune, such conduct has the worst appearance in these people, because they blunder in the very particular with which they profess that they are well acquainted. So philosophers who err in the conduct of their life are the more infamous because they are erring in the very thing which they pretend to teach, and, while they lay down rules to regulate life by, they are irregular in their own life.”
(Tusculan Disputations, 2.4)
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“I put my questions to Lysis: ‘I suppose, Lysis, your father and mother love you very much?’
‘Of course,’ he replied.
‘Then they’d want you to be as happy as possible?’
‘Naturally.’
‘Do you think that a man is happy when he’s a slave and allowed to do nothing he desires?’
‘Heavens, no, I don’t,’ he said.
‘Then if your father and mother love you and desire your happiness, it’s absolutely clear that they must do their best to make you happy.’
‘Of course,’ he said.
‘So they let you do what you want and don’t scold you at all or stop you doing what you desire?’
‘Heavens, no, Socrates, there are lots and lots of things they stop me doing.’
…
‘So your father deliberately sets lots and lots of bosses and masters over you. But when you go home to your mother, she lets you do what you want with her wool or her loom when she’s weaving, so that she can see you perfectly content.’
Lysis laughed and said, ‘Heavens, Socrates, not only does she stop me, but I’d actually be beaten if I touched any of that.’
…
‘Well then, what have you done to make them behave so oddly and stop you being happy and doing what you want, and bring you up by keeping you all day long in a state of constant subjection to someone else and in short doing virtually nothing you desire.’
…
‘It’s because I’m not yet of age, Socrates,’ he said.
‘I’m not sure it’s that that stops you, Lysis, since both your father, Democrates, and your mother trust you to some extent, I imagine, without waiting until you’re of age. For example, when they want things read to them or written for them, I imagine they give that job to you before anyone else in the house. Don’t they?’
‘Of course,’ he replied.
…
‘So, Lysis, what on earth can be the reason for their not stopping you in those cases, whereas they do stop you in the ones we were speaking of just now?’
‘I suppose it’s because I know about those things but not the others,’ he replied.
‘Well,’ I said. ‘Excellent! So your father is not waiting for you to come of age to trust everything to you, but on the day he considers that you know better than himself, he’ll trust both himself and his property to you.’
‘I expect so,’ he said.”
(Lysis, 207d-209d)
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Fehlende Folgen?
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“If a man resists truths that are all too evident, in opposing him it is not easy to find an argument by which one may cause him to change his opinion. The reason for this is neither the man’s ability nor the teacher’s weakness; nay, when a man who has been trapped in an argument hardens to stone, how shall one any longer deal with him by argument? …
Do your senses tell you that you are awake? ‘No,’ he answers, ‘any more than they do when in dreams I have the impression that I am awake.’ Is there, then, no difference between these two impressions? ‘None.’ Can I argue with this man any longer? And what cautery or lancet shall I apply to him, to make him realize that he is deadened. …
One man does not notice the contradiction — he is in a bad way; another man notices it, indeed, but is not moved and does not improve — he is in a still worse state … and his reasoning faculty has been — I will not say cut away, but brutalized.”
(Discourses, I.5)
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“For my part, Brutus, I am perfectly persuaded that it is expedient for me to philosophize; for what can I do better, especially as I have no regular occupation? But I am not for limiting my philosophy to a few subjects; for philosophy is a matter in which it is difficult to acquire a little knowledge without acquainting yourself with many, or all its branches.
Philosophy would never have been in such esteem in Greece itself, if it had not been for the strength which it acquired from the contentions and disputations of the most learned men; and therefore I recommend all men who have abilities to follow my advice to snatch this art also from declining Greece, and to transport it to this city.
Let philosophy, then, derive its birth in Latin language from this time, and let us lend it our assistance, and bear patiently to be contradicted and refuted; and although those men may dislike such treatment who are bound and devoted to certain predetermined opinions, and are under such obligations to maintain them that they are forced, for the sake of consistency, to adhere to them even though they do not themselves wholly approve of them; we, on the other hand, who pursue only probabilities, and who cannot go beyond that which seems really likely, can confute others without obstinacy, and are prepared to be confuted ourselves without resentment.”
(Tusculan Disputations, II.1-2)
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“Virtue, then, is twofold, intellectual and moral. Both the coming-into-being and increase of intellectual virtue result mostly from teaching—hence it requires experience and time—whereas moral virtue is the result of habit, and so it is that moral virtue got its name [ēthikē] by a slight alteration of the term habit [ethos]. It is also clear, as a result, that none of the moral virtues are present in us by nature. …
For as regards those things we must learn how to do, we learn by doing them—for example, by building houses, people become house builders, and by playing the cithara, they become cithara players. So too, then, by doing just things we become just; moderate things, moderate; and courageous things, courageous. …
As a result of building houses well, people will be good house builders; but as a result of doing so badly, they will be bad ones. If this were not the case, there would be no need of a teacher, but everyone would come into being already good or bad. So too in the case of the virtues: by doing things in our interactions with human beings, some of us become just, others unjust; and by doing things in terrifying circumstances and by being habituated to feel fear or confidence, some of us become courageous, others cowards. …
It makes no small difference, then, whether one is habituated in this or that way straight from childhood but a very great difference—or rather the whole difference.”
(Nicomachean Ethics, II.1)
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“SOCRATES: Now, Nicias, could you explain it to us again from the beginning? You know we started our discussion by considering bravery as a part of goodness?
NICIAS: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: So you did agree with our answer that it’s a part, and hence that there are other parts, which are known collectively as goodness, didn’t you?
NICIAS: Yes, of course.
SOCRATES: Now, you mean the same by these parts as I do, don’t you? For me, besides bravery, the list includes self-control, fairness and other similar qualities. Isn’t it the same for you?
NICIAS: Certainly. …
SOCRATES: [But] bravery can’t only be knowledge of what is fearful and what is encouraging, because like other kinds of knowledge it understands not only the future stages of good and evil, but also the present and the past.
NICIAS: Apparently so.
SOCRATES: So the answer you gave us, Nicias, covers only about a third part of bravery, whereas we asked what bravery is as a whole. And so now, it seems, on your own admission, bravery is knowledge not only of what is fearful and what is encouraging, but according to the way you describe it now, of pretty well the whole subject of good and evil, regardless of time. Does that reflect your change of mind, or would you put it differently, Nicias?
NICIAS: No, That’s how it seems to me, Socrates. …
SOCRATES: So, What you’re now describing, Nicias, won’t be a part of goodness, but goodness in its entirety.
NICIAS: So it seems.
SOCRATES: But we did say that bravery is only one of the parts of goodness.
NICIAS: Yes, we did.
SOCRATES: But what you’re now describing appears not to be so.
NICIAS: No, it seems not.
SOCRATES: So we’ve not discovered what bravery is, Nicias.
NICIAS: No, apparently not.”
(Laches, 198a-199e)
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“Any means by which it is possible to procure freedom from fearing other people is a natural good.
Some people have desired to gain reputation and to be well regarded, thinking in this way to gain protection from others. If the lives of such people are secure, they have acquired a natural blessing; but if they are not, they do not possess what they originally reached for by natural instinct.
No pleasure is bad in itself. But the things that make for pleasure in certain cases entail disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.”
(Leading Doctrines, 6, 7, and 8)
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“The opinion of Socrates respecting this matter is clearly stated in the book which treats of his death, of which we have already said so much; for when he had discussed the immortality of the soul, and when the time of his dying was approaching rapidly, being asked by Crito how he would be buried, ‘I have taken a great deal of pains,’ said he, ‘my friends, to no purpose, for I have not convinced our Crito that I shall fly from hence, and leave no part of me behind. Notwithstanding, Crito, if you can overtake me, wheresoever you get hold of me, bury me as you please: but believe me, none of you will be able to catch me when I have flown away from hence.’
That was excellently said, inasmuch as he allows his friend to do as he pleased, and yet shows his indifference about anything of this kind.
Diogenes was rougher, though of the same opinion; but in his character of a Cynic he expressed himself in a somewhat harsher manner; he ordered himself to be thrown anywhere without being buried. And when his friends replied, ‘What! to the birds and beasts?’ ‘By no means,’ said he; ‘place my staff near me, that I may drive them away.’ ‘How can you do that,’ they answer, ‘for you will not perceive them?’ ‘How am I then injured by being torn by those animals, if I have no sensation?’ …
With regard to the body, it is clear that, whether the soul live or die, it has no sensation.”
(Tusculan Disputations, I.43)
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SOCRATES: Now, Nicias, tell me – or rather, tell us, since Laches and I are sharing the discussion between us – your argument is that bravery is knowledge of what is fearful and what is encouraging, isn’t it?
NICIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And this isn’t something everyone is aware of … unless they supplement their own knowledge with this particular kind. Isn’t that what you said?
NICIAS: Yes, it was.
SOCRATES: So, it’s actually not something any pig would know, as the saying goes, and a pig couldn’t be brave.
NICIAS: No, I think not. …
SOCRATES: I think that if one puts forward this theory, one is forced to deny that any animal whatsoever is brave. …
NICIAS: ‘Brave’ is not a word I use to describe animals, or anything else that’s not afraid of danger because of its own lack of understanding; I prefer ‘fearless’ and ‘foolish.’ Or do you suppose I call every little child brave because it doesn’t understand, and so is not afraid of anything? No, I think to be unafraid and to be brave are two quite different things. Bravery and foresight are, in my opinion, things a very small number of people possess; whereas being reckless, daring, fearless and blind to consequences is the norm for the vast majority of men, women, children and animals. So you see, what you and most people call brave, I call reckless: brave actions are those coupled with wisdom, as I said.
(Laches, 196d-197e)
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“Away, then, with those follies, such as that it is miserable to die before our time. What time do you mean? That of nature? But she has only lent you life, as she might lend you money, without fixing any certain time for its repayment. Have you any grounds of complaint, then, that she recalls it at her pleasure? For you received it on these terms. …
Because there is nothing beyond old age, we call that long: all these things are said to be long or short, according to the proportion of time they were given us for.
Aristotle said there is a kind of insect near the river Hypanis, which runs from a certain part of Europe into the Pontus, whose life consists but of one day; those that die at the eighth hour die in full age; those who die when the sun sets are very old, especially when the days are at the longest.
Compare our longest life with eternity, and we shall be found almost as short-lived as those little animals.”
(Tusculan Disputations, I.39)
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“Those fortunes that turn out in the contrary way restrict and even ruin one’s blessedness, for they both inflict pains and impede many activities.
Nevertheless, even in the midst of these, nobility shines through, whenever someone bears up calmly under many great misfortunes, not because of any insensitivity to pain but because he is wellborn and great souled. …
For we suppose that someone who is truly good and sensible bears up under all fortunes in a becoming way and always does what is noblest given the circumstances, just as a good general makes use, with the greatest military skill, of the army he has. …
And if this is so, the happy person would never become wretched. … He would not be unstable and subject to reversals either, for he will not be easily moved from happiness, and then not by any random misfortunes but only by great and numerous ones.”
(Nicomachean Ethics, I.10)
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“It is to be expected, then, that we do not say that either a cow or a horse or any other animal is at all happy, for none of them are able to share in such an activity.
It is because of this too that a child is not happy either: he is not yet apt to do such things, on account of his age. …
As we said, both complete virtue and a complete life are required: many reversals and all manner of fortune arise in the course of life, and it is possible for someone who is particularly thriving to encounter great disasters in old age, just as the myth is told about Priam in the Trojan tales.
Nobody deems happy someone who deals with fortunes of that sort and comes to a wretched end.”
(Nicomachean Ethics, I.9)
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“The good Epicurean believes that certain events occur deterministically, that others are chance events, and that still others are in our own hands.
He sees also that necessity cannot be held morally responsible and that chance is an unpredictable thing, but that what is in our own hands, since it has no master, is naturally associated with blameworthiness and the opposite.
Actually it would be better to subscribe to the popular mythology than to become a slave by accepting the determinism of the natural philosophers, because popular religion underwrites the hope of supplicating the gods by offerings, but determinism contains an element of necessity, which is inexorable.”
(Letter to Menoeceus, II)
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“[Socrates] First of all, then, let’s try to say what bravery is, Laches; and after that we’ll investigate any ways of adding it to young men, in so far as it may be possible to do so by means of various activities and disciplines. So, as I say, try to put into words what bravery is.
[Laches] My word, Socrates, that’s not difficult! If a man is prepared to stand in the ranks, face up to the enemy and not run away, you can be sure that he’s brave. …
[Socrates] But what about another man, a man who still fights the enemy, but runs away and doesn’t make a stand?
[Laches] How do you mean, ‘runs away’?
[Socrates] Well, I suppose just like the Scythians are said to fight every bit as much in retreat as in pursuit. …
[Laches] Your point about the Scythians applies to cavalry – that’s the way cavalry go into action, but infantry operate as I described.
[Socrates] With the possible exception, Laches, of the Spartan infantry. At the battle of Plataea, so the story goes, the Spartans came up against the troops with wicker shields, but weren’t willing to stand and fight, and fell back. The Persians broke ranks in pursuit; but then the Spartans wheeled round fighting like cavalry and so won that part of the battle.
[Laches] That’s true.
[Socrates] Well, this is what I meant just now when I said it was my fault you didn’t give a proper answer, because I didn’t phrase the question properly; you see, I wanted to find out not just what it is to be brave as an infantryman, but also as a cavalryman, and as any kind of member of the forces; and not just what it is to be brave during a war, but to be brave in the face of danger at sea; and I wanted to find out what it is to be brave in the face of an illness, in the face of poverty, and in public life; and what’s more not just what it is to be brave in resisting pain or fear, but also in putting up stern opposition to temptation and indulgence – because I’m assuming, Laches, that there are people who are brave in all these situations.
[Laches] Very much so, Socrates.
[Socrates] … So try again, and tell me with respect to bravery first of all what the constant factor in all these situations is – or do you still not understand what I mean?”
(Laches, 190d-191d)
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“Happiness manifestly requires external goods in addition, just as we said. For it is impossible or not easy for someone without equipment to do what is noble: many things are done through instruments, as it were—through friends, wealth, and political power.
Those who are bereft of some of these (for example, good birth, good children, or beauty) disfigure their blessedness, for a person who is altogether ugly in appearance, or of poor birth, or solitary and childless cannot really be characterized as happy; and he is perhaps still less happy, if he should have altogether bad children or friends or, though he did have good ones, they are dead.
Just as we said, then, happiness seems to require some such external prosperity in addition.”
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1.8)
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“LACHES: I take courage to be a certain endurance present in one’s character, if I have to mention the element essentially present in all cases.
SOCRATES: Now, this is how it appears to me: by no means every kind of endurance, I think, can appear to you to be bravery. So endurance accompanied by wisdom would be both fine and good, wouldn’t it?
LACHES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But what of it when accompanied by foolishness? Surely it’s quite the opposite, damaging and detrimental?
LACHES: Yes.
SOCRATES: So, according to your account, wise endurance will be bravery.
LACHES: So it seems.
SOCRATES: Let’s see now: wise, but wise in what respect? Perhaps in every respect, great or small? Suppose, for instance, someone showed endurance in spending his money wisely, because he realized that if he spent it, he’d make a profit: would you call him brave?
LACHES: Good heavens, I certainly wouldn’t!
SOCRATES: Well then, suppose during a war a man showed endurance by being prepared to fight: he has calculated his chances wisely and realized that others will support him, and that he’ll be fighting an enemy outnumbered and outclassed by his own side, and that he has the stronger position – now, which would you say is the braver, the man showing endurance with the benefit of this kind of wisdom and these resources, or a man from the opposing camp willing to show endurance in standing against him?
LACHES: I’d say the man in the opposing camp, Socrates.
SOCRATES: But surely his endurance is more foolish than that of the other?
LACHES: Yes, you’re right.
SOCRATES: Now, we’ve previously shown that without knowledge endurance and daring are disgraceful and damaging, haven’t we?
LACHES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But now we’re claiming, on the contrary, that this disgraceful thing, endurance without knowledge, is bravery.
LACHES: Apparently so.
SOCRATES: Then do you think we’ve given a good account?
LACHES: Good heavens, Socrates, I certainly don’t. I’m not prepared to give up too soon, Socrates. I’m really annoyed because I can’t find the words to say what I’m thinking – I’m sure I can see what Bravery is, but somehow or other she has escaped me for the moment, so I can’t find the words to catch her and actually say what she is!
SOCRATES: Then do you mind if we invite Nicias here to join the hunt? He may be more resourceful than we are.
LACHES: Of course I don’t mind.
SOCRATES: Come on then, Nicias, your friends are floundering in a sea of words! We’ve got ourselves hopelessly confused, so you’d better give us some help, if there’s anything you can do. The hopelessness of our predicament is obvious; but if you tell us what you think bravery is, you’ll get us out of this hopeless state, and you’ll also confirm your own thoughts by putting them into words.”
(Laches, 192c-194c)
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“When I say that pleasure is the goal of living I do not mean the pleasures of libertines or the pleasures inherent in positive enjoyment, as is supposed by certain persons who are ignorant of our doctrine or who are not in agreement with it or who interpret it perversely.
I mean, on the contrary, the pleasure that consists in freedom from bodily pain and mental agitation. The pleasant life is not the product of one drinking party after another or of sexual intercourse with women and boys or of the seafood and other delicacies afforded by a luxurious table.
On the contrary, it is the result of sober thinking – namely, investigation of the reasons for every act of choice and aversion and elimination of those false ideas about the gods and death which are the chief source of mental disturbances.”
(Letter to Menoeceus, II)
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“But should we grant them even this, that people are by death deprived of good things; would it follow that the dead are therefore in need of the good things of life, and are miserable on that account? …
Can those who do not exist be in need of anything? To be in need of has a melancholy sound, because it in effect amounts to this — they had, but they have not; they regret, they look back upon, they want.
Such are, I suppose, the distresses of one who is in need of. Are they deprived of eyes? to be blind is misery. Are they destitute of children? not to have them is misery.
These considerations apply to the living, but the dead are neither in need of the blessings of life, nor of life itself. But when I am speaking of the dead, I am speaking of those who have no existence. …
‘To want,’ then, is an expression which you cannot apply to the dead. …
When such an expression is used respecting the dead, it is absolutely unintelligible. For to want implies to be sensible; but the dead are insensible: therefore, the dead can be in no want.”
(Tusculan Disputations, I.36)
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“Helvidius Priscus saw this, too, and acted on the insight.
When Vespasian told him not to attend a meeting of the Senate, he replied, ‘You have the power to disqualify me as a senator, but as long as I am one, I’m obliged to attend meetings.’
‘All right, then, attend the meeting,’ says Vespasian, ‘but don’t say anything.’ ‘Don’t ask me for my opinion and I’ll keep quiet.’
‘But I’m bound to ask you.’ ‘And I’m bound to say what seems right.’
‘But if you speak, I’ll have you killed.’ ‘Did I ever tell you that I was immortal? You do your job and I’ll do mine. Yours is to put me to death and mine to die fearlessly. Yours is to send me into exile and mine to leave without grieving.’”
(Discourses, 1.2.19)
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“The case of our friend Pompey was something better: once, when he had been very ill at Naples, the Neapolitans, on his recovery, put crowns on their heads, as did those of Puteoli; the people flocked from the country to congratulate him—it is a Grecian custom, and a foolish one; still, it is a sign of good fortune.
But the question is, had he died, would he have been taken from good, or from evil?
Certainly from evil. He would not have been engaged in a war with his father-in-law; he would not have taken up arms before he was prepared; he would not have left his own house, nor fled from Italy; he would not, after the loss of his army, have fallen unarmed into the hands of slaves, and been put to death by them; his children would not have been destroyed; nor would his whole fortune have come into the possession of the conquerors.
Did not he, then, who, if he had died at that time, would have died in all his glory, owe all the great and terrible misfortunes into which he subsequently fell to the prolongation of his life?”
(Tusculan Disputations, 1.35)
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